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Preface 
On 29 May 2014, Rachel Reeves MP, then Shadow Work and Pensions Secretary, launched 
an Independent Review of Retirement Income to look at how to boost defined contribution 
;DCͿ saǀeƌs͛ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe folloǁiŶg the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of the CoalitioŶ GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ peŶsioŶ ƌefoƌŵs aŶŶouŶĐed iŶ the 2014 Budget.  She invited Professor 
David Blake, Director of the Pensions Institute at Cass Business School, to lead the review, 
with Professor Debbie Harrison of the Pensions Institute as a senior consultant.  
The teƌŵs of ƌefeƌeŶĐe aƌe as folloǁs. ͚The Independent Review of Retirement Income will 
consider how to support a pensions market that works for all, retaining flexibility and choice 
on how savings are accessed and drawn down, while ensuring all savers, including those on 
low and modest incomes, are able to secure a decent and reliable retirement income.  
Specifically, this will include:  
 How to ensure that the workplace pension retirement products available to people 
are those best suited to ensure they have security and confidence in retirement  The support savers need to make the right choice at retirement for them and their 
family and how to build on the lessons of auto-enrolment  How savers can be helped to manage longevity risk  The role of the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) in helping savers to access 
good quality retirement products  The role of collective pension schemes and how these could be introduced in the 
UK͛. 
On 24 November 2014, the Review team issued a Consultation Paper containing 76 
questions. As part of the consultation process, we also held a number of meetings at which 
representatives of consumer groups, trade unions, scheme sponsors, providers, consultants, 
and fund managers participated. These meetings generated very useful feedback and we 
are also grateful to the participants in those meetings. They were held under Chatham 
House rules which means that the quotations we use from these meetings are 
unattributable. A summary of the feedback to the consultation paper has been prepared by 
Dr Edmund Cannon from Bristol University and a Fellow of the Pensions Institute. Again, the 
responses that we cite are unattributable. 
The Review team are members of the Pensions Institute, an independent academic research 
centre, based at Cass Business School. We believe that the subject of this Review is crucial 
to the long-term success of ďoth ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ aŶd auto-enrolment, the latter being 
a policy decision which has cross-party support. We agreed to undertake this study because 
we believe it is important to have pension schemes which generate good consumer 
outcomes in the face of the significant structural and social challenges facing people at 
retirement. The Report is independent and not party political. We would have undertaken 
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the same task had we been invited to do so by any other organisation. The Labour Party has 
not sought to influence the Report in any way. Our model for writing the Report was the 
Pension Commission and its two reports of 2004 and 2005.1 Nevertheless, we believe that 
this is the kind of report that the Government should have commissioned before 
introducing the pension reforms announced in the 2014 Budget.  
We used four sources of evidence gathering: published reports and surveys, individual 
interviews and panel session discussions, the responses to our consultation paper, and press 
articles. In total, we reviewed around 100 reports and surveys, read more than 2,000 press 
articles, and had discussions with around 100 people. In addition, 30 individuals and 
organisations kindly responded to our Consultation Paper. We are grateful to all the 
individuals and organisations that have directly and indirectly helped us to prepare this 
Report. We would particularly like to thank the pensions journalists whose articles 
summarising the often turbulent developments in the UK pensions market over the last 18 
months have been invaluable to us: they allowed us to listen in on the fascinating 
conversations taking place in the pensions industry during this period. However, we absolve 
all these people and organisations from any responsibility for the contents of this Report. 
In terms of the Report͛s structure, the early sections of each Chapter are used to assemble 
the relevant facts, arguments and industry views. These are followed by a section 
summarising the specific feedback we received from our interviews and the consultation. 
The final section of each Chapter is used to provide an analysis and recommendations. The 
vast amount of material that we sifted through and the discussions that we had enabled us 
to identify themes and patterns in industry practice, regulatory pronouncements and 
political decision making which both informed our analysis and guided our 
recommendations.  There is also a separate Executive Summary of the Report. 
I would like to thank: Professor Debbie Harrison for conducting a significant amount of the 
background research and interviews and for commenting on early drafts of the Report, Tom 
Boardman (Visiting Professor at the Pensions Institute) for commenting on early drafts of 
the Report, Dr Edmund Cannon (of Bristol University and a Fellow of the Pensions Institute) 
for preparing a summary of the feedback to the Consultation Paper, and Professor Kevin 
Dowd (of Durham University Business School and a Visiting Professor of the Pensions 
Institute) for preparing the illustrations of drawdown withdrawal strategies using the 
                                                     
1
 U.K. Pensions Commission 2004, Pensions: Challenges and Choices: The First Report of the Pensions 
Commission, TSO, London. 
(image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Money/documents/2005/05/17/fullreport.pdf); 
U.K. Pensions Commission 2005, A New Pension Settlement for the Twenty-First Century: The Second Report of 
the Pensions Commission, TSO, London. 
(webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2005/pensionscommreport/
main-report.pdf) 
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PensionMetrics software. I have tried to check all the facts as well as I can and I apologise 
for any errors that remain. 
The Report uses the following terms interchangeably: saver, investor, consumer, scheme 
member, client, customer, policyholder and individual. We also need to recognise that the 
pensions world is one of constant change. Even an organisation as longstanding as the 
National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) has decided that it needs a new name and in 
October 2015 rebranded as the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association (PLSA). However, 
for most of this Report, it will still be referred to by its original name. Constant change is a 
feature of pension policy and regulation. This Report was finalised in mid-February 2016 and 
does not take into account developments after this point. 
The overarching question that the Report seeks to address is this: What is the best way for 
the private-sector DC pension system to reconcile the fundamental principle of auto-
enrolment during accumulation – the success of which is predicated on member inertia – 
ǁith ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ duƌiŶg deĐuŵulatioŶ – the success of which is predicated on the 
ability of members to make informed decisions?  
The Report, despite at times being critical, is intended to be helpful and constructive. It is 
also intended to start a debate on the future of retirement income provision in the UK 
folloǁiŶg the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛. We look forward to participating in this 
debate. 
Professor David Blake 
Director, Pensions Institute 
Cass Business School 
London 
 March 2016 
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ERISA Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority 
ETF Exchange Traded Fund 
ETV Enhanced Transfer Value 
FAD Flexi-Access Drawdown 
FAMR Financial Advice Market Review  
FCA Financial Conduct Authority 
FMF Fund Management Fee 
FOI Freedom of Information 
FOS Financial Ombudsman Service 
FPW Fƌee Paƌtial Withdƌaǁal 
FRN Firm Reference Number 
FSCS Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
FTA Fixed Term Annuity 
GAA Governance Advisory Arrangement 
GAD  Government AĐtuaƌǇ͛s DepaƌtŵeŶt 
GAR Guaranteed Annuity Rates 
GMAB GuaƌaŶteed MiŶiŵuŵ AĐĐuŵulatioŶ BeŶefit 
GMDB GuaƌaŶteed MiŶiŵuŵ Death BeŶefit 
GMIB GuaƌaŶteed MiŶiŵuŵ IŶĐoŵe BeŶefit 
GMSB Guaranteed Minimum Surrender Benefit 
GMWB GuaƌaŶteed MiŶiŵuŵ Withdƌaǁal BeŶefit 
GPP Group Personal Pension 
HMRC Heƌ MajestǇ͛s ‘eǀeŶue AŶd Custoŵs 
HNW High Net Worth 
HR Human Resources 
IA Investment Association 
IBA Investment-Backed Annuity 
ICAEW Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales 
ICO IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe  
IFA  Independent Financial Adviser 
IFISA Innovative Finance ISA 
IFoA Institute and Faculty of Actuaries 
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IFS Institute for Fiscal Studies 
IGC  Independent Governance Committee 
IHT Inheritance Tax 
ILA Index-Linked Annuity 
IORP Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision 
IRA Independent Retirement Account 
ISA Independent Savings Account 
ISO International Standards Organization 
KFD Key Features Document 
KIID Key Investor Information Document 
LIA Longevity Insurance Annuity 
LPA Lasting Power of Attorney 
LPC Low Pay Commission 
LPI Limited Price Indexation 
LTA Life-Time Annuity 
LTB Last-Time Buyer 
LTC Long-Term Care 
MAF Master Trust Assurance Framework 
MAS Money Advice Service 
MBG Money Back Guarantee 
MIFID   Markets In Financial Instruments Directive (Directive 2004/39/EC) 
MIR Minimum Income Requirement 
MPAA Money Purchase Annual Allowance 
MPC Monetary Policy Committee 
MPT Modern Portfolio Theory 
MVA Market Value Adjustment 
MW MoŶeǇ͛s Woƌth 
NAPF National Association of Pension Funds 
NDPB Non-Departmental Public Body 
NEST National Employment Savings Trust 
NICs National Insurance Contributions 
NS&I   National Savings & Investment 
NURS Non-UCITS Retail Scheme 
OBR Office for Budget Responsibility 
OCF Ongoing Charges Figure 
OFT Office of Fair Trading  
OIR Office for Inter-Generational Responsibility 
OMO Open Market Option 
ONS Office for National Statistics 
P2P Peer-to-Peer 
PAYG Pay-As-You-Go 
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PHSO Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman 
PIB Pension Income Builder 
PIE Pension Increase Exchange 
PLA Purchased Life Annuity 
PLSA Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association 
PO Pensions Ombudsman 
PPI Pensions Policy Institute or Payment Protection Insurance 
PRA Prudential Regulatory Authority 
PRIIPs Packaged Retail and Insurance-Based Investment Products 
PTS Pension Transfer Specialist 
QPP Quebec Pension Plan 
QROPS Qualifying Recognised Overseas Pension Scheme 
RAO Regulated Activities Order 
RAS Resource Allocation System 
‘CLA ‘uiŶ-CoŶtiŶgeŶt Life AŶŶuitǇ 
RDR Retail Distribution Review 
RII Retirement Income Insurance 
RPI Retail Price Index 
RSA Royal Society of Arts 
RSS Retirement Saver Service 
S2P Second State Pension 
SAFE Secure, Accessible, Flexible, and Efficient 
SAYE Save As You Earn 
SERPS State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme 
SHIP Safe Home Income Plan 
SIPP Self-Invested Personal Pension Scheme 
SPA State Pension Age 
SRPP Shared-Risk Pension Plan 
SSC Strategic Society Centre 
SWR Safe (Sensible or Sustainable) Withdrawal Rate 
TB Target Benefit 
TCF Treating Customers Fairly 
TDF Target Date Fund 
TEE Taxed-Exempt-Exempt 
TER Total Expense Ratio 
TIPS Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities 
TISA Tax Incentivised Savings Association 
TPA Third-Party Administrator 
TPAS The Pension Advisory Service 
TPR The Pensions Regulator 
TSIP The Savings and Investments Policy Project 
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TUC Trades Union Congress 
TV Transfer Value 
UC Universal Credit 
UCIS Unregulated Collective Investment Scheme 
UCITS Undertakings for the Collective Investment of Transferable Securities 
UFPLS Uncrystallised Fund Pension Lump Sum 
VA Variable Annuity 
WGA Whole of Government Accounts 
WPAs With-Profits Annuities 
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Recommendations of the Independent Review of Retirement income 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Recommendation 1.1: Criteria for a good DC pension scheme 
We recommend that scheme providers should be required to demonstrate to scheme trustee 
(or governance) committees and to regulators how their schemes provide good outcomes for 
members in terms of the following criteria: 
 Delivers adequate and sustainable pensions; by sustainable, we mean having support 
mechanisms in place that help people not to spend their pension fund too quickly 
after retirement  Produces stable and predictable lifelong retirement incomes, even if those incomes 
cannot be guaranteed (unless a lifetime annuity is purchased)  Offers the flexibility to purchase a lifetime annuity at any time (or at regular 
predetermined intervals)  Has the fleǆiďilitǇ foƌ ŵeŵďeƌs to ǁithdƌaǁ fuŶds to ŵeet ͚luŵpǇ͛ eǆpeŶses, suĐh as 
the cost of a new boiler  Provides an investment strategy that reflects the scheme ŵeŵďeƌ͛s attitude to aŶd 
capacity to take risk, and generates a return at least as high as inflation  Provides value for money for every pound saved in the scheme  Has transparent charges and costs  Provides reliable and efficient administration  Delivers effective communications to members  Protects scheme assets from fraud or theft  Has minimum quality standards in terms of operational efficiency, charges and 
goǀeƌŶaŶĐe ǁith a dutǇ ďǇ the goǀeƌŶaŶĐe Đoŵŵittee to aĐt iŶ ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ďest 
interests. 
Recommendation 1.2: Explaining key risks involved in the generation of retirement income 
from pension savings 
We recommend that scheme providers should be required to explain to scheme trustee (or 
governance) committees (and where possible to members) the following key risks in 
retirement income provision and how their scheme deals with these risks: 
 Contribution risk  – The risk that pension contributions (and hence pension savings) 
are lower than planned, e.g., because the scheme member becomes unemployed, is 
unable to work due to ill health, or is unable to pay off their debts  Retirement timing risk – Uncertainty about when the scheme member will retire 
and/or begin to make withdrawals 
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 Product choice risk – Uncertainty about how the scheme member will make 
withdrawals, not least because of the very large set of choices now available   Investment risk – The risk that investment performance is worse than expected or the 
risk that investments do not generate incomes in a way that matches the desired 
pattern of consumption in retirement. A particularly important example of 
investment risk is sequence-of-returns risk  Inflation risk – The risk that inflation is higher than anticipated  Interest rate risk – The risk that interest rates are low at the point of annuity 
purchase  Longevity risk – The risk that individual savers live longer than their life expectancy 
(i.e., idiosyncratic longevity risk) and the risk that savers as a whole live longer than 
anticipated (i.e., systematic or aggregate longevity risk)  Cost risk – The risk that the total costs of running the pension scheme during 
accumulation and decumulation are higher than expected or understood  Political risk – The risk that the Government changes the rules in an adverse way 
(e.g., reduces the level of tax relief)  Regulatory risk – The risk that regulations change in an adverse way (e.g., the 
regulator increases regulatory capital requirements, which has the effect of reducing 
annuity rates)  Demographic/cultural risk – The risk that younger cohorts refuse or are unable to 
honour the implicit intergenerational contract that underlies many pension schemes. 
For example, the next generation of workers refuses – or is unable – to pay the 
pensions the retired generation expects to receive, because they are unwilling to 
honour the implicit contract or because there are too few of them in relation to the 
size of the retired population. Also, an arrangement that works in one culture (e.g., 
Holland) might not work in another (e.g., the UK)  Market conduct risk – The risk that those who provide services to the scheme act in a 
way that disadvantages scheme members (e.g., investment managers subject to a 
charge cap negate the effects of the charge cap by increasing portfolio turnover, or 
the benefits of economies of scale go to scheme provideƌs͛ shaƌeholdeƌs ƌatheƌ thaŶ 
to members); fraud and the activities of scammers would be included here  Behavioural risk – The risk that scheme members behave in a way that is not 
considered to be rational (i.e., is not in their long-term interests, since they make 
short-term decisions that they subsequently regret and are unable to learn from past 
mistakes). Inertia and lack of engagement would be included here, as would be the 
risk that members fail to understand the risks they face  Financial knowledge and understanding risk – The ƌisk that a ŵeŵďeƌ͛s fiŶaŶĐial 
knowledge and understanding are insufficient for the member ever to make an 
͚iŶfoƌŵed͛ ĐhoiĐe 
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 Mental impairment risk – The ƌisk that a sĐheŵe ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ŵeŶtal faĐulties aƌe 
reduced due to the onset of dementia, for example.  
Chapter 2. How to ensure that savers can get the best products in retirement  
Recommendation 2.1: Implementing the retirement financial strategy  
We recommend that providers offering retirement income solutions make clear to customers 
hoǁ theiƌ solutioŶs foƌ iŵpleŵeŶtiŶg the Đustoŵeƌ͛s ƌetiƌeŵeŶt fiŶaŶĐial stƌategǇ – 
comprising an investment strategy, a withdrawal strategy, and a longevity insurance 
strategy – make use of products that offer: 
 Accessibility – the degree of flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis  Inflation protection, either directly or via investment performance, with minimal 
involvement by individuals who do not want to manage the investment risk  Longevity insurance. 
We recognise that there may be important differences in implementation strategy and 
disclosure requirements, depending on the distribution channel, i.e., these will be different 
where a customer pays a fee for a personal recommendation – selected from the retail 
pƌoduĐt ŵaƌket aŶd ďased oŶ aŶ adǀiseƌ͛s uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the Đustoŵeƌ͛s Đoŵplete 
financial position/objectives – and where a trustee (or governance) committee offers a 
decumulation product to auto-enrolled members (which might also be via a default or 
default pathway). It is also important to bear in mind that many customers in the mass 
market may not have a clear retirement financial strategy. 
Recommendation 2.2: Terminology  
We recommend that the pensions industry reviews the terminology it uses in order to both 
modernise the language and bring greater clarity to customers. In particular: 
 Arrangements which do not involve longevity insurance should not be allowed to call 
theŵselǀes ͚peŶsioŶ sĐheŵes͛, ďut should ďe ƌeƋuiƌed to use aŶotheƌ Ŷaŵe, suĐh as 
͚dƌaǁdoǁŶ ŵaŶageŵeŶt sĐheŵes͛. The teƌŵ ͚peŶsioŶ sĐheŵe͛ should ďe a pƌoteĐted 
name  AŶŶuities should ďe ƌeďƌaŶded as ͚guaƌaŶteed iŶĐoŵe foƌ life pƌoduĐts͛, aŶd deferred 
annuities Ŷeed to ďe ƌeďƌaŶded as ͚loŶgeǀitǇ iŶsuƌaŶĐe͛  Arrangements which do not involve longevity insurance should be classified as 
complex and high risk from a regulatory standpoint. 
Recommendation 2.3: Criteria for granting safe harbour status to key retirement income 
products 
We recommend that regulators agree a set of criteria for granting safe harbour status to key 
retirement income products. Providers and advisers could not subsequently be sued for 
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offering or recommending a safe harbour product, having first determined its suitability for a 
client as part of a safe harbour retirement income solution. 
We recommend the following criteria are used to do this: 
 Design and construction – There needs to be a much clearer picture of how products 
are designed and constructed, especially if they involve guarantees. For example, if 
the guarantees are hedged with options, there needs to be clarity over whether the 
options are exchange traded or over-the-counter and, if the latter, the nature of the 
counter-parties involved. It is also critically important that the charges, particularly 
for guarantees, are not excessive  Investment strategy – It needs to be made clear how the investment strategy meets 
the aims claimed for the product. The circumstances under which the investment 
strategy might fail to meet these aims also needs to be specified  Projected real returns – Providers of drawdown products should present stochastic 
projections of the range of likely real outcomes (i.e., income adjusted for inflation 
aŶd total Đhaƌges aŶd ĐostsͿ that theiƌ pƌoduĐts Đould deliǀeƌ ďased oŶ the pƌoduĐt͛s 
underlying investment strategy  Accessibility – The degree of flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis  Longevity protection – The degree of longevity protection afforded by the product, 
illustrated by the probability of running out of money at different ages for a range of 
possible withdrawal strategies. Also included here will be the impact of the amount, 
if any, paid on death  Value for money – The benefits and costs of the product need to be clearly stated and 
the balance between them assessed.  
The regulator should establish minimum standards for each of these criteria. Any product 
satisfying these minimum standards could be classified as a safe harbour product. As part of 
the process of product regulation, a product rating service should be established to assess 
whether products satisfy the minimum standards. 
Recommendation 2.4: Modelling outcomes for different retirement income products 
As indicated in Recommendation 2.3, an important aspect of product design and 
construction is modelling outcomes. We recommend that: 
 The use of deterministic projections of the returns on products should be banned  They should be replaced with stochastic projections that take into account important 
real world issues, such as sequence-of-returns risk, inflation, and transactions costs in 
dynamic investment strategies  There should be a commonly agreed parameterisation for the stochastic projection 
ŵodel used, i.e., a ͚staŶdaƌd ŵodel͛ should ďe deǀeloped 
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 There should be a commonly agreed set of good practice principles for modelling the 
outcomes from retirement income products. 
As iŶ the Đase of “olǀeŶĐǇ II, pƌoduĐt desigŶeƌs ǁould ďe fƌee to use aŶ ͚iŶteƌŶal ŵodel͛, so 
long as they explained the differences between this and the standard model. 
Recommendation 2.5: Establishing a metric for measuring product value for money 
We recommend that the regulator establishes a metric for measuring product value for 
money that would: 
 Reflect the benefits and costs of the product and the balance between them  Reflect key risks  Have credibility and transparency  Be clear, simple, difficult to dispute and difficult to manipulate (i.e., avoid room for 
gaming the process). 
An example of such a metric would be the ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth ;MWͿ of a pƌoduĐt, ǁhiĐh is the 
ratio of the expected present value of payouts on the product to the price, with due 
allowance made for the greater flexibilities of some products in terms of accessibility and 
death benefits. The MW of a product could be measured relative to the benchmark 
provided by a lifetime annuity. Similarly, the risk of a product could be expressed in terms of 
the likelihood of a potential shortfall relative to a lifetime annuity. 
Recommendation 2.6:  Measuring and reporting charges and other costs 
We recommend that: 
 A standardised method for measuring the charges (and other costs) for all retirement 
income products is introduced. The measure should cover all the costs borne by the 
customer either directly or indirectly, including operational (administration) costs, 
fund management (including transaction and guarantee) costs, and delivery 
(platform) costs  A standardised method for reporting the charges (and other costs) for all retirement 
income products is introduced.  
Chaƌges aƌe a keǇ aspeĐt of a pƌoduĐt͛s ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁorth. They could be reported in the form 
of ďoth a ͚ƌate of Đhaƌge͛ – which could then be deducted from the gross rate of return to 
give a net rate of return – and as a monetary amount – which can then be compared with 
the ŵoŶetaƌǇ ǀalue of the Đustoŵeƌ͛s fund. 
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Recommendation 2.7: Candidate products for safe harbour status 
Subject to meeting Recommendations 2.3 – 2.6 and to meeting suitability requirements, we 
recommend that the regulator grants safe harbour status to the following products used to 
provide retirement income: 
 In the annuities class:  
o Lifetime annuities (with/without capital protection) – fixed and inflation-
linked 
o Investment-linked annuities (with a minimum income underpin and 
with/without capital protection) 
o Enhanced annuities  In the drawdown class: 
o Capped drawdown (with a minimum income underpin)  In the hybrid class: 
o Variable annuities (with a minimum income underpin) 
o Guaranteed drawdown (with a minimum income underpin). 
It is important that there is full transparency over the product design and over charges for 
each of the above products – and that the charges are demonstrably not excessive. 
Recommendation 2.8: Provider regulation and the economics of both institutional 
solutions and retail retirement income solutions 
We recommend that the regulator: 
 Aligns provider regulation with Recommendations 2.1 – 2.7  Reviews the economics of both institutional solutions and retail retirement income 
solutions, and   Encourages the use of institutional solutions over retail solutions where it can be 
demonstrated that these provide better value. 
Recommendation 2.9: Capping charges 
We recommend that, in due course, a charge cap should be imposed on a simple default 
decumulation product. The regulator should undertake preliminary work on what a 
reasonable level for the charge cap would be. 
At a minimum, the following should be included in any cap: 
 The total expense ratio or ongoing charges figure on the default investment strategy 
(including the costs of any guarantees)  Transactions costs (what is covered to be agreed)  Cost per ad hoc withdrawal subject to a maximum number of withdrawals. 
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The following additional costs would apply to any cap for retail drawdown: 
 Platform charge  Adviser fee if any. 
We do not have a view on the size of the charge cap or when it should be introduced. 
However, if there is little further evidence of innovation, there would be little point in 
delaying its introduction. Of course, products outside the decumulation default would not be 
subject to a charge cap. 
Recommendation 2.10: Stranded pots 
We recommend that the Government investigates the feasibility of introducing one the 
following two models for dealing with the issue of stranded pots: a) the aggregator model 
and b) the scheme-follows-member or the one-member, one-scheme model.   
While both have disadvantages (principally switching costs and the requirement for a central 
clearing house, respectively), they are both consistent with a transition of the UK pension 
system towards a small number of large trust-based schemes – which might be the natural 
outcome of the auto-enrolment process, an outcome that the Government should 
encourage.  
The pause on dealing with this issue, announced by the Government in October 2015, gives 
the Government an opportunity to completely rethink the problem of stranded pots. 
Chapter 3. Supporting savers to make the right choice at retirement for them and their 
family and how to build on the lessons of auto-enrolment 
Recommendation 3.1: Safe harbour retirement income plans 
We recommend that a quasi-default retirement income plan is designed and used by 
providers and advisers. This will involve a simple decision tree and a limited set of default 
pathways. The plan would be self-started following a guidance or advice surgery, and the 
plan member has the right to opt out until the point at which the longevity insurance kicks 
in.   
The guidance or advice surgery needs to collect information on: 
 pension pot size  other sources of lifelong income (especially any state and defined benefit pensions)  other sources of wealth (such as housing equity)  liabilities (e.g., mortgage, credit card debts)  health status  family circumstances, including bequest intentions  
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 given other income sources, health status and family circumstances, decide the levels 
of expenditure that are considered essential, adequate and desired  tax position  risk attitude  risk capacity. 
The plan could be operated by a provider or an adviser. Two forms of the plan would be 
acceptable: 
 drawdown plus a deferred annuity, or  layering – fiƌst seĐuƌe esseŶtial life loŶg eǆpeŶdituƌe ;͚heatiŶg aŶd eatiŶg͛Ϳ, theŶ 
allow for luxuries.  
The plan must allow for:  
 access – the flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis  inflation protection (either directly or via investment performance), and   longevity insurance. 
The customer will choose from a set of safe harbour products approved by the regulator. The 
purpose of the decision tree is to identify the products that are most suitable for meeting the 
Đustoŵeƌ͛s Ŷeeds. To ďe feasiďle, any default pathway using a decision tree would need to 
be aligned with the guidance guarantee process in a way that it is not classified as regulated 
advice or a personal recommendation. This is because a decision tree is advisory – not advice 
– and so would be granted safe harbour status. Any adviser or provider making use of such a 
retirement income plan would be protected against future mis-selling claims.  
A ǁhole ƌaŶge of pƌoďleŵs that eŵeƌged duƌiŶg the eaƌlǇ ŵoŶths of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ 
can be overcome by using such a default, e.g., lack of financial engagement and capability by 
members, ineffective communications, and scammers. 
Recommendation 3.2: Simplifying the definitions of information, guidance and advice 
We recommend that the Financial Conduct Authority: 
 reviews its multiple definitions of information, guidance and advice with a view to 
ƌeplaĐiŶg theŵ ǁith just tǁo Đategoƌies: ͚peƌsoŶal ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ͛ aŶd ͚fiŶaŶĐial 
help͛, ǁith the latteƌ ƌeplaĐing everything that is not full regulated fee-based advice 
where the adviser takes responsibility for the personal recommendation  recognises that a quasi-default deĐuŵulatioŶ stƌategǇ is ͚adǀisoƌǇ͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ 
͚adǀiĐe͛ aŶd that adǀiseƌs aŶd pƌoǀideƌs should ďe aďle to eǆplaiŶ the Ƌuasi-default 
decumulation strategy and assess suitability without this being classified as 
regulated advice. 
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The simplest solution involves only three routes: 
 execution-only – the Đustoŵeƌ ŵakes all the deĐisioŶs ;͚I ǁaŶt to do it ŵǇself͛Ϳ  ͚fiŶaŶĐial help͛ – the customer is helped or steered towards tailored options using a 
deĐisioŶ tƌee; ďut this is ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ Đlassified as adǀiĐe ;͚Help ŵe do it͛Ϳ  peƌsoŶal ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ oƌ full ƌegulated adǀiĐe ;͚Do it foƌ ŵe͛Ϳ 
It is also important to recognise that guidance and advice cannot be a single event, but has 
to be a process. There needs to be periodic financial health checks or just simple reminders: 
 10 years prior to the nominated retirement date to confirm whether a de-risking 
glidepath is required and, if so, when it needs to begin  1 year prior to the nominated retirement date to re-confirm commencement date  at age 74 to review death benefits  at ages 80 and 85 to confirm implementation of longevity insurance (i.e., the switch 
to annuitisation if drawdown was used at the beginning of retirement). 
Recommendation 3.3: Appropriate segmentation of the advice market 
We recommend that: 
 an attempt is made to segment the advice market in a way that would be helpful to 
consumers. There are a number of ways of doing this, e.g.: 
o by level of assets – Is theƌe a leǀel of a ssets ďeloǁ ǁhiĐh ͚fiŶaŶĐial help͛ aloŶe 
will be adequate (for most people) and above which full regulated advice is 
recommended?   
o by spending type – Aƌe theƌe speŶdiŶg tǇpes foƌ ǁhoŵ ͚fiŶaŶĐial help͛ aloŶe 
will be adequate and are there spending types for whom full regulated advice 
is recommended? 
o ďǇ ďehaǀiouƌal tǇpe, e.g., ͚eĐoŶ͛ oƌ ͚huŵaŶ͛. Econs only need information in 
order to make informed decisions. Humans face behavioural barriers and 
biases which need to be identified early on (e.g., low levels of financial 
literacy, overconfidence, and self-control and hyperbolic discounting 
problems). Are there simple nudges that would improve effective decision 
making by humans, such as:   help   What do ͚people like ŵe͛ do?  advice (simple and targeted)?  an attempt is made to agree on: 
o the appropriate level of help or advice for each market segment 
o the appropriate role of technology (e.g., robo-advice) for each market 
segment. 
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The service in economy class is broadly similar across different commercial airlines and the 
same is true for business class and first class. Millions of people are content with this simple 
classification. WhǇ ĐaŶ͛t the fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe ŵaƌket ďe segŵeŶted iŶ a siŵilaƌ ǁaǇ? 
Recommendation 3.4: Turning financial advisers into a recognised profession 
We recommend that financial advisers undertake a review of their industry with a view to 
transforming themselves into a recognised profession. The following issues would be covered 
in the review: 
 formalising and improving the professional (including training) standards of advisers  introducing a fiduciary standard for financial advisers who provide full regulated 
advice  the appropriate charging model for the service offered (fixed fee or percentage of 
assets), with the charges demonstrably delivering value for money to the customer 
and with full transparency over charges. 
Financial advisers are not a recognised profession, yet they wish to provide advice on 
billions of pounds of UK retirement savings. Further, research by the FCA shows that 
customers are put off seeking financial advice because they are unable to trust the advice 
they receive or judge its quality. The obvious solution is to transform themselves into a 
recognised profession. They should continue to improve their professional standards, 
accepting that the advice market might be smaller, although more profitable as a result. In 
particular, the professional training of advisers should be improved, with a much greater 
emphasis on understanding the risks involved in delivering retirement income solutions and 
how those risks can be measured, monitored and managed.   
Advisers should also consider introducing a fiduciary standard for those who provide full 
regulated advice, as in starting in the US. This requiƌes adǀiseƌs to aĐt solelǇ iŶ theiƌ ĐlieŶts͛ 
best interests. 
The current disparate views expressed by the industry on both the nature of the service 
offeƌed ;ƌaŶgiŶg fƌoŵ ͚eǀeƌǇoŶe Ŷeeds ďespoke adǀiĐe͛ to ͚adǀiĐe is oŶlǇ ŶeĐessaƌǇ foƌ the 
ǀeƌǇ ǁell off͛) and the charging model (fixed hourly rate vs percent-of-assets) is not helpful 
to consumers or in the long-term interests of advisers. We need a common national 
narrative on both these issues, bearing in mind that surveys show that most consumers are 
not currently prepared to pay very much for advice, because they do not place much value 
on it.  
In terms of adviser fees, there needs to be much greater justification of ad valorem fees 
where the fee is unrelated to the amount of work done. Such fees are now very uncommon 
in most other types of professional services organisations. Charges also need to be 
transparent and easy to understand. It is not acceptable in this day and age that a potential 
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client needs to have a long face-to-face meeting with an adviser before they are told what 
the charge will be, and then feel under some moral pressure to accept this charge. 
Recommendation 3.5: Review of the unresolved implementation challenges of the pension 
reforms  
We recommend that the Financial Conduct Authority: 
 reviews the circumstances where mandatory advice is necessary  Đlaƌifies the legal ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes foƌ Đustoŵeƌs, adǀiseƌs aŶd pƌoǀideƌs ǁheŶ ͚iŶsisteŶt 
ĐlieŶts͛ aĐt agaiŶst adǀiĐe. 
We support proposals, made by the ABI and others, to deal with the remaining 
implementation challenges of the pension reforms.  
Recommendation 3.6: Review of the powers of independent governance committees  
We recommend that the Government reviews the powers of independent governance 
committees (IGCs) in contract-based schemes with a view to making them equivalent to the 
powers of trustees in trust-based schemes.  
This essentially means giving IGCs a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of scheme 
members. For example, IGCs should be given the power to fire an underperforming fund 
ŵaŶageƌ ǁithout ƌeƋuiƌiŶg the ŵeŵďeƌs͛ eǆpƌess ĐoŶseŶt. 
Recommendation 3.7: Dealing with pension fraud and investment scams 
We recommend the following measures are taken to deal with the problems of pension 
fraud and investment scams: 
 all financial product sales (covering both regulated and unregulated products) should 
be brought under a common regulatory umbrella  telemarketing (cold-calling) should be made illegal  penalties for pension fraud and investment scams should be greatly increased.  
There can be no hiding place for pension fraudsters and investment scammers. 
Recommendation 3.8: Customer responsibility  
We recommend that the Government initiates a national debate amongst relevant 
stakeholders on the appropriate degree of customer responsibility and what industry and 
regulators need to do before consumers can reasonably become liable for their decisions in 
retirement. 
Associated with this should be attempts to improve customer engagement via better 
customer communications. 
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Recommendation 3.9: IŶtroduĐtioŶ of aŶ ͚early ǁarŶiŶg systeŵ͛ to help retirees 
We recommend that the Government introduces the following measures to support 
consumers as soon as possible: 
 a ͚peŶsioŶs dashďoaƌd͛  ͚peƌsoŶal peŶsioŶ aleƌts͛ to help poliĐǇŵakeƌs iŶteƌǀeŶe ǁheƌe appƌopƌiate ǁith the 
sub-groups it has identified as at particularly high risk.  
We suppoƌt the ǀaƌious pƌoposals that haǀe ďeeŶ ŵade to deǀelop a ͚peŶsioŶs dashďoaƌd͛ 
that would enable consumers to view all their lifetime pension savings (including their state 
pension) in one place. In the past, this idea has been dismissed as too much of a 
technological challenge, given the multiple data bases that this information is held on, but 
we understand that the technology is now available to do this. 
We also suppoƌt the pƌoposal foƌ iŶtƌoduĐiŶg ͚peƌsoŶal peŶsioŶ aleƌts͛, deǀeloped ďǇ the 
“oĐial Maƌket FouŶdatioŶ, ǁhiĐh ǁould eŶaďle poteŶtial iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs, suĐh as ͚taƌgeted 
support and advice; initiatives to make retirees think twice before taking one-off decisions 
suĐh as ǁithdƌaǁiŶg all theiƌ peŶsioŶ saǀiŶgs; aŶd, a ͞ŵid-ƌetiƌeŵeŶt fiŶaŶĐial health ĐheĐk͟ 
to encourage older people to reconsider their financial position for their later yeaƌs͛. 
Recommendation 3.10: Monitoring outcomes 
We recommend that the Government puts in place a monitoring mechanism to assess the 
suĐĐess of the ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ peŶsioŶ ƌefoƌŵs. This should ďe ďeŶĐhŵaƌked agaiŶst 
the criteria for a good pension scheme listed in Recommendation 1.1 and Table 1.1. 
Data should be collected from sources such as Pension Wise, the ABI, the FCA and HMRC.  
Focus groups should be established to discuss their experience. We support the Work and 
PeŶsioŶs “eleĐt Coŵŵittee͛s ƌeƋuest foƌ ďetteƌ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ oŶ: ͚Đustoŵeƌ ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs of 
those using freedoms from pot size to sources of retirement income; take-up of each 
channel of guidance; reasons for not taking up guidance and advice; subsequent decisions 
made and reasons for those deĐisioŶs͛. 
Recommendation 3.11: The annuities market 
We recommend: 
 The  sale of immediate annuities should be via an auction  The Government should facilitate and encourage the development of a market in 
deferred annuities.  
The first point deals with the pƌoďleŵ ideŶtified ďǇ the FCA iŶ ϮϬϭϰ, ŶaŵelǇ ͚ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ 
tendency to buy from their existing pension provider [which] weakens competitive 
discipline. Not only do incumbent providers feel less pressure to offer competitive vesting 
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rates, but challengers find it difficult to attract a critical mass of consumers. As a result, 
theƌe has ďeeŶ liŵited Ŷeǁ eŶtƌǇ iŶto the deĐuŵulatioŶ ŵaƌket iŶ ƌeĐeŶt Ǉeaƌs͛. It is also 
likely that these annuities will be medically underwritten, i.e., applicants have to fill in a 
medical questionnaire which asks health and lifestyle questions. 
The second point attempts to address the problem that an open market in deferred 
annuities does not exist in the UK, yet is essential to provide the longevity insurance needed 
for the decumulation default to work (see Recommendation 3.1). The various reasons why 
a deferred annuity market does not exist (e.g., onerous regulatory capital requirements 
under Solvency II) need to be addressed. 
Recommendation 3.12: The self-employed and non-eligible job holders for auto-enrolment  
We recommend that the Government: 
 considers revising the qualification for auto-eŶƌolŵeŶt fƌoŵ a ͚peƌ joď͛ ďasis to aŶ 
͚ĐoŵďiŶed joďs͛ ďasis  begins to collect more reliable information on the pension arrangements of the self-
employed and non-eligible job holders for auto-enrolment  investigates the possibility of establishing a Government-backed arrangement (like 
an ISA) to help these groups save for their retirement  considers how to help these groups draw a retirement income in a cost-effective 
manner. 
The combined size of these two groups is significant: 4.5m self-employed people (17% of the 
employed population) and 6.2m non-eligible job holders (24% of the employed population), 
implying that around 11m people working in the UK will not be auto-enrolled onto any 
pension scheme.  
The qualification for auto-eŶƌolŵeŶt is assessed oŶ a ͚peƌ joď͛ ďasis, ǁhiĐh iŵplies that 
individuals with a number of low-paid jobs will be excluded from auto-enrolment onto a 
pension scheme. The PPI estiŵates that ͚if the iŶĐoŵe from both first and second jobs was 
taken into account when assessing eligibility for automatic enrolment, then a further 80,000 
people ;ϲϬ,ϬϬϬ ǁoŵeŶ aŶd ϮϬ,ϬϬϬ ŵeŶͿ ǁould eaƌŶ eŶough to ŵeet the ƋualifǇiŶg Đƌiteƌia͛. 
We fully recognise the practical difficulties of implementing this recommendation. Further, 
the recommendation might not actually be desirable if it results in workers falling into a 
benefit trap. Indeed, it might be the case that the only feasible way of dealing with this 
group of workers is through the state pension system. 
We could find no accurate data on the combined number of the self-employed or non-
eligible job holders with individual DC policies. Similarly, when it comes to decumulation, it 
is likely that these groups will fail to benefit from institutional value for money solutions and 
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instead will have to rely on the high-cost retail market, unless NEST establishes a 
decumulation scheme which they could join. 
We suppoƌt the Đall of the ‘esolutioŶ FouŶdatioŶ ͚foƌ gƌeateƌ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ to ensure the 
self-employed [and and non-eligible job holders for auto-enrolment] are adequately 
pƌepaƌed foƌ theiƌ lateƌ Ǉeaƌs͛. These gƌoups should ďe eŶĐouƌaged to saǀe ŵoƌe foƌ theiƌ 
retirement, but in a way that allows them flexible access to their savings and has low 
charges. We therefore support the recommendation of the RSA for the introduction of a 
Government-backed ISA (e.g., provided by National Savings & Investments) to facilitate this. 
In addition, the groups could be encouraged to join NEST. We also suppoƌt the ‘“A͛s ͚“aǀe 
WheŶ Paid͛ pƌoposal ǁhiĐh autoŵatiĐallǇ diǀeƌts a peƌĐeŶtage of eǀeƌǇ paǇ ĐheƋue to a 
savings account. 
When it comes to drawing an income in retirement, both groups should be allowed access 
to a national decumulation scheme like NEST (once its decumulation blueprint has been 
implemented).  
Chapter 4. How savers can be helped to manage longevity risk 
Recommendation 4.1: Longevity bonds working party  
Since longevity bonds have a potentially important role to play in hedging systematic 
longevity risk, we recommend that the Government sets up a working party to undertake a 
cost-benefit analysis of government issuance of longevity bonds to help manage the 
associated longevity risk exposure.  
The terms of reference would cover:  the benefits that would accrue to all stakeholders; the 
scale of the longevity risk that Governments would be assuming; the actions Governments 
can take to mitigate this risk; inter-generational equity; the practicalities of issuing longevity 
bonds, such as the construction of reference longevity indices, potential demand, pricing, 
liquidity and taxation 
Chapter 5. The role of the National Employment Savings Trust in helping savers to access 
good quality retirement products 
Recommendation 5.1:  A role for NEST in decumulation 
We recommend that NEST should be allowed to compete in the decumulation market from 
2018 to provide a value-for-money decumulation product in the same way that it has in the 
accumulation market.  
This would enable NEST to set a competitive charge and governance standards that would 
provide a market benchmark. 
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Chapter 6. The role of collective pension schemes and how these could be introduced in 
the UK  
Recommendation 6.1:  Collective individual defined contribution schemes 
We recommend that the Government looks at the feasibility of establishing collective 
individual defined contribution schemes.  
Such schemes would be compatible not only with the defined ambition agenda, they would 
also be compatible with the new pension flexibilities following the 2014 Budget, while, at 
the same time, exploiting economies of scale to the full and allowing a high degree of risk 
pooling. 
Chapter 7. Conclusion: Developing a National Narrative 
Recommendation 7.1: Reviewing the working relationships within the pensions industry 
We recommend that the pensions industry – via its trade associations – conducts a review of 
the working relationships of its various components – providers, advisers, investment 
managers and insurers – to remove the serious fissures and thinly disguised hostilities that 
currently exist, and which impede customers getting the best solutions for their needs.  
All these parties are necessary to provide appropriate, effective and value-for-money 
retirement income solutions. Yet the evidence we have gathered for this report suggests 
that the working relationship between the parties is not working effectively in the best 
interests of customers. 
Recommendation 7.2: Creating a single pensions regulator 
We recommend that the Government creates a single pensions regulator, with the 
regulatory powers of the Financial Conduct Authority over contract-based schemes 
transferred to The Pensions Regulator. 
This would be consistent with the enhancement of the powers of independent governance 
committees in contract-based schemes to match those of the trustees in trust-based 
schemes proposed in Recommendation 3.6. It would also help to provide greater 
consistency of treatment between trust-based and contract-based schemes. Particularly 
important in this context is the issue compensation in the event of the insolvency of a 
pension scheme or a service provider to a scheme.  Our research shows that there are many 
serious and significant discrepancies between the compensation rules of trust-based and 
contract-based schemes. The creation of a single regulator would help to bring clarity and 
consistency to pension savers' rights and protections.   
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Recommendation 7.3: Establishing a pension tax and tax relief framework that reflects 
how people behave 
We recommend that the Government establishes a pension tax and tax relief framework 
that encourages the optimal level of pension savings given the reality that most people are 
͚huŵaŶs͛ Ŷot ͚eĐoŶs͛. 
The aims of the pension tax and tax relief framework would be: 
1. To encourage the level of pension savings needed to achieve a target standard of 
living in retirement which might be defined as: 
a) ͚esseŶtial͛ – iŶĐoŵe suffiĐieŶt to Đoǀeƌ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s ŵiŶiŵuŵ ďasiĐ 
expenditure needs 
b) ͚adeƋuate͛ – income sufficient to achieve a minimum lifestyle to which an 
individual aspires in retirement 
c) ͚desiƌed͛ – income sufficient to achieve the full lifestyle to which the 
individual aspires in retirement. 
2. To encourage individuals to make provision for long-term care. (While this is not 
directly a pension issue, the relationship between the increases in longevity and 
morbidity inevitably link the two.) 
3. To achieve tax neutrality over the life cycle. One objective of pension tax relief is to 
encourage larger pension funds than otherwise, but to do so in a way that is tax 
neutral to each generational cohort, so that the cumulative value of tax reliefs during 
the accumulation phase broadly equals the present value of tax that will be collected 
during the decumulation phase (both valued at the date of retirement). 
4. To achieve a degree of equity between members of the same generation through a 
redistribution of resources between low- and high-income individuals, men and 
women etc. 
5. To achieve a degree of equity across generations and, in particular, to avoid unfair 
burdens falling on future generations. 
Recommendation 7.4: Establishing a permanent independent Pensions, Care and Savings 
Commission 
We recommend that the Government establishes a permanent independent Pensions, Care 
and Savings Commission which reports to Parliament.   
Recommendation 7.5: Adopting a national retirement savings target of 15% of lifetime 
earnings 
We recommend that the Government adopts a national retirement savings target of 15% of 
lifetime earnings, achieved through auto-escalation, to avoid future pensioner poverty. 
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1. Introduction 
͚WheŶ I use a ǁoƌd͛, HuŵptǇ DuŵptǇ said, iŶ ƌatheƌ a sĐoƌŶful toŶe, ͚it 
means just what I choose it to mean—Ŷeitheƌ ŵoƌe Ŷoƌ less͛. 
Lewis Carroll (1871) Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There 
This Chapter is a scene-setter for the remainder of the Report. We begin by considering how 
pension schemes have traditionally been used and also how they are likely to be used in 
future following the introduction of the pension reforms announced in the 2014 Budget.  
These ƌefoƌŵs fuƌŶish us ǁith aŶ oppoƌtuŶitǇ to ask aŶeǁ ǁhat a ͚good͛ peŶsioŶ sĐheŵe 
should aim to achieve. There are also risks involved in the provision of pensions and we 
discuss the key ones. Unfortunately, widespread evidence shows that many if not most 
pension scheme members do not understand these risks and are unlikely ever to do so, 
however much guidance or education they receive. This will make it difficult for many of 
them to make informed choices about how they spend their retirement savings that takes 
these risks into account. This, in turn, raises the question about whether scheme members 
should be nudged (or even defaulted) into a well-designed decumulation product that has 
dealt with these risks in the most efficient and cost-effective ways possible – with the option 
to opt out, as in the case of auto-enrolment. We then consider the different types of 
pension member affected by the reforms. Finally, we discuss the attitudes of employers, 
consultants, providers, investment managers, and trade unions to the reforms.  
1.1 Pension schemes – uses and risks 
1.1.1 Uses 
The primary purpose of a pension scheme is to provide life-long retirement income security 
for however long the scheme member lives.2  This Report will examine retirement income in 
private-sector pension schemes, principally workplace schemes set up by employers for 
their employees. There are currently two types of such schemes in the UK – defined benefit 
(DB) and defined contribution (DC) schemes. DB schemes – which aim to deliver a pre-
defined pension in retirement, typically linked to average or final salary, together with the 
option of a tax-free cash lump sum – are in decline in the UK private sector and are being 
replaced by DC schemes – which specify what goes into the scheme in terms of 
contributions, but not what comes out in terms of the size of the pension. The Report will 
therefore concentrate on DC schemes, the type of scheme most people will have in the 
                                                     
2 This defiŶitioŶ of a peŶsioŶ sĐheŵe as pƌoǀidiŶg iŶsuƌaŶĐe agaiŶst outliǀiŶg oŶe͛s ƌesouƌĐes  is ǁell 
established in the academic literature, see, e.g., Zvi Bodie (1990) Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 28, 28-49; and Nicholas Barr and Peter Diamond (2008) Reforming Pensions: 
Principles and Policy Choices, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford. 
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future, although it will also look at transfers from DB to DC schemes. The Government͛s 
͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ ageŶda iŶtƌoduĐed iŶ the Budget oŶ ϭϵ MaƌĐh ϮϬϭϰ is iŶteŶded to 
apply to both DC and funded DB schemes, but not to unfunded DB schemes which most 
public-sector workers have.3  
Table 1.1 Criteria for a good DC pension scheme 
 Delivers adequate and sustainable pensions;4  by sustainable, we mean having 
support mechanisms in place that help people not to spend their pension fund too 
quickly after retirement  Produces stable and predictable lifelong retirement incomes, even if those incomes 
cannot be guaranteed (unless a lifetime annuity is purchased)  Offers the flexibility to purchase a lifetime annuity at any time (or at regular 
predetermined intervals)  Has the flexibility for members to withdraw funds to ŵeet ͚luŵpǇ͛ eǆpeŶses, suĐh as 
the cost of a new boiler  Provides an investment strategy that reflects the sĐheŵe ŵeŵďeƌ͛s attitude to and 
capacity to take risk, and generates a return at least as high as inflation  Provides value for money for every pound saved in the scheme  Has transparent charges and costs  Provides reliable and efficient administration  Delivers effective communications to members  Protects scheme assets from fraud or theft  Has minimum quality standards in terms of operational efficiency, charges and 
governance with a duty by the governance committee to aĐt iŶ ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ďest 
interests  If individuals are constructing their own pension scheme, they should use products 
that are effective and easy to understand5 
 
In order to make any assessment about the retirement income from a DC pension scheme, 
we need to establish a benchmark for comparison. In other words, we need to establish 
what ͚good͛ outcomes would be in a DC scheme. On the basis of our analysis and feedback 
                                                     
3
 H M Treasury (2014) Freedom and Choice in Pensions, Cm 8835 (Session 2013-14), 19 March; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/294795/freedom_and_choic
e_in_pensions_web_210314.pdf. 
4 
European Commission (2003), Adequate and Sustainable Pensions, Publication Office, Luxembourg. 
5
 In a similar way as was imposed on default funds in the accumulation phase. See Department for Work and 
Pensions (2014) Better Workplace Pensions: Further Measures For Savers, Cm 8840, March; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/298436/better-workplace-
pensions-march-2014.pdf 
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from our various discussions, we believe that a good DC pension scheme will meet the 
criteria set out in Table 1.1.6,7,8  
The 2014 Budget added two new possible uses for a pension scheme. The first of these is 
inheritability – the residual pension fund on the death of the scheme member can be 
inherited by a nominated beneficiary.9 Further, the 2014 Taxation of Pensions Act abolished 
the so-Đalled ͚death taǆ͛, the ϱϱ% taǆ Đhaƌge oŶ peŶsioŶ death ďeŶefits if the ŵeŵďeƌ dies 
before 75, so that the nominated beneficiary can inherit the residual pension fund without 
paying any tax. If the member dies after 75, the nominated beneficiary pays tax on the 
residual pension fund at their marginal tax rate. Given the generally low level of pension 
savings in DC schemes in this country, this outcome is likely to only be of real benefit to a 
relatively small number of well-off pensioners.10 But the consequences will be much more 
widespread. The inheritability of the pension fund became possible because the Chancellor 
removed the requirement to annuitise the assets in the pension scheme.11 At a stroke, the 
Chancellor converted all pension schemes in the UK – including DB schemes – into savings 
schemes, with no essential difference between them and other savings schemes, such as 
independent savings accounts (ISAs). However, the Chancellor cannot change the definition 
of a pension scheme which is to pay a pension until the member dies. Nevertheless, a key 
implication of his decision is that the risks involved in retirement income provision – in 
particular longevity risk – have been almost entirely individualised. The benefits from any 
form of collective risk sharing have been removed. 
                                                     
6 
The criteria listed in Table 1.1 will need quantifying for the table to be operationally useful.  
7
 The Pensions Regulator has identified the following 6 elements necessary to achieve the good member 
outcome of an adequate income in retirement in DC schemes:  Appropriate contribution decisions   Appropriate investment decisions   Efficient and effective administration   Protection of assets   Value for money   Appropriate decumulation decisions. 
See The Pensions Regulator (2011) Enabling Good Member Outcomes In Work-Based Pension Provision, 
Discussion Paper, January; http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/dc-discussion-paper-2011.pdf 
8
 Note that following ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛, it ŵight ǁell ďe the Đase that a ͚good͛ peŶsioŶ sĐheŵe is Ŷo loŶgeƌ 
provided by a single organisation: there might be one organisation providing the accumulation stage and 
another providing the decumulation stage. Table 1.1 would have to be modified to reflect this. 
9
 Daǀid CaŵeƌoŶ MP, the Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ, said: ͚ǁe ǁaŶt to ŵake suƌe ǁe Đoŵplete this gƌeat ƌeǀolutioŶ 
ǁheƌe ǁe͛ƌe giǀiŶg people ŵuĐh ŵoƌe poǁeƌ to saǀe, to aĐĐess theiƌ peŶsioŶ aŶd pass theiƌ peŶsioŶ oŶ to 
theiƌ ĐhildƌeŶ͛ ;ƌepoƌted iŶ “teǀeŶ “ǁiŶfoƌd aŶd DaŶ HǇde ;ϮϬϭϱͿ CƌaĐkdoǁŶ oŶ ďaŶks that deŶǇ loaŶs to the 
elderly, Daily Telegraph, 18 April).  
10
 Very few people will have amassed a significant sum in their pension pot by age 55. 
11
 The Chancellor, George Osborne MP, announced in the Budget: ͚Pensioners will have complete freedom to 
draw down as much or as little of their pension pot as they want, any time they want. No caps. No drawdown 
limit. Let me be clear. No oŶe ǁill haǀe to ďuǇ aŶ aŶŶuitǇ … People who have worked hard and saved hard all 
theiƌ liǀes, aŶd doŶe the ƌight thiŶg, should ďe tƌusted ǁith theiƌ oǁŶ fiŶaŶĐes͛. 
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The second new potential use is debt clearance. Previously, pensions could not be assigned 
to pay off a loan. After April 2015, everyone over 55 can take their pension as a lump sum. 
Strong supporters of the new pension regime are banks and building societies with 
customers with interest-only mortgages who earmarked no specific savings arrangements to 
pay back the mortgage loan.  If these customers have pension schemes, the mortgage 
lender can now invite them to exercise their pension ͚freedom͛ and pay off the mortgage.12  
1.1.2 Risks 
It is important to be aware of the risks involved in the generation of retirement income from 
pension savings. The key risks are listed in Table 1.2. FolloǁiŶg ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛, these 
risks are now borne directly by DC scheme members. 
Table 1.2 – Key risks involved in the generation of retirement income from pension savings 
Contribution risk The risk that pension contributions (and 
hence pension savings) are lower than 
planned, e.g., because the scheme member 
becomes unemployed, is unable to work due 
to ill health, or is unable to pay off their 
debts 
Retirement timing risk Uncertainty about when the scheme 
member will retire and/or begin to make 
withdrawals 
Product choice risk  Uncertainty about how the scheme member 
will make withdrawals, not least because of 
the very large set of choices now available  
Investment risk  The risk that investment performance is 
worse than expected or the risk that 
investments do not generate incomes in a 
way that matches the desired pattern of 
consumption in retirement. A particularly 
important example of investment risk is 
sequence-of-returns risk 
Inflation risk  The risk that inflation is higher than 
anticipated 
Interest rate risk  The risk that interest rates are low at the 
point of annuity purchase 
                                                     
12
 But at the risk of ending up with an inadequate retirement income and the potential cost to tax payers of 
additional welfare benefits. 
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Longevity risk  The risk that the individual savers live longer 
than their life expectancy (i.e., idiosyncratic 
longevity risk) and the risk that savers as a 
whole live longer than anticipated (i.e., 
systematic or aggregate longevity risk) 
Cost risk  The risk that the total costs of running the 
pension scheme during accumulation and 
decumulation are higher than expected or 
understood 
Political risk  The risk that the Government changes the 
rules in an adverse way (e.g., reduces the 
level of tax relief) 
Regulatory risk  The risk that regulations change in an 
adverse way (e.g., the regulator increases 
regulatory capital requirements, which has 
the effect of reducing annuity rates) 
Demographic/cultural risk  The risk that younger cohorts refuse or are 
unable to honour the implicit 
intergenerational contract that underlies 
many pension schemes. For example, the 
next generation of workers refuses – or is 
unable – to pay the pensions the retired 
generation expects to receive, because they 
are unwilling to honour the implicit contract 
or because there are too few of them in 
relation to the size of the retired population. 
Also, an arrangement that works in one 
culture (e.g., Holland) might not work in 
another (e.g., the UK) 
Market conduct risk  The risk that those who provide services to 
the scheme act in a way that disadvantages 
scheme members (e.g., investment 
managers subject to a charge cap negate the 
effects of the charge cap by increasing 
portfolio turnover, or the benefits of 
eĐoŶoŵies of sĐale go to sĐheŵe pƌoǀideƌs͛ 
shareholders rather than to members); fraud 
and the activities of scammers would be 
included here 
Behavioural risk  The risk that scheme members behave in a 
way that is not considered to be rational 
(i.e., is not in their long term interests, since 
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they make short-term decisions that they 
subsequently regret and are unable to learn 
from past mistakes). Inertia and lack of 
engagement would be included here, as 
would be the risk that members fail to 
understand the risks they face 
Financial knowledge and understanding risk The ƌisk that a ŵeŵďeƌ͛s financial 
knowledge and understanding are 
insufficient for the member ever to make an 
͚iŶfoƌŵed ĐhoiĐe͛ 
Mental impairment risk  The ƌisk that a sĐheŵe ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ŵeŶtal 
faculties are reduced due to the onset of 
dementia, for example 
 
There are a number of ways of dealing with such risks in general: 
 The ƌisks ĐaŶ ďe assuŵed oƌ ͚ƌuŶ͛ – this might be deliberate (e.g., in the case where a 
scheme member increases the level of investment risk in their pension fund in the 
hope of achieving a higher investment return and, hence, a higher anticipated 
pension
13
) or unavoidable (e.g., in the case of contribution, political or regulatory 
risk)  The risks can be regulated against – effective regulation can reduce cost and market 
conduct risk, for example  The risks can be explained – by informing people well in advance the importance of 
giving providers reliable signals of when and how the pension pot will be accessed, 
or explaining behavioural biases and nudging people towards making optimal 
decisions 
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 An early example of investment risk following the introduction of the pension reforms was the Chinese stock 
market crash in August 2015 (dubbed the Great Fall of China), which elicited the following headlines in the 
Daily Mail (above to an article by Louise Eccles published on 25 August): 
Don't risk cashing in your pension: Retirees warned they could cause 'irreparable damage' 
if they withdraw lump sums from their pots at such a volatile time   The top 100 companies in the UK – in which many pensions are invested – have 
had £170billion wiped off their value in the past two weeks  FTSE 100 down by almost 10% triggered by Chinese stock market crash  Fall means pensions invested in market have also plunged by up to 10%  Britons warned to hold fire on big decisions until markets have stabilised 
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 The risks can be reduced – by careful design of the scheme. For example, by careful 
design of the investment strategy and by making the most of diversification, 
investment risk can be reduced  The risks can be pooled amongst members of a given cohort (known as intra-
generational risk pooling) – idiosyncratic longevity risk can be pooled and hence 
made more stable and predictable, but this, in turn, requires scale (i.e., only large 
pension schemes can do this)  The risks can be shared between members of different cohorts (known as inter-
generational risk sharing) – investment returns can be smoothed across different 
cohorts using a smoothing fund  The risks can be hedged if there are suitable hedging instruments – e.g., inflation and 
interest rate risk can be hedged using inflation and interest rate derivatives, but 
systematic longevity risk cannot currently be hedged due to the absence of longevity 
bonds and indexed longevity swaps  The risks can be managed within a carefully designed default plan into which the 
members are auto-enrolled. When someone first starts work, this will be a default 
accumulation plan with a default contribution rate and investment strategy. When 
someone retires, this could be a default retirement expenditure plan. The onset of a 
mental impairment, such as dementia, needs to be identified early and carefully 
managed  Finally and most worryingly, the risks can be ignored. 
Unfortunately, many people do not understand the risks in Table 1.2, especially longevity 
risk, although they are unavoidable aspects of building up pension savings over a 40-year (or 
longer) working life and then running down those savings over a retirement period that 
could last 30 years or more. Even with improved financial education,14 it is unlikely that 
many people will fully understand some of these risks. This is because some risks have to be 
experienced before they can be genuinely understood, and often it is too late by that stage 
to do anything about them. In addition, many people will have problems understanding the 
full range of product choices that are now available. All this makes it difficult for many 
people to ďe iŶ a positioŶ to ŵake ͚iŶfoƌŵed͛ ĐhoiĐes. The Government is offering only 45 
ŵiŶutes of guidaŶĐe uŶdeƌ the ͚guidaŶĐe guaƌaŶtee͛ to cover all these issues.15  
If a large group of people cannot understand the risks they face in their pension scheme, 
despite being provided with information about those risks, then they should not be 
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 The Government has encouraged improvements in financial education for years now, athough there is little 
evidence that this has been effective. See, e.g., H M Treasury (2008) Thoresen Review of Generic Financial 
Advice: Final Report, March; 
 webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/8/3/thoresenreview_final.pdf 
15
 Provided by Pension Wise – see Chapter 3. 
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expected to manage these risks themselves.
16
 Instead, if people can have confidence that 
those designing and regulating pension schemes have dealt with these risks in the most 
efficient and cost-effective ways possible, then it might be possible to nudge (or even 
default) savers into making the right choice at retirement for them and their family. To do 
this, we will need to build on the lessons of auto-enrolment and, in particular, the issue of 
having a well-designed default decumulation process at retirement.   
One of the principal lessons of finance theory is that some risks can be reduced through 
diveƌsifiĐatioŶ, that is, ďǇ pooliŶg oƌ shaƌiŶg ƌisks. DiǀeƌsifiĐatioŶ has ďeeŶ Đalled ͚the oŶlǇ 
fƌee luŶĐh iŶ fiŶaŶĐe͛. As ŵeŶtioŶed aďoǀe, tǁo keǇ ƌisks that ĐaŶ ďe ƌeduĐed iŶ this ǁaǇ aƌe 
investment and longevity risk. This is one of the key benefits of saving for a pension in a 
large pension scheme. By individualising the risks listed in Table 1.2, the 2014 Budget 
encourages pension scheme members to give up their free lunch. The inevitable 
consequence will be that workers with similar salary histories and pension contributions will 
end up with very different pension outcomes: while some outcomes will be very good, 
others will undoubtedly be very poor. Many people would regard this as undesirable. We 
will examine how diversification benefits can be recaptured either in large schemes like 
NEST (National Employment Savings Trust) or with new types of collective pension schemes. 
1.2 Pension scheme members 
1.2.1 Who will be affected by the pension reforms? 
One of the principal arguments of economic theory is that competition and market forces 
can deliver good outcomes for consumers. However, the OffiĐe of Faiƌ TƌadiŶg͛s ;OFTͿ 
Defined Contribution Workplace Pension Market Study17 in 2013 provided evidence that 
competition and market forces are not working effectively when it comes to pensions and 
that the ŵaƌket foƌ ďuǇeƌs is ͚oŶe of the ǁeakest that the OFT has aŶalǇsed iŶ ƌeĐeŶt Ǉeaƌs͛. 
This is ďeĐause ͚ŵost eŵploǇees do Ŷot eŶgage ǁith oƌ uŶdeƌstaŶd theiƌ peŶsioŶs. PeŶsioŶs 
are complicated products, the benefits of which occur, for many people, a long time in the 
futuƌe͛.  
A wide class of pension scheme members will be affected by the new ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ 
regime:  
 Members of workplace DC auto-enrolment schemes: active, deferred and pensioners  Private-sector defined benefit (DB) scheme members who transfer to a DC scheme. 
Those who take advantage of the DB-to-DC transfer rules might use the DC scheme 
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 One of the reasons why pension schemes were first set up was because people did not understand and did 
not manage well these risks. 
17
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131101164215/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/market-
studies/oft1505 
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offered by their employer, if this includes a drawdown facility. Otherwise, they will 
have to switch to another provider  The self-employed  Workers with employment contracts that do not qualify them for auto-enrolment. 
We will examine the characteristics and challenges presented by each group in relation to 
achieving good retirement outcomes. Our main emphasis will be on the first group, 
although we will consider how DB-to-DC transferees, the self-employed and those with 
employment contracts that do not qualify them for auto-enrolment can also be helped. 
1.2.2 The impact of the pension reforms on welfare benefits 
If things do go badly for members of some of these groups and they run out of money 
before they die or invest unwisely and end up in poverty in old age, this will be a tragedy for 
them individually. But it will not be costless for the rest of society. This is because such 
people can claim certain means-tested welfare benefits which are funded by local and 
national taxation. The main local benefit is council tax support (previously council tax 
benefit, but now localised). 
In March 2015, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) issued a factsheet18 showing 
the qualification rules for the following income-related means-tested welfare benefits that 
will apply in respect of the new flexibilities for accessing pension pots after 6 April 2015:  
 Employment and Support Allowance (income-related)   Housing Benefit   Income Support   Joďseekeƌ͛s AlloǁaŶĐe ;iŶĐoŵe-based)   Pension Credit   Universal Credit.  
The rules are extremely complicated. For those below the qualifying age for a state pension, 
withdrawals from a pension pot will be treated as either income or capital, depending on 
certain factors, such as how regular the withdrawals are. If no money has been taken from 
the pot, it will not be taken into account when calculating benefit. For those over the 
qualifying age who choose not to buy an annuity, the DWP will assume they have 'notional 
income' equivalent to that of an annuity, based on 100% of GAD rates.19 Notional income 
must be reviewed: after every drawdown of capital; after every drawdown of income which 
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 Pension Flexibilities and DWP Benefits; 
 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417473/pension-
flexibilities-dwp-benefits.pdf. 
19These aƌe the ŵaǆiŵuŵ ǁithdƌaǁal ƌates peƌiodiĐallǇ set ďǇ the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt AĐtuaƌǇ͛s DepaƌtŵeŶt foƌ 
capped drawdown (which caps the level of income that can be withdrawn to reduce the risk the fund will run 
out – see Chapter 2); https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/drawdown-pension-tables. 
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exceeds the notional income level; and at the claimant's request. If people take an income 
from their pension pot, it will be treated as the actual income if it amounts to more than the 
notional income.  
People who take a cash lump sum will have this treated as a capital withdrawal. Ad hoc 
withdrawals will be regarded as capital (despite potentially being entirely taxed as income). 
If the ĐlaiŵaŶt has saǀiŶgs oƌ iŶǀestŵeŶts of aŶ aŵouŶt gƌeateƌ thaŶ the ͚Đapital disƌegaƌd' 
(currently £10,000), the excess will be deemed to provide an assumed weekly income, 
currently £1 for every £500 (or part) of the excess.  
Pension income may affect entitlement to contributory benefits. For Employment and 
Support Allowance (contribution-based), all pension income over £85 per week, and, for 
Jobseekers Allowance (contribution-based), all pension income over £50 per week will be 
taken into account. Uncrystallised benefits20 will not impact upon contributory benefits. 
Individuals are warned to avoid ͚deliďeƌate depƌiǀatioŶ͛. The factsheet explains the 
͚depƌiǀatioŶ ƌule͛ ǁhiĐh states that if aŶ eligiďle iŶdiǀidual speŶds, tƌaŶsfeƌs oƌ giǀes aǁaǇ 
any money taken from their pension pot, the DWP will consider whether they had 
deliberately deprived themselves of that money in order to secure (or increase) entitlement 
to benefits. If it is decided that the individual has deliberately deprived themselves, they will 
be treated as still having that money and it will be taken into account as income or capital 
when any benefit entitlement is worked out. 
However, the factsheet does not make clear how the DWP will decide whether someone 
has deliberately deprived themselves. Commentators have questioned whether people who 
have made poor investment decisions or been a victim of pension fraudsters would be 
caught out by this. Foƌ eǆaŵple, Neil Loǀatt, diƌeĐtoƌ at “Đottish FƌieŶdlǇ, said: ͚The 
Government is promoting the right of the individual to have control of their pension, while 
reserving the right to decide whether they have used that money wisely. [If a pensioner 
spends their pot on a Lamborghini, the DWP is likely to take a dim view of this], but if a 
pensioner loses money after investing in a buy-to-let property, will that be considered 
reckless? [The rules need to be much clearer about this], otherwise we [will] have 
ďuƌeauĐƌats ŵakiŶg judgŵeŶts oŶ peŶsioŶeƌs ǁith the ďeŶefit of hiŶdsight͛.21 
Entitlement to means-tested benefits is also likely to be influenced by the introduction of 
the new single-tier state pension for future pensioners on 6 April 2016.22,23 This is to be set 
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 These relate to that part of the pension pot which has not been accessed in any way – see Chapter 2. 
21
 Quoted in Harvey Jones (2015) Pension reform may lead to poverty: State will not support spenders with 
benefits, Daily Express, 1 April.   
22
 The following is based on a note from Djuna Thurley, House of Commons Library, 27 March 2015 (1503-243). 
The new single-tier state pension will replace the basic state pension, the state earnings-related pension 
(SERPS) and the state pension (S2P). 
23
 Pensions Act 2014, s1. 
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at £155.65, just above the level of the basic means-tested guarantee (i.e., £155.60 per week 
in 2016-17).24 Thirty-five qualifying years will be needed to be entitled to the full amount. 
People with fewer qualifying years will be entitled to a proportionate amount, provided they 
have at least ten qualifying years.25 The new state pension is expected to reduce eligibility 
for Pension Credit, with the main driver for this being the abolition of Savings Credit.  
Pensioners with relatively low incomes may qualify for means-tested support through the 
Pension Credit. This currently has two elements: 
 The GuaƌaŶtee Cƌedit tops up ǁeeklǇ iŶĐoŵe to a ͚staŶdaƌd ŵiŶiŵuŵ guaƌaŶtee͛ 
(£151.20 for a single person in 2015-16). Additional amounts are payable in respect 
of severe disability, certain caring responsibilities and housing costs.   The Savings Credit aims to provide an additional amount for those aged 65 or over 
who have made some provision for their retirement. The maximum Savings Credit 
for a single person is £14.82 in 2015-16. However, Savings Credit is to be abolished 
for future pensioners from 6 April 2016.26 
Pensioners with housing assets could also be affected by the Care Act 2014. This introduced 
new measures for both financing and limiting the costs of long-term residential or nursing 
care which affects around 150,000 people per year.27 First, it established a mandatory local-
authority-ƌuŶ ͚uŶiǀeƌsal defeƌƌed paǇŵeŶt sĐheŵe͛ fƌoŵ Apƌil ϮϬϭϱ, ǁhiĐh ŵeaŶs that 
people might not need to sell their home in their lifetime to pay for their care costs. Instead, 
if a local resident meets the eligibility criteria, the local authority pays certain care costs and 
a deďt is estaďlished agaiŶst the loĐal ƌesideŶt͛s ŵaiŶ hoŵe. This is a loaŶ agaiŶst the ǀalue 
of the pƌopeƌtǇ ǁhiĐh is ƌepaid oŶ the loĐal ƌesideŶt͛s death. The Department of Health 
states that ŵost people ĐaŶ use ͚aƌouŶd ϴϬ% to ϵϬ% of the eƋuitǇ aǀailaďle in their home. 
The limit on equity is to protect you from not having enough money to pay sales costs of the 
property - like solicitors' fees - and to protect the council against a drop in housing prices 
and the risk that it may not get all of the money baĐk͛. Councils can charge interest linked to 
the cost of government borrowing, up a current maximum of 2.65% p.a.  
Second, the Act establishes a £72,000 cap on care costs. The original plan was to introduce 
the cap in April 2016, but, in July 2015, the Government announced that this would be 
delayed until 2020. The cap will be means-tested. Those with assets of less than 
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 The Prime Minister, David Cameron MP, claims the single-tier pension will be adequate to live on (reported 
in Michael Klimes  (2014)  David Cameron claims single-tier pension is adequate safety net, Professional 
Pensions, 20 October). 
25
 Pensions Act 2014, s2. In July 2015, the DWP announced that only 37% (222,000 out of 600,000) of 
pensioners will be able to claim the full amount in 2016. This is expected to rise to 50% by 2020 and to 84% by 
2035. 
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Pensions Act 2014, s23 and Sch 12 Part 3. 
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£17,500 receive free care. There is then a sliding scale of state support up to a threshold of 
£123,000.  Those with assets (including pension assets) above £123,000 will receive no help 
towards the cap. In addition, the cap covers only the cost of personal care (help with 
washing, dressing, eating and mobility) and medical care (requiring nursing supervision), but 
Ŷot ͚hotel Đosts͛ such as food aŶd aĐĐoŵŵodatioŶ. EaĐh ĐouŶĐil ǁill use a ͚ƌesouƌĐe 
alloĐatioŶ sǇsteŵ͛ ;‘A“Ϳ to deteƌŵiŶe the ŶotioŶal Đost of Đaƌe iŶ its aƌea, ǁith Đosts Đapped 
at £230 a week. One council, for example, might determine the cost is £200 a week and, if 
total care costs are £700 a week, then the resident is responsible for paying the remaining 
£500 per week. What all this means is that a cap of £72,000 on personal spending on care is 
likely to be a severe underestimate of the true cost of long-term care. According to 
Partnership, a care cost funding provider, the true cost could be double the £72,000 cap.  
When the means test is applied, different sources of income and capital are assessed in 
different ways. In the case of pension or annuity income, 50% of this is disregarded if the 
claimant has a partner. In the case of flexi-drawdown,28 the entire drawdown fund will be 
treated as a capital asset, with an income tariff, equivalent to a single life, non-escalating 
annuity, applied to it. This could mean that the care resident needs to make a greater 
personal contribution in the case of drawdown than in the case of an annuity.  
1.2.3 Pension adequacy and pension inheritance 
We Ŷote that oŶe of the good outĐoŵes of a DC peŶsioŶ sĐheŵe ǁas aŶ ͚adeƋuate͛ 
pension. But this will largely depend on the level of contributions made to the scheme and 
the investment returns on these prior to retirement. It is generally not possible – due to the 
risks involved – to achieve this objective from low levels of pension savings that rely on 
unrealistically high real rates of investment return being realised over extended periods. 
Since our Report is about retirement income, we will be looking at good outcomes, 
conditional on the contributions made during the accumulation phase. We have not been 
asked to address the question of the adequacy of pensions or the adequacy of pension 
savings.  
Nevertheless, we note that, as a society, we are collectively not saving enough for our 
pensions.29 AŵoŶgst ͚ďaďǇ ďooŵeƌs͛ iŶ the 55 to 74 age range, 40% have not yet begun to 
save for a pension, according to a recent Blackrock Investor Pulse survey.30 Of those with 
savings, 63% hold them in cash which has lost 15% of its purchasing power over the last 5 
years due to inflation. At the other end of the age range, saving is also a very low priority for 
͚ŵilleŶŶials͛ – those born after 1980 – according to recent research by BNY Mellon.31 Yet for 
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 This is discussed in Chapter 2. 
29 See the Appendix to this Chapter for a review of some recent studies investigating this proposition. 
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 Natasha Browne (2015), Research - 40% of baby boomers not saving for retirement, Professional Pensions, 
27 January. 
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 Paul Traynor (2015), The Generation Game – Savings for the New Millennial; 
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living standards to grow, we need to invest iŶ iŶĐƌeasiŶg the eĐoŶoŵǇ͛s Đapital stoĐk and the 
only sustainable source of long-term investment is long-term savings.32, 33  
Aegon has reported research which shows that people have difficulty in calculating how 
much they need to save for retirement, since they are not clear what they will get from the 
state pension scheme in future. A man aged 65 would need approximately a £200,000 
pension pot to buy a £150-a-week income (roughly the same as the new single-tier state 
peŶsioŶ fƌoŵ Apƌil ϮϬϭϲͿ. DuŶĐaŶ Jaƌƌett, of AegoŶ UK, said: ͚This is significantly more than 
the £63,815 those approaching retirement have on average in their private pension, 
highlighting just hoǁ fuŶdaŵeŶtal the state peŶsioŶ is to people͛s ƌetiƌeŵeŶt plaŶs͛.34 In 
2014, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation published research which suggests that the 
minimum income needed in retirement is £13,500.35 Since the new single-tier state pension 
is approximately £8,000 p.a., then someone needs a minimum of £5,500 in annuity income. 
At age 65, this costs £103,000 for a level annuity and £145,000 for an index-linked annuity. If 
someone delays the annuity purchase until age 75, the costs are £76,000 and £102,000, 
respectively.36 Even these minimum amounts are well in excess of what most people 
currently have in their DC pot.  
A couple of surveys were published in April 2015 on attitudes to inheritance of the pension 
fuŶd afteƌ the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s death. The fiƌst ǁas a suƌǀeǇ spoŶsoƌed ďǇ )uƌiĐh of 1,000 people 
aged over 50 with DC pensions. Although 79% valued the reforms, 55% said they would 
have no effect on how they spend or save in retirement, while 35% reported that they did 
not expect to leave much of the pension fund to pass on to their family. Only 5% said they 
would change their behaviour, knowing their beneficiaries would inherit more of the 
peŶsioŶ folloǁiŶg the ƌeŵoǀal of the ϱϱ% ͚death taǆ͛.37  The second was a survey sponsored 
by HSBC, and contained in a report called Choices for Later Life which found  that 26% of UK 
respondents said retirees should spend all their money, while just 5% thought they should 
saǀe as ŵuĐh as possiďle foƌ theiƌ iŶheƌitoƌs. The ͚speŶd ǀeƌsus saǀe gap͛ of Ϯϭ peƌĐeŶtage 
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No society can indefinitely borrow to invest. 
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 There is, of course, an alternative to saving for retirement and that is not retiring at all. It was not many 
generations ago that this is what happened in the UK and elsewhere, one worked until one dropped.  This is 
some evidence that this is returning to the UK: there are some people who simply cannot afford to retire.  
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 Reported in Amy Frizell (2015) Pension system changes are putting people off saving for their retirement, 
experts warn, Independent, 24 August. 
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 Abigail Davis, Donald Hirsch, and Matt Padley (2014) A Minimum Income Standard for the UK in 2014, Joseph 
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points was higher than for any of the other 15 countries involved in the survey; the overall 
average was 8 percentage points.38 Despite these findings, there has been a significant 
increase in the demand for advice about pensions and inheritance tax planning since the 
Budget announcements, according to a survey of accountants by Investec Wealth & 
Investment.39 
1.3 Employers and consultants 
We held a number of meetings with employers, as sponsors of occupational pension 
schemes, and their consultants between January and April 2015. One example was a 
meeting with members of the CBI͛s peŶsioŶs paŶel oŶ Ϯϱ FeďƌuaƌǇ ϮϬϭϱ aŶd aŶotheƌ ǁas 
with the Society of Pension Professionals on 6 January 2015. There were also many separate 
face-to-face meetings. We discussed a broad range of issues which we summarise under the 
following headings.  
What are the attitudes of employers in general to Ǯfreedom and choiceǯ? 
A tǇpiĐal ƌespoŶse fƌoŵ a ĐoŶsultaŶt ǁas this: ͚We kŶoǁ that eŵploǇeƌs aƌe aďsolutelǇ 
disenchanted with Government peŶsioŶ poliĐǇ aďout ͞fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͟. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, it 
does not help them with retirement management now that employees can take their pot as 
cash from age 55 and continue working for as long as they want/need to. So, for employers, 
the DC scheme is no longer a key feature of the reward structure – if they want to improve 
attraction/reward, theǇ do this thƌough a shaƌe sĐheŵe, foƌ eǆaŵple͛. 
Overwhelmingly, employers called for a period of stability in pensions policy. They noted 
that the 2014 Budget was completely unexpected, massive in impact, and the reforms were 
introduced without any consultation. Employers need stability from a business perspective – 
they are still dealing with a whole range of major issues, including auto-enrolment (AE), the 
ending of contracting out, DB funding issues, etc. Business systems take time to adapt in 
response to major changes. Employers believed it was essential that policy makers really 
made an effort to understand how the pensions market works in practice and how it works 
for different types of employers. Currently, this is not the Đase: ͚Hoǁ ĐaŶ ŵiŶisteƌs aŶd Điǀil 
servants understand if they are remote from the real world and if they were auto-enrolled 
into a gold-plated, tax-payer-fuŶded DB sĐheŵe ǁheŶ theǇ staƌted eŵploǇŵeŶt?͛ IŶ ǀieǁ of 
this, some employers were keen to explore the idea of a permanent pensions commission. 
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 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015)  Pensions and IHT behind 'sharp rise in demand for financial advice', 
Professional Adviser, 24 April. This is likely to mainly from those with above-average incomes and/or savings. 
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Do employers differ in their responses to Ǯfreedom and choiceǯ? 
Employers are grouped along a spectrum. At one end are those employers and their 
advisers who want to encourage their scheme members to transfer out of the DB scheme in 
order to de-risk it. Some employers expected 50% of their members to transfer and are 
promoting/advertising transfer values (TV): 
 using all communications channels  actively targeting those above age 50  TV information in retirement packs  TV information in annual benefit statement. 
At the other end are large long-established employers running a single trust-based DC 
scheme which was set up when the DB scheme was closed down. Such employers: 
 are more paternalistic partly by nature or history and partly because they have a 
reputation to protect  feel the need to do something to protect employees from themselves; they want 
current and future employees to know that they look after their staff at the point of 
retirement and beyond  are not commercial – they are not trying to sell anything  are big, compared with new AE schemes – some go back more than 20 years. 
Other employers in this second group include the outsourcing industry, facilities 
management, former-public-sector companies, etc. They have a very high staff turnover 
rate for a lot of workers, but also a significant number of long-service employees – and they 
need to be able to retire them efficiently. Employersǯ attitudes on value for money for scheme members 
One employer told us that haǀiŶg paid ϭϲ% p.a. iŶto eŵploǇees͛ pension pots, he  wanted to 
ensure members secured value for money in drawdown. This type of employer is likely to 
ensure members get the right sort of help. This might not be just because they are altruistic, 
it is also because it makes good business sense, since efficient retirement solutions avoid 
the HR log-jam. 
When addressing the needs of the majority of auto-enrolled members, the employers that 
we interviewed recognised the importance of caution when assessing the pot size. The 
pensions industry (providers and advisers) tends to assume that £80,000 is a large sum, 
even though this buys a relative small annuity of only around £4,000 p.a. Employers were 
concerned that the industry would focus more on the fee/commission/profit that can be 
made than on the solutions it could provide. Many thought that retail drawdown products 
were expensive. 
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Hoǁeǀeƌ, the OFT͛s Defined Contribution Workplace Pension Market Study cited earlier also 
pointed out that ͚ŵaŶǇ eŵploǇeƌs ŵaǇ Ŷot haǀe the ĐapaďilitǇ oƌ the iŶĐeŶtiǀe to dƌiǀe 
competition on the key elements of value for money in the interests of scheme 
ŵeŵďeƌs…EŵploǇeƌs ŵaǇ also seek to pƌioƌitise the iŶteƌests of sĐheŵe ŵeŵďeƌs that aƌe 
current employees, oveƌ those sĐheŵe ŵeŵďeƌs that aƌe foƌŵeƌ eŵploǇees͛. The last poiŶt 
is likely to be very important when it comes to retirement income in the new pensions 
environment: we were told on numerous occasions that many employers will just want to 
see the their retired employees off their books and will have little interest in how they 
spend their pension pot. 
Value for money for employers 
Employers also told us they are keen to secure value for money in return for company 
pension contributions. The benefit to the employer of running a scheme has changed 
significantly since the hey-day of final-salaƌǇ sĐheŵes. The eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh eŵploǇeƌs ͚Đaƌe͛ 
aďout eŵploǇees͛ peŶsioŶs is ĐloselǇ liŶked to staff tuƌŶoǀeƌ aŶd age. MaŶǇ eŵploǇeƌs still 
use the pension scheme for traditional recruitment/retention purposes, e.g., they offer a 2-
for-1 match (so if the employee puts in 5%, the employer will put in 10%, giving a total 
contribution of 15%). Some employers still have low staff turnover (one employer told us 
this was just 2% in his company) and so being able to provide an adequate secure 
retirement income is a very important benefit and really valued by employees. Attitudes will 
be different in the case of a call centre with 200% annual staff turnover of mainly young 
employees. In such businesses, the cost of a pension scheme above the legal minimum is 
disproportionate to the benefit to the business.  
The 2014 Budget combined with the loss of the right to retire employees at a specific age (as 
a result of age discrimination legislation) means that, for employers, the pension scheme 
͚has falleŶ apaƌt͛ as the keǇ tool iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt ŵaŶageŵeŶt. “o peŶsioŶs aƌe defeƌƌed paǇ, 
but key questions employers are asking are (a) to what age is pay deferred? and (b) how 
long does our commitment last after that? The Budget changes actually push some 
decisions out to an older age than ever before. If employers offer scheme drawdown, they 
need to know when to annuitise and this will be at a much older age than employers are 
used to dealing with. Employers will have a long-term risk on their books, especially in 
relation to the cognitive issues many of their older former employees will face – this is very 
worrying for employers. 
Employers are very keen to regain control of human resource management in their 
businesses. Even HR managers – generally the strongest supporters of a pension scheme in 
any business – are beginning to think that the cost of the scheme does not represent value 
for money for the business. Finance directors – traditionally amongst those in a business 
who are the least interested in the company pension scheme – have become very focused 
on this and are increasingly convinced that even a DC scheme is not a worthwhile business 
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cost – especially given the level of contribution needed to deliver an adequate pension and 
the risk that employees can no longer afford to retire.  
Furthermore, we were told that the following attitude was common amongst trustees: 
͚Tƌustees ƌeallǇ, really doŶ͛t ǁaŶt a peŶsioŶeƌ ĐategoƌǇ added to the eǆistiŶg active and 
defeƌƌed ŵeŵďeƌ Đategoƌies. IŶ faĐt, theǇ doŶ͛t eǀeŶ ǁaŶt defeƌƌed ŵeŵďeƌs aŶd get ƌid of 
theŵ ǁheŶeǀeƌ theǇ ĐaŶ.͛ The tƌeatŵeŶt of defeƌƌed ŵeŵďeƌs giǀes us aŶ iŶdiĐatioŶ of 
what is likely to happen to retirees in some trust-based DC schemes. We understand that 
trustees usually have the right to force annuitisation by default. We were told that many 
tƌustees ĐoŶduĐt aŶ aŶŶual ͚sǁeep up͛ eǆeƌĐise aŶd tƌaŶsfeƌ defeƌƌed ŵeŵďeƌs to ĐoŶtƌaĐt-
based arrangements. Since this is likely to be the existing pƌoǀideƌ͛s peƌsoŶal peŶsioŶ 
(rather than an aggregator contract-based DC scheme), it is quite possible that the annual 
charge would be higher (some trustees insist on no increase; others do not). We were told 
that many trustees will take this same approach to retired members, which means that 
unless the member has already taken action, he or she will be transferred into a contract-
based DC pension within the first year. We understand that trustees have the right to do 
this ǁithout seekiŶg the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s peƌmission. 
The iŵpliĐatioŶ of this tƌeŶd, if the ͚sǁeep up͛ pƌaĐtiĐe ďeĐoŵes eǆteŶsiǀe aŶd if ƌetiƌees 
are transferred from trust- to contract-based arrangements, is that the trust-based model 
for auto-enrolment could unravel. Employers – the buyers of schemes – will decide that it is 
much easier to use a contract-based scheme from the outset. 
So the future of private sector pension provision in the UK might well be very different from 
the past as a result of recent policy changes, and not just because of ͚freedom and choice͛, 
but also because of the reductions in the annual allowance and the lifetime allowance and 
possible changes to the system of pension tax relief. These latter changes and potential 
ĐhaŶges sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ ƌeduĐe the ǀalue of diƌeĐtoƌs͛ peŶsion benefits – so why should 
directors be interested in pensions for their employees? In future, firms might provide just 
the minimum level of contributions to an AE scheme and offer some other employee 
benefits (e.g., SAYE), but also set up non-pension corporate trust or custody accounts for 
certain high valued employees. The aim would be to use a non-pension route to maintain 
corporate control over when employees can afford to retire. 
1.4 Providers and investment managers 
We participated in a number of meetings and events between January and March 2015 with 
providers – mainly insurance companies – and their representative body, the ABI. We also 
met a selection of investment managers and their representative body, the Investment 
Association. This section summarises the various views expressed by individuals 
representing these organisations under the following headings. 
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What are the attitudes of providers and investment managers in general to Ǯfreedom 
and choiceǯ? 
The following points emerged from our discussions: 
 ͚The 2014 Budget changes were introduced without consultation with industry: 
͞once the genie is out of the bottle, it͛s ǀeƌǇ haƌd to put it ďaĐk iŶ͛͟  ͚There has been no stability in pensions policy since the 1988 Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act introduced personal pensions to replace retirement annuity 
contracts and Section 226 policies from 1 July 1988͛  ͚The only policy success in recent years has been auto-enrolment. There has been no 
success in increasing engagement, or in financial education, or in getting people to 
understand the risks they face. Safeguards only work if people are engaged and 
understand these risks͛  ͚No further quick changes. We may need change, but it must be done slowly and 
carefully. Any further changes need to take account of existing policy changes͛  Insurers (including those with investment management arms) need to address the 
lack of consumer trust. An interviewee – from a provider – told us: ͚CuƌƌeŶtlǇ, 
provider self-iŶteƌest dƌiǀes outĐoŵes͛  ͚The various mis-selling scandals over the last 25 years are ͞open sores͟. Insurers are 
trusted less than banks and estate agents͛  ͚Insurers need to reform to meet the entire set of needs in decumulation, which 
comprise not only insurance products, but also investment management. They need 
to adapt to survive͛  IŶsuƌeƌs aĐĐept that it is the ĐlieŶts͛ ŵoŶeǇ aŶd that the clients can do what they like 
with it –͚ǁe doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to ďe iŶ the pƌess saǇiŶg ǁe ǁouldŶ͛t giǀe it to theŵ͛  ͚A key issue which we cannot duck is the inadequacy of savings. The best 
decumulation market in the world cannot compensate for this͛  ͚Another key challenge is the younger generation which will rely entirely on DC. One 
in three babies born in 2015 will live beyond age 100͛  ͚Innovation is essential. In other sectors, providers offer automatic upgrades in terms 
of tariffs and products (e.g., mobile phone). There was no reason why the pension 
industry should not do the same. Existing customers should be offered the latest 
products and pricing. Old products should be decommissioned without penalties to 
existing customers͛  ͚Retirement will no longer be a point-in-time event͛  ͚͟Freedom and choice͟ has Ŷot ĐhaŶged Đustoŵeƌs͛ Ŷeeds͛. What is a Ǯgoodǯ pension scheme trying to achieve? 
A good pension scheme needs to deliver a minimum of three things: 
 Accessibility 
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 Inflation protection via investment performance  Longevity insurance. 
Good outcomes for a pension scheme will be: 
 A sustainable income  The flexibility to take into account personal circumstances  Customers do Ŷot ǁaŶt to ďe suƌpƌised ďǇ ǁhat Đould happeŶ iŶ ϭϬ Ǉeaƌs͛ tiŵe, i.e., 
running out of money. 
However: 
 ͚Good͛ is Ŷot defiŶed iŶ poliĐǇ oƌ ƌegulatioŶ  It is difficult to construct a definition because needs vary  We ŵust also deĐide if ͚good͛ ŵeaŶs the iŶdividual gets what they need, rather than 
what they want. 
What are the biggest challenges to achieving these objectives? 
The biggest challenge is to stop people from self-harm in terms of tax, charges, investment 
risk, etc. The biggest risks relate to: 
 Tax: if people withdraw too much in a single tax year, they could put themselves into 
a higher tax bracket for that year  Charges: the impact of charges relative to returns  Market volatility risk: taking income after the market has fallen. One provider told 
us: ͚We ŵaŶage ǀolatilitǇ ďǇ ďalaŶĐiŶg the souƌĐe of ǁithdƌaǁals ďetǁeeŶ Đapital 
growth and dividends – dividends are important because they still tend to be paid 
eǀeŶ if the ŵaƌket falls sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ͛.  Composure risk: people need to avoid over-reacting to market volatility – the risk is 
that if the market ͚tanks͛, people will sell at the bottom; this mainly affects non-
advised customers  Underspending: many people are scared of running out of money, so a big risk is that 
they under-draw and therefore do not enjoy the retirement they could afford; this is 
common behaviour in the US. 
Another challenge relates to the issue of multiple pension pots. People might have a 
different pension pot for every job. This fragmentation of DC pots makes it difficult to 
aggregate. This is compounded by the fact that back books are often sold and resold. One 
iŵpliĐatioŶ is that ͚pot size is a teƌƌiďle pƌoǆǇ foƌ ǁealth – people could have secure DB 
peŶsioŶs aŶd ŵight Ŷeed a ďƌidgiŶg peŶsioŶ foƌ a feǁ Ǉeaƌs͛. Theƌe ǁas suppoƌt foƌ the 
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ĐoŶĐept of a ͚peŶsioŶ dashďoaƌd͛ ǁhiĐh shoǁs the state peŶsioŶ, aŶǇ DB peŶsioŶ aŶd up to 
three DC pension pots. This would need HMRC and state pension calculators to plug in.40 
1.5 Trade unions 
A panel of trade unionists and TUC officials (together with two consumer group participants) 
met with us on 12 January 2015 to address the following questions. What should be the primary aims of a Ǯgoodǯ DC scheme?  
The view of the panel members was that the primary aim of a good DC scheme should be to 
provide a lifelong index-linked income in retirement. This is ďeĐause theƌe is a ͚lack of 
loŶgeǀitǇ ƌisk aǁaƌeŶess͛ aŶd ďeĐause theƌe is ͚little ŵeƌit iŶ a pƌediĐtaďle iŶĐoŵe that is 
deĐliŶiŶg iŶ ƌeal teƌŵs͛. OŶe paƌtiĐipaŶt said: ͚People do Ŷot uŶdeƌstaŶd iŶflatioŶ or 
longevity very well. I think the answer is that we need to have good defaults so people are 
nudged into having some kind of inflation-linked income. Why is the only choice level or RPI-
linked annuities? Is there not a sense that people spend more in their early retirement? 
However, not everybody has a predictable U-shaped expenditure need; spending more in 
early retirement then becoming frailer. These are the sorts of things we might think about in 
a default stƌategǇ͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the saŵe paƌtiĐipaŶt ĐoŶĐeded that: ͚It is ƌatioŶal to take out a 
level annuity if you have a small pot. Most of your income is from the state pension. This 
suggests that theƌe should ďe soŵe iŶflatioŶ liŶkiŶg ďut Ŷot Ƌuite the eǆpeŶse of ‘PI͛. 
AŶotheƌ paƌtiĐipaŶt said: ͚There is also the issue of who pays for social care. This is crucial 
for knowing what is an adequate pension. Could it be something like a 50% target 
replacement ratio? Similarly, who is paying the pension contributions? What is the 
eŵploǇeƌ͛s ƌole iŶ that? Histoƌically, employers have paid much more in contributions into 
DB schemes. Are we still expecting good DC schemes to replicate the proportion of income 
that DB does? It doesŶ͛t do that. Good DC oŶlǇ Đoŵes aďout ǁith adeƋuate ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs͛. 
How do you assess value for money? 
We next asked about value for money as a primary aim of a good scheme which led to the 
following discussion: 
 ͚It is difficult to define value for money. It is impossible when you do not know what 
the charges are. No-one knows the full extent of hidden charges͛  ͚For accumulation, NEST provides some sort of target or benchmark for other 
schemes regarding their charges. A NEST-like vehicle in decumulation might echo 
that by providing a standard others could match͛  ͚If you think how difficult shoppiŶg aƌouŶd foƌ aŶ aŶŶuitǇ is, it͛s goiŶg to ďe eǀeŶ 
more difficult in future under drawdown. There will be investment charges, 
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administration charges, platform charges, even before you get into the transaction 
costs. It is going to be very difficult for people to compare͛  ͚Given that we know retired people will not be rational consumers in a market place, 
how do we get institutional arrangements that have trust-based decumulation 
vehicles of sufficient size and scale to negotiate good value contracts? In the same 
way NEST has done well to secure low charges from fund managers because they 
kŶoǁ pots ǁill get ŵuĐh ďiggeƌ iŶ futuƌe; aŶd People͛s aŶd NOW pƌoďaďlǇ haǀe got 
charges down too.  We need a limited number of large trust-based schemes that can 
really push the investment managers down to the lowest possible charges͛. 
What are the longer term consequences of Ǯfreedom and choiceǯ? 
OŶe paƌtiĐipaŶt said: ͚AŶ uŶiŶteŶded ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe ŵight ďe that ĐoŵpaŶies sǁitĐh to 
contract-based schemes. I think it is unrealistic to expect an employer-sponsored trust-
based DC scheme to be to be looking after their pensioners too – as well as current workers. 
I wonder whether there should be a way for occupational trust-based single-employer 
schemes to pass on assets to a trust-based decumulation vehicle. It could be NEST. We need 
to learn the lesson of auto-enrolment which is that the market failed, particularly, low and 
middle income earners. You need to have a new public policy-based, trust-based 
decumulation vehicle. It would provide an option for schemes that do not want to carry on 
doing that. I am worried about what small contract-based providers can offer in terms of 
decumulation. I am also worried about the expense of advice. For small pots, guidance is 
probably sufficient. Members with large pots have more need for advice, but are also more 
capable of paying for that usually. I think there is a vested interest in the pensions industry 
for making everything as complicated as possible. For low and middle income earners, it 
should be a commodity product. Only a minority of employers will want to operate 
decumulation options for their workforce. It is easy to get wrong. The advantages to the 
employer aƌe ŵiŶiŵal͛. 
AŶotheƌ paƌtiĐipaŶt agƌeed: ͚EŵploǇeƌs ŵight ďe keeŶ to look after current contributors, 
but not so when they have left their employment. Few employers make good contributions 
to DC schemes. What does that tell you about their likely enthusiasm for providing 
deĐuŵulatioŶ pƌoduĐts?͛.  Yet aŶotheƌ said: ͚If aŶ employer is putting in extra into pensions, 
they will want it to go as a benefit to existing staff, not those who have left. There is no 
poiŶt pƌoǀidiŶg ďeŶefits at that stage͛. 
1.6 Wider issues 
The 2014 Budget changes will have wider macro-economic consequences beyond those that 
affect pension scheme members and sponsors. Of particular importance is what will happen 
to the UK bond market. The gilts market is the longest maturity bond market in the world as 
a result of the demand by pension schemes and insurance companies for long maturity 
bonds to match their pension and annuity payments. This has helped to drive down long-
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term bond yields, which have been driven down further by the Government͛s ƋuaŶtitatiǀe 
easing programme. The corporate bond market has also benefited from this as insurers 
have switched to this sector in search of higher yields. However, annuity sales have fallen by 
60% in the year since the Budget41 and this has had a significant impact on the corporate 
bond market. According to Andreas Michalitsianos, manager of J.P. Morgan Asset 
Management's Sterling Corporate Bond Fund, issuance in the long-dated sterling corporate 
ďoŶd ŵaƌket has ďeeŶ dƌiǀeŶ to the poiŶt of eǆtiŶĐtioŶ. He said: ͚What [the peŶsioŶ 
reforms] did was take away a natural buyer of long-dated investment grade corporates. The 
market for annuities was £11bn p.a., and two-thirds of that made its way into the sterling 
Đoƌpoƌate ďoŶd ŵaƌket so, iŶ ĐoŶteǆt, that ŵeaŶs a sigŶifiĐaŶt sloǁdoǁŶ….The tƌeŶd is 
likely to be here for the long term, as future demand for annuities is unlikely to return to 
pƌeǀious leǀels͛.42 The Government could also find it much harder to issue long-term bonds 
in the future due to reduced demand from annuity providers. 
However a report from CREATE-Research and Northern Trust was more optimistic about the 
future of annuities. Based on interviews with 15 insurance companies and investment 
manageƌs, the ƌepoƌt stated: ͚Oǀeƌ tiŵe aŶŶuities ǁill ŵake a ĐoŵeďaĐk ǁithiŶ a Ŷeǁ 
hierarchy of products, with diversified income funds at the bottom and annuities at the top. 
In between, two new product sets will emerge: pathway funds that target retirement 
income in the accumulation phase (e.g., target date funds, diversified growth funds) and 
ŵaŶaged dƌaǁdoǁŶ fuŶds offeƌiŶg a steadǇ iŶĐoŵe͛.43 The Budget also had a significant 
impact on annuity pricing. According to Billy Burrows, the annuity expert: ͚The peŶsioŶ 
fƌeedoŵs haǀe plaǇed haǀoĐ ǁith aŶŶuitǇ pƌiĐiŶg͛, ǁith aǀeƌage staŶdaƌd aŶŶuity rates at 
their lowest ever level in April 2015.44  
As a final point, we note that the ending of both private-sector defined-benefit pension 
provision in the UK and the requirement to annuitise private-sector DC pension pots will 
radically change the concentration of longevity risk in the UK. Until recently, this was shared 
between the state – via state pension provision – and the private sector – via company DB 
peŶsioŶs aŶd aŶŶuities sold ďǇ iŶsuƌeƌs. UŶdeƌ ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛, iŶdiǀiduals Ŷoǁ ďeaƌ 
their own idiosyncratic longevity risk. But if things go wrong and a significant proportion of 
these individuals outlive their pension pots, the burden for bailing them out will fall 
exclusively on the state – in other words, the next generation of tax payers. They might, in 
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turn, refuse to help out their reckless and profligate forebears, leading to intergenerational 
conflict.45 
1.7 Responses to the consultation paper 
We will summarise the responses to the first two questions in the consultation paper here. 
1. ;aͿ What should ďe the pƌiŵaƌǇ aiŵs of a ͚good͛ DC sĐheŵe? Please eǆplaiŶ.  ;ďͿ If the 
pƌoǀisioŶ of a pƌediĐtaďle iŶĐoŵe should ďe a pƌiŵaƌǇ aiŵ of a ͚good͛ DC sĐheŵe, hoǁ 
should this ďe defiŶed? ;ĐͿ If ǀalue foƌ ŵoŶeǇ should ďe a pƌiŵaƌǇ aiŵ of a ͚good͛ DC scheme, 
how should this be defined?  
Responses to this question were quite varied (and some respondents listed many desiderata 
while others noted just one). However, there was surprisingly little agreement amongst 
pension professionals about what the aims of a good DC pension scheme should be. With 
this important point in mind, three themes did stand out as being important. First, the level 
of pension savings should be adequate. Second, pension savers need choice and flexibility. 
Finally, pension savers need simplicity to help them engage with the process. 
2. (a) Do you agree with the breakdown of risks listed in the Introduction? (b) Are there any 
important risks we have not identified? 
Ninety-five per cent of respondents agreed or largely agreed with the breakdown of risks. 
Additional risks (or issues) were also mentioned: health and long-term care risk; risk via 
shocks to a partner or family; lack of engagement by savers; sequence-of-returns risks and 
shocks; delays in realising that mistakes had been made and consequent delays in taking 
remedial action; the risk that regulation might stifle competition and raise costs. 
1.8 Analysis 
Our discussions with representatives of employers, consultants, providers, investment 
managers and unions together with the feedback we received from the consultation have 
provided invaluable inputs into our analysis in this Report as well as the recommendations 
we make. In terms of this Chapter, they have helped us develop the criteria for a good DC 
pension scheme that we propose in Table 1.1 and complete the list of key risks involved in 
the generation of retirement income from pension savings in Table 1.2. The discussions 
have also provided an insight into the longer term consequences that might follow from the 
introduction of ͚freedom and choice͛.  
One of the key reasons why enlightened employers established pension schemes in the 
nineteenth century was to manage the exit of their employees from the company when 
they were no longer capable of productive work, while ensuring that their former 
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 “ee, e.g., Daǀid Blake ;ϮϬϭϮ, p.ϱϭͿ It͛s the deŵogƌaphiĐs, stupid!, ai-CIO.com, May/June. 
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employees did not live in poverty in old age. In those days, retirement was a single event, 
while today it is a process. This, in turn, has meant that age management has become an 
increasingly important aspect of human resource management, especially in large 
organisations. However, this becomes considerably more difficult following the 2014 
Budget.  If employees over the age of 55 spend their pension pot unwisely, they may not be 
able to retire as planned and may be forced to stay in post, often with little or no notice 
given to the company. Our interviews revealed that employers are not at all happy with this 
prospect.  Inevitably, it will lead to many of them questioning why they now need to have a 
pension scheme. They are, of course, required to provide their employees with access to a 
pension scheme at the AE minimum, but many will begin to wonder why they even need to 
do that, given that many of their employees do not appear to value pension benefits and 
that recent governments have massively reduced the incentives for company directors to 
accrue pension benefits for themselves.  
We might well look back at the 2014 Budget as the event that marked the end of private-
sector employer commitment to providing any pension provision above the legal required 
minimum. Naturally, we would regard that as little short of tragic. This is because: (a) we 
find it hard to see what alternative cost-effective age management tools are available to 
employers, (b) we find it hard to see what other vehicles will enable employees to save 
enough to provide a decent life-long standard of living after they retire, and (c) we believe it 
will put great pressure on governments to raise the value of the minimum safety net 
provided by the state pension or to increase the state pension age even more rapidly than is 
currently planned. Nevertheless, our Report is about the decumulation of existing pension 
assets and we devote the rest of this Report to this task.46  
Our interviews appear to show that employers are bifurcating into two groups. On the one 
hand, there are those employers who see ͚freedom and choice͛ as a unique opportunity to 
reduce their DB pension deficits, by encouraging scheme members to transfer out into a DC 
scheme – when they do this, they take their share of the deficit with them. How often is an 
eŵploǇeƌ giǀeŶ the oppoƌtuŶitǇ to Đut theiƌ ǁoƌkeƌs͛ (deferred) pay47 by 15% or more and 
the workers believe they are better off as a result?  
On the other hand, there are paternalistic employers who want the best for their former 
employees, but who are terrified of being sued if things go wrong. An interesting message 
from our interviews is that ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ has iŶĐƌeased risk aversion on the part of 
employers. Some employers would like to provide advice for their soon-to-be former 
employees, but are reluctant to do so in case it later backfires. Some employers are even 
considering scheme drawdown, e.g., by offering decumulation defaults that involve 
drawdown with automatic annuitisation triggers if the fund falls below a certain level to 
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 There is, however, a brief discussion of the adequacy of pension savings in the appendix to this Chapter. 
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 Pensions are deferred pay under EU legislation. 
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protect against longevity risk. Yet, we are not aware of any employers that have actually 
gone ahead with this idea and it is clear that many employers would be uncomfortable with 
any sort of scheme defaults due to the associated long-term liability associated with poor 
outcomes. 
1.9 Recommendations 
Our analysis in this Chapter leads to the following two recommendations. 
Recommendation 1.1: Criteria for a good DC pension scheme 
We recommend that scheme providers should be required to demonstrate to scheme 
trustee (or governance) committees and to regulators how their schemes provide good 
outcomes for members in terms of the following criteria: 
 Delivers adequate and sustainable pensions; by sustainable, we mean having 
support mechanisms in place that help people not to spend their pension fund too 
quickly after retirement  Produces stable and predictable lifelong retirement incomes, even if those incomes 
cannot be guaranteed (unless a lifetime annuity is purchased)  Offers the flexibility to purchase a lifetime annuity at any time (or at regular 
predetermined intervals)  Has the fleǆiďilitǇ for ŵeŵďers to ǁithdraǁ fuŶds to ŵeet ͚luŵpǇ͛ eǆpeŶses, such 
as the cost of a new boiler  Provides aŶ iŶvestŵeŶt strategǇ that reflects the scheŵe ŵeŵďer͛s attitude to aŶd 
capacity to take risk, and generates a return at least as high as inflation  Provides value for money for every pound saved in the scheme  Has transparent charges and costs  Provides reliable and efficient administration  Delivers effective communications to members  Protects scheme assets from fraud or theft  Has minimum quality standards in terms of operational efficiency, charges and 
governance with a duty by the governance committee to act iŶ ŵeŵďers͛ ďest 
interests. 
As part of this recommendation, each qualitative term (such as adequate, sustainable, 
stable, predictable, suitable, reliable, effective and efficient) needs to be given a 
quantitative measure that would gain wide acceptance by the industry, regulators and 
policy makers, along the lines of what is specified in, say, a service level agreement. 
It is important to note that the recommendation implicitly assumes that the pension 
scheme provides both the accumulation and decumulation stages. If, as it is becoming 
increasingly likely, the accumulation and decumulation stages are separated and different 
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providers service the different stages, then the above list of criteria would have to modified 
to reflect this. 
Recommendation 1.2: Explaining key risks involved in the generation of retirement 
income from pension savings 
We recommend that scheme providers should be required to explain to scheme trustee 
(or governance) committees (and where possible to members) the following key risks in 
retirement income provision and how their scheme deals with these risks: 
 Contribution risk  – The risk that pension contributions (and hence pension savings) 
are lower than planned, e.g., because the scheme member becomes unemployed, 
is unable to work due to ill health, or is unable to pay off their debts  Retirement timing risk – Uncertainty about when the scheme member will retire 
and/or begin to make withdrawals  Product choice risk – Uncertainty about how the scheme member will make 
withdrawals, not least because of the very large set of choices now available   Investment risk – The risk that investment performance is worse than expected or 
the risk that investments do not generate incomes in a way that matches the 
desired pattern of consumption in retirement. A particularly important example of 
investment risk is sequence-of-returns risk  Inflation risk – The risk that inflation is higher than anticipated  Interest rate risk – The risk that interest rates are low at the point of annuity 
purchase  Longevity risk – The risk that individual savers live longer than their life expectancy 
(i.e., idiosyncratic longevity risk) and the risk that savers as a whole live longer 
than anticipated (i.e., systematic or aggregate longevity risk)  Cost risk – The risk that the total costs of running the pension scheme during 
accumulation and decumulation are higher than expected or understood  Political risk – The risk that the Government changes the rules in an adverse way 
(e.g., reduces the level of tax relief)  Regulatory risk – The risk that regulations change in an adverse way (e.g., the 
regulator increases regulatory capital requirements, which has the effect of 
reducing annuity rates)  Demographic/cultural risk – The risk that younger cohorts refuse or are unable to 
honour the implicit intergenerational contract that underlies many pension 
schemes. For example, the next generation of workers refuses – or is unable – to 
pay the pensions the retired generation expects to receive, because they are 
unwilling to honour the implicit contract or because there are too few of them in 
relation to the size of the retired population. Also, an arrangement that works in 
one culture (e.g., Holland) might not work in another (e.g., the UK) 
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 Market conduct risk – The risk that those who provide services to the scheme act in 
a way that disadvantages scheme members (e.g., investment managers subject to 
a charge cap negate the effects of the charge cap by increasing portfolio turnover, 
or the ďeŶefits of ecoŶoŵies of scale go to scheŵe providers͛ shareholders rather 
than to members); fraud and the activities of scammers would be included here  Behavioural risk – The risk that scheme members behave in a way that is not 
considered to be rational (i.e., is not in their long-term interests, since they make 
short-term decisions that they subsequently regret and are unable to learn from 
past mistakes). Inertia and lack of engagement would be included here, as would 
be the risk that members fail to understand the risks they face  Financial knowledge and understanding risk – The risk that a ŵeŵďer͛s fiŶaŶcial 
knowledge and understanding are insufficient for the member ever to make an 
͚iŶforŵed͛ choice  Mental impairment risk – The risk that a scheŵe ŵeŵďer͛s ŵeŶtal faculties are 
reduced due to the onset of dementia, for example.  
1.10 The remainder of the Report 
Chapters 2-6 will address the following issues and make recommendations: 
 How to ensure that the workplace pension retirement products available to people 
are those best suited to ensure they have security and confidence in retirement  The support savers need to make the right choice at retirement for them and their 
family and how to build on the lessons of auto-enrolment  How savers can be helped to manage longevity risk  The role of the National Employment Savings Trust in helping savers to access good 
quality retirement products  The role of collective pension schemes and how these could be introduced in the UK. 
Chapter 7 will conclude the Report and present our overarching recommendations. 
Appendix: Studies on the adequacy of pension savings 
Most studies going back over a number of years show that the level of pension savings in 
the UK is not adequate to produce a reasonable standard of living in retirement: 
 Aegon and the Association of Independent Financial Advisers (2010) Saving Britain: A 
White Papeƌ oŶ ‘eďuildiŶg BƌitaiŶ͛s “aǀiŶgs Cultuƌe  Aviva (2010)  Mind The Gap: Quantifying The Pensions Gap In The UK  Aviva (2011) Big Picture Thinking – Towards Sustainable Savings  Aviva (2012) Tackling the Savings Gap: Engagement and Empowerment  Chartered Insurance Institute (2011) An Age-old Problem: Developing Solutions for 
Funding Retirement 
56 
 
 Chatham House (2011) Squeezed in Retirement: The Future of Middle Britain  Strategic Society Centre (2011) Who Saves for Retirement?  
More recently, in March 2015, the Savings and Investments Policy Project (TSIP), managed 
by the Tax Incentivised Savings Association (TISA), published a report, Our Financial Future, 
found that: 
 The average pension pot size at retirement is £28,000, but at least £230,000 is 
needed for the average household to retire on two thirds of pre-retirement income  Two thirds of adults recognise they are not saving enough, one fifth do not save 
anything  More than half of people would like to save more but cannot afford to  One third of the population has less than £250 in savings  Fewer than half (45%) of people of working age are saving for retirement. 
The report found that inadequate financial education and a lack of trust in financial services 
had Đƌeated a saǀiŶgs gap, ǁhiĐh ǁill lead to ͚Đƌisis poiŶt' iŶ ϮϬϯϱ ǁheŶ the ͚auto-enrolment 
geŶeƌatioŶ͛ ďegiŶs to ƌetiƌe. T“IP wants to establish a forum, comprising industry, 
Government and the Financial Conduct Authority, to agree on a common approach to 
financial education. It wants to simplify pension taxation so that the benefits of pension 
saving are made clearer and it wants to see the abolition of the lifetime allowance which 
acts as a disincentive to save. It also wants pension contributions to increase slowly to 
around 15%. 
In September 2015, the Office for National Statistics published the results of its 
Occupational Pension Schemes Survey 2014. Active membership of occupational DC pension 
schemes has increased by two million since 2013 to 3.2 million, as a result of auto-
enrolment, but average contributions have halved from 9.1% of earnings to 4.7%, because 
most of these members will have been auto-enrolled on the minimum contribution rate.48 
In December 2015, the ONS revealed that 69% of employees in occupational DC schemes 
had employer contributions of less than 4%.49 
A study by PwC, also published in September 2015, reported the results of a survey of 1,200 
working adults. It found that 60% have put off saving more into their pension scheme 
because they are so confused about the current pensions system, with women and younger 
workers particularly unlikely to put money aside. The survey respondents are only saving an 
average of 5% of their salary towards their retirement, independent of age. Only 5% are 
saving more than 10% of their salary and this is mostly those earning over £100,000 a year. 
                                                     
48 Reported in Michael Klimes (2015) ONS: DC membership jumps by 2m but contributions halved, Professional 
Pensions, 24 September. Active membership of private sector defined benefit schemes is only 0.6 million. 
49 Office for National Statistics (2015) Active Members of Occupational Pensions-Employer Contribution Rates,  
December.  
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Average employer contributions are 6%. Philip Smith, head of defined contribution pensions 
at PǁC, said: ͚Effoƌts Ŷeed to foĐus oŶ iŵpƌoǀiŶg saǀeƌ aǁaƌeŶess, iŶĐƌeasiŶg auto-
enrolment contribution levels and improving financial education, so people can plan for the 
retirement they hope foƌ͛.50 
Another study published in September 2015 was commissioned by Royal London  and 
conducted by the Centre for Economics and Business Research. This again found that 
millions of young people are not saving enough for their retirement, yet will face much 
higher expenses when they retire than the current generation of pensioners. The study 
estimates that 8.3 million people aged between 30 and 40 are not saving for a pension, but 
ǁill haǀe to speŶd ϭϰϴ peƌ ĐeŶt ŵoƌe thaŶ todaǇ͛s peŶsioŶeƌs to ŵaiŶtaiŶ liǀiŶg staŶdaƌds 
by 2050, with the minimum income needed of £33,000 per annum. The implication is that 
the average 35-year-old who is halfway to retirement in 2050 with a pension pot of just 
£14,000 will need a fund of at least £666,000 – not including any state pension. Today, a 
typical pensioner spends £1,084 a month on housing, food, heating and transport.  With 
inflation, this will rise to £1,715 a month by 2050.51 
In October 2015, the Association of Consulting Actuaries (ACA) published the results of a  
survey of contributions to auto-enrolment schemes. A total of 477 employers  sponsoring 
over 620 pension schemes responded to the survey. Of these, 46% had reached their 
staging date for auto-enrolling employees into a qualifying scheme, while many of the rest 
had not reached their staging date and did not have an existing pension scheme. When 
scaled up to the level of the economy, the survey suggests that millions of workers having 
been enrolled into pension schemes since 2012 at the minimum level of combined employer 
and employee contributions of barely 2% of total earnings. This has had a dramatic effect in 
reducing the average contribution rate into DC schemes over the last couple of years as 
Table 1.3 reveals. The table shows the 2% combined minimum contribution rate into NEST, 
but it also shows that the combined contribution rate into trust-based DC schemes has 
fallen from 11.4% to 9% since 2013. This contrasts with contributions of up to 26% in DB 
schemes.   
 
 
 
                                                     
50
 Reported in Lauren Fedor (2015) Pension confusion is leaving British workers unprepared for retirement – 
PwC, City A.M., 30 September. 
51 Reported in Sarah O'Grady (2015) Poverty warning to millions in their 30s who scorn pensions, Daily Express, 
29 September. Another problem is that fewer young people will be able to afford to buy their own homes in 
future which means that they will not be able to subsequently sell their homes to pay for long-term care. This 
will have a knock-on effect on future welfare payments.  
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Table 1.3: Median contribution rates into pension arrangements provided by responding 
employers  
 Employer Employee 
Group personal pension 4% 
(5.8%) 
3% 
(4.2%) 
Trust-based DC 5% 
(6.9%) 
4% 
(4.5%) 
NEST 1% 
(NA) 
1% 
(NA) 
Other multi-employer 
schemes 
3% 
(NA) 
1% 
(NA) 
Mixed DB/DC 11-15% 
(NA) 
5% 
(NA) 
Defined benefit 16-20% 
(21.9%) 
6% 
(6.1%) 
Note: Figures in brackets are 2013 mean figures from ACA (2013) Pension Trends Survey Report 
Source: Figure 3 in ACA (2015) Pension Trends Survey, First Report, Table 8, page 21, and ACA (2015) Pension 
Trends Survey, Second Report, page 25 
 
In October 2015, Equiniti published the results of a survey of 1,200 employees which 
showed that 27% of them were unable to save on a regular basis, despite being keen to do 
so. Only about a third were saving on a regular basis with savings of at least 5% of earnings. 
Most of the rest had made no financial provision for their future or were focused on paying 
off theiƌ ŵoƌtgage aŶd ĐleaƌiŶg otheƌ deďts. EƋuiŶiti ĐoŶĐluded that theƌe is a ͚loŶg teƌŵ 
saǀiŶgs gap ǁhiĐh thƌeateŶs to ďeĐoŵe a fiŶaŶĐial tiŵe ďoŵď͛.52 
In November 2015, Scottish Widows and the Fawcett Society released a report called 
Women in Retirement which showed that only half of British women are saving enough for 
their retirement, while nearly a quarter are saving nothing at all. By contrast, 60% of men 
save adequately for retirement, and 15% do not save at all. Jackie Leiper of Scottish Widows 
said: ͚WheŶ it Đoŵes to attitudes toǁaƌds ƌetiƌeŵeŶt saǀiŶg, ǇouŶg ŵeŶ aŶd ǁoŵeŶ appeaƌ 
to be almost on a par, yet our research has identified an alarming divergence in the 30s 
ǁhiĐh Ŷeeds to ďe addƌessed. Whetheƌ it͛s haǀiŶg a faŵilǇ, takiŶg a Đaƌeeƌ ďƌeak oƌ 
                                                     
52 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Quarter of workers willing but unable to save – research, Professional 
Adviser, 20 October. 
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changing working patterns, we need to ensure that these life changes impacting women do 
Ŷot jeopaƌdise theiƌ futuƌe seĐuƌitǇ͛.53  
A Scottish Widows Retirement Report published in June 2015 paints a slightly more 
optiŵistiĐ piĐtuƌe of the ŶatioŶ͛s ƌetiƌeŵeŶt saǀiŶgs, ďased oŶ a suƌǀeǇ of ϱ,ϬϬϬ people. 
Whilst acknowledging that 6.2 million people (or 20% of the population) are still saving 
nothing for retirement and a further 19% have no savings or investments whatsoever, the 
report finds that ϱϲ% of the populatioŶ aƌe Ŷoǁ ŵakiŶg ͚adeƋuate͛ peŶsioŶ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs 
which the insurer defines as 12% of earnings. This is more than twice the 2006 contribution 
level (6%) and a third higher than the 9% level reached in 2013.54 A survey published by 
National Savings & Investments in July 2015 showed that monthly per capita savings have 
increased by 50% over the past decade from £68.85 in 2005 to £104.56 in 2015. However, 
this would not be adequate to provide a decent standard of living in retirement.55 
Despite these encouraging glimmers, we believe, on balance, that the following assessment 
is ŵoƌe ƌealistiĐ: ͚The DWP has ǁaƌŶed that ϭϭ.ϵŵ UK adults aƌe failiŶg to saǀe eŶough foƌ 
aŶ ͞adeƋuate iŶĐoŵe͟ iŶ lateƌ Ǉeaƌs. No ǁoŶdeƌ the Chaƌteƌed IŶsuƌaŶĐe IŶstitute 
estimated the total savings gap – just to deliver pensions at a level most people expect for a 
tolerable lifestyle – at aƌouŶd £ϵ tƌillioŶ͛.56 This ŵeaŶs that theƌe ǁill ďe a ͚Đƌisis poiŶt͛ aŶd 
it will happen much sooner than people possibly imagine. Robert Gardner, chief executive of 
investment consultant Redington, speaking at the 2015 NAPF annual conference, predicts 
that widespread social and eĐoŶoŵiĐ uŶƌest ǁill ďe Đƌeated ďǇ the UK͛s ageiŶg populatioŶ. 
Currently, one in six pensioners (1.8 million people) live in poverty. He expects this to 
increase to five in six pensioners over the coming decades.57 
The 2015 Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index places the UK pension system at the 
bottom of category B for good pension systems with a score of 65 out of 100, putting it in 
ninth position behind countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Australia. A key 
reason for this is low contribution rates. Glyn Bradley, senior associate at Mercer, said: 
͚Despite the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of auto-enrolment and record numbers of people in the UK 
eŶƌolled iŶ peŶsioŶ sĐheŵes, the UK is uŶlikelǇ to ŵake the A gƌade sooŶ. ͞HaǀiŶg a 
peŶsioŶ͟ is Ŷot the saŵe as haǀiŶg an adequate pension. The UK lacks the savings culture of 
other countries and current minimum auto-enrolment contributions are unlikely to deliver 
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 Reported in Rebecca Shahoud (2015), Only half of UK women saving enough for retirement, Professional 
Pensions, 18 November. 
54 http://www.scottishwidows.co.uk/extranet/working/about/reports/pension-report 
55 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) National savings up by half – is the message finally getting through?, 
Professional Adviser, 14 July.  
56 Quoted from KPMG (2015) 11.9 million failing to save enough for an adequate retirement income, 
advertorial in Financial News, 21-27 September. 
57 ‘epoƌted iŶ AŶdƌeǁ PeaƌĐe ;ϮϬϭϱͿ UK is headiŶg toǁaƌds a ͚peŶsioŶ Đƌisis͛, FiŶancial News, 15 October 
2015.  
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adequate retirement outcomes. [The UK is] also an aging society, with relatively high debt, 
and [its] public sector and state pensions are almost entirely unfunded. [Its] pensions 
system has a high degree of integrity by international standards, but its low scores on 
adeƋuaĐǇ aŶd sustaiŶaďilitǇ aƌe puttiŶg [it] iŶ daŶgeƌ of ďeiŶg ƌelegated to the ͚C' league͛.58 
In September 2015, BlackRock launched a retirement income tool, called CoRI, to allow 
consumers to determine how much they need to save to avoid running out of money in 
retirement. CoRI tells people of a given age what the cost of receiving a 'pound for life' from 
the age of 65. For example, on 22 September 2015, a 60-year-old (who will be 65 in 2020) 
would have to save £23.15 for every pound they want in their retirement. Users can then 
take the figure of their total savings and divide it by the value the index has produced to 
arrive at their annual retirement income for life. Someone with a pension pot of £250,000 at 
age 65 would receive a lifetime income of £10,799 (i.e., £250,000/23.15). The aim of CoRI is 
to inform people how much they need to save during their working lives to achieve a 
desired standard of living in retirement. Suppose someone wanted to have a pension of 
£5,000 p.a. in retirement. They would need a pension pot of £115,750 (£5,000 x 23.15). 
With an interest rate of 5% p.a., they would need to save £958 each year for 40 years. Chip 
Castille, Đhief ƌetiƌeŵeŶt stƌategist at BlaĐkƌoĐk said: ͚We haǀe a oŶce-in-a-generation 
opportunity to change people's attitudes – they need to understand with certainty whether 
their savings will provide a sufficient income to support their desired lifestyle in 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛.59  
The alternative to saving for retirement is to delay retirement, possibly indefinitely. This is 
the fate awaiting one in 10 Britons who are preparing to work until they drop, according to 
research by Baring Asset Management published in November 2015. One in three admitted 
they have no formal pension savings at all.60 A report entitled The Death of Retirement, 
released by Royal London in February 2016, found that someone contributing 8% of 
earnings from age 22 would need to work until 85 if they want to eŶjoǇ the ͚gold staŶdaƌd͛ 
of 67% of pre-retirement income which is then indexed to inflation and also provides a 
paƌtŶeƌ͛s peŶsioŶ. If they were content to live on the ͚silver standard͛ of 50% of pre-
retirement income they would have to work until 80.
61
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 Reported in Jack Jones (2015) Freedom and choice blamed for weakening UK savings system, Professional 
Pensions, 20 October. 
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 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) BlackRock launches 'future value of a pound' retirement tool, 
Professional Adviser, 22 September. 
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 Reported in Harvey Jones (2015) Millions of Britons are facing up to a retirement pot shortfall, Daily Express, 
24 November. 
61 Reported in Rebecca Shahoud (2016) Royal London: Decent retirement might mean working until age 85, 
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2. How to ensure that savers can get the best products in retirement  
͚I suppose I ought to eat oƌ dƌiŶk soŵethiŶg oƌ otheƌ; ďut the gƌeat 
question is, what?' The great question certainly was, what? Alice looked all 
round her at the flowers and the blades of grass, but she did not see 
anything that looked like the right thing to eat or drink under the 
circumstances.  
Lewis Carroll (1865), Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
In the past, most members of DC pension schemes were required to buy a lifetime annuity 
at some point during their retirement. The Budget on 19 March 2014 has changed that 
requirement, as well as opened up the possibility that new types of retirement products will 
become available. Not all of these will be appropriate, especially if they can lead to people 
spending all their pension savings before they die. We will examine the new products to see 
which are most suitable, given the new pension flexibilities. We then consider the most 
effective way in which scheme members can access the best of these products. In particular, 
ǁe ǁill look at hoǁ ͚loŶgeǀitǇ iŶsuƌaŶĐe͛ ;e.g., in the form of an immediate or a deferred 
lifetiŵe aŶŶuitǇͿ ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith ͚sĐheŵe dƌaǁdoǁŶ͛ to pƌoǀide a Đost-effective 
institutionally delivered retirement income solution that allows for flexibility in spending 
during retirement, while ensuring that savers do not run out of money before they die. We 
end by looking at the best way of helping people deal with stranded pots. 
2.1 Introduction 
Until recently, the only purpose of a pension scheme was to provide lifetime income 
security. Members of defined benefits (DB) schemes received a pension for life and 
members of defined contribution (DC) schemes had to buy a lifetime annuity and the 
annuity provider purchased low-risk bonds to back the annuity payments. The annuity, in 
effect, died when the member died and the annuity could not be bequested (unless a joint 
life annuity was purchased for a surviving partner).   
However, a combination of falling bond yields and increasing life expectancy resulted in a 
substantial reduction in annuity rates, making annuities more expensive.62 This was one of 
the factors that led to the introduction of income drawdown in DC schemes in 1995 as an 
alternative to an annuity. The pension scheme retained an investment in growth assets 
during the decumulation phase and this helped to generate an average return in excess of 
the return on bonds, although with the risk that the value of the assets in the pension pot 
could fall in times of financial market turbulence.63  
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 This does not necessarily make them poorer value. 
63
 It would be interesting to know, given the degree of global stock market turbulence since 2000, how many 
of those using drawdown have actually enjoyed a higher standard of living than they would have done had 
they instead bought an annuity. 
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When income drawdown was first introduced, it was a recommended strategy only for pot 
sizes above £250,000 and there was still a requirement to annuitise the remaining pot by 
age 75. Compulsory annuitisation ended on 6 April 2011. From that date, retirees with a 
minimum income requirement (MIR) of at least £20,000 from all state and DB pensions 
Đould ŵake use of ͚fleǆiďle dƌaǁdoǁŶ͛ and access any DC pension pot without any 
ƌestƌiĐtioŶs. AŶǇoŶe failiŶg to ŵeet the MI‘ ǁas ƌeƋuiƌed to use ͚Đapped dƌaǁdoǁŶ͛ ǁhiĐh 
restricted the annual amount that could be withdrawn to some multiple of the GAD rate, 
which was the amount from a single life level annuity as specified by the Government 
AĐtuaƌǇ͛s DepaƌtŵeŶt. The ŵultiple, ǁhiĐh is set aŶd ĐhaŶged by the Government, has 
varied between 100% and 150% of the GAD rate. As a result of these changes, drawdown 
providers lowered the minimum pot size they would accept to £75,000 – £100,000 
depending on the provider. However, the median pot size at retirement is currently around 
£17,000, the average pot size is £28,000 and only 10% of the 350,000-400,000 people who 
retire each year have pot sizes of £75,000 or more.64 
The ϮϬϭϰ Budget iŶtƌoduĐed a Ŷeǁ ƌegiŵe of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ foƌ all DC sĐheŵe 
members from age 5565 (whether retired or not).66 The most significant of these was that no 
one was required to annuitise at all.67 However, only a small number of people currently 
have a sufficiently large pot size to take full advantage of the new regime without risking 
running out of money before they die. With the success of auto-enrolment, pot sizes will, on 
average, be larger in future. Although pension contributions and pension adequacy are not 
formally part of our remit, it is worth restating the obvious point that in order to get a 
decent-sized pension pot for retirement, it is necessary to make adequate pension 
contributions (something of the order of 15% of pensionable salary,68 shared between the 
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 ABI annuity sales statistics. 
65
 To rise to 57 in 2028. 
66
 The enabling legislation for the Budget proposals was the Pension Schemes Act 2015, while the 
consequential changes to pension tax legislation were set out in the Taxation of Pensions Act 2014.  
67
 The risks associated with ending annuitisation were discussed in:  David Blake,  Edmund Cannon, and Ian Tonks (2010) Ending Compulsory annuitisation: What are the 
Consequences?,  Pensions Institute; 
www.pensions-institute.org/reports/EndingCompulsoryAnnuitisationConsequences.pdf;   David Blake,  Edmund Cannon, and Ian Tonks (2010) Ending Compulsory Annuitisation: Quantifying 
the Consequences, Pensions Institute; 
www.pensions-institute.org/reports/EndingCompulsoryAnnuitisationConsequences2.pdf;   David Blake (2014) The Consequences of Not Having to Buy an Annuity, Pensions Institute; 
www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp1409.pdf 
68 Lord John Hutton, former Work and Pensions Secretary, is the latest in a long line of people who have 
recommended that the UK adopts a national retirement savings target of 15% to avoid future pensioner 
poverty (reported in Ollie Smith (2015) Labour peer calls for 15% UK retirement savings target, New Model 
Adviser, 10 March). If people think that a 15% contribution rate is a lot, they should consider what happens in 
otheƌ ĐouŶtƌies. IŶ HollaŶd, foƌ eǆaŵple, the ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ ƌate is aƌouŶd ϮϬ%. As the DutĐh saǇ, ͚ǁe ǁoƌk 
FƌidaǇs foƌ ouƌ peŶsioŶ͛. IŶ “ǁedeŶ and Singapore, the contribution rate is even higher.  
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employer and scheme member) into a pension scheme which are then invested over many 
years.  
From 6 April 2015 (or Flexiday), individuals above the age of 55 will have to decide the 
retirement financial strategy for their DC pot. This comprises: 
 The investment strategy – the strategy for investing the pension pot   The withdrawal strategy – the strategy for withdrawing cash from the pension pot to 
finance expenditures  The longevity insurance strategy – the strategy for determining when longevity 
insurance is purchased and when it comes into effect.69 
There are three broad classes of product for delivering the retirement financial strategy: 
annuities, drawdown and hybrids (which combine drawdown and annuities). These products 
have different advantages and disadvantages in terms of withdrawal flexibility and 
investment risk and we discuss these at length in this Chapter.  
There are five legal forms70 for drawing funds from a DC pension scheme from 6 April 2015, 
as laid out in the Taxation of Pensions Act 2014 (all of which are subject to income tax at the 
highest marginal rate while the member is alive, although 25% of the pension fund can be 
taken as a tax free lump sum, kŶoǁŶ as a ͚peŶsioŶ ĐoŵŵeŶĐeŵeŶt luŵp suŵ͛):71 
 Lifetime annuities (LTAs). LTAs provide an income for however long the scheme 
member lives. Payments on LTAs can be guaranteed for a set period even if the 
member dies during that period. There are no death benefits with standard annuities 
unless they are joint life annuities or have a guarantee term. However, it is possible 
to buy a capital-protected LTA.  Capped drawdown. This option is not available for new schemes after 6 April 2015, 
but can continue if it was already in place on 5 April 2015. The member takes an 
income from the fund, but the income is capped at 150% of the equivalent annuity 
rate set by the Government AĐtuaƌǇ͛s DepaƌtŵeŶt, kŶoǁŶ as the GAD ƌate. The Đap 
will be reviewed every three years prior to age 75 and annually thereafter. The 
member can take up to 25% of the fund as a tax-free benefit. Whatever tax-free 
lump sum is taken, three times that amount ǁill ďe tƌeated as ͚ĐƌǇstallised͛ for tax 
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 A scheme without a longevity insurance strategy is NOT a pension scheme. 
70 Theƌe is teĐhŶiĐallǇ a siǆth pƌoduĐt Đalled ͚ŵoŶeǇ puƌĐhase sĐheŵe peŶsioŶ͛, ďut siŶĐe it is ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ Ŷot 
possible to move from a scheme pension to drawdown, it is likely that the popularity of this product will 
decline. 
71
 For more information about these choices, see: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales 
(2015) Freedom and Choice in Pensions: A Guide to the Pension Reforms; Aon (2015) Reward: In-depth Guide to 
Retirement and Pension Changes; Staffcare and LCP (2015) Your Essential Guide to Implementing Flexible 
Benefits; Retirement Intelligence (2014) The Retirement Advice Survival Guide 
(www.mgmadviser.com/retirement-advice-survival-guide). 
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purposes on the death of the member, with the remainder of the fund being 
͚uncrystallised͛.72 If members only take the tax-free lump sum, they can continue to 
make contributions to a scheme under capped drawdown up to the £40,000 money 
purchase annual allowance (MPAA) with tax relief available on contributions up to 
age 75. If they draw down more than the lump sum, the MPAA reduces to £10,000.  Flexible drawdown. There are no restrictions on what can be withdrawn from the 
fund. Prior to the Budget, flexible drawdown was only available to members who 
had a guaranteed income (known as the minimum income requirement (MIR)) of 
£20,000 from other sources, such as the state pension or a DB pension. Members 
choosing this optioŶ ǁill haǀe theiƌ peŶsioŶ fuŶd tƌaŶsfeƌƌed iŶto a ͚fleǆi-access 
dƌaǁdoǁŶ ;FADͿ fuŶd͛.73 The trigger event for a reduction in MPAA is the same as 
with capped drawdown.  Uncrystallised fund pension lump sum (UFPLS).74 The fund is drawn down in a series 
of payments when the member needs cash. The first 25% of each payment is tax free 
and the rest is taxed as income.75 What is left in the fund is ͚uncrystallised͛ on death. 
Members using this option have their MPAA for making additional contributions 
reduced to £10,000 and there will be no option to carry forward any unused annual 
allowance.   Trivial commutation. Members with up to three pension pots each of £10,000 or less 
from three different providers can take them as a lump sum rather than transfer to a 
drawdown policy. This means that up to £30,000 can be taken as a lump sum (which 
is now the trivial commutation limit). The first 25% is tax free and the rest taxed as 
income. Any residual balance on death will not be taxed, but will instead will be 
included in the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s estate foƌ iŶheƌitaŶĐe taǆ puƌposes.76  
The tax treatment of death benefits with capped drawdown, flexible drawdown and UFPLS 
is shown in Table 2.1, following the 2014 Taxation of Pensions Act. The Taxation of Pensions 
Act 2014 does not apply to DB schemes. 
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 See below. Essentially this means that this segment of the pension fund has not been accessed by the 
member for inheritance tax purposes. 
73 BeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ FADs aƌe sepaƌated iŶto depeŶdaŶts͛ FADs, ŶoŵiŶees͛ FADs aŶd suĐĐessoƌs͛ FADs. NoŵiŶees 
are those who are not dependants on the first death, while successors comprise all beneficiaries on the second 
death. The successor is named not by the member, but by the nominee, unless the member nominates a trust 
oŶ the fiƌst death ǁith tƌustees ǁho ǁill ƌefleĐt the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ǁishes.  
74
 Note this is not the same as the pension commencement lump sum which is tax free. 
75
 This option is only available from uncrystallised funds. It is not available in drawdown. It can therefore be 
offered by schemes which do not offer flexi-access drawdown. 
76 ͚IŶheƌitaŶĐe taǆ ;IHTͿ ƌules oŶ ǁheŶ a peŶsioŶ fuŶd ǁill ďe ĐouŶted iŶ the deĐeased͛s estate haǀe Ŷot 
changed. Generally, where the scheme member can bind the trustees to pay to a specified beneficiary who is 
Ŷot a depeŶdaŶt, it ǁill ďe tƌeated as paƌt of the deĐeased͛s estate for IHT. But where the trustees can exercise 
discretion, the funds will generally be outside IHT assessment. Most schemes operate on an expression of wish 
ďasis ;soŵetiŵes Đalled a ͚ŶoŵiŶatioŶ of ďeŶefiĐiaƌǇ͛Ϳ, ǁith the sĐheŵe adŵiŶistƌator making the final 
deĐisioŶ͛ (Source: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (2015, p.4) Freedom and Choice in 
Pensions: A Guide to the Pension Reforms). 
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The Pension Schemes Act 2015 allows scheme members to transfer all their DC benefits and 
leave their DB benefits in the scheme.77 It seems unlikely that the trustees of a DB scheme 
will allow their members to exercise the new flexibilities within the scheme itself and 
instead will require members to transfer the value of their benefits to a DC arrangement.78 
This Đould ďe a tƌaŶsfeƌ eitheƌ to the spoŶsoƌ͛s oǁŶ DC sĐheŵe if it has oŶe oƌ to aŶ eǆteƌŶal 
provider. In addition, the changes to the tax treatment of death benefits do not currently 
applǇ to DB sĐheŵes. A depeŶdaŶt͛s peŶsioŶ iŶ a DB sĐheŵe is taǆed at the depeŶdaŶt͛s 
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 Previously, all benefits had to be transferred. 
78 Reported in Natasha Browne (2015) Schemes likely to rebuff plans to extend freedoms directly to DB, 
PƌofessioŶal PeŶsioŶs, ϮϮ JaŶuaƌǇ. “iŵoŶ TaǇloƌ, paƌtŶeƌ at BaƌŶett WaddiŶghaŵ, said: ͚Fƌoŵ the sĐheŵes I͛ǀe 
spokeŶ to, theƌe͛s Ŷot a lot of iŶteƌest iŶ adŵiŶisteƌiŶg these fƌeedoŵs ǁithiŶ theiƌ DB sĐheŵe. I think it falls 
iŶto the ͚too diffiĐult͛ ďoǆ. You haǀe all soƌts of adŵiŶ aŶd aĐtuaƌial issues aďout hoǁ to ĐalĐulate the ďeŶefit 
that͛s left ďehiŶd. What do Ǉou do aďout adǀiĐe aŶd guidaŶĐe?͛. 
Table 2.1:  Tax treatment of death benefits with capped drawdown, flexible drawdown and 
UFPLS 
Age 
at 
death 
Paid from benefits which 
are: 
Benefit 
type 
Relevant 
time 
Tax Subject to Life 
Time  Allowance  
test? 
< 75 
years  
Crystallised Income < 2 
years 
Tax Free No 
< 75 
years 
Crystallised Income > 2 
years 
Tax Free No 
< 75 
years 
Uncrystallised Lump 
Sum 
< 2 
years 
Tax Free Yes 
< 75 
years 
Uncrystallised Lump 
Sum 
> 2 
years 
45% No 
< 75 
years 
Uncrystallised Income < 2 
years 
Tax Free Yes 
< 75 
years 
Uncrystallised Income > 2 
years 
Marginal No 
< 75 
years 
Crystallised Lump 
Sum 
< 2 
years 
Tax Free No 
< 75 
years 
Crystallised Lump 
Sum 
> 2 
years 
Tax Free No 
≥ϳϱ 
years  
Crystallised/Uncrystallised Income N/A Marginal No 
≥ϳϱ 
years  
Crystallised/Uncrystallised Lump 
Sum 
N/A 45% No 
Source:  Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (2015, p.5) Freedom and Choice in Pensions: A 
Guide to the Pension Reforms 
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marginal rate of tax irrespective of the age at which the member died. Further, death 
benefits can only be paid to a narrow group of dependants in DB schemes, whereas death 
benefits can be paid to any named beneficiary in a DC scheme.79 
Of equal importance to the pension product itself is the delivery or distribution vehicle, the 
arrangement through which the scheme member receives the pension product. 
Traditionally, the distinction was between institutional and retail distribution arrangements, 
but a new hybrid institutional-retail distribution arrangement is being considered. Currently, 
most DC scheme members have to go to the retail market to buy a pension product, even if 
theǇ haǀe ďeeŶ a ŵeŵďeƌ of theiƌ eŵploǇeƌ͛s peŶsioŶ sĐheŵe duƌiŶg the aĐĐuŵulatioŶ 
stage.80 But the retail retirement income market has a reputation for poor design and high 
charges. 
Although, the 2014 Budget will revolutionise the retirement income market, this will only be 
of any benefit to customers if the new market is both effective and efficient in terms of both 
pƌoduĐt desigŶ aŶd deliǀeƌǇ ĐhaŶŶels. It also Ŷeeds to ŵeet the Đustoŵeƌ͛s Ŷeeds as ǁell as 
recognise that retirement will no longer be a single point in time event in future, but instead 
will for many people be a process that takes place gradually over time.  
A good product for delivering retirement income needs to offer at the very minimum:81 
 Accessibility – the degree of flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis  Inflation protection either directly or via investment performance, with minimal 
involvement by individuals who do not want to manage the investment risk82  Longevity insurance. 
No single product meets all these requirements, but a combination of drawdown and a 
deferred (inflation-linked) annuity does, for example. So a well-designed retirement income 
plan will have to involve a combination of products. Mark Fawcett, chief investment officer 
of NEST, agrees with this. He argues that ͚foƌ ŵaŶǇ ŵeŵďeƌs, flexibility in the early stages of 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt is keǇ, as theǇ ǁill siŵplǇ Ŷot kŶoǁ ǁhat theiƌ iŶĐoŵe Ŷeeds ǁill ďe….[Hoǁeǀeƌ], 
as retirees get older, they need less flexibility and longevity risk becomes the most 
important risk. The most appropriate solution is therefore a hybrid product that blends 
                                                     
79
 Punter Southall (2015) Flexiday Briefing Note Issue 10, February. 
80
 This is unlike a defined benefit scheme in which the member receives a pension directly from the scheme. 
The exception would be members of group personal pension schemes. 
81
 This was suggested at a meeting with Ewan McCulloch and Stuart Patton Evans of Scottish Widows on 12 
May 2015. Other criteria for a good pension scheme are listed in Table 1.1. 
82
 This is confirmed by surveys discussed in the next Chapter. 
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drawdown in the early years and longevity insurance, with opt out options, in the later 
Ǉeaƌs͛.83 
Taking all these issues into account implies that the appropriate arrangement for providing 
income in the period between retirement (or more strictly the age at which the pension is 
first drawn) and the age at which the longevity insurance comes into effect: 
 Benefits from institutional design, governance, and pricing  Is simple to understand, transparent and low-cost  Requires minimal consumer engagement  Benefits from a low-cost delivery system. 
If any product satisfies these conditions as part of a hybrid solution in a good pension 
scheme (as specified in Table 1.1), it might be considered to be a ͚safe haƌďouƌ͛ pƌoduĐt.  
The term comes from the US Pension Protection Act 2006 which introduced auto-enrolment 
in the US and created a demand for safe harbour Qualifying Default Investment 
Alternatives, such as target-date funds, for 401(k) savings plans. Any adviser in the US 
recommending such a product cannot subsequently be sued for poor advice. So far the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has refused to grant safe harbour status to any UK 
investments. 
We now turn to an examination of the following issues:  
 The products on offer for investing the accumulated pension pot and for providing 
an income in retirement  Current and planned delivery systems for these products   The withdrawal strategy  The longevity insurance strategy  Charges, charge disclosure and proposals to cap charges  Product and provider regulation  How to deal with stranded pots 
2.2 The products on offer for investing the accumulated pension pot and for providing an 
income in retirement  
We discuss the three main ways of providing an income in retirement: annuities, drawdown 
and hybrid products.  
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 Quoted in Amanda White (2015), Best practice de-cumulatisation - a hybrid approach, Top1000funds, 14 
May. 
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2.2.1 Annuities84 
2.2.1.1 Lifetime annuities (LTAs) 
Lifetime annuities (LTAs) provide a guaranteed income for life for the scheme member 
(single life annuity) or for the scheme member and their partner (joint life annuity). There 
are two variations: level (the income is fixed for the whole period) and index-linked (the 
income increases with inflation). For the same premium, index-linked annuities pay a lower 
starting value than a level annuity: around 50% lower at age 55, 44% lower at age 65 and 
26% lower at age 75.85  The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) covers 100% of 
the value of an annuity in the event that the insurance company providing the annuity 
defaults.  
LTAs have two main advantages, as Tom McPhail, head of pensions policy at Hargreaves 
LaŶsdoǁŶ, poiŶts out: ͚theǇ pƌoǀide a guaƌaŶtee of iŶĐoŵe foƌ the ƌest of aŶ iŶǀestoƌ͛s life, 
however long that may be; they also allow investors to benefit from the ͞mortality cross-
subsidy͟,86 by sharing out some of the value of the pensions of those who die young, they 
iŶĐƌease the paǇŵeŶts to those ǁho liǀe loŶgeƌ. This is aŶ eǆtƌeŵelǇ effiĐieŶt sǇsteŵ͛.87  
LTAs also have a number of disadvantages. First, there is no flexibility to change the 
payments. Second, there is no residual fund with a single life annuity on the death of the 
annuitant, so it is not possible to bequest the annuity when the annuitant dies.
88
 Third, the 
investment return on LTAs is related to the return on bonds. This is because annuity 
providers, which must be established as life assurance companies, invest the proceeds from 
selling the annuity (i.e., the premium) in low-risk, low-return bonds and make the annuity 
payments from these.89 Further, due to the nature of the guarantees involved in providing 
LTAs, the life companies selling annuities face stringent capital requirements, the cost of 
which is inevitably borne by the annuitants. Nevertheless, the return on a LTA does increase 
the longer the annuity purchase is delayed, on account of the mortality premium being 
higher at higher ages.90 Finally, LTAs will become more expensive in the new pensions 
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 For more details, see Billy Burrows (2015) The Case for Annuities, Retirement Intelligence. Prior to the 2014 
Budget changes, 90% of annuities sold were level, 5% index-linked (or inflation-linked) and 5% investment-
linked  (ABI sales data 2014). 
85
 Cazalet Consulting (2014, p. 69) WheŶ I͛ŵ “iǆtǇ-Four, September. 
86
 The ͚ŵoƌtalitǇ Đƌoss-suďsidǇ͛ – also called ͚ŵoƌtalitǇ pƌeŵiuŵ͛, ͚ŵoƌtalitǇ dƌag͛, oƌ ͚ŵoƌtalitǇ Đƌedit͛ – arises 
because LTAs are a longevity risk pooling mechanism, whereby those dying earlier than their life expectancy 
cross-subsidise those who live longer.  
87
 Reported in Corporate Adviser, 29 September 2014. 
88
 This is not a design fault. It is a deliberate feature of the longevity risk pooling aspects of an annuity which, 
unfortunately, is not well understood by consumers. 
89
 The provision of annuities is not primarily an investment risk management business, rather it is a longevity 
risk management business. 
90
 The greater the age at which the pool starts, the greater the percentage of the pool that will die every year, 
and hence the larger the mortality premium that goes to surviving annuitants. 
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environment. This is, in part, because fewer annuities will be sold in future and, as a result, 
scale economies and the effectiveness of risk pooling will be reduced. It will also be because 
of the iŵpaĐt of ͚seleĐtioŶ͛ effeĐts: those ďuǇiŶg LTAs iŶ a ǀoluŶtaƌǇ ŵaƌket aƌe likelǇ to 
have higher life expectancies than those buying in a mandatory or compulsory purchase 
market and this will be reflected in their price. 
It is also important to bear in mind the following point about adviser fees. The FCA͛s ‘etail 
Distribution Review (RDR) banned advisers from receiving commission from product 
proǀideƌs aŶd pƌoǀidiŶg ͚fƌee͛ adǀiĐe to Đustoŵeƌs iŶ eǆĐhaŶge. IŶstead, fƌoŵ ϭ JaŶuaƌǇ 
2013, clients must pay advisers a fee for advice. However, if annuities are sold directly to 
consumers via a comparison website or platform, the FCA does not stop providers paying 
commission (of between 1-3%) to the owners of the comparison website or platform.91 So 
we have the anomaly that, on the one hand, customers using an adviser pay an advice fee 
but no commission, and, on the other hand, customers using a comparison website or 
platform indirectly pay commission but receive no advice, even though the commission 
might be equal to or higher than the fee might have been. Moreover, there is less consumer 
protection – via the FSCS – for customers who make the product choice, because, by so 
doing, they take responsibility for the decision. 
The Market Study on annuities by the Financial Conduct Authority (2014), together with the 
Occasional Paper by Aquilina et al (2014), found that annuities generally provided good 
value for money relative to alternative withdrawal strategies if they were purchased on the 
open market by someone in good health for their age and an average-sized pension pot.92 
But the FCA found that the current annuity market did not serve well the following types of 
customer: captive (or internal or rollover) customers of an insurance company accumulation 
fund who did not shop around,93 consumers in poor health who would have benefited from 
an enhanced annuity, and consumers with small pots. The failure of customers to shop 
around, despite being told about the open market option (OMO) – the right to buy an 
                                                     
91 A platfoƌŵ is ͚aŶ oŶliŶe adŵiŶistƌatioŶ seƌǀiĐe, ǁith a siŶgle poiŶt of contact to the investment market. It 
pƌoǀides adǀiseƌs aŶd ĐlieŶts ǁith a siŶgle ǀieǁ of the ĐlieŶt͛s eŶtiƌe poƌtfolio. A platfoƌŵ pƌoǀides the 
teĐhŶologǇ foƌ adǀiseƌs to ŵaŶage theiƌ ĐlieŶt͛s iŶǀestŵeŶts ŵoƌe effiĐieŶtlǇ aŶd ŵoƌe effeĐtiǀelǇ͛ ;Eŵŵa AŶŶ 
Hughes (2012) What is a platform?, FT Adviser, 4 April). Platforms provide portfolio valuation statements and 
poƌtfolio plaŶŶiŶg tools. TheǇ also Ŷeed to safeguaƌd ĐlieŶts͛ assets aŶd disĐlose sepaƌate platfoƌŵ, adǀiseƌ 
and fund manager fees. Platforms are typically provided by life insurance companies where they are also 
known as wrappers  (e.g., Cofunds which was owned by Legal & General at the time of writing) and by fund 
supermarkets (e.g., Vantage is owned by Hargreaves Lansdown), although there are some independent 
platforms. See Chapter 3 for more details. 
92 Financial Conduct Authority (2014), Retirement Income Market Study: Interim Report, Market Study 
MS14/3.2, December (http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/market-studies/ms14-03-2.pdf); Matteo 
Aquilina, Robert Baker and Tommaso Majer (2014), The Value for Money of Annuities and Other Retirement 
Income Strategies in the UK, Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional Paper No. 5, December 
(http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-5.pdf) 
93
 TheǇ ǁeƌe ͚deteƌƌed fƌoŵ eŶgagiŶg ǁith theiƌ optioŶs ďǇ the leŶgth aŶd ĐoŵpleǆitǇ of the ͞wake-up packs͟ 
sent out by providers͛ (p.6) in the period before they have to make their annuity decision. 
70 
 
annuity from a different insurer to the one which offered the pension savings scheme – is a 
serious problem. Figures from the Association of British Insurers (ABI) show that 60% of 
aŶŶuities sold iŶ the fiƌst Ƌuaƌteƌ of ϮϬϭϱ ǁeƌe ďought fƌoŵ Đustoŵeƌs͛ eǆistiŶg  iŶsuƌeƌs. IŶ 
some cases, this will be because the annuities have valuable guarantees not available with 
other providers. But, in many cases, it will be because they are, according to Tom McPhail, 
͚diseŶgaged fƌoŵ the ǁhole shoppiŶg aƌouŶd pƌoĐess͛.94 
Even for annuities sold on the open market, annuity rates have fallen by 73% since 2000 as a 
result of falling interest rates and increasing longevity. A study by Moneyfacts found that, if 
a 65-year old man who paid £100 a month into a typical personal pension fund for 20 years 
and bought a level annuity in 2015, he would receive an annual income of £2,109, compared 
with £7,748 if he had bought it in 2000. Richard Egan, pensions editor at Moneyfacts, said: 
͚The daǇs of ϭϱ Ǉeaƌs ago haǀe goŶe foƌeǀeƌ. The eĐoŶoŵiĐ Đliŵate has ǁoƌked ŵassiǀelǇ 
against retirees. Dreams of a comfortable retirement could easily be shattered unless 
individuals can either make up the pension shortfall through greater contributions or accept 
that theǇ ŵaǇ haǀe to delaǇ theiƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛.95  
As a result of the high proportion of captive customers who did not get a competitive rate 
and negative press coverage, the value of annuities is now severely underappreciated.  
However, annuities are being given a makeover and we will consider some examples below. 
There are also attempts to rebrand them as a ͚guaƌaŶteed iŶĐoŵe foƌ life͛ pƌoduĐt. IŶ the 
process, their critical role in well-designed retirement income plans will need to be 
explained much better. Customers need to understand the difference between investment 
and insurance – only insurance (an annuity) can provide a perfect hedge against longevity 
risk.  
LTAs sold on the open market (via the OMO) could be classified as safe harbour products.  
2.2.1.2 Short- or fixed-term annuities (FTAs) 
Short-term or fixed-term annuities are written under income drawdown rules and the 
product is classed as an investment within a drawdown plan, and, indeed, is sometimes 
ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚guaƌaŶteed dƌaǁdoǁŶ͛. This means the FTA could be either a single 
arrangement whereby the whole of the DC pot is used to buy a FTA or part of a drawdown 
portfolio that also includes investment funds. Although classed as drawdown, the product 
can, and usually is sold on a non-advised basis. Typical commission is about 2% of the fund. 
While products vary, the conventional FTA provides income payments for a set number of 
years, e.g., five. Traditionally, the annual income did not exceed the GAD maximum. The 
                                                     
94 Reported in Ruth Lythe (2015) Savers urged to shop around as two in three opting for an annuity take the 
first pension deal offered to them, Dail Mail, 1 July. 
95
 Reported in Rosie Taylor and Louise Eccles (2015) 75% fall in annuity income in 15 years: Ageing population 
and rock bottom interest rates blamed for the fall on pension income, Daily Mail, 14 September. 
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premium might be invested in a short-term gilts fund, but some products link the income 
level to a fund or index performance. As with LTAs, most sales of FTAs are for a level single 
life, but the policy can be set up on a joint life basis and with a guaranteed income period or 
a value-protection option to provide death benefits.  
At the end of the term, the insurer returns a percentage of the original premium as a 
maturity value, e.g., 80% after five years – the amount will depend on the number of years 
and the level of income chosen. The maturity value can be used to continue DC 
decumulation, for example, by purchasing another FTA, a LTA, or by using drawdown.  
The advantages of the FTA, like income drawdown, include the deferment of the LTA 
purchase, while still receiving a regular income. A traditional use of the FTA was to provide a 
bridging pension for an individual who had a DC pot that matured at age 60 and a good DB 
pension that began at age 65. In this case, it made sense to take the maximum income 
permitted from the FTA. The 2014 Budget allowed all pension pots to be accessed from age 
55 from April 2015. 
The main attraction of a FTA as promoted by providers is that when the fixed term ends, 
aŶŶuitǇ ƌates ŵight haǀe  iŵpƌoǀed aŶd/oƌ the iŶdiǀidual͛s health ŵight haǀe deteƌioƌated, 
in which case he or she might qualify for a higher LTA rate than would have been the case 
previously. However, the opposite might also occur, so the individual needs to be aware of 
the risks associated with uncertain future annuity rates (interest rate risk) and the 
iŶdiǀidual͛s futuƌe state of health ;loŶgeǀitǇ ƌiskͿ. These aƌe ǀery significant risks which, 
fƌoŵ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe, aƌe Ŷot so ŵuĐh uŶkŶoǁŶ as uŶkŶoǁaďle.  
There is, therefore, a danger that this product confers a potentially misleading sense of 
psychological security. Although it keeps the capital secure for a short period, it is Ŷot ͚safe͛ 
in terms of protecting future income sustainability, since it cannot guarantee the income 
that the maturity value will buy when it matures in, say, fiǀe Ǉeaƌs͛ tiŵe. This is a significant 
risk for low-income investors, especially if they are also conservative investors. Therefore, 
we would argue that fixed-term annuities might be more accurately described as short-term 
income drawdown. It will be important for the promotion of these products to avoid the use 
of the ǁoƌd ͚guaƌaŶtee͛, uŶless the pƌeĐise Ŷatuƌe of this ͚guaƌaŶtee͛ is eǆplaiŶed ĐleaƌlǇ. 
Moreover, the combination of income and return of fund can vary and we were told that 
some providers emphasise the higher income at the expense of maturity value. If the 
income taken at the outset is at the GAD maximum, the fund returned at the end of the 
term will be lower than if a lower income had been taken. If, at this time, interest rates are 
lower and less favourable mortality assumptions are being used to price new annuities, then 
the buyer of the FTA could end up with a lower income than if a LTA had been purchased 
from the start. We were informed that there needs to be a 10% increase in the prevailing 
annuity rate for the annuitant to break even, when compared with the purchase of a LTA 
from the outset. One adviser who ran a series of quotations for us showed that assuming no 
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changes in health, the income that could be purchased after five years is likely to be 
significantly lower. Reinvestment risk is therefore the main concern with this product, as 
well as the additional charges which include the new fee for advice or the new commission 
where a replacement annuity is purchased via a non-advice service.  
Legal & General has introduced two FTAs that it describes as ͚flexible retirement income 
products͛ which people with a larger pension pot can combine with flexible drawdown to 
produce the best combination of retirement income solutions for their circumstances: 
 A cash-out retirement plan, which offers a guaranteed level of income over an 
agreed time period and also allows for tax-efficient withdrawals to stop people 
exceeding their tax allowance  The fixed-term retirement plan provides a guaranteed level of income over an 
agreed time period with a cash lump sum at maturity.  
An example of a FTA provided by a fund manager rather than an insurer is the FTSE100 
Retirement Deposit Plan 1 launched by Investec Structured Products in August 2015. The 
product offers guaranteed income payments plus a bonus payment at maturity which is 
dependent on the level of the FTSE100 index at the time. The product – available only via a 
self-invested personal pension (SIPP) – offers fixed annual payments of either 5.25% (Option 
1) or 4% (Option 2) over its six-year term. Option 1 aims to return the full deposit amount 
provided the FTSE100 index is greater than 90% of its start level at maturity, while Option 2 
requires the index to be greater than 75% of its start level at maturity, to return the full 
deposit. Gary Dale, head of intermediary sales at IŶǀesteĐ “tƌuĐtuƌed PƌoduĐts, said: ͚IŶ 
today's financial environment of low interest rates and low gilt yields, it is more and more 
important to be able to ensure that capital lasts longer and retains its power to provide 
long-term income throughout the period of retirement. This new [plan] will help clients 
maximise income from their retirement funds at a time when the need for more 
competitive retirement income is clearly a priority within the post-ƌetiƌeŵeŶt ŵaƌket͛.96  
FTAs could NOT be classified as safe harbour products, since they do not hedge longevity 
risk.  
                                                     
96 Reported in Professional Adviser (2015) Structured product for retirees launched, 19 August. 
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2.2.1.3 Annuities with more flexible payments and more flexible terms, including 
marketability 
Annuities with more flexible payments 
HM Treasury (2014, p 14-15)97 announced that it was consulting on whether to allow 
annnuities to have more flexible payment terms that: 
 Allow lifetime annuities to decrease, which will provide significantly more flexibility 
around the design of the product. This will allow providers to offer products which 
ŵeet iŶdiǀiduals͛ Ŷeeds ŵoƌe ĐloselǇ, foƌ eǆaŵple, ďǇ alloǁiŶg aŶŶuitǇ paǇŵeŶts to 
reduce once an individual becomes eligible for the state pension   Allow lump sums to be taken from lifetime annuities, on the condition that this is 
specified in the contract at the point of purchase. This will allow providers to 
structure much more flexible products that are capable of meeting specific 
circumstances, such as care needs  Allow payments from guaranteed annuities to be paid to beneficiaries as a lump 
sum, where they are under £30,000. This will allow beneficiaries to receive pension 
payments as a lump sum if they wish, rather than having to spread these out over 
several years.  
AŶotheƌ pƌoposal is to haǀe ͚lifestǇle aŶŶuities͛ ǁhiĐh pƌoǀide aŶ iŶĐoŵe that depeŶds on 
which stage of retirement – early, mid or late – the annuitant is in. Specific examples of 
these are U-shaped and J-shaped annuities.98  A U-shaped annuity has payments that are 
initially high, then fall and later rise again. This is designed to match expenditure needs in 
the three periods of retirement: active retirement, inactive retirement and the final period 
of life when care costs start to impact. A J-shaped annuity is a U-shaped annuity which 
allows for the possibility that expenditure during the final phase of retirement might be 
higher than during the initial active phase. 
Annuities with more flexible payments could be classified as safe harbour products. 
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 HM Treasury (2014) Freedom and Choice in Pensions: Government Response to the Consultation, Cm 8901, 
July 2014;  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/332714/pensions_response
_online.pdf 
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 Suggested by Dr Ros Altmann (2014) Pensions revolution: how a 'J-shaped annuity' could revolutionise your 
retirement, Daily Telegraph, 21 July;  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/pensions/10979903/Pensions-revolution-how-a-J-
shaped-annuity-could-revolutionise-your-retirement.html 
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Annuities with more flexible terms 
A number of suggestions have been put forward to allow annuities to have more flexible 
terms. These include a cooling-off period after purchase and the ability to change the type 
of annuity, to switch provider and to sell the annuity. 
The former Pensions Minister, Steve Webb MP, had a pre-2014 Budget proposal to 
introduce a 12-month cooling-off period after the LTA purchase. The Government was 
aware of the intense pressure DC customers are under when they make their LTA purchase.  
The idea is that the cooling-off period would give retirees the chance to review and change 
what might have been a poorly informed decision. It would have the additional benefit of 
putting insurance companies and distributors on notice, since they would suffer if there 
were a mass exodus of customers in the first 12-months due to poor pricing and/or sales 
processes. Moreover, data on redemptions and repurchases would be very valuable for the 
industry and the regulators, as it would be possible to identify insurance companies that sell 
inappropriate products at uncompetitive rates and distributors that operate poor sales 
practices. 
Nevertheless, there are cost implications. Insurance companies would have to hold the 
premium in low-interest liquid assets for a year in case annuitants asked for their money 
back at the end of the cooling off period. Further, the annuity would have to be re-priced at 
the end of the year to reflect prevailing interest rates and any revised mortality 
assumptions. If insurance companies were required to honour the quote made a year 
earlier, then this would have to be sufficiently low to account for the risks that the insurance 
companies are carrying in the intervening period.  
Following the 2014 Budget reforms, this proposal should no longer be necessary at the point 
of retirement, particularly if scheme drawdown becomes the norm, since this would provide 
a breathing space pre- rather than post-LTA purchase. This would avoid the introduction of a 
potentially complex and costly process of LTA review, rebate and repurchase that the 
cooling-off period would entail, and the eƋuallǇ likelǇ daŶgeƌ of a ͚ĐhuƌŶ͛ ŵeŶtalitǇ 
developing among insurers and distributors, since they now have an incentive to bid for 
these clients during the cooling off period.  
Despite these concerns, the proposal still might be relevant for two reasons. First, the 
purchase of annuities for health/lifestyle reasons at the point of retirement might be 
inappropriate where the enhancements are small. It will be important to avoid annuitisation 
under the new regime, where the rationale is based on the availability of an enhancement 
without considering its merits relative to drawdown. Second, it will still be important when 
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DC retirees purchase a LTA in later life, since at this point it will be essential to achieve the 
best rate in the open market, based on the underwriting of health and lifestyle factors.99 
Currently, people cannot switch between products, such as between a single-life and a joint-
life annuity and vice versa if their circumstances change. In future, insurers could be allowed 
to offer policies that enabled members to switch from a joint-life to a single-life policy if 
their spouse or civil partner dies before them, or to make the opposite switch if they marry 
after purchasing a single-life annuity. 
Steve Webb, also had a pre-Budget proposal that would enable members to switch annuity 
provider post purchase. The proposal was met with fierce criticism by insurance companies, 
which argued that the cost of this flexibility would reduce LTA rates by about 25%.   
Insurance companies are buy-and-hold investors of the bonds used to make the LTA 
payments. They buy bonds with different maturities and make the annuity payments from 
the coupons and redemption payments on these bonds. The cash inflows from the bonds 
need to be received before the LTA payments are made in order to minimise the insurance 
ĐoŵpaŶies͛ holdiŶgs of liquid reserves.  
LTA payments typically are made monthly, but the coupon payments on the bonds are only 
received semi-annually. The required cash-flow matching exercise is complex and needs to 
be done in the most cost-effective way. Once the bonds are in place, they are held until they 
mature and then the redemption proceeds are used to buy new bonds at prevailing rates 
which might be higher or lower than the insurance company had initially predicted. This is 
known as reinvestment risk and insurance companies need to hold reserves to cover the 
possibility that interest rates are lower and therefore that the new bonds are more 
expensive than predicted.  
Insurance companies already have to accommodate in their reserves the possibility of 
adverse mortality experience, i.e., that realised mortality rates turn out to be lower 
(annuitants live longer) than predicted. If, in addition to this, insurance companies have to 
allow for the possibility that annuitants can sell back their annuities at any time, then this 
would certainly increase costs. Insurance companies would have to hold sufficient liquid 
reserves to avoid the possibility of having to sell some of the bonds needed to make 
payments to the remaining annuitants. This proposal has, to a certain extent, been 
superseded by the next proposal, namely the introduction of a secondary annuities market. 
Annuities with more flexible terms could be classified as safe harbour products. 
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 This is where insurers ask applicants to fill in a medical questionnaire relating to their health and lifestyle. 
Insurers will be aware that individuals who voluntarily purchase annuities are likely to know from their own 
aŶd theiƌ faŵilǇ͛s ŵediĐal histoƌǇ that theǇ ǁill haǀe aďoǀe aǀeƌage life eǆpeĐtaŶĐǇ aŶd iŶsuƌeƌs Ŷeed to get as 
accurate a fix as possible on their true life expectancy. 
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Secondary (or marketable or second-hand) annuities 
In the Budget on 18 March 2015, the Chancellor announced that annuitants could sell (or 
assign) their annuity for cash to the highest bidder (but not back to their annuity provider) 
from 6 April 2016.100 The proceeds could be paid directly to the seller or paid into a 
dƌaǁdoǁŶ aĐĐouŶt. IŶ ďoth Đases, taǆ oŶ ǁithdƌaǁal is paǇaďle at the iŶdiǀidual͛s ŵaƌgiŶal 
income tax rate.101 However, people who did this would not be allowed to claim means-
tested benefits to compensate for the loss of income, and people already on means-tested 
benefits would not be eligible. Also the annual allowance would be reduced to £10,000 if 
the option were exercised. Further, the option will not be open to someone receiving a DB 
pension. The institution buying the annuity would receive a taxable income for as long at 
the annuity seller is alive. Steve Webb had raised the possibility of selling annuities in 
January 2015.102 There are currently around 6 million people in the UK with annuities from 
their pension scheme.    
In July 2015, MorganAsh, a company that provides medical information for assessing 
longevity for the financial services industry, announced plans to operate a 'central annuity 
bureau' in the second-hand annuity market, following discussions with the FCA and other 
interested parties. The company proposed using medical underwriting to help in the 
valuation of the annuities brought to market. It said four key points had emerged during its 
discussions on annuity resale: 
 There is efficiency in undertaking the medical underwriting and other checks on the 
consumer just once and sharing among the various purchasers  There is merit in having one or a few central annuity bureaux (CAB) or portals that 
would undertake the medical underwriting and additional checks  There is merit in the CAB being independent from the purchaser and the seller to 
avoid bias  There is benefit to having some structure and order to the medical underwriting and 
tendering process. 
The company argues the CAB service could run as a commercial operation, rather than a  
government-sponsored organisation, on the grounds that: 
 Commercial organisations can be flexible and quick to provide solutions  The purchasers are likely to self-police the quality of the medical underwriting 
services, as they are likely to lose out if this service is poor or biased 
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 HM Treasury (2015) Creating a Secondary Annuity Market, March; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/413763/Creating_a_second
ary_annuity_market__print_file_.pdf 
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 In addition, there would be no tax-free allowance. 
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 Tim Ross (2015) Sell your pension for cash under radical plan, Sunday Telegraph, 4 January. 
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 90% of the systems and processes required already exist within commercial 
organisations.103 
There was some support for the idea of a secondary annuity market.  For example, Dr Ros 
Altmann suggested that the following would benefit:104 
 ͚People who purchased an annuity because they had no choice, but need the money 
now to repay debts or pay for health or care needs or other urgent spending͛  ͚People who have other pensions and for whom the annuity is not an important 
source of their retirement income͛  ͚People who purchased small annuities, for whom the small amount of ongoing 
income will make little difference to their standard of living in retirement. For 
example, someone with a £5,000 pension fund who bought an annuity at age 60 
might have less than £5 a week for life, whereas having a few thousand pounds 
straight away could make a real difference to their lives͛. 
Similarly, Stephen Lowe, group external affairs and customer insight director at Just 
Retirement, gives qualified support for the idea:  
As you would expect, we are passionate supporters of guaranteed income 
to provide simplicity and peace of mind through retirement. Yet we also 
support the power of innovation and choice to drive better value through 
individually tailored solutions. The secondary annuity market will free that 
small but significant minority of annuitants who could benefit by switching 
out of their current contract. 
So in what kind of scenarios might people benefit by trading their annuity 
in? 
• To ƌeĐoŶfiguƌe ďeŶefits – for example, to switch out of a single life 
annuity to provide income for a spouse, or to switch from regular income 
to more flexible arrangements 
• To pƌeseƌǀe ǀalue foƌ the next generation – trade the annuity and 
transfer the value into flex-access drawdown 
• To tuƌŶ iŶĐoŵe iŶto a luŵp suŵ – where people find they have sufficient 
income from other sources 
• To ƌatioŶalise a sŵall aŶŶuitǇ iŶĐoŵe – to switch an annuity paying a 
trivial income into a worthwhile lump sum, and 
• To eǆtƌaĐt ŵoƌe ǀalue fƌoŵ peŶsioŶs ĐoŶtaiŶiŶg guaƌaŶteed aŶŶuitǇ 
rates (GAR) for those people needing a lump sum – accept the GAR but 
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 Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) MorganAsh reveals secondary annuity market bureau plans, Professional 
Adviser, 1 July. 
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 Reported in Scott Sinclair (2015) Ministers 'to discuss' radical annuities-for-cash plan, Professional Adviser, 
12 March. 
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then trade the annuity to generate a lump sum above the current value of 
the DC pension. 
Our support for a secondary market depends on two major conditions. 
..[T]here needs to be robust consumer protection in place to ensure people 
considering selling their annuity fully understand the consequences. There 
also needs to be a transparent and competitive marketplace.105 
 
A secondary annuity market could also help DB plans hedge their longevity risk. According to 
Adam Michaels, partner at LCP, traded contracts could be bundled and sold to DB schemes 
to match pensions in payment, hedging changes in long-term interest rates and longevity 
improvements.106 
However, most industry insiders were not particularly enthusiastic about the proposal.  A 
Pensions Buzz poll in Professional Pensions of 135 trustees, scheme managers and industry 
figures found that only 30% thought it was a good idea.107 A ĐoŵŵoŶ ǀieǁ ǁas that ͚It is all 
too easy to imagine older pensioners being bullied by their families into selling their 
annuities for a lump sum for their own needs, leaving the pensioner more reliant on the 
state… I ĐaŶ͛t iŵagiŶe it ǁould ďe aŶ optioŶ ǁe ǁould adǀise takiŶg ofteŶ͛.108 Sales would 
need to be carefully regulated to prevent high-paying annuities bought before the fall in 
interest rates as result of quantitative easing being sold to unscrupulous companies for a 
pittaŶĐe. AŶotheƌ Ŷegatiǀe faĐtoƌ is the iŶsuƌaŶĐe ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s gƌoss pƌofit ŵaƌgiŶ. We were 
told this accounts for up to 20% of the original purchase price  and for the sale to be equally 
pƌofitaďle, the aŶŶuitaŶt ǁill ƌeĐeiǀe a ͚seĐoŶdaƌǇ sĐƌeǁiŶg͛.109 Some commentators have 
suggested that sales costs could be between 20% and 40% of the value of the annuity.110  
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) pointed out the complexity of the decision, especially for 
oldeƌ people: ͚EǀideŶĐe suggests that at least a sigŶifiĐaŶt ŵiŶoƌitǇ of aŶŶuitǇ holdeƌs – in 
particular, older annuity holders – may struggle with the complex decisions required in 
valuing their annuity compared to an alternative lump sum. This suggests that, at the very 
least, individuals will need to have access to good quality financial advice and guidance in 
order to navigate this new market – if, iŶdeed, suĐh a ŵaƌket does spƌiŶg iŶto eǆisteŶĐe͛.111 
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There would be a particular issue with joint life annuities in order to ensure that the 
interests of the second beneficiary were protected and that they were getting fair value for 
their foregone benefits. 
It was also not clear that all providers would find the pƌopositioŶ that attƌaĐtiǀe: ͚a lifetiŵe 
annuity is priced on the life and medical conditions of that particular customer. So if it is 
sold on, the new risks and medical conditions would need to be priced in as part of the 
tƌaŶsaĐtioŶ͛.112  There is a clear moral hazard problem, since there is nothing to stop an 
annuitant who develops a life shortening illness from trying to sell the annuity without 
informing the provider of their new medical situation.  There is also a clear adverse selection 
problem as the IF“ ƌeĐogŶises: ͚Who is ŵost likelǇ to ǁaŶt to Đash iŶ theiƌ aŶŶuitǇ? 
Someone who now knows they don't have long to live. How much will they get for their 
aŶŶuitǇ? Not ŵuĐh͛.113 
There would also be an expensive monitoring process to ensure that the annuity payments 
stop when the annuitant dies if the policy were sold to a third party. The seller would have 
to agree to regular certification of being alive (such as a monthly phone call) with the 
original insurance company. Finally, there is the issue of contract law. It is hard to change 
existing contracts if one side does not want to. Nevertheless, Toby Strauss, then chief 
executive of Scottish Widows, while acknowledging the contractual problems, thought that 
some new providers might be interested in investing in these income streams.114 
An obvious question is whether a second-hand annuity could be sold to a retail investor and 
the Government has ruled this out. A second-hand annuity would be similar to a traded life 
policy or life settlement. The FCA condemned these as ͚high-ƌisk, toǆiĐ pƌoduĐts͛ aŶd 
effectively banned them for sale to retail customers in 2014.115  More suitable buyers might 
be pension funds which wanted such assets to match their pensions in payment,116 but it is 
not clear how big a market this would be. A simpler solution would be to sell the annuity 
back to the original life company in exchange for a lump sum, subject to a medical 
examination, but how would a fair price be determined in this case? While it might be 
argued that the facility to surrender annuities would stimulate competition and prompt 
iŶsuƌaŶĐe ĐoŵpaŶies to offeƌ higheƌ ƌates iŶitiallǇ, the ĐalĐulatioŶ of the ͚suƌƌeŶdeƌ ǀalue͛ of 
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an annuity would prove complex and potentially allow the insurer to extract additional 
profit.117   
A survey by Saga of 2,000 existing annuity holders found that 20% would be willing to sell, 
ǁith those ǁith the sŵallest pots aŶd heŶĐe the loǁest iŶĐoŵes ͚ŵost likelǇ͛ to do so. The 
main reasons are as follows: 58% said their monthly income is too small to be able to do 
anything meaningful with it, 30% said they would use the cash to invest in an ISA or the 
stock market, and 12% said they would spend the money on luxuries such as cars and 
holidays.118  A survey of 1,800 retirees by Tilney Bestinvest found that 17% would consider 
selling their annuity, 33% said they would not sell, while 50% stated they did not know what 
their plans were.119 
Another survey, this time of 1,531 over-55s conducted by YouGov and sponsored by the 
Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (IFoA) found that 55% of annuitants would avoid cashing 
in their policies on a secondary market, despite only 48% believing their policy to be good 
value. Only 9% said they would be tempted because they had not wanted to buy it in the 
first place, and an additional 10% said they were in a position to cash in their annuity 
because they had another source of income. Around 40% agreed there was a high risk they 
would end up worse off if they cashed in their contract. Gareth Connolly, chairman of the 
IFoA peŶsioŶs ďoaƌd, said: ͚It ƌeŵaiŶs to ďe seeŶ hoǁ ŵuĐh deŵaŶd theƌe ǁill ďe iŶ pƌaĐtiĐe 
for buying secondary annuities once the market has developed, and whether they will be 
good value for pensioners. As the YouGov survey demonstrates, annuities will continue to 
play an important role in the pensions market as people value the certainty they provide. 
Access to adequate financial advice will be vital for pensioners in understanding the pros 
and cons, and the inherent risks, relating to the new option they will have available. Many 
annuitants will likely be amongst the most vulnerable in society. It is therefore crucial that 
the implications of choices are fully understood and that consumer safeguards are in place 
to reduce the risk of mis-selliŶg͛.120  
In July 2015, the Government announced that the introduction of a secondary annuity 
market would be delayed until April 2017, much to the relief of industry. Huw Evans, 
diƌeĐtoƌ geŶeƌal of the ABI, said: ͚The Ŷeǁ tiŵetaďle aŶŶouŶĐed todaǇ is a ǀeƌǇ ǁelĐoŵe 
move and follows strong representations from the industry that the previous timetable was 
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too quick. Providers want the reforms to the secondary annuity market to work for 
customers and it is right more time is allowed to get the right structures and regulation in 
plaĐe ďefoƌe goiŶg ahead͛.121 The same announcement also allowed the annuity to be sold 
back to the original annuity provider. 
Marketable annuities could be classified as safe harbour products.  
2.2.1.4 Annuities with guarantees 
Extended guarantee annuities 
HM Treasury (2014, p 14-15)122 announced that it would remove the 10-year guarantee 
period limit for guaranteed annuities and allow payments to be made to beneficiaries from 
guaranteed annuities to continue beyond the current 10-year maximum. This will allow 
pƌoǀideƌs to Đƌeate aŶŶuities that eŶsuƌe ŵoƌe of aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s fuŶd is ƌetuƌŶed to theiƌ 
families in the event of their death. 
However, such extended guarantee annuities are expensive to offer and it appears unlikely 
those over 75 would be permitted to buy them. 
Annuities with extended guarantee periods could be classified as safe harbour products.  
Annuities with capital protection  
One way to overcome members fears of losing their capital when they die is the capital-
protected (also known as the value-protected or money-back) annuity. This might be more 
attractive than an annuity with a 10-year guarantee period.123  
These annuities work by gradually phasing into full annuitisation over a period of time. Only 
a small amount of the fund is annuitised in the first year after retirement, and then there is 
a gradual increase in the percentage of the fund annuitised, with full annuitisation occurring 
only by around age 80, after which age the entire remaining fund will be lost on death in 
exchange for the lifetime income guarantee. 
The capital-protected annuity removes one of the single biggest consumer objections to 
annuities: ͚If I die sooŶ afteƌ I ƌetiƌe, the aŶŶuitǇ pƌoǀideƌ ǁill keep ŵǇ fuŶd͛. The ͚liǀe oƌ die͛ 
guarantee of the member getting their money back is very easy to explain and avoids 
uncertainty by allowing the member to lock into investment and longevity guarantees to 
provide guaranteed lifetime income.  
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The cost of the capital protection is around 7% for a standard healthy life and 14% for an 
unhealthy life.  In October 2014, the best annuity rate for a standard 65-year old male with a 
£100,000 pension pot was £6,024 pa, while it was 7% lower for a 100% capital-protected 
annuity at £5,596. For a 65-year old male who survived a heart attack, the rate was £7,130, 
while full capital protection lowered the rate to £6,119, which is 14% lower.124 
In April 2015, MGM Advantage introduced a capital-protected annuity which offers retirees 
a selection of guarantee options with improved death benefits. This is achieved through 
either an extended income guarantee period of up to 30 years or returning the fund balance 
in a lump sum. Another option is for a capital protection benefit of up to 100% of the initial 
purchase price, giving a lump sum on death at any age. Andrew Tully, pensions technical 
diƌeĐtoƌ at MGM, said: ͚The ŵoŶeǇ-back guarantee is a cost-effective option that everyone 
should consider, and which can be designed to suit the needs of individual customers. This 
gives families peace of mind that the money invested in providing a secure income won't be 
lost and removes the understandable sense of financial injustice that can sometimes be felt 
ǁheŶ a holdeƌ dies eaƌlǇ. [MGM͛s oǁŶ ƌeseaƌĐh shoǁed that ĐoŶsuŵeƌs do still ǁaŶt a 
seĐuƌe iŶĐoŵe foƌ life, so] it͛s iŵpoƌtaŶt that aŶŶuities aƌe ƌeiŶǀigoƌated so theǇ ĐaŶ ƌeŵaiŶ 
central to retirement planning in the future͛.125 
Annuities with Đapital pƌoteĐtioŶ could be classified as safe harbour products.  
Ruin-contingent life annuities  
AŶotheƌ tǇpe of aŶŶuitǇ ǁith guaƌaŶtees is the ƌuiŶ-ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt life aŶŶuitǇ ;‘CLAͿ ǁhiĐh 
ŵakes paǇŵeŶts ďased oŶ tǁo ĐoŶtiŶgeŶĐies ƌelated to loŶgeǀitǇ aŶd ǁeak iŶǀestŵeŶt 
peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe. A ‘CLA is an annuity that pays out only if both the pensioner is still alive at a 
certain date and there has been weak investment performance prior to that date. The 
payments are inflation protected.   
RCLAs are not currently available in the UK. 
2.2.1.5 Investment-linked annuities (ILAs) 
This tǇpe of aŶŶuitǇ ;also kŶoǁŶ as ͚iŶǀestŵeŶt-ďaĐked͛Ϳ, ǁhiĐh aĐĐouŶts foƌ ϱ% of total 
annuities sold, invests the premium in one or more funds. There are two types: with-profits 
annuities (WPAs) and unit-linked annuities. As the name suggests, the former invests in a 
with-pƌofits fuŶd; the latteƌ iŶǀests iŶ the aŶŶuitaŶt͛s ĐhoiĐe of a ƌaŶge of unit-linked funds, 
which can be actively or passively (indexed) managed. The income, which is set at the outset 
with reference to the prevailing annuity rate and an assumed investment return, might 
fluctuate significantly, depending on the choice of fund. On average over the long run, a 
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higher income should be achieved by an ILA which invests in growth assets compared with a 
LTA which invests mainly in bonds, but this is not guaranteed. 
ILAs offer a similar range of features to the LTA, such as single or joint life, a guaranteed 
period, and different payment frequencies. We understand that enhanced terms can also 
apply. Some providers set a guaranteed floor below which the income will not fall, which 
might be around 50-55% of the LTA rate at the time of purchase. As with a standard annuity, 
a mortality premium is built into the return, although this is likely to be smaller than with a 
LTA because, in general, it is only the wealthier and healthier annuitants who buy this 
product.  
While favoured by some experts, due to the potential for income growth, there are 
important considerations that might make this product unsuitable for some people: 
 Standardisation – There is little standardisation in product design, which makes it 
very difficult to compare like with like. Nevertheless, the purpose of the ILA is to 
combine the best features of drawdown – maintaining an investment in growth 
assets in the immediate period after retirement – with the best features of an 
annuity – providing longevity insurance. In principle, if it were well designed and 
offered good value for money, the ILA would be an attractive competitor to 
drawdown, particularly if it included capital protection features which are currently 
not common. It is also more attractive than a LTA for those who would not qualify 
for an enhanced LTA rate and who have no partner or dependants to consider. The 
ILA might also represent a suitable component part of a mixed portfolio of DC 
decumulation products.  Cost – Annual costs are estimated at about 2% p.a., with a higher charge in the first 
year to include the cost of advice.  However, we were shown many examples where 
the costs were not easy to calculate. Nevertheless, charges are typically lower than 
with drawdown  Investment risk – Investment risk and income risk are closely connected, as we show 
in the more detailed consideration of the with-profits annuity below. The perceived 
attraction of the ILA is that it will deliver a higher income over time than is possible 
with the LTA, therefore the fund must generate a minimum level of growth, after 
charges, so that the actual maximum income that can be drawn is higher than that 
offered by the LTA rate that was available at the date of purchase. 
Example: With-profits annuities 
To explore the risks of the ILA, we focus on the with-profits version. It is significant to note 
that the with-profits market is generally in decline, as a result of reputational damage 
caused by Equitable Life and with-profit mortgage endowment policies. Nevertheless, 
several providers – including mutual insurers – continue to offer the fund as a general 
investment. The important point here is that the choice of provider and its financial strength 
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(which indicates its ability to support future bonuses, among other factors) is crucial. Where 
a provider closes its with-profits book to new business, the investment strategy will become 
more cautious as the book matures.  
With-profits funds invest in a range of asset classes, for example, bonds, equities and 
property. The declared annual bonus is set to provide a smoothed – generally growing – 
income from the fund, unlike the income from a unit-linked fund which is much more 
volatile since the value of the units directly reflects the value of the underlying fund. The 
smoothing mechanism requires the holding of a reserve, with the objective of delivering a 
fairly stable income even during periods where the markets are volatile and falling.  
How the bonus is calculated is not at all transparent to customers. The initial income is set in 
accordance with basic LTA principles, but the future income in a particular year depends on 
the relationship between the declared bonus – which represents the actual ͚ƌetuƌŶ͛ oŶ the 
fund to the annuitant in that year – and the anticipated bonus rate (ABR) – which is the 
projected growth rate of the fund. The annuitant – with the help of his or her adviser, where 
relevant – can increase the starting income by selecting a higher ABR.  
The Retirement Academy describes the process as follows: 
The ABR can currently be anywhere between 0% and 5% and effectively 
allows a policyholder to borrow against future income payments. At the 
end of the year, the anticipated bonus is subtracted from the annuity 
before adding the actual bonuses declared in that year. If the anticipated 
bonus is lower than the declared bonus, the annuity payments increase 
and vice versa.  
For example, if you select a 4% ABR, the starting income will be similar to a 
standard level annuity. This makes sense because standard annuities are 
priced in relation to yields on fixed interest bonds which in normal market 
conditions are around 4%. The ABR is effectively the yield on which the 
WPA is priced. Whereas the yield on the standard annuity is fixed for the 
term of the annuity, the annual bonuses on WPAs change every year. 
This means that, if in year two the declared WPA bonus is higher than the 
ABR, the WPA income will increase, whereas, if the bonus is lower the 
WPA, income will fall. 
Example 
Assume a WPA with an ABR of 4% pays a starting income of £ 1,000 p.a.  
If the year 2 declared bonus is 5%, the Year 2 income increases to 
£ 1,000 x [1.05 (Declared bonus) – 1.04 (ABR)] = £1,010  
However if the year 2 declared bonus is 3%, the Year 2 income decreases to   
£ 1,000 x [1.03 (Declared bonus) – 1.04 (ABR)] = £ 990  
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A few insurance companies have tried to launch a product that invests part of the premium 
in a LTA and part in a with-profits annuity. However, we understand that these products 
have been withdrawn after a short period.  
Despite the current poor reputation of with-profit products, there is great value to having a 
product which smooths out investment returns (using a smoothing fund) and provides an 
income for life.126 Theƌe is theƌefoƌe a stƌoŶg Đase foƌ ͚ƌe-iŶǀeŶtiŶg͛ ǁith-profit annuities 
with a new name. However, this will only be successful if there is much greater transparency 
over how the smoothing is done and also over costs. 
If the issues surrounding standardisation, cost and investment risk can be resolved, then ILAs 
(with a minimum income underpin127) could be classified as safe harbour products. 
2.2.1.6 Deferred annuities 
With a deferred annuity, a premium is paid when the annuity is purchased, but the income 
received does not start for a number of years. In the case where the income does not begin 
until the purchaser has reached a high age such as 80 or 85, the annuity is known as an 
advanced life deferred annuity (ALDA). In the standard case, the premium is non-refundable 
if the purchaser dies before the payments begin. 
A deferred annuity is potentially an ideal asset in a drawdown programme. It would, 
however, require investment managers to partner with insurance companies to provide 
ALDAs.   
However, there are a number of important hurdles to cross. First and foremost is the fact 
that a deferred annuity market does not currently exist in the UK. There used to be a market 
for deferred level annuities for the self-employed, but a combination of high inflation in the 
1970s and more onerous regulatory capital requirements under various EU solvency capital 
requirements led to its demise. Solvency II, introduced in January 2016, will not help. 
Second, deferred annuities would need to be medically underwriten and this will add to 
costs. Third, there is the reluctance of individuals to buy deferred annuities because they 
are concerned that they might die during the deferment period. 
A keǇ ƋuestioŶ is: ͚ǁill defeƌƌed aŶŶuities ŵake a ĐoŵeďaĐk?͛. AdƌiaŶ BouldiŶg, Pension 
Quality Mark chairman, believes they could do. He points to the growing success of 
͚loŶgeǀitǇ iŶsuƌaŶĐe͛ iŶ the U“ ǁhiĐh is the U“ Ŷaŵe foƌ a defeƌƌed aŶŶuitǇ. It ǁoƌks ďǇ 
using 10-15% of the pension pot at age 65 to buy longevity insurance. Mr Boulding believes 
that having to pay for longevity insurance upfront might put people off and prefers the idea 
of monthly instalments. Simon Chinnery, head of UK defined contribution at J.P. Morgan 
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Asset Management, also believes deferred annuities will make a ĐoŵeďaĐk: ͚There will still a 
place for annuities as the primary retirement vehicle for those wanting certainty, but we're 
likely to see more investors incorporating partial or deferred annuities as one part of a 
ǁideƌ iŶǀestŵeŶt ŵiǆ͛.128  
Others doubt whether this will happen. Adrian Kennett, director at Dalriada Trustees, said: 
͚Who is goiŶg to ǀoluŶtaƌilǇ ďuǇ this pƌoduĐt? If you are taking your DC benefit flexibly, you 
are doing that because you want the cash now. The only way that product will fly is if 
someone legislates to say you have got to buy it – and that is not going to happen because 
that goes against the pension freedoŵs͛. Daǀid Haƌƌis, ŵaŶagiŶg diƌeĐtoƌ of TOR, argues 
that communicating the benefits of deferred annuities would be a challenge: ͚TheǇ aƌe 
ŶotoƌiouslǇ ĐoŶfusiŶg aŶd ĐoŵpliĐated to eǆplaiŶ͛. 
Andy Cheseldine, partner at LCP, believes it is a matter or ďƌaŶdiŶg: ͚If Ǉou asked people, 
͞ǁould Ǉou like to ďuǇ aŶ aŶŶuitǇ?͟, ϵϬ% of people ǁould saǇ ͞Ŷo, Ŷo, that's hoƌƌid͟. But, if 
Ǉou asked, ͞ǁould Ǉou like aŶ iŶsuƌed guaƌaŶteed iŶĐoŵe iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt?͟, a lot of them 
ǁould saǇ ͞Ǉes͟. It's the saŵe thiŶg, it's just aŶŶuities haǀe had a ďad pƌess͛.  Mƌ CheseldiŶe 
accepts that deferred annuities could be expensive, but believes the strengths outweigh the 
ǁeakŶesses: ͚It ǁill look eǆpeŶsiǀe Ŷo ŵatteƌ hoǁ Ǉou do it, ďut ďeiŶg eǆpeŶsiǀe does Ŷot 
make it poor value. I think it would be popular if you get it right. There are some people who 
would not be able to afford it and just take cash. If you are going to take your income over 
the long term, then this is a really good safety net and does make sense. These products will 
theŶ ďe populaƌ ďeĐause it ŵeaŶs people aƌe Ŷot ƌuŶŶiŶg out of ŵoŶeǇ iŶ old age͛.  
Mark Stopard, head of product development at Partnership, believes that the way that 
deferred annuities are sold – through the retail market or packaged up as part of an 
integrated institutional solution – ǁill also haǀe aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt iŵpaĐt: ͚Fƌoŵ the Đustoŵeƌ's 
point of view, it needs to be a packaged solution. As soon as you ask consumers to buy an 
add-on, it becomes a more complicated and difficult decision for consumeƌs͛.  
Deferred annuities could be classified as safe harbour products. One fundamental problem, 
however, is that a deferred annuity market does not currently exist in the UK. Another is that 
level deferred annuities would be subject to inflation risk. 
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2.2.1.7 (US-style) Longevity Insurance Annuities 
The 2014 Budget overhaul of the DC decumulation tax rules, and, in particular, the new 
regime after Flexiday, will – or certainly should – focus attention on the value of the LTA as 
an insurance product that provides a perfect longevity hedge for pensioners in later 
retirement, when insurance against living beyond their life expectancy becomes a more 
important consideration than investment returns. Such a focus would recognise that the 
real weakness in the new DC regime is the long tail of longevity risk that individuals must 
bear.129 
In the US, one form of DC decumulation for those with 401(k) pension plans130 is to split the 
fund, say, 85/15, between a drawdown product and a deferred annuity product. The 
former, kŶoǁŶ as a ͚ƌolloǀeƌ͛ oƌ iŶĐoŵe ƌetiƌeŵeŶt aĐĐouŶt ;I‘AͿ, opeƌates iŶ a siŵilaƌ ǁaǇ 
to income drawdown. The latter can come in one of two forms: a deferred income annuity 
(DIA) or, since 2014, a longevity insurance annuity (LIA).  The distinction is that DIAs can 
start at any age, while LIAs start at advanced ages.  LIAs are also known as an advanced life 
deferred annuities or simply as longevity insurance. They begin to pay out at a date in very 
late retirement, e.g., age 80 or 85, if the DC customer survives to that age, although they 
could start as early as age 70.  Both types are purchased at the time of retirement.  
When they are purchased through IRAs, LIAs are provided on a gender basis.  LIAs are also 
available through employer-sponsored plans under ERISA,131 but in this case must be 
provided on a unisex basis. Because annuities sold on a unisex basis disadvantage men and 
the extent of the disadvantage increases with age, men are reluctant to buy unisex LIAs. 
One of the respondents to our consultation told us: ͚IŶ ŵǇ ǀieǁ, a ŵaƌket foƌ loŶgeǀitǇ 
insurance annuities is not viable in the UK, because they would be offered only on a unisex 
basis. The difference in life expectancy by gender at older ages makes these annuities 
unfavourable to males, so, in principle, they would only be offered based on female 
mortality rates. To my knowledge, nowhere in the world is there a viable unisex longevity 
iŶsuƌaŶĐe ŵaƌket͛.  
The basic LIA is pure insurance: it only pays out if the insured individual lives until the 
specified age. It is possible to buy certain features, which reduce the rate, e.g.:  
 Death benefit – if the annuitant dies before the start of payments, the insurance 
company returns the value of the fund and, in some cases, adds an amount for 
interest.  
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 Cash refund – if the annuitant dies after payments commence, the balance of the 
fund is paid to his or her beneficiaries.     Early payment – this can be arranged with some providers, for example, where the 
annuitant has to go into a nursing home. This element is also known as a life-care or 
immediate needs annuity (see Section 2.2.1.8). 
Only a small number of US life companies offer LIAs, notably, New York Life Insurance  
Company, Symetra Life Insurance Company and Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance 
Company.  New York Life is currently the largest seller, although only 4% of the purchasers 
of these annuities buy a pure LIA; the rest are LIAs with death benefits. Fidelity and 
Vanguard sell DIAs.  LIAs are also sold in Chile, but not currently in the UK. 
The combination of tail-end longevity insurance (via a LIA) and drawdown potentially 
sounds an attractive proposition, but there are some problems. The first is the regulations 
on unisex annuities, although this could possibly be circumvented by individual 
underwriting. Second, the standard LIA is a level annuity, so the impact of inflation is likely 
to be significant by the time the annuitant begins to draw the income. Third, from a 
regulatory perspective, LIAs are capital intensive for insurers to provide in the absence of a 
longevity hedge.132   
Nevertheless, if these problems can be overcome, LIAs could be classified as safe harbour 
products.133 As with deferred annuities, it would be important to recognise that level LIAs 
would be subject to inflation risk. 
2.2.1.8 Annuities linked to health status 
Enhanced Annuities 
There are two types of enhanced annuity: 
 Lifestyle annuity – provides higher annuity payments to an individual who has a 
loǁeƌ life eǆpeĐtaŶĐǇ thaŶ a tǇpiĐal ŵeŵďeƌ of that iŶdiǀidual͛s Đohoƌt as a ƌesult of 
the iŶdiǀidual͛s lifestǇle. AŶ eǆaŵple is aŶ iŶdiǀidual ǁho sŵokes oƌ is oďese. A 
smoker can get a 10-15% higher annuity payment than a non-smoker of the same 
age.134 
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 Impaired life annuity – provides higher annuity payments to an individual who has a 
medical impairment which lowers their life expectancy. Examples would be heart 
disease, high ďlood pƌessuƌe, ĐaŶĐeƌ, aŶd PaƌkiŶsoŶ͛s disease. “oŵeoŶe ǁith 
prostate cancer can get a little more than twice the amount paid to a normally 
healthy person of the same age.135 
All enhanced annuities are medically underwritten: individuals applying for one need to fill 
in a health questionnaire and might also need to give permission to their doctor to show the 
insurer their medical records. If the health questionnaire contains an extensive set of 
ƋuestioŶs aŶd the iŶsuƌeƌ also ŵakes a detailed eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of the appliĐaŶt͛s ŵediĐal 
records, a procedure known as full underwriting, the applicant might be offered a much 
higher annuity than the standard annuity, since the insurer will now have a better estimate 
of the appliĐaŶt͛s ƌeduĐed life eǆpeĐtaŶĐǇ. If, oŶ the otheƌ haŶd, the health ƋuestioŶŶaiƌe is 
short and there is no exaŵiŶatioŶ of the appliĐaŶt͛s ŵediĐal ƌeĐoƌds, a pƌoĐeduƌe kŶoǁŶ as 
light underwriting, the level of enhancement offered might be quite small compared with a 
standard annuity.136     
Billy Burrows argues that enhanced annuities are hard to beat when compared to 
drawdown (in The Case for Annuities, April 2015). The annuity specialist Partnership 
estimates around 65% of people could qualify for an enhanced annuity.137 
Immediate-Needs/Long-Term Care Annuities 
The standard benefit from a long-term care (LTC) insurance policy is a particular type of LTA 
known as an immediate-needs or long-term care annuity. This will pay an income for the 
ƌeŵaiŶdeƌ of the poliĐǇholdeƌ͛s life aŶd the iŶĐoŵe is used to fund long-term care for the 
policyholder.  
It is important to bear in mind that, while an immediate-needs or LTC annuity is payable for 
life, there is no guarantee that the annuity will provide sufficient income to cover the full 
cost of the care required. This might be because the inflation rate in LTC provision is much 
higher than the general inflation rate. There are also tax benefits if the annuity is paid 
directly to the care or nursing home: the policyholder is not liable to income tax on the 
annuity payments.  
It is also important to recognise the possibility that the policyholder might eventually 
experience dementia and that this should be prepared for by the policyholder assigning a 
power of attorney to a family member or solicitor who would, if necessary, take 
responsibility for spending the income under the annuity. 
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Tom McPhail and Patrick Gale, Defaqto non-executive chairman, have proposed that the 
Government allow savers to access their pension pots tax free to pay for long-term care,138 a 
move supported by Dr Ros Altmann, then the Government͛s ďusiŶess ĐhaŵpioŶ foƌ oldeƌ 
workers, in her report  A New Vision for Older Workers released in March 2015.139 
Both enhanced annuities and iŵŵediate-Ŷeeds/loŶg-teƌŵ Đaƌe aŶŶuities could be classified 
as safe harbour products. 
2.2.1.9 State annuities 
On 2 April 2014, the Government announced the details for its plan to allow pensioners and 
those who reach pension age before 6 April 2016 to top-up their state pension by up to £25 
per week.140 The offer, which will be available for 18 months starting in October 2015, will 
enable people to get a higher inflation-proofed state pension by making Class 3A Voluntary 
National Insurance Contributions. The cost is based on age and takes account of average life 
expectancy. For a 65-year-old, an extra £1 of weekly pension will cost £890; for a 75-year-
old, £1 per week will cost £674. A calculator is available online.141 
This is an interesting move on the Government͛s paƌt, as, iŶ effeĐt, it ƌepƌeseŶts a short-
term entry into the retail annuity market.  The Government͛s pƌiĐiŶg Đoŵpaƌes ǀeƌǇ 
favourably with an index-lined annuity bought on the open market.   
2.2.2 Drawdown products  
2.2.2.1 Issues to consider with drawdown 
Standard drawdown does not involve the purchase of an annuity at any stage after 
retirement. Instead, the buyer of a drawdown product can take the tax-free lump sum, 
leave the rest of the fund invested and make withdawals as and when required. 
Withdrawals are taxed as income at the marginal income tax rate. People can invest in funds 
offered by life offices or investment managers, either directly or via a platform, or they can 
build their own investment portfolios. The investments can be actively or passively 
managed. If the withdrawals exceed the income generated by the investment fund, then the 
fund will be reduced. With an annuity, the product automatically provides a lifetime income 
in retirement. But, this is not the case with drawdown where the customer has to make an 
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active decision to withdraw cash and the fund can run out of money before the customer 
dies.  
Drawdown has three components:  
 the product in which the pension pot is invested according to an agreed investment 
strategy  the arrangement for delivering the pension (e.g., a self-invested personal pension 
scheme or scheme drawdown), and  the withdrawal strategy, the programme for withdrawing funds over time to finance 
expenditures.   
Drawdown, by itself, does not have to have a longevity insurance strategy, and, because of 
this, it could not be classified as either a pension scheme or a safe harbour product. 
As an investment product that is classified by the FCA as potentially high-risk, the regulator 
used to require a fully advised process for drawdown. This is distinct from guided- or non-
advice (execution-only) which is the most common method of purchasing annuities, 
particularly for funds worth less than £100,000. However, providers and advisers now make 
drawdown available for DC customers with as little as £30,000 to invest. Since, Flexiday, 
drawdown customers are not required to take regulated advice.142 
The suitability of drawdown in relation to the risk-return trade-off will depend partly on the 
iŶdiǀidual͛s ƌisk toleƌaŶĐe, ďut also oŶ a pƌofessioŶal assessŵeŶt of the ͚Type A Critical 
Yield͛. This is the ƌetuƌŶ Ŷeeded to pƌoǀide aŶd ŵaiŶtaiŶ aŶ iŶĐoŵe eƋual to that oďtaiŶaďle 
under an equivalent immediate annuity. The calculation assumes that an income will be 
taken at the level of the available annuity until a specified age (usually 75) and, at that age, 
there will be sufficient money in the drawdown fund to purchase an annuity equal to what 
could be bought at the point when drawdown started. The higher the annuity rate available 
(for example, enhancements might apply), the higher the critical yield required.   
Unfortunately, it appears that the regulations on calculating the critical yield, which were 
introduced in 1998, are out of date and contain dangerous loopholes. Where these 
loopholes are exploited, this could lead to cases of mis-selling on the basis of an 
understated investment risk. In particular, the rules do not specify the basis of the 
calculation. A revision to the rules should include the requirement to use the best OMO 
rates, including the best enhanced rates.  
Annuity Direct gave us the following explanation: 
This creates an issue in that the basis for the annuity is not properly 
defined and when Regulatory Update 55 was drafted in August 1998, the 
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enhanced market was not as advanced as it is today. This means that 
providers generally use their own annuity rate to calculate the critical 
yield. The result will be that, where the annuity rate is not competitive, the 
critical yield will be lower, resulting in the risks of drawdown being 
understated. 
The problem is exacerbated when a client is eligible for an enhanced 
annuity, because the higher the annuity rate available, the higher the yield 
required. Our practice, therefore, is to broke the annuity in the open 
market – including medical information where appropriate – and then to 
use the highest annuity rate to calculate the Type A Critical Yield. The 
following example may help: 
A client has £61,000, which he wants to use for drawdown. 
The Ƌuote fƌoŵ the [pƌoǀideƌ͛s Ŷaŵe deleted] iŶteƌŶal ƌates pƌoduĐed aŶ 
annuity of £3,010 and this was used to calculate a Type A Critical Yield of 
6.6% p.a. 
We were able to obtain an enhanced annuity for the client amounting to 
£3,488. When we ran this rate through the critical yield quote system, the 
required yield increased to 7.65% p.a. 
 
A final issue to consider is the implication of the ageing process, as Fiona Heald, head of 
court of protection at Moore Blatch, points out. Drawdown, unlike an annuity, requires the 
person to be able to manage their financial affairs until they die. However, as individuals 
age, they are more likely to experience a physical or mental disability that could reduce their 
ability to manage their own affairs. The appropriate way to prepare for such an eventuality 
is through a lasting power of attorney ;LPAͿ. This is a legal doĐuŵeŶt alloǁiŶg the ͚doŶoƌ͛ to 
appoiŶt soŵeoŶe ;kŶoǁŶ as aŶ ͚attoƌŶeǇ͛Ϳ to ŵake deĐisioŶs oŶ theiƌ ďehalf, should theǇ 
haǀe ďeĐoŵe iŶĐapaĐitated. Theƌe aƌe tǁo tǇpes of LPA, oŶe foƌ ŵaŶagiŶg a peƌsoŶ͛s health 
and welfare, and one foƌ ŵaŶagiŶg a peƌsoŶ͛s pƌopeƌtǇ aŶd fiŶaŶĐial affaiƌs.143 
2.2.2.2 Examples of drawdown products 
All drawdown products need to balance income security, growth and cost. But modern 
drawdown products also need to be able to deal with much smaller pot sizes than before.  
With a current average pot size of £28,000, many retirees will prefer to take that as cash. 
But a percentage of retirees will want to experiment with drawdown.   
We begin with the investment funds that have been proposed for use with drawdown. The 
most common are multi-asset funds – in particular, diversified growth funds (DGFs) – multi-
asset target return funds, and multi-asset income funds. There are also examples of multi-
manager funds. In addition to the charges (for administration and fund management) 
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reported below, there would be a platform charge of 0.25-0.5% p.a. and a potential advisory 
charge of 0.5-0.75% p.a.144  
We came across the following examples of diversified growth funds:  
 Prudential has launched a range of diversified growth funds. The five Dynamic 
Growth Funds were designed to reflect different member risk appetites, with the 
lowest risk option having a 30% weighting in equities and the highest risk option 
having 100% exposure. The asset allocation of the different funds is built using sub-
fuŶds, suĐh as BlaĐkƌoĐk͛s passiǀe eƋuitǇ fuŶds aŶd M&G's aĐtiǀe fiǆed iŶteƌest 
funds. Charges fall within the 0.75% charge cap imposed on default investment funds 
in the accumulation stage145   HSBC Global Asset Management has introduced three risk-rated multi-asset 
retirement funds:  cautious, balanced, and dynamic. Head of UK institutional, Stuart 
White, said the DC iŶǀestŵeŶt ǁoƌld Ŷeeded to ŵoǀe fƌoŵ a ͚ĐolleĐtiǀised appƌoaĐh͛ 
to ͚ŵass ĐustoŵisatioŶ͛ ǁheƌe saǀeƌs' iŶdiǀidual Ŷeeds ĐaŶ ďe ŵet.146  Each portfolio 
will have an annual management charge of 0.25% and the ongoing charges figure 
(OCF) will vary between 0.46% and 0.53% depending on the underlying asset mix.  Blackrock has introduced a dynamic diversified growth fund with a charge of 0.65%. 
Similarly, some examples of target return funds: 
 PiŵĐo͛s ŵulti-asset fixed income fund has a target return that is based on the 
average of three objectives – tracking annuity prices, outperforming cash and 
producing a stable income – thereby providing a compromise between the 
requirements of those who want an annuity and those who prefer to remain in 
drawdown  Legal & GeŶeƌal IŶǀestŵeŶt MaŶageŵeŶt͛s ;LGIMͿ ‘etiƌeŵeŶt IŶĐoŵe Multi-Asset 
(RIMA) Fund. This has a target return of 3.5% above the Bank of England base rate 
over a complete 5-7 year market cycle. Income is paid by redeeming units and LGIM 
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believes that a drawdown rate of 6.5% is sustainable. The fuŶd͛s pƌiŶĐipal 
investments are bonds and equities, but the fund also invests in property and 
alternatives, such as global real estate investment trusts, infrastructure, private 
equity and high yield bonds.147 This involves a much greater diversification into long-
term growth assets than traditional drawdown products, a key benefit of 
institutional design. But LGIM is also concerned that savers are not forced to sell 
assets in distressed markets and so the fund is designed to generate sufficient 
regular cash flows from coupons, bond redemptions, and dividends. The annual fund 
management charge is 0.35% p.a.148  Schƌodeƌ͛s Flexible Retirement Fund is a multi-asset fund –  invested in risk-seeking 
assets, such as equities, and property, but also investment grade bonds – has the 
target of generating returns in line with the Consumer Price Index plus 2% for 
members over a three to five-year business cycle, with losses limited to 8% over any 
tiŵe fƌaŵe. JohŶ MĐLaughliŶ, head of poƌtfolio solutioŶs, said: ͚WheŶ ǀolatilitǇ goes 
above 6%, we take a break. If something spooks the market, we would immediately 
put a quarter of the portfolio into cash – so if, for instance, stress is at 8%, they 
ǁould sell out aŶd take ǀolatilitǇ doǁŶ to ϲ%͛.149 The fund has sufficient liquidity to 
meet withdrawals. The annual fund management charge is 0.3% p.a.150 
Multi-asset income funds aim to generate a stable income (higher than on a deposit 
account) with capital preservation.151 There are three types of income funds: (a) equity 
income funds which invest in the equities of mature companies and utilities generating a 
dividend yield in excess of 3.5% per annum, (b) fixed-interest income funds which invest in 
corporate bonds but offer no capital growth, and (c) covered call funds which use call 
optioŶs to ďoost the ͚Ŷatuƌal͛ iŶĐoŵe152 produced by the underlying assets, paid for by 
giving up some capital growth. 
Some examples of multi-asset income funds involving equities or bonds are: Premier Multi 
Asset Monthly Income (estimated yield 5%), Fidelity MoneyBuilder Balanced (4%), 
Woodford Equity Income (4%), Artemis Global Income (3.2%), Henderson UK Property 
(3.4%) and Jupiter Strategic Bond (3.2%). Typical multi-asset income funds have annual fund 
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management charges of around 0.9% a year.
153
 The M&G Episode Income fund has a 1% 
fund management charge. It aims for a 4% yield, is managed dynamically and holds between 
20% to 50% in equity, 40% to 80% in fixed income (including cash), and up to 20% in other 
assets.  
Examples of covered call funds are:  Insight Equity Income Booster (estimated yield 8%), 
Schroder Income Maximiser (7%), Schroder Asian Income Maximiser (7%) and Fidelity 
Enhanced Income (6.2%).154  
Danny Cox, head of communications at Hargreaves Lansdown, argues that income funds 
should be a serious consideration for customers considering income drawdown. 155 
Nevertheless, Tom Becket, chief investment officer at Psigma Investment Management, has 
warned that, as a result of quantitative easing, it has much more difficult for income funds 
to generate returns without taking on more risk. He said: 'Years of monetary stimulus had 
turned low-risk, higher-yielding assets into high-risk, lower-ǇieldiŶg assets….It has Ŷeǀeƌ 
been more difficult to be a cautious investor. In fact, the term 'cautious' is now basically 
prehistoric as the ravaging and distorting effects of central bankers have eliminated the 
ƌetuƌŶ poteŶtial of ŵost tƌaditioŶallǇ Đautious iŶǀestŵeŶt ĐhoiĐes….Ouƌ aŶalǇsis shoǁs that 
some cautious funds [which traditionally invested mainly in gilts and investment grade 
bonds] now have around 50% of theiƌ assets iŶ eƋuities, ŵostlǇ iŶ iŶĐoŵe stƌategies͛.156 
It is also the case that UK equity income fund managers are struggling to find suitable 
investment opportunities in the UK and are beginning to look overseas. They are able to 
hold up to 20% of their assets in overseas equity markets. Some of the largest funds are 
nearing the 20% limit (e.g., Newton UK Income), although the average for 2015 is 13%, up 
from 10% in 2013. Simon Molica, senior investment consultant at Morningstar which 
compiles the data, said: ͚If Ǉouƌ ŵaŶageƌ is ďuǇiŶg oǀeƌseas stoĐks, Ǉou Ŷeed to uŶdeƌstaŶd 
how the currency could add to the volatility within the fund performance, and whether the 
fuŶd hedges ĐuƌƌeŶĐǇ eǆposuƌe͛.157  
Multi-manager funds outsource investment decisions to other fund managers. These can 
have higher annual fund management charges up to 2%, although some are lower.158 For 
example, “Đhƌodeƌ͛s Multi MaŶageƌ DiǀeƌsitǇ Funds have OCFs in the range 1.26 – 1.97%.159  
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Hargreaves Lansdown has a multi-manager range of six funds for non-advised retail 
investors called Portfolio Plus. The six funds, which are rebalanced back to their original 
weightings every six months, are: Adventurous Income (estimated yield 3.03%), Balanced 
Income (estimated yield 3.03%), Conservative Income (estimated yield 2.38%), Adventurous 
Growth, Balanced Growth and Conservative Growth. There are no set-up charges, but the 
annual management charge varies between 1.34% and 1.46% and there is an additional 
platform (Vantage) charge of 0.45%. The portfolios are constructed from Hargreaves 
Lansdown's five multi-manager funds, including its Equity & Bond and Special Situations 
funds.160  
The main advantages of drawdown can be summarised as follows: 
 Control over the investment strategy  Flexibility to change the income drawn on an annual basis (subject to the maximum 
in the case of capped drawdown)  Potential for higher returns over the longer term, but only if the fund is invested in 
riskier assets than those used to provide an annuity (mainly bonds)   Death benefits: oŶ death iŶ dƌaǁdoǁŶ, the iŶǀestoƌ͛s paƌtŶeƌ oƌ otheƌ ŶoŵiŶated 
beneficiary can continue to draw an income or take it as a lump sum  Deferment of the annuity purchase – in theory indefinitely, although experts agree 
that in most cases the guarantees provided by the LTA will become attractive at 
some point. 
The main disadvantages of drawdown can be summarised as follows: 
 Ill-informed decisions – this is the risk that the guidance and advice market161 will 
not provide the level of individual support required to ensure all consumers make 
well-informed decisions, for example, in relation to taxation and the income level 
drawn  Cost – drawdown can be an expensive product and not all of the costs involved will 
be visible  Longevity risk if longevity insurance has not been purchased – the risk that the 
individual will run out of money before death  Investment risk – the risk that the investment returns will not exceed those on a 
comparable annuity after the additional costs have been taken into account. In 
addition, there is the potential inability of drawdown products to generate stable 
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returns over time.
162
 There is increasing evidence that investment returns since 2000 
have been on average lower and more volatile than in the 50 years before 2000.  The 
implication is that retirees will have to draw down their capital to maintain their 
living standards, which increases the likelihood that they will run out of money 
before they die. Furthermore, investment risk increases as life expectancy reduces, 
since there is less time left to recover from a big fall in the stock marketAnnuity-
conversion risk – a range of factors, including the level of interest rates, the mortality 
assuŵptioŶs aŶd the iŶdiǀidual͛s health status, ǁill all affeĐt the LTA ƌate iŶ the 
future, assuming the individual buys longevity insurance at some point  Capacity to take risk – related to the previous three points, any longevity insurance 
needs to be in place before its price exceeds the funds available to purchase it and 
the capacity to continue taking risk disappears. 
David Trenner, technical director at Intelligent Pensions, argues that the new style multi-
asset funds will fail to deliver in precisely the same way that the old style multi-asset funds 
failed to deliver: 
[I]f the objective of drawdown is to provide income for life, the one 
keyword that seems to be absent from all of these changes [following 
pension freedom] is sustainability. 
Quite simply people want to ensure that their income does not expire 
before they do. 
Back in 1995, a number of the early drawdown plans offered by insurance 
companies offered with-profits investment. 
With reversionary bonus rates as high as 9% per annum, it looked simple 
to take the bonuses as a sensible level of income, leaving the capital intact.  
Some companies did not offer with-profits funds for drawdown, however. 
They argued that bonus rates might fall – how right they were! They also 
drew attention to the need for market value reductions when the 
underlying value of assets was below the face value of the with-profits 
units. 
So these companies introduced drawdown invested in managed funds. 
These invested in cash, bonds, property and equities to provide the 
prospects for growth, but with downside protection. But they did not solve 
the problem of taking income when markets were down: while the fund 
included cash it was still necessary to take income from all of the fund 
thereby capitalising any losses. … 
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Since Mr Osborne announced the pension freedoms there have been few 
new products, but there has been a plethora of new fund launches. And 
the fuŶd of ĐhoiĐe seeŵs to ďe the ͚ŵulti-asset fuŶd͛. 
These funds include income producing assets with income targeted at 
around 3% of the fund. But which client wants only 3%? 
From where I sit, multi-asset funds are just managed funds coming back 
with a new name, and if I am right, they will fail drawdown investors for 
the same reason that managed funds did.163 
 
Standard flexible drawdown products could NOT by themselves be classified as safe harbour 
products, since they do not hedge longevity risk.  
2.2.3 Hybrid products 
Hybrid products combine drawdown with longevity insurance to provide a lifelong income.  
They are therefore part drawdown and part annuity to differing degrees, although this will 
not be appareŶt to the ĐoŶsuŵeƌ foƌ ǁhoŵ aŶ ͚aŶŶuitǇ͛ is a ďad product. Those that are 
more annuity-like are provided by insurance companies, those which are more drawdown-
like with income guarantees tend to be offered by investment management houses and 
investment banks, as well as some insurers. We focus on two key examples: variable 
annuities and guaranteed drawdown. 
2.2.3.1 Variable annuities 
The classic example of a hybrid product lying between lifetime annuities and drawdown is a 
͚ǀaƌiaďle aŶŶuitǇ͛ ;VAͿ ǁhiĐh ǁas invented in the US in the 1950s and was introduced in the 
UK around 10 years ago.164 However, unlike a lifetime annuity or drawdown, VAs have an 
accumulation stage and a decumulation stage, although people are free to use only a 
decumulation stage VA. As such, they offeƌ ďoth liǀiŶg ďeŶefits aŶd death ďeŶefits. 
LiǀiŶg ďeŶefits aƌe those ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ ďe eǆeƌĐised ďǇ poliĐǇholdeƌs ǁhile theǇ aƌe still aliǀe. 
These iŶĐlude: 
 GuaƌaŶteed ŵiŶiŵuŵ aĐĐuŵulatioŶ ďeŶefits ;GMABsͿ165  GuaƌaŶteed ŵiŶiŵuŵ iŶĐoŵe ďeŶefits ;GMIBsͿ  GuaƌaŶteed ŵiŶiŵuŵ ǁithdƌaǁal ďeŶefits ;GMWBsͿ166 
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 VAs were first introduced in the US in 1952 by TIAA-CREF (Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association - 
College Retirement Equities Fund). 
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 GMABs include capital guarantees (e.g., a fixed maturity amount at age 75) and a guaranteed minimum 
return, while still permitting investments in equities, although this is really a stop-loss rather than a return 
guarantee. 
166 A GMWB can be interpreted as a RCLA on top of drawdown plan, implying that a RCLA is similar to a 
variable-annuity-style guarantee. 
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 Fƌee paƌtial ǁithdƌaǁals ;FPWsͿ. UŶdeƌ speĐified ĐoŶditioŶs, the poliĐǇholdeƌ ĐaŶ 
eǆeƌĐise the ƌight to ǁithdƌaǁ a pƌopoƌtioŶ of the fuŶd ǀalue ǁithout iŶĐuƌƌiŶg a 
suƌƌeŶdeƌ Đhaƌge. AŶ eǆaŵple ŵight ďe the optioŶ to ǁithdƌaǁ up to a speĐified liŵit 
;e.g., ϯϬ%Ϳ of the eǆpeĐted ǀalue of the ƌesidual paǇŵeŶts ďased oŶ a ŵoƌtalitǇ taďle 
at the tiŵe of puƌĐhase oŶ a oŶe-tiŵe oŶlǇ ďasis oŶ a keǇ date ;e.g., the ϱth, ϭϬth oƌ 
ϭϱth aŶŶiǀeƌsaƌǇͿ upoŶ a ͚sigŶifiĐaŶt ŶoŶ-ŵediĐal loss͛  Guaranteed minimum surrender benefits (GMSBs). 
Death ďeŶefits ;iŶ the foƌŵ of guaƌaŶteed ŵiŶiŵuŵ death ďeŶefits, GMDBsͿ aƌe those 
ǁhiĐh aĐĐƌue to ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt ďeŶefiĐiaƌies oŶĐe the poliĐǇholdeƌ has died. The ŵost ĐoŵŵoŶ 
is the ;paƌtialͿ ƌetuƌŶ of pƌeŵiuŵ.  When the VA policyholder dies, a specified beneficiary 
will receive the larger of the account balance and the value of the initial investment less 
total withdrawals. 
The lifetiŵe iŶĐoŵe aŶd iŶǀestŵeŶt guaƌaŶtees, ǁheƌeďǇ the poliĐǇholdeƌ ƌeĐeiǀes a 
ŵiŶiŵuŵ iŶĐoŵe iƌƌespeĐtiǀe of loŶgeǀitǇ aŶd iŶǀestŵeŶt ƌetuƌŶs, aƌe fuŶded ǀia aŶ aŶŶual 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt Đhaƌge aŶd a ƌestƌiĐtioŶ oŶ ŵaǆiŵuŵ ǁithdƌaǁals iŶ aŶǇ Ǉeaƌ. The ĐoŶtiŶued 
aĐĐess to Đapital aŶd higheƌ death ďeŶefits Đoŵes at the eǆpeŶse of a loǁeƌ iŶĐoŵe thaŶ 
aǀailaďle uŶdeƌ a ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal lifetiŵe aŶŶuitǇ. The liǀiŶg ďeŶefits optioŶs iŶĐuƌ higheƌ 
Đhaƌges as ǁell as haǀiŶg the effeĐt of ƌeduĐiŶg the death ďeŶefit paid to iŶdiǀiduals ǁho die 
at oldeƌ ages, ďut also eŶaďle the pƌoǀideƌ to ďuild up ƌeseƌǀes fƌoŵ all poliĐǇholdeƌs up to 
the poiŶt of theiƌ death to help it hoŶouƌ the lifetiŵe iŶĐoŵe guaƌaŶtee to those ǁho liǀe a 
loŶg tiŵe. This is the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh the loŶgeǀitǇ ďoŶus ǁoƌks ǁith a VA. 
The new flexible payment terms for standard annuities (see Section 2.2.1.3) also apply to 
variable annuities. Previously, while the income paid can increase if the underlying 
investment fund performs well, it was not possible to cut the income if the investments are 
performing poorly. In future, providers of variable annuities will be allowed to raise and 
lower the income paid depending on investment performance.   
Subject to there being complete transparency over design and the absence of excessive 
charges, variable annuities (with a minimum income underpin) could be classified as safe 
harbour products.  
2.2.3.2 Guaranteed drawdown 
AŶ eǆaŵple of a ͚guaƌaŶteed dƌaǁdoǁŶ pƌoduĐt͛ is the “eĐuƌe Income Option offered by 
MetLife, a US life insurance company with a presence in the UK since 2007.167 The product 
offers flexible drawdown (in the form of immediate income and deferred income) with 
guarantees. Customers can consolidate existing DC pension pots into a pre-drawdown 
product and lock in a drawdown rate pre-retirement. There is a formula for uplifting the 
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drawdown rate if income is deferred. If the client chooses a secure income, this is 
guaranteed by MetLife. The drawdown rate is lower than an annuity by up to 30% (e.g., 4% 
at age 65 when the annuity rate is 5.5%), but allows more flexibility of access, a guaranteed 
income and death benefits. MetLife does not offer standard LTAs, but there is no maturity 
date with the guaranteed drawdown product which therefore potentially provides a 
guaranteed nominal income for life.168  
Once purchased, the customer locks in guaranteed future income rates. If they elect not to 
take benefits on their initial chosen age, they have flexibility to change dates and use the 
guaranteed rate for new higher age, for example 4% at age 65 increasing to 4.10% at age 
66.  For each year the guaranteed income in delayed, MetLife will increase the guarantee 
base by 5%. So for a £100,000 investment, a delay in taking income by a year will increase 
the guarantee to £105,000. If after 12 months, the fund value is higher, e.g., increased to 
£107,000, then the higher fund value of £107,000 will be locked in and become the new 
guarantee base. In addition, if the fund has performed better than 5%, the higher value will 
be locked in annually.  
Lump sum withdrawals above the guaranteed level of income will proportionately reduce 
the guaranteed income. For example, a £100,000 investment could pay a guaranteed 
income of £4,000 p.a. at 65. If the policyholder decides to withdraw a lump sum of £10% of 
the fund, the guarantee base would reduce by 10% to £90,000. Subsequently, the 
guaranteed income would reduce by 10% to £3,600. 
The death benefit paid is the higher of:  
 the initial guaranteed base minus guaranteed income taken, and  the fund value.    
So for example, suppose a policy has an initial guarantee base of £100,000. Suppose also 
£10,000 of guaranteed income is paid and the fund value has fallen to £85,000. The amount 
paǇaďle is £ϵϬ,ϬϬϬ. The poliĐǇholdeƌ͛s ďeŶefiĐiaƌies ĐaŶ take the death ďeŶefit as a luŵp 
sum or as income. 
Longevity risk modelling and analysis is an important component of the design of the 
product and MetLife: 
 Uses a standard actuarial table for mortality (not the general population table)  Assumes a mix of males and females  Makes adjustments to these tables to reflect MetLife͛s ĐlieŶt deŵogƌaphiĐs  Allows for mortality improvements over time. 
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The product invests in unit-linked funds and involves unit-linked guarantees. The objectives 
of the funds chosen by policyholders are to manage volatility to a target and to seek a total 
return. This creates liabilities for MetLife. MetLife uses a dynamic hedging programme 
called constant proportion portfolio insurance (CPPI)169 to hedge the risk to its balance sheet 
from offering these guarantees.170 CPPI involves daily switching between unit-linked funds 
and risk-free assets (such as Treasury bills) as the value of the unit-linked funds changes. If 
the fund values fall, units are sold and T-bills purchased; if the fund values rises, the 
opposite set of transactions occurs. The goal of the hedging programme is to construct a 
synthetic put option to protect the portfolio from falls in the market values of the 
underlying assets. The effectiveness of the hedge depends on holding assets which can be 
readily bought and sold. This broadly means that the funds it offers will comprise equity and 
fixed interest assets which are listed on large stock markets. MetLife uses BlackRock (for 
equities) and Fidelity Worldwide Investment (for fixed income). Only small amounts of 
property or hedge funds are included in the portfolio as they are inherently unhedgeable 
asset classes.  
Since no hedge is perfect, it is possible for mismatches between assets and liabilities to 
oĐĐuƌ. IŶ this Đase, the liaďilitǇ is MetLife͛s, so aŶǇ shoƌtfall ǁould ďe ŵet fƌoŵ MetLife͛s 
reserves/capital. If the hedging programme were to fail, then the shareholder capital would 
be used to cover any unmet policyholder liabilities. The only point at which the guarantee 
could fail would be if MetLife Europe Limited were to fail. In this circumstance, the 
Đustoŵeƌ͛s iŶǀestŵeŶt aŶd theiƌ guaƌaŶtee Đould ďe lost. Hoǁeǀeƌ the pƌoduĐts aƌe 
covered by the FSCS.  
Charges are as follows: 
 Annual management charge (i.e., the charge for administration) – 0.70% for funds up 
to £149,999, 0.6% for funds from £150,000 to £249,999, 0.5% for funds from 
£250,000 to £499,999, and 0.4% for funds above £500,000  Investment management charge (for the operation of the funds) – 0.55%  Guarantee charge (for providing the income guarantee) –  0.60%  Additionally, there may be an adviser charge. 
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this risk. 
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This means that the charge for a £50,000 investment by a 65-year-old would be 1.85%, 
excluding any adviser charge.171  
The preferred customer is someone with a £1.5m pension pot who uses £0.5m to provide 
minimum core income for essential spending and puts £1m into a diversified portfolio. Next 
are clients with other assets who want to guarantee a legacy for their descendants with 
long-term capital guarantees. Next are mass affluent clients with £100,000-150,000. MetLife 
has now brought down the minimum to £30,000, in line with the new level of trivial 
commutation. 
Clients come via advisers (i.e., the product is an advised solution) who help explain longevity 
risk and the risk of underestimating how much people need to live on using cash flow 
modelling software (e.g., Voyant) which inputs data on typical spending patterns of the 
client. According to MetLife, ͚advised sales provide greater comfort as benefits and risks of 
our products are explained to our customers and the adviser checks for understanding. For 
example, MetLife believes it is important how customers understand sequence-of-returns 
risk and how safe drawdown overcomes this͛.172   
Another example is Aegon which has launched a drawdown product with combined access 
to unit-linked guarantees on its Retirement Choices platform in July 2015. David Macmillan, 
AegoŶ ŵaŶagiŶg diƌeĐtoƌ, said: ͚The aďilitǇ to ĐoŵďiŶe tƌue lifeloŶg iŶĐoŵe guaƌaŶtees ǁith 
drawdown on platform will provide customers and their advisers with the certainty of 
income they tell us they want, but also with a huge amount of flexibility, both in terms of 
iŶĐoŵe aŶd iŶ teƌŵs of theiƌ aďilitǇ to sǁitĐh ďetǁeeŶ pƌoduĐts͛.     
Zurich is also launching a guaranteed drawdown product in 2016 that combines drawdown 
and a protection element that converts the plan into an income for life at a certain pre-
determined age. The charge is not yet known. The product was designed in response to a 
survey Zurich conducted which revealed that 18% of respondents were interested in 
drawdown, but were fearful of running out of money. The survey results were as follows: 
 10% of over-55s in DC pension schemes have dipped into their retirement savings 
under the new freedoms  69% of over-55s have not explored their options under the new freedoms (37% were 
͚Ŷot ƌeadǇ', Ϯϲ% had alƌeadǇ ďought aŶ aŶŶuitǇͿ. 
The main reasons for not accessing pensions after exploring options were: 
 54% were not ready to make a decision 
                                                     
171
 Jenna Towler (2015) MetLife unveils flexible guaranteed drawdown offering, Retirement Planner, 14 
September. 
172
 http://www.metlife.co.uk/uk/Sales_Aids/2015/0471_Hour_of_Maximum_Danger.pdf. ͚“eƋueŶĐe of ƌetuƌŶ͛ 
risk will be discussed shortly. 
103 
 
 34% were keeping their pension funds invested and tapping into other assets first  18% claimed the fear of running out of money by taking a lump sum or going into 
drawdown was holding them back  7% said their pension provider did not offer the option they wanted.173 
Subject to there being complete transparency over design (in particular how the guarantee is 
underwritten) and the absence of excessive charges, guaranteed drawdown products (with a 
minimum income underpin) could be classified as safe harbour products.  
2.2.4 Other products 
͸.͸.4.ͷ ǮMix and matchǯ 
Just Retirement has lauŶĐhed a ƌaŶge of ͚ŵiǆ aŶd ŵatĐh͛ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe pƌoduĐts 
taƌgeted at ͚Middle BƌitaiŶ͛. AloŶgside LTAs, it offeƌs UFPL“, guaƌaŶteed iŶĐoŵe pƌoduĐts 
ǁith fleǆiďle eǆteŶded guaƌaŶtee peƌiods aŶd ͚dƌaǁdoǁŶ-lite' which invest in a selection of 
moderate to low-ƌisk passiǀe fuŶds. “tepheŶ Loǁe, diƌeĐtoƌ, said: ͚The ĐoŶseŶsus of 
consumer research shows that people with sufficient pension savings would like the best of 
both worlds – a guaranteed income for life to ensure regular bills may be paid and a flexible 
fuŶd that ŵaǇ ďe aĐĐessed ǁheŶ ƌeƋuiƌed foƌ iƌƌegulaƌ eǆpeŶdituƌe aŶd to pƌoǀide a ͚just iŶ 
Đase͛ fuŶd͛.174  
2.2.4.2 DIY 
Some commentators have proposed a do-it-yourself approach which involves investing in 
assets and dipping in to them to withdraw investment returns or capital as required. Simple 
examples of assets suggested for this purpose are investment trusts and exchange-traded 
funds that focus on income generation. Typical yields lie between 3.4 and 3.8%.175 More 
sophisticated approaches would involve constructing a DIY fund, in other words, a 
personalised multi-asset fund consisting of UK and global income funds, possibly with some 
diversification into property.176 
DIY products could NOT be classified as safe harbour products, since they do not hedge 
longevity risk.  
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2.2.4.3 Pension bank account 
This is where the pension scheme is used as a cash machine (i.e., taking withdrawals via 
UFPLSs, where 25% of what is withdrawn is tax free) and has traditionally been available 
only for retail customers via a SIPP. So-Đalled ͚peŶsioŶ ďaŶk aĐĐouŶts͛ haǀe ǀeƌǇ high 
charges. The initial fee could be as high as 3% and there will be additional administration 
and fund management charges of 1% p.a. For example, someone setting up a SIPP with 
Alliance Trust with a pension pot of £20,000 will pay an arrangement fee of £300, annual 
administration charge of £311 plus an annual fund management charge. Ad hoc cash 
withdrawals could cost anywhere between £30 and £400 per withdrawal depending on the 
SIPP provider.  
IŶ MaƌĐh ϮϬϭϱ, the FCA said it ǁould ͚look at the diffeƌeŶt tǇpes of ĐhaƌgiŶg stƌuĐtuƌes put 
in place, and look at whether they are sufficiently transparent [and whether] people are 
aǁaƌe of ǁhat Đhaƌges theǇ ǁill faĐe͛.177  
The Đhaƌges aƌe a lot loǁeƌ iŶ pƌoǀideƌs͛ sĐheŵes that alloǁ UFPL“.178 For example, Aviva, 
Scottish Widows, Standard Life and Aegon will allow such withdrawals and will not charge 
extra for doing so or limit the number of withdrawals, while Legal & General and LV= will 
not, and Prudential and Friends Life were undecided as of February 2015.179 However, most 
existing workplace DC pension schemes cannot currently be used as bank accounts, since 
they are not set up to offer this facility.180 
In June 2015, the Daily Telegraph reported that Friends Life was refusing to allow clients to 
use theiƌ peŶsioŶ sĐheŵes as ͚ďaŶk aĐĐouŶts͛, ǁhile otheƌ ĐoŵpaŶies, iŶĐludiŶg NE“T, ǁeƌe 
ƌefusiŶg to alloǁ ĐlieŶts to ͚dip iŶto theiƌ fuŶds as ofteŶ as theǇ Ŷeed͛. Custoŵeƌs faĐed the 
following restrictions depending on the provider: a minimum withdrawal of £5,000, a 
maximum of 3 or 4 withdrawals per year, and no flexible access if the pension pot is less 
than £30,000. Fidelity charged no fee for up to three withdrawals per year, while NFU 
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Mutual charged £240 per withdrawal. However, under pressure from the Daily Telegraph 
and other national newspapers, Friends Life reversed its decision shortly after. 181 
In July 2015, Which? published a report on drawdown charges, included those on UFPLS.182 
This again confirmed the variety of charges from different providers ranging from Charles 
Stanley Direct which charges £270 for the first withdrawal each year, through James Hay 
(£100), Barclays Stockbrokers, Halifax Sharedealing and TD Direct (all £90) to Fidelity and 
Hargreaves Lansdown which have no charge at all. 
There is a risk that people will take their pension as a cash lump sum and leave it in a bank 
account. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme provides 100% protection for 
annuities and up to 90% of the value of other insurance products without limit. For deposits, 
however, it only protects up to £75,000 per person per bank or building society. FCA 
CoŶsuŵeƌ PaŶel Đhaiƌ “ue Leǁis saǇs: ͚We aƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed that ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ǁith peŶsioŶ pots 
exceediŶg the F“C“͛s £ϳϱ,ϬϬϬ liŵit ŵaǇ iŶadǀeƌteŶtlǇ lose out oŶ pƌoteĐtioŶ foƌ theiƌ ŵoŶeǇ 
if they choose to withdraw their pot rather than buying an annuity or leaving their money 
iŶǀested͛.183  
Pension bank accounts could NOT be classified as safe harbour products, since they do not 
hedge longevity risk.  
2.2.4.4 Buy-to-let pensions184 
With a buy-to-let pension, part of the pension pot is used to make a deposit on a buy-to-let 
property. The pensioner then takes out a mortgage and uses the rest of the pension pot to 
cover the mortgage repayments.  The rental income provides the pension which is taxable. 
The attraction of buy-to-let was that the mortgage repayments attracted tax relief. 
However, this relief was removed in the Budget on 8 July 2015, in large measure due to the 
increase in pension wealth moving into buy-to-let and the distortions to the housing market 
this was causing, following the introduction of the pension reforms in April 2015. Instead a 
tax credit worth 20% of the mortgage interest will be applied. The changes will be phased in 
between 2017 and 2020. The Daily Telegraph provided the following before and after 
example to illustrate the consequences, assuming a landlord paying 40% tax:   
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NOW  
Your buy-to-let earns £20,000 a year and the interest-only mortgage costs 
£13,000 a year. Tax is due on the difference or profit. So you pay tax on 
£7,000, meaning £2,800 for HMRC and £4,200 for you.  
2020  
Tax is now due on your full rental income of £20,000, less a tax credit 
equivalent to basic-rate tax on the interest. So you pay 40% tax on £20,000 
(i.e., £8,000), less the 20% credit (20% of £13,000 = £2,600), meaning 
£5,400 for HMRC and £1,600 for you. Your tax bill has therefore gone up by 
93%.  
Now, say Bank Rate – and in turn your mortgage rate – rises by a small 
fraction, lifting your mortgage cost to £15,000, while your rent remains at 
£20,000.  
You will have to pay £5,000 tax in this scenario, so you make no profit at 
all.185  
 
In November 2015, the Government announced that purchasers of buy-to-let properties will 
have to pay an extra 3% in stamp duty from April 2016. There are other potential pitfalls.  
The mortgage lender is likely to require a deposit of 40% or more. If the pensioner draws 
down the pension pot to pay a mortgage of this size, this could put the pensioner into a 
higher income tax bracket which could make the strategy uneconomic. The net rental 
iŶĐoŵe afteƌ takiŶg iŶto aĐĐouŶt ŵoƌtgage ƌepaǇŵeŶts, the lettiŶg ageŶt͛s fee, iŶsuƌance, 
service charges and maintenance costs might not be very large. Further any void periods, 
where the property is unlet, will reduce rental income. If a large number of people start to 
use buy-to-let, this will have the effect of lowering average rents. Also the buy-to-let 
pƌopeƌtǇ is iŶĐluded iŶ the peŶsioŶeƌ͛s estate foƌ iŶheƌitaŶĐe taǆ puƌposes. If the pƌopeƌtǇ is 
sold before death, capital gains tax is payable.  
A survey of 1,000 over-55 year olds by Prudential in September 2015 indicated that 14% of 
them were planning to buy property to let as a result of the pension freedoms, while 37% 
said they were planning to buy property to live in themselves. The most common reason 
(43%) for planning a purchase was to downsize to a smaller home.186 
It is an open question whether a buy-to-let pension could be classified as a safe harbour 
product. While it potentially hedges longevity risk (assuming a sufficiently long lease) and 
could provide an inflation-linked income, the changes to the market announced by the 
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Government on and after 8 July 2015 have substantially reduced the return on and increased 
the risk of this product. 
2.2.4.5 Extreme-inflation protection 
At present, due to the approximate 40% reduction in initial income, only about 5% of people 
who buy a LTA purchase inflation-proofing (i.e., buy an index-linked annuity). We were told 
that it would be possible to design a cheaper form of inflation-proofing which aims to match 
RPI more closely and which would provide a hedge against extreme inflation shocks (a 
featuƌe desĐƌiďed as aŶ ͚iŶflatioŶ-kiĐkeƌ͛Ϳ.   
The concept, which has yet to come to market, is based on the assumption that most 
retirees can tolerate a limited amount of inflation risk. Therefore, if inflation were below 
3%, the annuity income might fall slightly. If it were exactly 3%, there would be no change. 
Above this figure, the income would increase. 187  
This is an interesting idea and quite different from the two existing methods of capping the 
cost of inflation protection. The first is to buy a fixed rate of escalation, e.g. 3% per annum. 
The problem with this is that the annuitant receives the increase irrespective of actual 
inflation rates, so it could be more or less than is needed to keep pace. Due to the current 
low-inflation environment, 3% indexation is not significantly cheaper than full RPI. The main 
problem with a fixed rate of escalation is that it offers no protection in the event of soaring 
inflation, such as that experienced in the 1970s. With quantitative easing about to unwind, 
it would be impossible to rule out an inflation spike over the next 20 or 30 years. 
The second method is limited price indexation (LPI). This matches RPI, but only up to a limit 
of 2.5 or 5%. So, like fixed escalation at 3%, it does not protect against a future inflation 
spike.  
͸.͸.4.6 Home equity release plans 
Home equity release plans (also known as reverse mortgages or lifetime mortgages) can 
take the form of a LTA, although this is not the most popular form. Equity release allows 
home owners to borrow from the equity in their homes while still living in them. This might 
be particularly attractive to the elderly who might have low pensions, but substantial net 
housing wealth.188 According to a study by LV=, 32% of retirees live on less than the 
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minimum wage, are going without adequate food and heating, yet the majority of these 
have untapped housing assets.189 
Home equity release plans started in US in the 1980s, where they are available from age 62. 
The most common type is the home equity conversion mortgage, which allows borrowers to 
take a reverse mortgage in the form of: a lump sum, a lifetime income or drawdown (in 
effect a line of credit). The amount that can be borrowed is negatively related to the 
interest rate. Interest (typically 1.50% above government bond rates) is accrued and paid on 
moving or death, so there is no credit risk. However, the total interest payable is capped at 
the sale price of the property and lenders are protected against total interest costs rising 
above this limit (as a result of the home owner living a very long time) by a mortgage 
insurance policy that the borrower is required to take out (at a cost of 2% of the amount 
borrowed plus 0.5% p.a.). 
In the UK, home equity release plans are provided by members of SHIP (Safe Home Income 
Plans). SHIP members offer a range of guarantees, including the right to live in the property 
for life, the flexibility to move home without penalties, and never owing more than the 
value of the property. 
The following types of plan are offered: 
 Home reversion plans – The home (in whole or part) is sold in exchange for a lump 
sum or monthly income (or some combination). The home owner therefore becomes 
a tenant and when the property is eventually sold (typically following the plan 
ŵeŵďeƌ͛s deathͿ, the ƌeǀeƌsion company receives the value of the loan plus interest 
(up to the value of the property sold)  Home income plans – The plan member takes out a mortgage against the value of 
the property and uses the money to buy a purchased life annuity (PLA). Interest on 
the mortgage is deducted from the annuity, while the capital sum borrowed to buy 
the aŶŶuitǇ is geŶeƌallǇ ƌepaid ǁheŶ the pƌopeƌtǇ is sold afteƌ the plaŶ ŵeŵďeƌ͛s 
death  Lifetime mortgages – The plan member receives a lump sum or annuity (or some 
combination) with the interest being rolled up into the loan.  The original loan plus 
interest is repaid when the property is eventually sold. 
The maximum initial loan increases with the plan ŵeŵďeƌ͛s age, ďut is geŶeƌallǇ Đapped at 
50% of the value of the property.  
Equity release has not always had a good image in the UK. There was a mis-selling scandal in 
the 1980s. Since then, standards have improved with the establishment of the Equity 
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Release Council (ERC). Membership of the ERC ensures that only qualified independent 
financial advisers can sell equity release products, that the value of the loan cannot exceed 
the value of the home, and that a homeowner cannot lose their home, since interest can be 
rolled up and paid on their death. However, the protection against losing the home has 
been put at risk by the European Mortgage Directive (EMD)  ǁhiĐh alloǁs Ŷeǁ ͚equity 
release-lite͛ pƌoduĐts Đalled ͚lifetiŵe ŵoƌtgages͛ to ďe sold.  TheǇ ĐaŶ be sold without advice 
and require interest to be paid rather than rolled up. The requirement to pay interest means 
the product no longer comes under the equity release rules, but instead comes under the 
residential mortgage rules, which means borrowers can lose their homes if the interest is 
not paid.190 
In September 2015, the ERC announced that there was £710m of equity release in the first 
half of 2015, the largest half-year amount on record. Homeowners over 55 were 
withdrawing more than £4m of housing wealth every day. The main reasons given for this 
are rising house prices, tougher borrowing conditions and inadequate pension provision. 
Table 2.2 provides details of the equity release market and shows, for example, that 65% of 
new plans were drawdown and 35% were lump sum.191 
Table 2.2: The equity release market in 2015 
  Drawdown Lump sum 
Average house price  £304,340 £242,476 
Average initial withdrawal £46,958 (15.4%)* £77,494 
Average drawdown reserves £32,348 (10.6%)* NA 
Average loan-to-value (LTV) 26% 32.0% 
Average age at purchase 71.5 67.7 
Source: ERC 
Note: * % of average house price 
 
Aleǆ EdŵaŶs, head of ƌetiƌeŵeŶt at “aga, said: ͚The [FCA͛s] Moƌtgage Maƌket ‘eǀieǁ has 
stopped many older people from accessing a traditional mortgage, this and the fact that 
many people are now coming to the end of their interest-only mortgage term without a full 
repayment plan, has meant that more are turning to equity release as a viable solution to 
borrowing in retirement. Indeed, Saga has seen an increase in the use of equity release to 
clear a mortgage. Now is a good time to consider equity release, as interest rates are at 
                                                     
190
 Michelle McGagh (2014) Mortgage directive revives equity release fears, Citywire, 24 November 2014. 
191
 Reported in Professional Adviser (2015) Older homeowners flock to equity release, ERC data shows, 23 
September. 
110 
 
their lowest ever levels, property prices are increasing and loan-to-values have recently 
increased, meaning people are able to access more of the wealth tied up in their 
pƌopeƌtǇ͛.192 
In September 2015, the FCA announced that it was considering how regulation can help 
fosteƌ ͚ŵoƌe of a ŵaƌket͛ iŶ eƋuitǇ ƌelease. Chƌistopheƌ Woolaƌd, diƌeĐtoƌ of stƌategǇ aŶd 
ĐoŵpetitioŶ said: ͚The aǀeƌage peŶsioŶ pot is £ϯϬ,ϬϬϬ, Ǉet a sigŶifiĐaŶt Ŷuŵďeƌ oǁŶ 
property assets of around seven times that number or more. The ability to access some of 
that asset, as a restricted lump sum or as a gradual income, could make a significant 
difference to people's lives. Yet, in the not too distant past, equity release became a dirty 
word. Whilst we have seen a combination of regulation and industry-led initiatives to help 
clean up the market, some will argue that the costs of equity release, both up front and 
compounded over time, are relatively high for the individual, and that the previous image 
has stuck. We believe there is a debate to be had about what products and markets could 
exist, and whether more entrants and innovation here might benefit consumers with 
gƌeateƌ ĐhoiĐe aŶd iŵpƌoǀed pƌoduĐts͛.193 
Some argue that equity release could also be used to fund long-term care. For example, 
Adrian Walker, retirement planning manager at Old Mutual Wealth, raised the issue when 
he discussed the findings from a survey his company had conducted for its Redefining 
Retirement report. The YouGoǀ suƌǀeǇ of ϭ,ϲϬϬ people aged ϱϬ to ϳϱ shoǁed that ͚ǁhile 
eƋuitǇ ƌelease ǁas pƌediĐted to plaǇ a gƌeateƌ iŶ people͛s ƌetiƌeŵeŶt aŶd loŶg-term care 
planning, long-term care is still one of the great unknowns of growing old. We Brits 
faŵouslǇ doŶ͛t like to talk aďout death aŶd, siŵilaƌlǇ, it ǁould seeŵ that ǁe also doŶ͛t like 
to thiŶk aďout hoǁ aŶd ǁheƌe ǁe ŵight speŶd ouƌ lateƌ daǇs͛. The suƌǀeǇ asked people 
aged 50 to 75 about their provision for long-term care: 30% of respondents have some 
savings set aside for their long-term care, but only 1% had a care plan in place, and 2% have, 
or plan to have, long-term care insurance; 46% had not thought about their long-term care 
needs and 8% had no intention of doing so. 
Mr Walker argues that ͚advisers and clients must address the potential need to meet long-
term care costs and come up with a plan accordingly. As property is very often the biggest 
asset that people hold, it makes some sense to look at how that, as an asset, could be used 
to help paǇ foƌ a peƌsoŶ͛s Đaƌe Đosts. HousiŶg assets aƌe takeŶ iŶto aĐĐouŶt iŶ the ĐuƌƌeŶt 
system. If you have more than £23,250 in assets194 you will be responsible for your own care 
costs. However, if you receive care in your own home, property assets are not considered in 
the calculation. As soon as you move into a care home, then your home is included and can 
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be used to cover costs. In the same survey, we asked whether people would be interested in 
releasing value from their home and, of those who would, 34% said they would do so in 
order to pay for their long-teƌŵ Đaƌe͛. 
Mƌ Walkeƌ aĐĐepts that: ͚[Equity release] is already increasing in its use as a source of 
delivering income in retirement of which care costs would be part. It seems a logical step 
that people should start to consider how they access the value of their property when they 
are able, in order to put something aside and form a plan for later in life when they may 
have a requirement for care outside their home and when they may not have the luxury of 
tiŵe to plaŶ͛.  
However, many people do not like the idea of someone else having an interest in their 
home, so another solution is downsizing, allowing the released equity capital to be invested 
to fund future long-term care, although this too has ͚eŵotioŶal issues attaĐhed to it͛.195 It 
also has cost implications, with typical moving costs in the region of £20,000.196 
2.2.4.7  ISA pensions and care ISAs 
I“A peŶsioŶs haǀe ďeeŶ pƌoposed ďǇ Michael Johnson of the Centre for Policy Studies.197 He 
argues that ͚Many eschew pension saving, thereby missing out on tax relief, but 
eŶgageŵeŶt ǁith I“As is high. ‘eadǇ aĐĐess aŶd fleǆiďilitǇ is ǀalued aďoǀe taǆ ƌelief͛.  
His proposals involve replacing occupational pensions with ISA-style pensions. This, in turn, 
would involve replacing the existing EET (exempt-exempt-taxed) pension tax system with 
the TEE (taxed-exempt-exempt) tax system of ISAs. 198  With EET, contributions and 
investment income are exempt from tax and only the pension is taxed. With TEE, 
contributions are taxable (i.e., paid from post-tax income), but investment income and 
withdrawals are exempt. Mr Johnson believes this switch would bring forward significant tax 
paǇŵeŶts aŶd ƌeduĐe the defiĐit ďǇ ͚peƌhaps up to £ϭϬďŶ͛.   
Early research from PwC suggests that employees would welcome switching to a system 
that treats pensions like ISAs, since they believe that the current tax treatment of pensions 
is too complex. PwC surveyed 1,197 employees and found two-thirds did not understand 
the current system. Around 40% said they would rather contribute out of taxed income, and 
enjoy tax-free money in retirement, while only 27% wanted to keep the current tax regime, 
and just 14% said the tax relief on offer was an incentive to save. Further, 60% said that the 
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constant tinkering with the pension system had put them off saving. Philip Smith, head of 
defiŶed ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ peŶsioŶs at PǁC, said: ͚People ǁaŶt a oŶĐe iŶ a lifetiŵe oǀeƌhaul of 
how pensions are taxed to create a simple and stable system which they can understand 
and trust. Moving towards an ISA-stǇle taǆ sǇsteŵ ǁould Đƌeate ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ aĐƌoss people͛s 
saǀiŶgs pots aŶd help theŵ plaŶ foƌ theiƌ futuƌe ǁith ŵoƌe ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͛.  
Nevertheless, Raj Mody, head of pensions consulting at PwC, said the Government would 
still need to incentivise people to put money into retirement saving vehicles, if upfront relief 
ǁas ƌeŵoǀed: ͚The ƌealitǇ is that ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to tǇiŶg up ŵoŶeǇ foƌ the loŶg teƌŵ, people 
need an incentive. Otherwise, why would you bother saving for your retirement when faced 
ǁith ŵoƌe iŵŵediate pƌessuƌes oŶ Ǉouƌ fiŶaŶĐes?͛. A siŵilaƌ ǁaƌŶiŶg Đaŵe fƌoŵ JoŶathaŶ 
Hoǁe, UK iŶsuƌaŶĐe leadeƌ at PǁC: ͚PeŶsioŶs saǀiŶgs aƌe a hugelǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt paƌt of the UK 
retirement bank. Any reform must not reduce incentives for individuals to save for the long-
term and increase the risk of a future pensions hole. Upfront reliefs can be a very important 
element and they also help make it clear that pensions are intended to be different – for 
long-teƌŵ saǀiŶg͛.199  
Phil Loney, chief executive of Royal London, also warned that saving levels could fall 
significantly under the TEE framework. He also believes that many people will not trust a 
system which requires people to accept that a future government will not tax pension 
withdrawals. He said: ͚This so Đalled ͞I“A-stǇle͟ taǆ tƌeatŵeŶt of peŶsioŶ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs is a 
fundamental and far-reaching change to the principles of pension savings, which could pose 
considerable risk to the Government's aim of creating a savings culture in the UK. There is 
no evidence that the promise of tax-free income, 25-30 years into the future, would be 
believed by the public given the volume of changes to the pensions system over the last 25 
years. Consequently, there is a real risk of a significant fall in savings, which are already too 
low in the UK. It would also create a parallel system which is wholly incompatible with 
people's existing pension arrangements, would take years to develop and would increase 
the overall cost of pensions. We believe that it is vital to reform the current tax relief system 
to make long term saving fiscally neutral for all. The incentives need to focus on those with 
lower incomes, to create a more realistic and lower risk way forward. This could also enable 
the abolition of the lifetiŵe alloǁaŶĐe͛.200 
IŶ a siŵilaƌ ǀeiŶ, Dƌ ‘os AltŵaŶŶ, ďefoƌe ďeĐoŵiŶg PeŶsioŶs MiŶisteƌ, pƌoposed ͚Caƌe I“As͛, 
as a vehicle for funding later life care.201  In August 2015, the insurer LV= disclosed that, over 
the previous five years, more than 19,000 pensioners had to remortgage their homes with 
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local authorities because they were unable to afford the cost of residential care. Many 
people face care bills well in excess of their pension pots because of a dramatic increase in 
the average time spent in a care home in recent years.202 
I“A peŶsioŶs ǁould NOT ďe Đlassified as safe haƌďouƌ pƌoduĐts, siŶĐe theǇ do Ŷot hedge 
loŶgeǀitǇ ƌisk. 
2.2.4.8 Peer-to-peer loans 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) lender Zopa has launched a campaign to allow members of SIPPs to 
include P2P loans in their pension pots. This followed a successful campaign for P2P loans to 
be allowed in a new style of innovative finance ISA (IFISA) from April 2016. According to the 
DailǇ Telegƌaph: ͚CuƌƌeŶtlǇ, PϮP loaŶs aƌe Đlassed as ŶoŶ-standard investments, meaning 
that the pension provider must set aside more capital against the possibility of the loan 
defaulting. The result is that any SIPP provider who does allow P2P investment will charge 
the pensioner extra fees to cover the capital cost.   
͚Peeƌ-to-peer loan firms market themselves as an alternative to banks, where savers put 
their money into a platform that lends it on to pre-vetted individuals or companies. 
However, in return for the extra interest savers must also accept a greater risk that the 
borrower will not repay the loan and so it is possible to lose ŵoŶeǇ…[aŶd] ϱϳ% of leŶdiŶg oŶ 
)opa is fuŶded ďǇ saǀeƌs aged ϱϱ oƌ aďoǀe͛.203  
In February 2016, the FCA announced it would bring P2P loans under its investment advice 
rules. This would allow advisers with appropriate permissions to advise on the products and 
introduce a ban on commission from the products. Other types of advisers would not be 
expected to give advice on specific P2P loans.204 
Also in February 2016, Lord Adair Turner, former chair of the FSA, was concerned that 
automated processes and a lack of good credit underwriting will mean people are bound to 
lose ŵoŶeǇ fƌoŵ theiƌ iŶǀestŵeŶt. He said that: ͚You ĐaŶŶot leŶd ŵoŶeǇ to sŵall aŶd 
medium enterprises, in particular, without somebody going and doing good credit 
underwriting. This idea that you can just automate that on to a platform, I think it has a role 
to plaǇ, ďut I thiŶk it ǁill eŶd up pƌoduĐiŶg ďig losses….The losses ǁhiĐh ǁill eŵeƌge fƌoŵ 
peer-to-peer lending over the next five to ten years will make the worst bankers look like 
aďsolute leŶdiŶg geŶiuses͛.   
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Kevin Caley, chief executive of crowdfunding platform ThinCats, confirmed that neither it 
Ŷoƌ its ͚spoŶsoƌs͛ – a network of former bank managers who write a report on what the 
business does, its cashflow projections, and its ability to repay the loan – give 
recommendations to investors. He said is was the responsibility of the financial adviser 
recommending a client make a P2P loan to do their own due diligence on the borrower.205 
Peer-to-peer loans ǁould NOT ďe Đlassified as safe haƌďouƌ pƌoduĐts. 
2.3  Current and planned delivery systems for retirement income products  
Until Flexiday, the most common vehicles for delivering retirement income from DC 
schemes were personal pensions, SIPPs, and group personal pensions (GPPSs), all of which 
are essentially retail products. Following the new pension flexibilities, three forms of 
retirement income delivery vehicle have been developed: institutional, retail, and a hybrid 
combination of institutional and retail.  
2.3.1 Institutional distribution vehicles  
2.3.1.1 Institutional annuitisation  
With institutional annuitisation, the DC scheme arranges for the pension to be paid until the 
scheme member dies.  This is what happens in DB schemes. There are two cases.   
In the first case, the scheme self annuitises and is responsible for making good any deficit 
arising because, say, member life expectancy has been underestimated. The benefit from 
group self-annuitisation is that the scheme retains the mortality premium that arises from 
those members of the scheme who die earlier than their life expectancy. It is equal to the 
ratio of the proportion of the annuitants aged x who die during a particular year (having 
survived to the beginning of that year, denoted qx) to the proportion of the annuitants aged 
x who survive the particular year (denoted (1 – qx)).206 It can be used to enhance the annuity 
paid to those who live longer than their life expectancy. This can be seen from Figure 2.1 
which shows that the amount paid on an annuity has three components: the return of 
capital or initial premium,207 the investment return on the capital (less charges), and the 
mortality premium.208 Initially the weight of the mortality premium in the total payment is 
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 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2016) Ex-FSA chairman attacks P2P in wake of industry's biggest failure, 
Professional Adviser, 10 February. 
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 That is, the mortality premium at age x is equal to qx/(1 – qx), which, in turn, is equal to the odds of dying at 
age x. It arises because those annuitants who die below life expectancy no longer need to be paid and the 
payments that would otherwise be paid to them are redistributed to surviving annuitants. No other type of 
investment has this additional source of return and it increases significantly with age as both Figure 2.1 and 
Figure 2.3 show. 
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 The aŶŶuitaŶt͛s iŶitial iŶǀestŵeŶt ;the pƌeŵiuŵ oƌ ĐapitalͿ is gƌaduallǇ ͚ƌetuƌŶed͛ ;oƌ paid ďaĐkͿ to the 
annuitant as part of each annuity payment. 
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 We are grateful to Tom Boardman for preparing this Figure. 
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quite low, since only a small proportion of the retirees die soon after retirement. By 
contrast, the proportions of the total payment represented by the return of capital and the 
investment return (net of charges) are initially quite large. Over time, these proportions 
decrease in size as capital is returned to the annuitant and the relative significance of the 
mortality premium increases.  
Group annuities are the only financial asset ever invented to benefit from this additional 
source of return. Drawdown products do not benefit from the mortality premium (since 
they do not pool mortality risk). Unfortunately, very few people understand this.209 
 
Figure 2.1: Decomposition of annuity payments 
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An international example of group self-annuitisation is the Swedish Premier Pension System 
(PPM).210 Here each cohort of retiƌees ĐoŵpletelǇ ͚self-aŶŶuitises͛ usiŶg toŶtiŶe aŶŶuities.211  
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 A tontine annuity – named after a Neapolitan banker called Lorenzo Tonti (1635-1690) – is generally 
classified as a pooled or mutual annuity where the investment and longevity risks are borne by the members 
of the pool and there are no cross-subsidies with other cohorts of members. In other words, there is complete 
self-annuitisation within the pool. A number of subscribers contribute capital to a common investment fund 
aŶd theŶ take aŶ aŶŶuitǇ fƌoŵ the fuŶd ǁhiĐh depeŶds oŶ the fuŶd͛s peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe aŶd the Ŷuŵďeƌ of 
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The starting annuity rate is set on the basis of current mortality projections and interest 
rates. However, the annuity is rebased annually in the light of revised mortality projections 
and investment returns. This means that the annuity can rise and fall over time. The 
intention is to avoid intergenerational cross-subsidies. 
In the second case, the scheme buys in annuities for its retired members from an insurance 
company via bulk purchase annuities (BPAs). BPAs have become common in DB schemes 
since 2007 and the economies of scale involved can benefit scheme members as well as the 
DB scheme itself (i.e., through an improvement to its funding level and its risk profile 
relative to liabilities). The idea is for the insurance company to underwrite the longevity 
risks, relative to a guaranteed lifetime income, presented by a cohort of retirees. There 
would be a requirement for the individual underwriting of each annuity sold by means of a 
medical questionnaire, but it is possible that this could be simplified if there were common 
characteristics in the cohort, for example, in relation to the industry in which they worked 
(e.g., a common oĐĐupatioŶal health ƌiskͿ aŶd/oƌ iŶ the aƌea iŶ ǁhiĐh theǇ liǀed ;͚postĐode͛ 
or socio-economic underwriting, also known as geodemographic profiling). 
If this model could be fully developed for the DC auto-enrolment market, it could deliver 
better value for money for retirees, and it might be implemented via a national clearing 
house, for example, to ensure universal access and competitive pricing. It might also be 
offered directly by the large-scale DC schemes, once they have achieved the necessary 
critical mass. However, it is also possible that some – indeed many – schemes might be 
reluctant to assume the additional liabilities associated with group self-annuitisation. 
2.3.1.2 Scheme drawdown 
How scheme drawdown works 
Scheme drawdown is where a pension scheme is used to provide a withdrawal facility 
together with an institutional investment management solution to meet the decumulation 
needs of DC members in early retirement, i.e., until longevity insurance kicks in. In many 
respects, scheme drawdown is a natural extension of the default fund used by modern 
multi-trust, multi-employer schemes for the auto-enrolment accumulation stage.  It is also a 
Ŷatuƌal eǆteŶsioŶ of the tƌustees͛ goǀeƌŶaŶĐe ƌole aŶd fiduĐiary duties, which, prior to 6 
April 2015, ended very abruptly when members were steered towards the purchase of LTAs 
at the point of retirement. Under scheme drawdown, the trustees would be responsible for 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
surviving subscribers. As each subscriber dies, his or her share is divided among the survivors in proportion to 
their initial subscription. Depending on the mortality experience of the pool and the investment performance 
of the fund, the survivors will receive either an increasing or falling annuity over time. The last surviving 
subscriber gets the entire residual fund.
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governance, which would include the selection of the investment manager(s) and 
adŵiŶistƌatioŶ of paǇŵeŶts iŶto ƌetiƌed ŵeŵďeƌs͛ iŶdiǀidual aĐĐouŶts. This goǀeƌŶaŶĐe 
structure would avoid the need to rely on individual employers.  
The specific details about scheme drawdown offerings available are sketchy. However, 
Toǁeƌs WatsoŶ͛s Fit foƌ ‘etiƌeŵeŶt “uƌǀeǇ ϮϬϭϱ suggested that 31% of schemes are 
planning to offer some form of scheme drawdown in 2016 and a further 13% are 
considering its introduction in 2017.212 We were told that the maximum recommended 
income that a member can drawdown might still be linked to GAD rates, as was the case for 
retail drawdown prior to Flexiday, although it would be reviewed annually (rather than 
every three years) because members might wish at any point to purchase a LTA. The cap on 
maximum income might be set at a slightly lower level than the GAD maximum – e.g., 5-10% 
lower – iŶ oƌdeƌ to pƌoǀide a ͚ďuffeƌ͛ oƌ ƌeseƌǀe. This ǁould eŶaďle the fuŶd to sŵooth the 
income payments when markets are volatile and also to return funds to members who 
decide the time is right to make an annuity purchase.  
The income would be generated partly from the investment yield and partly from a 
drawdown of capital (i.e., the accumulated pension pot). For example, if the aim were to 
deliver a maximum income of 6%, this might comprise 3.5% from the yield and 2.5% from 
capital.  Funds are likely to be low-risk and largely bond-based, but might also include a 
modest allocation to growth assets in order to help preserve the annuity-purchasing power 
of the funds.  
We were told that there would be no need for individual advice with this type of 
arrangement – as there is with retail income drawdown – because it is an income-paying 
fund with an administration facility offered by the scheme trustees. Even if this is the case, it 
will be necessary for trustees to provide clear member communications and much would 
depend on whether scheme drawdown is the default or an option. Where drawdown is the 
default, then for the early years of retirement, there would need to be some form of 
screening process to ensure members for whom the strategy is not suitable are offered 
alternative arrangements. For example, a single person with no dependants who is in poor 
health would probably be better off with an enhanced annuity or a cash lump sum. Where it 
is not the default, a professional decumulation service appointed and monitored by the 
trustees could steer members towards the most appropriate decision for their 
circumstances, in which case, the scheme drawdown fund would be one of the available 
options. The regulator would also have to settle the issue of whether any such steer 
constituted guidance or advice.213  
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The attraction of scheme drawdown is that it has the potential to be much cheaper and 
deliver more consistent results than conventional drawdown, due to economies of scale, 
trustee oversight, and the use of a well-designed institutionally managed fund. Scheme 
drawdown would also be more flexible than a FTA because members would be able to 
purchase an LTA at any time or at designated regular intervals, depending on the scheme 
rules.  
Scheme drawdown could therefore be used as a relatively short-term decumulation 
solution. This would provide members with a breathing space before purchasing the LTA. It 
might also be used for a longer period during the early stage of retirement. The scheme 
might have a default age to switch to an LTA, such as 75.  
We did not have access to the pricing of products that are being launched, but we estimate 
that the member charge might be in the region of 0.6% to 1%. The breakdown for a member 
charge of 0.6% might be 0.40% for fund management and 0.20% for administration of 
payments to individual accounts.   
Investment strategies with scheme drawdown 
The investment strategies with scheme drawdown will have to reflect the realities of the 
Ŷeǁ ǁoƌld of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, sĐheŵe desigŶeƌs ǁill haǀe to ƌeĐonsider 
the asset allocation of the glide path during the de-risking phase pre-retirement. Previously, 
most de-risking glide paths ended up with a fund that was 25% in cash, to hedge the tax-
free cash element, and 75% in bonds, to hedge annuity rates. This would no longer be 
suitable for members who go into drawdown: it would be appropriate to have a much larger 
weight in growth assets at the beginning of the decumulation phase. However, for scheme 
members who want to take cash as soon as they can under the new flexibilities, a glidepath 
that ends with 100% in cash is more appropriate in this case.  
Scheme providers will therefore have to ask their members what their likely choice will be – 
cash, drawdown and annuitisation – at the ďegiŶŶiŶg of the sĐheŵe͛s de-risking glidepath, 
which might be 5 or 10 years before the nominated retirement age. If the choice is 
drawdown, then the next question that scheme providers will need to ask members is what 
income level they wish to achieve in retirement. This will allow members to reconsider their 
funding strategy and, if necessary, increase their contribution rate. They might also use the 
opportunity to consider the investment strategy they will employ post retirement (although, 
of course, that can be reviewed again much closer to the date).   
A key aim of scheme drawdown is to deliver a low-cost and flexible drawdown facility. The 
most common investment vehicle for doing this is a target date fund (TDF) which spans the 
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later years of accumulation and the early years of decumulation.
214
 The TDF is an 
investment strategy designed for DC default funds, whereby the scheme establishes a range 
of TDFs, each with its own de-risking glide path. This might involve a TDF for each possible 
retirement date, or there might be a single TDF for members who plan (or are expected) to 
retire within a given five-year window. The more traditional method of de-risking in the UK 
is to use lifestyle strategies. The similarities and differences between the TDFs and lifestyle 
strategies are presented in Table 2.3.  
 
Table 2.3: Target date funds versus life style strategies 
Similarities 
 Both place funds in higher-risk assets when individuals are younger and move these 
in to less risky assets as they approach retirement   Both types are managed with a retirement date or retirement window in mind  Both types have assumed, at least until recently, that individuals will with draw a 
25% tax-free lump sum and purchase a level annuity 
Differences 
 Target date funds are overseen by professional fund managers who can make 
changes to both the strategic and tactical asset allocation in the event of changes to 
the markets or regulatory framework. In contrast, lifestyle strategy funds are 
generally pre-programmed to place funds in lower-risk assets as individuals 
approach retirement, and only change this approach at the discretion of trustees and 
pension providers  Target date funds operate to a broad retirement window (e.g., 2032-34 fund) in 
contrast to lifestyle strategies that target a specific day, often linked to a birthday  Target date funds can continue to pro-aĐtiǀelǇ ŵaŶage ŵeŵďeƌs͛ assets ďeǇoŶd 
theiƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt date iŶ ĐoŶtƌast to lifestǇle stƌategǇ fuŶds that teŶd to ͚set aŶd 
foƌget͛ afteƌ ƌeaĐhiŶg the assuŵed ƌetiƌeŵent date 
Source: Pensions Policy Institute (2014) DC saǀeƌs͛ Needs under the New Pension Flexibilities, PPI Briefing Note 
Number 72, October 
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TDFs have their supporters. For example, in August 2015, Mark Fawcett, chief investment 
officer at NEST, gave his views on why he supports the use of TDFs which he regards as 
inherently flexible when compared to 'mechanistic lifestyling': 
With fewer and fewer workers knowing the exact date they'll retire, what's 
the point of target date funds? If savers are now going to continue 
investing through retirement, why de-risk as they approach state pension 
age? Retirement rarely happens on one day at the end of a working life 
anymore. It's more of a journey than an event. But this doesn't undermine 
the case for target date approaches to investment management, in our 
view. 
Rather we'd argue that target date funds represent an agile way to 
respond to savers' shifting needs in a world of changing retirement 
patterns and greater pension freedoms. People may continue investing for 
longer, but there'll come a point when they're no longer building up their 
pots and start to rely on them for income instead. Their risk capacity will 
change significantly in their final working years and beyond. The amount 
of investment risk in their pots will need to be gradually reduced, although 
not necessarily completely into bonds and cash, as in the days of 
compulsory annuitisation. They'll also need a different type of asset mix, 
focusing on generating an income and avoiding the risk of sharp declines in 
value. 
Unlike with mechanistic lifestyling, the target date fund structure is 
inherently flexible. This allows for sophisticated and dynamic risk 
management that can be implemented and adapted, efficiently and cost 
effeĐtiǀelǇ. IŶ tƌaditioŶal ͚lifestyling', the re-balancing of assets happens 
automatically at the same rate, each year, irrespective of market 
conditions and the valuation of the different asset classes. By contrast, 
target date fund managers, like NEST, are able to analyse economic and 
market conditions at the time and then act accordingly to best keep 
members on track. 
But this isŶ't all. NE“T's ͚default fund', where members are invested if they 
don't make an active choice, is actually made up of around 50 single year 
target date funds. This unique structure means we've been able to adapt 
to the new landscape by implementing two significant changes to the de-
risking phase of these funds. 
The first was to the shape of the glidepath into retirement following the 
͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ reforms. Many pension providers including NEST 
have tended to de-risk into annuity-tracking portfolios, which no longer 
seems appropriate. Savers are now less likely to be buying annuities 
straight away as many will have had to do in the past. In response, we've 
changed the primary objective of the consolidation phase for funds 
maturing after 2020. These funds will now aim to outperform CPI after all 
charges while progressively dampening volatility. In the run up to 2020, we 
believe our members' pots will still be relatively small and it's most likely 
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they'll be taken as cash. We've therefore changed the consolidation phase 
objective for NEST Retirement Date funds maturing up to 2020 to manage 
the risks associated with converting a member's pot into a cash lump sum 
rather than an annuity. We've used the flexibility of target date funds to 
set different groups of members on different glidepaths, according to their 
likely needs in the run up to retirement. 
The second change was to add into the consolidation phase asset mix 
single-year dated gilts that mature in line with their fund's target date. For 
example the 2017 NEST Retirement Date Fund now invests, in part, in a 
2017 gilt, the 2018 NEST Retirement Date Fund invests in a 2018 gilt, and 
so on. This measure is designed to get better returns than the cash we've 
been holding in the portfolios, without needing to worry too much about 
the ŵaƌket ǀalue of the ďoŶds iŶ the iŶteƌiŵ… 
Both these ĐhaŶges haǀe ďoƌƌoǁed fƌoŵ ĐoŶĐepts of ͚liaďilitǇ-driven 
investment' that are more common in the defined benefit world. The aim is 
to align the investment horizon of a member's portfolio with their saving 
journey. In other words, workers should have a seamless investment 
experience as they move from saving up to withdrawing their pension. So 
faƌ this tǇpe of ͚liaďilitǇ aǁaƌe' appƌoaĐh, ǁhiĐh is possiďle ǁithiŶ a taƌget 
date fund structure, has not been widely applied in more traditional 
defined contribution strategies.215 
 
Others, however, are critical of both TDFs and lifestyle as de-risking strategies. A poll carried 
out by the Association of Investment Management Sales Executives (AIMSE) of its members 
found that 55% of respondents believed that, folloǁiŶg ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛, traditional 
life-styling would need to be radically overhauled, while 30% said it would only work if life-
style de-risking also followed through to the decumulation stage. Despite the greater 
flexibility claimed for TDFs by their supporters, only 12% of AIMSE members – whose job is 
to sell TDFs – thought they would work well in the new pensions environment.216  
Another critique is Robert C. Merton, the 1997 Nobel laureate in economics. He believes 
that both TDFs and lifestying focus on the wrong target: ͚If the goal is iŶĐoŵe foƌ life afteƌ 
age 65, the ƌeleǀaŶt ƌisk is ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ, Ŷot poƌtfolio ǀalue…The seeds of 
an investment crisis have been sown. The only way to avoid a catastrophe is for plan 
participants, professionals and regulators to shift the mindset and metrics from asset value 
to iŶĐoŵe͛.217 This, of course, is the opposite of what the 2014 Budget changes do. 
Furthermore, de-risking glidepaths will not be effective in a world where individuals make 
ad hoc withdrawals from their pension pot, while leaving much of the remaining pension 
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pot invested for the long-term (i.e., where individuals use their pension pot as a bank 
account). According to information compiled by Hargreaves Lansdown, lifestyle funds lost 
an average of 9% of their value between February and June 2015. Some such as Aviva, 
Blackrock, Friends Life and Scottish Equitable lost more than 10%. The explanation is that 
the funds switched from equities into long-dated bonds at a time when long-term interest 
rates are anticipated to rise which led to a loss in value for these bonds. According to Alan 
Milleƌ, fouŶdeƌ of fuŶd ŵaŶageƌ “CM Pƌiǀate: ͚It is sĐaŶdalous that losses oŶ this sĐale haǀe 
oĐĐuƌƌed ǁith supposedlǇ ͞safe͟ fuŶds…LifestǇle fuŶds aƌe Ŷo loŶgeƌ fit foƌ puƌpose͛. The 
solution, according to Steve Patterson, managing director of Intelligent Pensions, is for 
people between the ages of 55 and 65 to take on more risk, via a higher equity exposure on 
the grounds that equities give people a better chance of inflation-beating returns which will 
ultimately provide more income in retirement.218 
A report by JLT Employee Benefits published in September 2015 indicates that 56% of 
companies have not changed their investment strategies in the light of the new pensions 
freedoms, despite the fact that just 11% of employers thought members would purchase 
annuities. Maria Nazarova-Doyle, deputy head of defined contribution investment 
ĐoŶsultiŶg at JLT, said: ͚A fuŶd that ĐoŶtiŶues to eŵploǇ a seeŵiŶglǇ safe stƌategǇ of 
investing into long-dated gilts and corporate bonds to track the price of annuities more 
closely becomes quite risky if members do not plan to buy this type of longevity 
insurance...For instance, pension savers looking to withdraw cash lump sums [using] income 
drawdown could be left open to the adverse effects of interest rate fluctuations [which 
ĐhaŶge the ƌetuƌŶs offeƌed ďǇ ďoŶds] ǁithout ŵuĐh of aŶ upside….In addition to the actual 
investment risk consideration, there is now a requirement for default strategies to be 
relevant for the majority of pension scheme members. So, if the majority of members no 
longer intend to purchase an annuity, keeping the old strategy unchanged cannot be 
justified͛.  
Another study, by Towers Watson's master trust LifeSight of around 100 employers, found 
that two-thirds were still targeting annuity purchase in their default investment strategy. 
Only 43% of the employers surveyed said they planned to offer drawdown options. When 
asked why not, 70% said the management and implementation was too difficult, 60% cited 
governance problems, 53% had no desire, and 45% mentioned costs and other barriers. 
Fiona Matthews, managing director of LifeSight, said many employers and trustees had 
been slow to respond because they had been careful to balance giving people what they 
wanted with mitigating risk.219 
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Whatever new de-risking solutions now develop in response to the new pensions 
flexibilities, it seems likely that they will be more expensive than previously. In part, this will 
be due to the increased uncertainty about when funds will be withdrawn. In part, it will be 
because the new flexibilities will discourage investment in long-term illiquid growth assets, 
such as infrastructure, thereby lowering the potential returns on pension savings. Although 
pension savers welcome increased flexibility, unfortunately this comes at a price. 
Examples of scheme drawdown 
There are scheme drawdown offerings from investment managers, life offices and 
consultants. We provide some examples. 
AllianceBernstein has launched a scheme drawdown product that integrates both the 
accumulation and decumulation stages and is suitable for the mass market.220  The product 
ĐoŵďiŶes AlliaŶĐeBeƌŶsteiŶ͛s ƌaŶge of TDFs – which were set up for the new auto-
enrolment market – with an income drawdown product called Retirement Bridge. Its first 
client was the BlueSky Pensions master trust. The product is aimed at scheme members up 
to age 75 and employs an age-related diversified investment approach with a risk-managed  
investment growth target, while allowing member full accessibility to their funds. The 
Retirement Bridge fund will be available to members from age 55. At this age, the member 
is iŶǀested ϰϬ% iŶ eƋuities. AlliaŶĐeBeƌŶsteiŶ͛s  DǇŶaŵiĐ Asset AlloĐatioŶ stƌategǇ is used to 
gradually de-risk the investment portfolio, so that by age 75, the equity investment is 
reduced to 20%. AllianceBernstein also uses volatility management to make short-term 
adjustments to the portfolio to protect against downside risks in turbulent market 
conditions. The aim is to produce an income that is 20% more than that from an annuity 
between 55 and 75.   
AllianceBernstein believes that their product would make a suitable default from age 55. 
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to Tiŵ BaŶks, ŵaŶagiŶg diƌeĐtoƌ of sales aŶd ĐlieŶt ƌelatioŶs: ͚Ouƌ eǆteŶsiǀe 
market research shows that 74% of 55 to 64 year olds have not decided what to do with 
their pension pot. We believe that providing a default solution that keeps them invested 
during this important time in their life, while offering full flexibility to change their mind, 
best meets the modeƌŶ ǁoƌkiŶg eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt͛. At ϳϱ, ŵeŵďeƌs aƌe eǆpeĐted to aŶŶuitise 
ƌeŵaiŶiŶg assets. The ƌeasoŶ foƌ this is giǀeŶ ďǇ Mƌ BaŶks: ͚If soŵeoŶe is iŶ dƌaǁdoǁŶ, eǀeŶ 
if it pƌofessioŶallǇ ŵaŶaged, Ǉou doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ ǁaŶt people iŶ pƌoduĐts that ƌeƋuiƌe 
engagement in theiƌ late ϳϬ͛s͛, giǀeŶ the fall-off in cognitive abilities by that stage.221 
BlackRock has launched the Retirement Income Account for workplace pension schemes. 
Paul BuĐkseǇ, head of UK defiŶed ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ, said: ͚We ďelieǀe this iŶŶoǀatioŶ pƌoǀides 
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our members with a simple, flexible and cost-effective way of moving from the 
aĐĐuŵulatioŶ phase of ǁoƌkplaĐe peŶsioŶ saǀiŶg to deĐuŵulatioŶ͛. The aĐĐouŶt alloǁs 
members to choose  either regular or ad-hoc income payments which are made by selling 
units in the funds held in the account and drawing down capital over time.  
The Đoƌe fuŶd iŶ BlaĐk‘oĐk͛s suite is LifePath Fleǆi. This is a TDF which extends into the 
decumulation phase with a typical asset allocation illustrated in Figure 2.2.222  
The de-risking glidepath used reflects the new reality following the introduction of pension 
fleǆiďilities, ŶaŵelǇ ͚aŶ iŶitial foĐus oŶ gƌoǁth – equities and other risky assets – and a 
gradual move to a more balanced asset mix where growth and volatility management are 
twin objectives. That move may start 20 years or so from a stated retirement date, and 
accelerate as the date becomes closer. It͛s important to remember that the expected 
retirement date is rarely precise – the chosen date is just a best guess foƌ ŵost ŵeŵďeƌs͛.223  
The member can also choose from another 100 investment funds from BlackRock and other 
fund managers. By remaining invested into retirement, members can retain the potential for 
future capital growth, but also alter income as required. The AMC for the LifePath Flexi fund 
is 0.41% which covers account administration and fund charges. There are no set up, 
transaction, or exit fees. There is also no charge for moving from an existing workplace 
scheme to the BlackRock Retirement Income Account. The minimum fund size is £50,000.224 
PƌudeŶtial͛s offeƌiŶg foĐuses oŶ fouƌ lifestǇle solutioŶs: a default solutioŶ foƌ those ǁho 
have not specified a retirement preference, a solution for those planning to take their fund 
in cash, a solution for those planning to use drawdown, and a solution for those planning to 
ďuǇ aŶ aŶŶuitǇ. JohŶ WaƌďuƌtoŶ, distƌiďutioŶ diƌeĐtoƌ, said: ͚The lauŶĐh of the DǇŶaŵiĐ 
Growth Funds, priced to sit between active and passive investments, gives our corporate 
customers a modern, cost-effective, default investment solution which offers diversification, 
flexibility and choice around the new pension freedom. The addition of further default 
lifestyle strategies demonstrates our commitment to offering enhanced levels of flexibility 
to our customers. These enhancements are part of our continuing corporate pensions 
pƌopositioŶ deǀelopŵeŶt to ŵeet eǀolǀiŶg Đustoŵeƌ Ŷeeds͛.225 
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125 
 
 
 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 -30
Years to Retirement 
Figure 2.2: An  Illustrative Asset Allocation for Blackrock's LifePath 'Flexi' Fund 
UK Equity Developed Ex UK Developed Ex-UK small Emerging Markets Property Commodities
UK Gilts UK Inflation Linked UK Corporate O/S Gov O/S Corp O/S EMD
126 
 
Consultants, such as Aon Hewitt, Buck Consultants and Mercer, have designed a scheme 
drawdown product for their existing employer accumulation clients. Xafinity is planning to 
launch a mass-market scheme with full flexibility. 
Despite all these offerings and plans, there have been very few public announcements by 
companies that have adopted any of them in the days and months following Flexiday. This 
raises the question about how willing companies are to offer scheme drawdown to their 
members in practice. There are mixed views about this according to interviews with trustees 
and pension managers conducted by Spence and Johnson in March 2015 on behalf of the 
Defined Contribution Investment Forum (DCIF). Respondents in favour of scheme 
drawdown said this would be best delivered as all-in-one packaged solutions. Schemes that 
were less supportive said they were concerned about the administration difficulties and 
fiduciary implications. Some said scheme drawdown was more likely to be offered through 
master trusts than by single-employer schemes.226 
The reluctance of many trust-based DC schemes to offer drawdown was confirmed by 
AdƌiaŶ BouldiŶg, theŶ peŶsioŶs stƌategǇ diƌeĐtoƌ at Legal & GeŶeƌal: ͚A lot of eŵploǇeƌs aƌe 
reluctant to continue to be involved in a scheme providing drawdown, because it is not a 
͞oŶĐe aŶd doŶe͟ oƌ ͞set aŶd foƌget͟ solutioŶ. It ƌeƋuiƌes oŶgoiŶg ŵaŶageŵeŶt aŶd 
monitoring, and the difficulties come between 15 and 20 years down the track when the 
ŵoŶeǇ staƌts to ƌuŶ loǁ. That͛s a step too faƌ foƌ a lot of theŵ͛.227 Similarly, Nigel Aston, 
head of European DC at State Street Global Advisors, expects little appetite from trustees 
and plan sponsors to shoulder the burden of looking after members once they retire and 
expects them to look to master trusts aŶd platfoƌŵs iŶstead: ͚You ĐaŶ iŵagiŶe a situatioŶ 
where some of the large master trusts – either the not-for-profit ones or the truly 
commercial ones – ǁill saǇ: ͞We͛ll aggƌegate all those iŶdiǀiduals at ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛͟. At ϲϱ, Mƌ 
Aston believes members will leave the scheme used for accumulation and go across to 
NE“T, NOW: PeŶsioŶs, The People͛s PeŶsioŶ, oƌ the PeŶsioŶs Tƌust. AlteƌŶatiǀelǇ, theǇ ǁill 
ŵoǀe to ͚a platfoƌŵ ǁith “taŶdaƌd Life, FidelitǇ, )uƌiĐh, ǁhoeǀeƌ;…. it͛ll ďe ƌelatiǀelǇ 
seamless for the iŶdiǀidual, ďut theǇ͛ƌe soƌt of oŶ theiƌ oǁŶ, ďut Ǉou still haǀe a plaŶ that is 
ǁell goǀeƌŶed͛.228 An additional concern of trustees is that partnering with a drawdown 
provider might be seen by members as giving advice.229 
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2.3.2 Retail distribution 
With retail distribution, the scheme member chooses a drawdown provider either directly 
or via a platform and transfers their pension pot to them and sets up a SIPP with flexible 
access. We consider some examples. 
Haƌgƌeaǀes LaŶsdoǁŶ͛s “IPP is hosted oŶ HL͛s Vantage platform which has an annual charge 
of 0.45% for pension savings up to £250,000.  HL have no set up charge, but they have an 
exit charge of £295 + VAT if all the assets are withdrawn within 12 months. There will also 
be the annual fund management charge on the funds that the member chooses to invest in. 
This could average 1.5% pa.  
LV= has launched a simplified drawdown product which charges 0.25% for funds up to £1m. 
It has a set up charge of £295 if the pot size is below £37,500 and £175 if the pot size is 
above. It also has a SIPP drawdown product with a maximum charge of 0.55% and no extra 
transactions costs.230  
Intelligent Pensions has launched a fixed low-cost drawdown plan which allows DC scheme 
members to transfer to a SIPP and use flexi-access drawdown with ongoing advice. The SIPP 
is operated by James Hay. The drawdown plan has an annual charge of 0.75%, which 
matches the new charge cap on default funds in auto-enrolment pension schemes. The 
charge covers both the SIPP administration costs and the annual management charges on a 
wide range of investment funds. There is a set-up fee of 1% on funds above £100,000. The 
company believes that the minimum suitable for pension drawdown is £100,000. It also 
believes that  flexi-access drawdown is only appropriate for people who are willing to take a 
͚faiƌ degƌee͛ of oŶgoiŶg ƌisk iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt aŶd aƌe also pƌepaƌed to take oŶgoiŶg adǀiĐe. 
MaŶagiŶg diƌeĐtoƌ “teǀe PatteƌsoŶ said: ͚OŶgoiŶg ƌisk ŵaŶageŵeŶt is seĐoŶd oŶlǇ to iŶitial 
suitability and anyone who thinks of drawdown as a DIY process is highly likely to come 
uŶstuĐk ǁith poteŶtiallǇ disastƌous effeĐts. ͞OŶe size fits all͟ solutioŶs aƌe no longer 
appropriate – eǀeƌǇďodǇ͛s ƌetiƌeŵeŶt ǁill ďe diffeƌeŶt. To aĐhieǀe the ďest possiďle 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt outĐoŵes a faƌ ŵoƌe peƌsoŶalised appƌoaĐh is Ŷeeded͛.231 
Charges for retail drawdown products can be very high. Which? investigated the drawdown 
market and found that one product was charging 2.76% p.a.232 Natanje Holt, managing 
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director at Dunstan Thomas, has identified the following types of retail drawdown 
charges:233 
 Transfer out charge – for moving from one contract to another  Transfer out charge to UK-based schemes  Transfers out charge to overseas schemes  Annuity purchase charge  Tax-free cash charge (in drawdown a member might be charged several of these as 
they drawdown tax-free cash by stages)  Income charge (essentially an annual usage fee)  Crystallisation charge (as monies are drawdown)  Pot depreciation charge (taken just before the pot balance goes to zero)  Review charge (for those in capped drawdown where pre-April 2015 drawdown 
scheme members opting to be capped will remain if they do not exceed their 
stipulated maximum income allowance)  Death benefit charge  Additional designated charges, associated with phased drawdown. 
In addition, the Dunstan Thomas analysis found little uniformity in terms of amounts 
charged. For example, based on a sample of 54 SIPP providers, the average transfer out 
charge was £161.70, but it varied between nothing and more than £500. 
2.3.3 Hybrid institutional-retail distribution 
With hybrid institutional-retail distribution, the occupational pension scheme only offers the 
accumulation stage and then sends its members to a provider of retirement income 
solutions, such as those considered in the previous section, but as retail customers.  
This reflects the reluctance, noted in Section 2.3.1 above, of trust-based DC schemes to 
offer drawdown themselves. Members will have to transfer to a SIPP if they want to use 
drawdown. Some trust-based DC schemes used to allow up to two lump sum withdrawals 
peƌ Ǉeaƌ, ďut Ŷo ŵoƌe. A keǇ ƌeasoŶ is Đost. JoŶ DeaŶ, a ĐoŶsultaŶt at Altus, said: ͚Eǀen 
something as apparently simple as removal of drawdown limits can necessitate changing 
multiple interconnected IT systems, redesigning the business processes and controls they 
suppoƌt, aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiŶg the ĐhaŶges to distƌiďutioŶ paƌtŶeƌs͛. 234  
Some contract-based schemes, while showing more flexibility on UFPLS, will also require 
people who want drawdown to move to a SIPP or a stakeholder pension scheme. For 
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example, Scottish Widows will allow unlimited UFPLS withdrawals, but customers will have 
to move to another Scottish Widows scheme to use drawdown.  
The costs of transferring between schemes can be high. Exiting an existing pension scheme 
to get a lump sum or transferring a pension scheme to another provider with a drawdown 
facility could involve punitive exit charges imposed by the transferring scheme and the loss 
of valuable benefits such as guaranteed annuity rates. This would be especially true for 
pension policies sold by insurance companies during the 1980s and 1990s by advisers who 
were paid large commissions. These commissions are spread over the life of the policy, but 
need to be paid whether or not the policy holder continues to pay the premiums. Exit 
penalties are the way in which the remaining premiums are captured. It is hard to get 
reliable information on the size of the exit penalties. Insurers claim they are too complex 
and too tailored to individual policies. However, they can range between 2-20%.235 One 
example is Abbey Life which has an annual charge of 5.25% and an exit penalty of 11%.236,237 
2.4 The withdrawal strategy 
Determining the withdrawal strategy for a DC pension scheme is a critical issue.  If too much 
is withdrawn too soon, then there is the risk that the scheme member will run out of money 
while they are still alive. If too little money is withdrawn, then there is the risk that the 
scheme member dies with a large chunk of the pension pot unspent and hence could have 
enjoyed a much higher living standard in retirement.  
2.4.1 Factors influencing the withdrawal strategy 
A number of factors need to be taken into account. 
The first factor is the level of income that should be drawn in relation to income tax (i.e., the 
avoidance of moving into a higher marginal rate band than is necessary) and to longevity 
risk (i.e., the avoidance of drawing a high level of income in the early years that would result 
in running out of money in later retirement should the individual live longer than expected). 
The level of income drawn will also be influenced by the new rules on inheritance. For those 
with sufficient alternative sources of savings, such as ISAs, it will be optimal to draw from 
those sources before drawing from the pension scheme.  This is because income from ISAs is 
tax free, whereas pension income is taxed. Further, ISAs are subject to inheritance tax (IHT), 
whereas the pension fund can be passed tax free to a named beneficiary if the member dies 
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before age 75. If the member dies after age 75, the pension fund can go to any named 
beneficiary who pays income tax at their marginal rate. 
The second factor is the state pension.  For those with sufficient private pension savings and 
in good health, it pays to delay taking the state pension. Alan Higham, then head of 
retirement insight at Fidelity, has shown that those who reach state pension age before 
April 2016 would receive a 10.4% higher state pension for each year that they delayed 
drawing it. To illustrate, suppose someone is about to retire with a state pension of £6,000 
and delays taking the pension for three years when inflation is 3%. The uplifted pension in 
fouƌ Ǉeaƌs͛ tiŵe ǁill ďe £ϴ,ϲϬϮ Đoŵpaƌed ǁith £ϲ,ϱϱϲ if theƌe ǁas Ŷo defeƌƌal, ǁhiĐh is 
31.4% higher. The three years of missing state pension payments amount to £18,922 and 
this has to be withdrawn from the DC pension pot. As an alternative to taking the extra state 
pension as an annuity, it is possible to take it as a lump sum. This would amount to £19,241. 
The retiree has to live 11 years for the strategy to break even, so the strategy is not suitable 
for those in poor health. If someone lived until 90, the total benefit would be £54,000. After 
April 2016, the increase in the state pension for each year of deferral falls to 5.8% which is 
still much better than most investments offer.238 
The third factor is the investment strategy. The withdrawal strategy cannot be made 
independently of the investment strategy. If the scheme member chooses to invest entirely 
in a LTA, then the income from the pension pot will be predictable and lifelong, but also 
inflexible. If, however, the scheme member chooses to invest in a diversified growth fund, it 
is possible to withdraw a higher average, but potentially more volatile income. But investing 
in a DGF will not hedge longevity risk, so at some stage longevity insurance needs to be 
purchased to avoid running out of money before the scheme member dies. 
A number of academic studies have shown that the optimal strategy for someone who is not 
extremely risk adverse is to begin retirement with a significant investment in growth assets 
and then to switch to an annuity in later life.239 For example, according to Raimond Maurer 
aŶd Baƌaďaƌa “aŵoǀa͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ ƌepoƌt Rethinking Retirement Income Strategies – How Can 
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We Secure Better Outcomes for Future Retirees?, commissioned by the European Fund and 
Asset Management Association:240  
[T]he modelling presented in this report [suggests that] the best 
investment strategy for payout solutions is to hold a significant proportion 
of pension assets in well-diversified equity portfolios early in retirement, 
and to switch to annuities and bond holdings progressively over time, 
takiŶg iŶto aĐĐouŶt iŶdiǀiduals͛ speĐifiĐ ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes. This stƌategǇ ƌesults 
in significantly higher consumption possibilities, at a relatively low risk 
compared to immediate full annuitisation at retirement. 
The risk of being worse off in terms of retirement income in [the] case of 
adverse stock [market] developments is limited for individuals adjusting 
their pension asset portfolio. ….The simulations of consumption levels 
under different financial markets conditions show that the majority of 
individuals (70%) can expect to enjoy up to a third of higher lifetime 
consumption level if they hold equity at the beginning of retirement and 
gradually switch to annuities over time, instead of annuitising all their 
wealth at the age of 65.  Moreover, the consumption level of individuals 
ending up in the worst financial market scenarios would be less than 10% 
lower than under full annuitisation. 
As a consequence, compulsory full annuitisation of retirement wealth at 
the age of 65 results in significant costs in terms of foregone consumption.  
Taking into account the desire of individuals to leave money to their 
surviving relatives and/or build a financial buffer to cope with large and 
sudden expenses, the disadvantage from enforced annuitisation becomes 
substantially aggravated. 
The report also demonstrates that retirees can enjoy a smooth 
consumption pattern during retirement if they keep their retirement 
wealth invested in pension products featuring a switching mechanism to 
increase the proportion of annuities and bonds as time goes by. This result 
reflects the fact that short-term fluctuations in equity markets become less 
important over long investment horizons when the gradual reduction in 
equity expense limits the exposure of pension assets to market volatility. 
 
2.4.2 Is there a safe withdrawal rate? 
As Aďƌahaŵ OkusaŶǇa aƌgues: ͚For clients in retirement, developing a sensible and 
sustainable withdrawal strategy is at least as important as developing a sensible investment 
strategy. Unless a client annuitises all or most of their retirement pot, they need to have a 
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robust framework in place to guide their withdrawal decisions or risk running out of 
ŵoŶeǇ͛.241  
2.4.2.1 The 4% rule 
The US fiŶaŶĐial plaŶŶiŶg ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ has deǀeloped the ĐoŶĐept of a ͚safe ;seŶsiďle oƌ 
sustainable) withdrawal rate' (SWR) which is based on the work of a financial planner called 
Williaŵ BeŶgeŶ. IŶ ϭϵϵϰ, he deǀised the ͚ϰ% ƌule͛. The ƌule stated that aŶ iŶdiǀidual Đould 
withdraw 4% of the fund in the first year and the same amount adjusted for inflation in 
subsequent years. Based on all the rolling historical periods in his dataset, Bengen showed 
that the fund would last for at least 30 years.242 Bengen later introduced the term 'safemax' 
to describe the highest withdrawal rate that would allow at least 30 years' of inflation-
adjusted withdrawals and showed that the safemax rate was 4.5% if the income is tax-free 
and 4.1% if it is taxable.243 
The ϰ% ƌule ǁas ͚ĐoŶfiƌŵed͛ ďǇ the so-called Trinity study in 1998. Philip L Cooley, Carl M. 
Hubbard, and Daniel T. Walz used Monte Carlo simulation techniques on US financial data 
between 1926 and 1995244 to show that a 4% withdrawal rate from a fund invested 50% in 
US equities and 50% in US bonds would have a 95% chance of lasting at least 30 years (i.e., a 
5% failure rate).245 
More recently, Wade Pfau, a professor of retirement income at the American College of 
Financial Services, investigated the 4% rule for the UK and 16 other developed market 
economies.246 He employed 109 years of financial market data (between 1900 and 2008) for 
each of the 17 countries. Using the same historical simulations approach as Bengen, he 
examined the outcomes for individuals retiring in each year of the 80 years between 1900 
and 1979, allowing for a retirement period of 30 years.   
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Table 2.4:  Safe withdrawal rates for UK retirees 
  'Safemax' 10th percentile 
% failures  
(4% rate) 
% failures 
 (5% rate) 
 'Perfect' foresight 
assumption 
3.77 4.17 3.8 27.5 
 UK 50/50 portfolio 3.43 4.01 9.3 55.6 
 Global 50/50 portfolio 3.26 3.55 17.9 31.0 
Source: Wade D. Pfau (2010) An International Perspective on Safe Withdrawal Rates: The Demise of the 4 
Percent Rule?, Journal of Financial Planning, 23(12), 52–61. 
 
The outcomes for the UK are shown in Table 2.4. Even with perfect foresight of future asset 
returns and the most favourable asset mix in the light of this perfect foresight, Pfau showed 
that the ͚safeŵaǆ' ƌate foƌ the UK is oŶlǇ ϯ.ϳϳ%. If the iŶdiǀidual is prepared to accept a 10% 
probability of failure (i.e., a 10% chance of running out of money before 30 years), the SWR 
increases to 4.17%. A 5% withdrawal rate results in a failure probability of 27.5%. Returning 
to BeŶgeŶ͛s oƌigiŶal Đase of a ϱϬ/ϱϬ poƌtfolio, the ͚safeŵaǆ' ƌate is just ϯ.ϰϯ%. With a ϭϬ% 
failure probability, the SWR is 4.01%, while a withdrawal rate of 5% leads to a failure rate of 
55.6%. The outcome is actually worse if the individual invests in a global 50/50 portfolio 
(i.e., 50% in global eƋuities aŶd ϱϬ% iŶ gloďal ďoŶdsͿ. Noǁ the ͚safeŵaǆ' ƌate is ϯ.Ϯϲ%, the 
SWR rate with a 10% failure probability is 3.55%, and the failure rate with a 5% withdrawal 
rate is 31%. 
While a fixed SWR is simple to understand, it has a number of weaknesses. 
First and most importantly, it ignores longevity risk.  Office for National Statistics data shows 
that a 65-year old couple has a 25% chance of one of them reaching 97 and a 17% chance of 
one of them reaching 100. A rule designed so that funds last 30 years is clearly inadequate. 
Moshe A. Milevsky and Huaxiong Huang (2011, Table 3) show that, for individuals who are 
concerned about running out of money before they die (i.e., have longevity risk aversion), it 
is optimal for them to use a proportion of their pension pot to buy index-linked LTAs. These 
authors show that lifetime consumption in retirement (as well as lifetime utility or welfare) 
is maximised if all pension wealth is annuitised at the time of retirement.247 Some have 
argued that individuals who do not want to formally purchase an annuity because they 
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value the flexibility of drawdown, should not actually choose a SWR above that of an 
annuity (i.e., 2.5% - 3%).248 
“eĐoŶd, it igŶoƌes the iŶdiǀidual͛s attitude to ƌisk, ďoth iŶ teƌŵs of the uŶdeƌlǇiŶg 
investment portfolio and the failure probability. Individuals with a low degree of investment 
risk tolerance and a low tolerance to running out of funds before dying would want to invest 
in a much more conservative fund and, consequently, have a much lower SWR.  
Third, the rule involves taking out a fixed (albeit index-linked) amount whatever market 
conditions. This leaves open the possibility that individuals could spend all their pension pot 
before dying. It also leaves open the possibility that individuals underspend their pension 
pot before dying and hence could have enjoyed a higher standard of living in retirement. 
Fouƌth, it is Ŷot ͚safe͛ iŶ a loǁ-yield world. Michael Finke, Wade D. Pfau, and David M. 
Blanchett show that if the Trinity study was repeated with real bond rates as of January 
2013 (4% below the historical long-run average), then the failure rate with the 4% rule 
increases from 5% to 57%. If bond rates return to their historical average after 5 (10) years, 
the failure rate is still high at 18% (32%).249   
Fifth, it ignores fund management charges. Maria A. Bruno, Colleen M. Jaconetti, and Yan 
Zilbering show that the SWR with a 50/50 US equity/bond portfolio, an 85% success rate 
and a 30-year spending horizon drops from 3.9% with a 0% charge, to 3.8% with a 0.25% 
charge, and to 3.3% with a 1.25% charge.250 
Sixth, it ignores the dynamic nature of market and portfolio returns. Many advisers use 
cashflow models to help clients understand their income and expenditure needs after 
retirement. Included in income is the withdrawal amount from the fund, e.g., 4%. This 
withdrawal rate will be based on an assumed rate of return on the invested fund. The 
problem is that the cashflow models are deterministic and assume that the rate of return is 
fixed and hence ignore real world randomness. In particular, they ignore ͚sequence-of-
returns͛ ƌisk.251 This is the risk that there is a sequence of negative returns on the invested 
portfolio in the early years after retirement. If a fixed (in real terms) amount of money is still 
withdrawn from the fund each year, many retirees will run out of money, not only well 
before they die, but also well before they have completed 30 years of retirement. 
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Table 2.5:  Sequence-of-returns risk 
Year Portfolio A Portfolio B Client age Portfolio A Portfolio B 
1 -5.9 5.73 60 89,100 100,730 
2 -13.3 5.73 61 72,250 101,502 
3 -22.7 5.73 62 58,849 102,318 
4 20.9 5.73 63 56,476 103,181 
5 12.8 5.73 64 58,705 104,093 
6 22.0 5.73 65 66,621 105,057 
7 16.8 5.73 66 72,813 106,077 
8 5.3 5.73 67 71,672 107,155 
9 -29.9 5.73 68 45,242 108,296 
10 30.1 5.73 69 53,860 109,501 
11 14.5 5.73 70 56,670 110,775 
12 -3.5 5.73 71 49,686 112,123 
13 12.3 5.73 72 50,798 113,547 
14 20.8 5.73 73 56,363 115,054 
15 -5.9 5.73 74 48,038 116,646 
16 -13.3 5.73 75 36,649 118,330 
17 -22.7 5.73 76 23,330 120,110 
18 20.9 5.73 77 23,206 121,993 
19 12.8 5.73 78 21,176 123,983 
20 22 5.73 79 20,835 126,087 
21 16.8 5.73 80 19,335 128,312 
22 5.3 5.73 81 15,360 130,664 
23 -29.9 5.73 82 5,767 133,151 
24 30.1 5.73 83 2,503 135,781 
25 14.5 5.73 84  138,561 
26 -3.5 5.73 85  141,500 
27 12.3 5.73 86  144,608 
28 20.8 5.73 87  147,894 
29 5.73 5.73 Average   
Source: FinalytiQ 
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This can be shown using the following example.
252
 Table 2.5 shows the returns from two 
portfolios. The second column (Portfolio A) represents a sequence of realistic annual 
returns, while the third (Portfolio B) represents what advisers might use in their 
deterministic cashflow model by assuming the average annualised return from column 2 
holds for each of the 29 years in the Table. The key point is that both portfolios have the 
same average return, but the sequence of returns is very different. 
A client withdrawing £5,000 a year from age 60 will run out of money with Portfolio A by 
age 83, while Portfolio B allows the customer to withdraw the same level of income 
indefinitely and bequest more than the initial pension pot to their descendants. The 
explanation for what happens to portfolio A is 'reverse pouŶd Đost aǀeƌagiŶg' oƌ ͚pouŶd Đost 
ƌaǀagiŶg͛: the Đustoŵeƌ has to sell uŶits at loǁ pƌiĐes to paǇ the ƌeƋuiƌed iŶĐoŵe aŶd the 
portfolio can never recover from the early poor performance by later good performance, 
however good that subsequent performance is. 253  As Abraham Okusanya argues: 
͚DeteƌŵiŶistiĐ ŵodelliŶg tools hide the daŶgeƌ of Ŷegatiǀe seƋueŶĐe-of-returns, especially in 
the eaƌlǇ Ǉeaƌs of ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛.254 Some advisers are even less complementary about cash 
flow models. Richard Bishop, director and prinĐipal at Pƌeŵieƌ PƌaĐtiĐe, saǇs: ͚I'ŵ goiŶg to 
come out and say it: cashflow modelling is utter nonsense and is only used to justify 
eǆtoƌtioŶate adǀiseƌ fees͛.255 
Finally, the SWR ignores the fact that the future might not be like the past: in particular, 
future returns might by lower and more volatile than the historical returns upon which the 
4% rule was based. As mentioned by Jonathan Gardner of Towers Watson, the 4% rule was 
built on the particularly favourable post-World War II investment experience, and this might 
well not be repeated going forward.256 A similar point has been made by Duncan Robertson, 
ŵaƌketiŶg diƌeĐtoƌ at AegoŶ IƌelaŶd: ͚Yes, the past has a useful story to tell, and through our 
experiences of the past we can build models of what might happen in the future. But it 
would be misguided to use it blindly. Models on sustainability need to be calibrated to 
today's world, using today's expectations on rates of return and volatility of assets and 
todaǇ's eǆpeĐtatioŶs oŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual's loŶgeǀitǇ….. Withdƌaǁal ƌates of ϱ%+ ŵaǇ ďe 
perfectly sustainable when risk-free yields are at historical higher levels, and planning to 
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exhaust funds 30 years after retiring may also be okay when people weren't living so long. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, this isŶ't the ĐuƌƌeŶt ǁoƌld͛.257  
It is, of course, possible to reduce the failure rate by adjusting withdrawals down in bad 
years and up in good years. The main ways of doing this are through the use of variable 
spending strategies: 
 Giving up the inflation uprating in years when there are poor investment returns  Cutting spending when the portfolio withdrawal rate exceeds 20% of their initial 
level  because the portfolio is declining258  Increasing spending when portfolio withdrawal rate falls by more than 20% of their 
initial level because the portfolio is growing  Withdrawing a constant percentage from the fund, rather than a constant amount. 
All these options involve, albeit to differing degrees, volatile income and hence expenditure 
from one year to the next, although with the last option, the retirees will never run out of 
money before they die.  
Luke Delorme (2014, p.33) examined three common withdrawal strategies in terms of their 
͚utilitǇ sĐoƌes͛.259,260 These were the original 4% rule (an inflation-adjusted percentage 
starting at 4% of the initial pot), a constant monetary amount (equal to 4% of the initial pot) 
and a constant percentage (4% of whatever the pot size is at the time of withdrawal). Based 
on bootstrapped simulations which draw returns randomly from the period 1928 to 2013, 
the author shows that the withdrawal strategy with the highest utility score in the worst-
case scenario is the original 4% rule (utility score = 4.93). The strategy with the lowest score 
is the constant monetary amount (utility score = 2.92), while the constant percentage 
strategy lies in between (utility score = 4.11). 
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2.4.2.2 Alternatives to the 4% rule 
Some alternative withdrawal strategies to the 4% rule have been proposed which 
dynamically adjust withdrawals to market and portfolio conditions and we consider the 
most common of these.261  
This first is based on withdrawing the annuitised value of the fund, i.e., withdrawing the 
amount Fx/ax at age x, where Fx is the value of the fund at age x, and ax is the annuity factor 
at age x.262 This is kŶoǁŶ as the ͚eƋuiǀaleŶt aŶŶuitǇ͛ stƌategǇ. A ǀaƌiatioŶ oŶ this is the ͚ϭ/Ex͛ 
rule, where Ex is the iŶdiǀidual͛s life eǆpeĐtaŶĐǇ at age ǆ, aŶd the ǁithdƌaǁal aŵouŶt at age 
x is given by Fx/Ex. With these strategies, retirees will never run out of money before they 
die.  
Ed Denbee (2008, Figures 4 and 8) examined the equivalent annuity and 1/Ex strategies.
263 
Both strategies give similar results.264  The pattern in the case of the median simulation for 
someone retiring at 65 is that the withdrawal amount is initially higher than for an 
equivalent index-linked annuity.265  It increases year on year until the early 70s and then 
falls back, dropping below the annuity payment in the early 80s. Someone surviving to 100 
would have around one quarter of the payment they would have received on the index-
linked annuity.  
The seĐoŶd is to dƌaǁ oŶlǇ the ͚Ŷatuƌal͛ iŶĐoŵe fƌoŵ the fuŶd. Mark Rimmer, product 
director for Premier's multi-asset team, defines this as the ͚pay-out of dividends [coupons, 
rent etc] from income-geŶeƌatiŶg iŶǀestŵeŶts͛. 266 This, of course, is what equity income 
funds do. Since there is no cashing-in of units to pay an income, the annual income received 
will fluctuate from one year to the next aŶd ͚theƌe is Ŷo tidǇ ǁaǇ of gettiŶg aƌouŶd this͛. 
The third is auto-rebalancing.267 This involves making withdrawals from the asset classes 
that experienced the highest growth during the year. An extreme form would be to 
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rebalance the portfolio annually to a constant asset mix, by selling relative winners and 
buying relative losers. 
The fourth is to use a cashflow reserve (or bond) ladder or bucket (also called time 
segmentation).268 This involves holding enough in deposits or short-maturing bonds to meet 
the next two years of expenditure. This means that equities do not have to be sold in a 
falling market to fund expenditure. The next rung of the ladder includes medium-term 
bonds intended to cover the next 5 to 10 years of expenditure, but which could be sold in a 
prolonged market downturn without too big a capital loss. At the top of the ladder are 
equities. With luck, by the time the client needs to sell equites to meet expenses, the 
market has recovered. A feature of this approach is that the portfolio becomes riskier over 
time, since there is no rebalancing of the portfolio as the safest and most liquid assets are 
sold to pay for consumption.  
The fifth is the rising equity glide path proposed by Wade Pfau  and the US financial planner 
Michael Kitces.269 This starts with a low equity allocation which increases gradually during 
the first decade of retirement.  This strategy reduces portfolio return volatility at the time 
the portfolio is most susceptible to sequence-of-returns risk. Also if there has been a 
sequence of negative returns during the early years of retirement, the rising glide path 
results in the clients buying low. The approach is the exact opposite of conventional wisdom 
which suggests that the equity weighting in the portfolio should decrease with age (as in the 
common rule of thumb used by advisers that the equity weighting should equal 100 minus 
age).  
The sixth is the floor-leverage rule.270  This involves establishing a safe and secure spending 
floor with 85% of the assets in the portfolio. The remaining 15% of the portfolio is invested 
in a 3 times leveraged equity fund. If the equity portion of the portfolio exceeds 15% of the 
total portfolio, equities are sold to reduce the allocation to 15% and the proceeds are used 
to increase spending. Otherwise, do nothing. 
The fiŶal oŶe is a ͚least Đost͛ oƌ ͚Đollaƌed͛ speŶdiŶg stƌategǇ.271 The designers of this strategy 
argue that the 4% rule leads to situations where surpluses are accumulated (and unspent) 
when markets outperform and where there are spending shortfalls when markets 
underperform. They estimate that these surpluses amount to 10%-ϮϬ% of the ƌetiƌee͛s 
                                                     
268
 See Finalytiq (2014) Pound Cost Ravaging: Understanding Volatility Drag, Sequencing Risk & Safe 
Withdrawal Rates in Retirement Portfolios,  http://www.finalytiq.co.uk/pound-cost-ravaging-whitepaper; 
Abraham Okusanya (2014), Chaos Theory: How to Manage Sequencing Risk in a Retirement Portfolio, 
Professional Adviser, 13 November;  Cazalet Consulting (2014, p. 114-5), WheŶ I͛ŵ “iǆtǇ-Four, September. 
269
 Wade D Pfau and Michael E. Kitces (2014) Reducing Retirement Risk with a Rising Equity Glide Path, Journal 
of Financial Planning, 27(1), 38–45. 
270
 Jason S Scott and John G Watson (2013) The Floor-Leverage Rule for Retirement, Financial Analysts Journal, 
69(5), 45–60. 
271
 Jason S. Scott, William F. Sharpe, and John G. Watson (2009) The 4% Rule—At What Price?, Journal of 
Investment Management, 7(3), 31–48. 
140 
 
initial wealth, while the spending shortfalls are equivalent to an additional 2%-4% of initial 
ǁealth. TheǇ pƌopose aŶ alteƌŶatiǀe ͚least Đost͛ speŶdiŶg plaŶ ǁhiĐh eliŵiŶates the 
inefficiencies – amounting to 12%-24% of initial wealth – in the 4% spending plan. This 
involves using options to put a cap on spending when the market is underperforming and a 
floor on spending when the market is performing well and hence puts a ͚Đollaƌ͛ oŶ speŶdiŶg 
that eliminates the surpluses and deficits. 
It is important to note that none of these strategies, apart from the first one, hedge 
longevity risk, unless longevity insurance in the form of a deferred annuity is purchased at 
retirement which comes into effect at, say, 85. 
2.5 The longevity insurance strategy 
The longevity insurance strategy determines when longevity insurance is purchased and 
when it comes into effect. The strategy is essential for ensuring that a pension scheme 
serves its primary purpose of providing an income for however long the scheme member 
lives. But when should longevity insurance be purchased and when should it come into 
effect? This essentially boils down to the choice between buying an immediate annuity 
when it is needed and buying a deferred annuity at the point of retirement with the 
deferred annuity beginning to make payments when it is needed. 
 
Figure 2.3:  The Milevsky switching rule 
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The optimal combined investment and longevity insurance strategy in retirement is complex 
and impossible to implement properly without sophisticated stochastic dynamic 
programming software. However, Milevsky (1998) proposed a simple rule of thumb for 
deciding when to switch from risky equity-linked assets to an annuity: this is when the 
mortality premium exceeds the equity premium as shown in Figure 2.3.272 The mortality 
premium for a particular age (x) can be thought of as the excess return on a level annuity 
over a risk-free investment; it is shown by the upward sloping curved line in the Figure. The 
equity premium is the excess return on equities over a similar risk-free investment: in Figure 
2.3, the equity premium is assumed to be fixed at 3% p.a. 
In the early years after retirement, the equity premium exceeds the mortality premium and, 
all other things being as expected, the retiree receives a higher average return from 
investing in an equity-linked portfolio than investing in a level annuity, which is equivalent 
to a bond-based investment. However, the level of the mortality premium increases each 
year and eventually exceeds the equity premium. Figure 2.3 shows that the switchover age 
is around 80 if the equity premium is 3%.  This rule of thumb is a reasonable approximation 
to the optimal switching rule if the scheme member is risk-neutral, but it overestimates the 
switching age if the member is risk averse: for example, if they are extremely risk-averse 
they should annuitise at retirement and not delay.273 
Figure 2.ϯ shoǁs the ͚aǀeƌage͛ iŶǀestŵeŶt outĐoŵe ǁith a ϯ% eƋuitǇ pƌeŵiuŵ. But, 
presenting information on the basis of averages is deceptive: investment returns are not 
guaranteed and Figure 2.3 ignores important realities, such as sequence-of-returns risk. To 
show what could happen in the real world, we use the PensionMetrics stochastic simulation 
model.274 
We make the following assumptions: 
 Male retires age 65 with a pension pot of £100,000 (F65)  Investment strategy: 25% equites, 75% bonds  Expected interest rate = 4%  Volatility of interest rate = 4%  Expected inflation rate = 2%  Volatility of inflation rate = 4%  Equity premium = 3%  Volatility of equity returns = 20% 
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 Total expense ratio = 1%  Annuity rate at age 65 (a65) = 5.5%  Age at which deferred annuity starts if purchased at age 65 = 85  Number of simulation trials = 2,500. 
 
Figure 2.4: Distribution of real income with 100% drawdown and no deferred annuity
 
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of real income with 100% drawdown and no deferred 
annuity. What is depicted is a fanchart showing the 90% prediction interval for the 
distribution of income from the 2,500 different scenarios. Each year, the member is 
assumed to withdraw the annuity equivalent of their remaining pension pot. At age 65, the 
member withdraws 5.5% of £100,000 (= a65 x F65 = £5,500), which is the same amount that 
could be taken from a level lifetime annuity at age 65.  This means that £94,500 (=£100,000 
- £5,500) is available for investment in the first year of retirement. Suppose the investment 
portfolio loses 5%, so the pension pot is valued at £89,775 (F66 = £89,775) at the end of the 
year, and the annuity rate is 5.8% at age 66 (a66 = 5.8%): then the income that could be 
withdrawn at age 66 would be £5,270 (= a66 x F66 = 5.8% of £89,775). Suppose instead that 
the investment portfolio gains 5%, so the pension pot would now be valued at £99,225 (F66 = 
£99,225), and the income that could be withdrawn at age 66 would be £5,775 (= a66 x F66 = 
5.8% of £99,225). These are two of the possible 2,500 scenarios for what might happen at 
age 66. The most likely outcome for what could happen between ages 65 and 100 (assuming 
the member survives that long) is given by the dark central band in the fanchart. We can 
also be 90% confident that the actual outcome will lie somewhere in the fanchart. 
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Also depicted in Figure 2.4 is a thin slightly curved downward sloping line. This shows the 
real value of the payments on a level annuity purchased at age 65, with the payments 
declining in real terms at the rate of 2% p.a. due to inflation. The average real value of the 
income that can be drawn from the drawdown programme falls each year, since more is 
taken out of the fund every year than the average value of the investment return (and there 
is also the effect of inflation). But it initially falls by less than the fall in the real value of the 
annuity, due to the equity premium earned by the drawdown fund. However, after around 
age 80, the mortality premium exceeds the equity premium. Also a higher mortality rate 
implies a higher annuity rate.  
Since the amount taken out of the fund in a given year depends on the fund size, the 
annuity rate for that year and the equity premium, once the mortality premium exceeds the 
equity premium, the income that can be drawn from the fund falls very rapidly. This is 
because, while the annuity rate increases, the fund size falls at a bigger rate. But note that 
the pension pot never runs out, because the member never draws down more than the 
annuity equivalent of the remaining pension pot. Also note that the prediction interval is 
very wide, particularly for people in their 80s. For example, at age 80, someone could be 
lucky and be drawing £6,500, or they could be unlucky and only be drawing £3,000.  
Figure 2.4 shows that the user of drawdown will on average receive a higher income in the 
earlier years of retirement than the annuitant, but a lower income in the later years if they 
live that long. Of course, when the retiree dies, the residual fund with drawdown goes to 
their estate, whereas the family of an annuitant gets nothing. 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show what happens if 120% and 150%, respectively, of the annuity 
equivalent is withdrawn each year. Individuals will enjoy a much higher standard of living in 
early retirement than a lifetime annuity, but they will pay for it in later retirement if they 
live that long. 
Figure 2.7 shows what happens if only 80% of the annuity equivalent is withdrawn each 
year. In the first year, £4,400 is withdrawn. The larger sum that is retained in the pension 
pot to begin with means that, on average, increasing amounts can be taken out in 
subsequent years until the early 80s. Thereafter, the amount that can be withdrawn 
declines gradually and falls below that of an annuity by the late 80s.  
Figure 2.8 shows what happens if a fixed amount is withdrawn each year – equal to 150% of 
the initial annuity amount of £5,500 (i.e., £8,250) – irrespective of the subsequent 
investment performance of the investment portfolio. It is clear that this is a very high-risk 
strategy that risks the pot being depleted completely by around age 80. Even taking only 
£5,500 per year is not much less risky as Figure 2.9 shows. 
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of real income with 120% drawdown and no deferred annuity
 
 
Figure 2.6: Distribution of real income with 150% drawdown and no deferred annuity 
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of real income with 80% drawdown and no deferred annuity 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Distribution of real income with a fixed amount withdrawn each year equal to 
150% of the initial annuity amount 
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of real income with a fixed amount withdrawn each year equal to 
100% of the initial annuity amount 
 
The next set of Figures show what happens if part of the pension fund is used to buy a 
deferred annuity at age 65 which starts to pay out at age 85 if the member survives that 
long – the premium for the deferred annuity is lost if the member dies before 85. Figure 
2.10 shows what happens in the case where 10% of the fund is used at age 65 to purchase a 
deferred annuity, and there is 100% drawdown on the remaining fund. Although lower on 
average than the income from an annuity at most ages, the income from this combination 
of drawdown and deferred annuity matches the annuity income quite closely – except at 
high ages – and certainly much better than the pure drawdown strategy shown in Figure 
2.4. And drawdown has much more flexibility. If concerned about the fall off in income at 
high ages, the member could consider using 15% of the fund to buy a deferred annuity as 
shown in Figure 2.11.  Figure 2.12 shows what happens in the case of 150% drawdown with 
10% of the fund used at age 65 to purchase a deferred annuity that starts paying at age 85. 
The benefits from purchasing a deferred annuity at high ages are clear.  
What these Figures strikingly demonstrate is the two key unavoidable tradeoffs people need 
to make in retirement: (a) a higher income earlier in retirement or a higher income later 
(and vice versa), and (b) the higher overall lifetime income from an annuity against the extra 
flexibility and death benefits available with drawdown. Ultimately, the optimal decision 
comes down to choosing what risk of a reduction in future lifetime income retirees are 
prepared to accept for retaining control over their assets.  
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Figure 2.10: Distribution of real income with 100% drawdown and 10% of the fund used at 
age 65 to purchase a deferred annuity that starts paying at age 85 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Distribution of real income with 100% drawdown and 15% of the fund used at 
age 65 to purchase a deferred annuity that starts paying at age 85 
 
148 
 
Figure 2.12: Distribution of real income with 150% drawdown and 10% of the fund used at 
age 65 to purchase a deferred annuity that starts paying at age 85 
 
2.6 Charges, charge disclosure and proposals to cap charges 
2.6.1 Charges 
Charges for drawdown vary considerably and have up to four components: the charge 
imposed by the scheme provider to cover operational costs (such as administration), the 
fund management charge, the platform charge, and the charge for advice.  
Even for a simple fund structure from a low-cost provider, the annual charge might be 1% 
plus an administration fee of £250 per annum, which would cover the cost of income 
payments and income amount reviews, for example. A more common total cost is about 2% 
p.a. which is similar to that for an investment-backed annuity. Guaranteed drawdown 
products could cost up to 2.5% p.a. (or even more), although for large funds, the charge 
drops to around 1.55% p.a. We came across cases where the charges for a SIPP package and 
advice were 4%-4.5% p.a. Platform costs can be between 0.25-0.50% p.a. and advice can be 
between 0.50-0.75% p.a. There are also hidden costs, including bid-offer spreads, the cost of 
sub-funds within the main fund, etc. Where an actively managed fund is selected, there is a 
risk that high turnover (churning) would add significantly to the total cost due to the 
transaction costs involved. Which? fouŶd ͚oŶe pƌoǀideƌ ĐhaƌgiŶg Ϭ.ϱ% ŵoƌe thaŶ aŶotheƌ 
foƌ iŶǀestiŶg iŶ the eǆaĐt saŵe fuŶd, aŶd oŶe pƌoǀideƌ͛s Đhaƌges ranging from 0.44% to 
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1.24% for very similar funds, which can make a significant difference over the course of 
soŵeoŶe͛s ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛. The ǁoƌst Đase ǁas a fuŶd ĐhaƌgiŶg Ϯ.ϳϲ% p.a.275 
We pool together some of the charges noted above: 
 Annuities – It is haƌd to ideŶtifǇ the ͚Đhaƌge͛ the aŶŶuitǇ pƌoǀideƌ iŵposes foƌ selliŶg 
an annuity to a customer. The annuity provider simply sells the annuity for a price.  It 
is possible to work out the annuity rate (which is the annuity payment divided by the 
purchase price), but that does not reveal anything about the charge. We do know 
that agents selling annuities on a non-advised basis get a one-off commission of 1-
3% of the purchase price  Short- or fixed-term annuities (FTAs) – Typical one-off commission for sales on a non-
advised basis is about 2% of the fund  Investment-linked annuities (ILAs) – Annual charges are estimated at about 2%  Diversified growth funds – Annual charges are in the range 0.65% - 0.75%  Multi-asset income funds – Annual charges of around 0.9%  Multi-manager funds – Annual charges up to 2%.276  
With current charges, drawdown products are more profitable to platforms than annuities, 
aĐĐoƌdiŶg to IaŶ Goƌhaŵ, Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe of Haƌgƌeaǀes LaŶsdoǁŶ: ͚ǁe ŵake a oŶe-off 
commission if clients take out an annuity, but in the longer term we make more money on 
drawdown; as long as a client has a drawdown account for more than four years, it is more 
ƌeŵuŶeƌatiǀe͛.277 
In July 2015, Which? published a comprehensive report on drawdown charges, entitled The 
True Cost of Pension Freedom.278  For the case of a £50,000 pension pot with a 4% 
withdrawal rate, the difference in charges over 10 years between the most expensive 
provider (The Share Centre, which charged £8,100) and the cheapest (Fidelity, which 
charged £4,991) was around £3,000.  
For someone with a £250,000 pot, withdrawing 6% a year, the cost differences over 10 
years between the dearest and cheapest providers was £10,000, with Scottish Widows 
charging £26,490 and LV= charging £16,325. Table 2.6 shows the full set of results across the 
18 companies that took part in the Which? survey.   
The different companies had a variety of ways of charging: six charge to set up a drawdown 
plan, seven charge an annual fee for using drawdown, eight charge an annual fee if the 
                                                     
275
 Which? calls for additional pension reforms , 6 March 2015; 
http://www.which.co.uk/news/2015/03/which-calls-for-additional-pension-reforms-397246/ 
276
 Kyle Caldwell (2015) Under the microscope - the new funds launched for pension freedoms, Daily 
Telegraph, 14 May.  
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 Reported in Anna Fedorova (2015) Hargreaves shares slide 4pc as FSCS levy bites, Investment Week, 20 
May. 
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 http://www.which.co.uk/news/2015/07/the-true-cost-of-pension-freedom-409249/ 
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Đustoŵeƌ uses a “IPP, aŶd seǀeŶ Đhaƌge a siŵpleƌ siŶgle aŶŶual ͚platfoƌŵ fee͛ but with 
additional charges for certain types of investments.  
‘iĐhaƌd LloǇd, Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe of WhiĐh? said: ͚The old aŶŶuitǇ ŵaƌket failed peŶsioŶeƌs 
miserably and the Government ŵust eŶsuƌe the saŵe thiŶg doesŶ͛t happeŶ agaiŶ ǁith 
drawdown. With such big differences in cost, and confusing charges that make it difficult to 
Đoŵpaƌe, it͛s Đleaƌ ŵoƌe Ŷeeds to ďe doŶe to help ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ŵake the ŵost of the 
[peŶsioŶ] fƌeedoŵs͛.279 
Table 2.6: Drawdown costs 
 
Company Cost over one year Cost over a decade 
LV= £1,786 £16,325 
Alliance Trust Savings £1,966 £18,155 
AJ Bell YouInvest £2,035 £18,815 
Halifax Sharedealing £2,049 £18,957 
Interactive Investor £2,069 £19,156 
The Share Centre £2,467 £20,597 
James Hay £2,410 £21,152 
AXA Wealth £2,444 £22,081 
Fidelity £2,468 £22,284 
Old Mutual/Skandia £2,491 £22,487 
Charles Stanley Direct £2,636 £22,536 
Hargreaves Lansdown £2,620 £23,600 
Barclays Stockbrokers £2,699 £23,708 
TD Direct Investing £2,724 £24,031 
Bestinvest £2,880 £25,006 
Aviva £2,820 £25,310 
Prudential £2,820 £25,310 
Scottish Widows £2,959 £26,490 
Note: The table calculates the costs based on a pot of £250,000, withdrawing 6% of the fund a year and 
pension growing by 5% per year. It also includes fund management charges. Which? used the Henderson 
Cautious Managed fund as the investment vehicle. 
 
2.6.2 Charge disclosure  
In September 2015, The People's Pension published the results of a survey of 1,256 working 
adults aged below 65 by YouGov which showed that 89% of scheme members did not know 
what charges they pay to their pension provider, while 51% said there were not aware that 
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 Reported in Michelle McGagh (2015) The £10,000 cost of getting drawdown wrong, Citywire, 21 July. 
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they were paying charges. Most (94%) respondents said providers should have to tell people 
how much they were charging them to manage their savings. Darren Philp, director of policy 
and market engagement at The People's PeŶsioŶ said: ͚Ouƌ ƌeseaƌĐh ƌeǀeals a ǁoƌƌǇiŶg laĐk 
of awareness about pension scheme charges. At the present time, schemes can charge in 
very different ways which makes comparison difficult and means consumers could be being 
ripped off. This survey reveals a strength of public opinion that the Government, regulators 
and wider pensions industry cannot afford to ignore. The public have made it clear that they 
want to see charges explained in a way that they understand, and which allows them to 
easilǇ Đoŵpaƌe pƌoduĐts͛.280 
In response to media criticism of their charges, some providers have reduced their charges. 
For example, Standard Life has removed its set up charge of £208 and one-off early 
depletion charge of £312 in its flexible drawdown product. David Tiller, head of adviser 
platfoƌŵ pƌopositioŶs at “taŶdaƌd Life, said: ͚Fƌoŵ the feedďaĐk ǁe'ǀe ƌeĐeiǀed, ǁe kŶoǁ 
that it's the fundamentals that matter, such as: the reliability of income payments, the 
speed at which we can pay withdrawals on the day the client chooses and the quality of 
reporting to advisers and clients. It's not just about providing access, it's about providing a 
great service that can be relied on. The impact of the pension freedoms goes well beyond 
provider and adviser operational readiness. This legislation will transform the UK long-term 
savings market. Instead of being seen as inaccessible and opaque, pensions are about to 
become consumers' long-term savings vehicle of choice. Our role is to make it easy for 
advisers to access the flexibility, which is why we've decided to drop these additional 
drawdown charges. We know advisory businesses understand the opportunity arising from 
the new pension freedoms, but, at the same time, are concerned about increasing their 
capacity to deliver retirement advice while managing the obvious risks for clients living off 
their portfolios on a day-to-day basis. Platform technology has a clear role to play in 
providing an efficient and consistent way to facilitate the level of advice these clients 
Ŷeed͛.281 
A requirement for full disclosure of all costs is currently being discussed by the industry, the 
regulators and the Government. MiFID II will also require product providers to disclose to 
clients full details of the costs and charges related to their investment, including cost 
aggregations, the timing of disclosure (ex-ante and ex-post) and information on the 
cumulative effect of costs on the investment return. 
In July 2015, Martin Davis, chief executive of Kames Capital, called on the UK investment 
management industry to agree a common simple, transparent and understandable way to 
disclose fund management fees to investors. Although in 2014, he criticised the Financial 
Services Consumer Panel for ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdiŶg a siŶgle Đhaƌge as ďeiŶg ͚oǀeƌ-siŵplistiĐ͛.  
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 Reported in Michael Klimes (2015) Vast majority of scheme members in the dark over fees, Professional 
Pensions, 15 September. 
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 Jenna Towler (2015) Standard Life removes drawdown charges, Professional Adviser, 5 March. 
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The Investment Association (IA), the trade body of the investment management industry, 
recommends the ongoing charges figure (OCF). However, some investment managers, such 
as Invesco Perpetual and Legal & General Investment Management, use the term fund 
management fee (FMF), which is similar to OCF. Others still use the less comprehensive 
annual management charge (AMC). But even OCF does not include all costs such as 
transaction charges. 
Mƌ Daǀis said: ͚Theƌe is Ŷo poiŶt iŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ paƌts of the iŶdustƌǇ gettiŶg all ĐleaŶed up aŶd 
not others. It has got to be meaningful and the customer has got to understand it. I would 
like to see the top ten in the UK, managing the vast majority of funds, come to some sort of 
agreement around the best way to articulate our charges in a way that is simple and 
understandable. Then the Investment Association could turn that into something the rest of 
the iŶdustƌǇ Đould sigŶ up to͛.282  
 
2.6.3 Proposals to cap charges 
The Pension Schemes Act 2015 allows the Government to impose a charge cap on 
drawdown products in future.  No figure is mentioned, but it would be probably be higher 
than the 0.75% charge cap on DC default investment funds in the accumulation stage from 
April 2015.283   
A number of organisations have put forward proposals to cap costs in the decumulation 
stage, just as they have been capped on default funds in the accumulation stage. For 
example, in December 2014, Age UK proposed a charge cap for income drawdown products 
oŶ the gƌouŶds that ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg aŶd ĐoŵpaƌiŶg the total Đhaƌges foƌ aŶ iŶĐoŵe 
drawdown pension is very complicated. It will be very difficult for consumers to compare 
the cost of different schemes, shop around and switch to better value arrangements. The 
extension of the charge cap to income drawdown will help prevent consumers from paying 
excessive chaƌges͛. 284  Similarly, in March 2015, Which? launched a Better Pensions 
campaign285  in which it calls for the introduction of a charge cap for default drawdown 
products.286  
                                                     
282
 Reported in Natalie Kenway (2015) Kames CEO calls on top UK fund houses to unite over charging, 
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 Note the charge cap does not apply to investment funds offering any guarantees, say, concerning 
investment returns. 
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 Dominic Lindley (2014) Dashboards and Jam-Jars: Helping Consumers with Small Defined Contribution 
Pension Pots Make Decisions about Retirement Income, Age UK, December;  
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http://www.which.co.uk/news/2015/03/which-calls-for-additional-pension-reforms-397246/ 
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Futher, in the lead up to the May 2015 General Election, the Labour Party called for a cap on 
͚ƌip-off͛ dƌaǁdoǁŶ Đhaƌges oŶ the gƌouŶds that ͚people ǁho dƌaǁ ŵoŶeǇ out of theiƌ haƌd-
eaƌŶed peŶsioŶ pot should haǀe siŵilaƌ pƌoteĐtioŶs to ǁheŶ the put ŵoŶeǇ iŶ͛.287 
The Laďouƌ PaƌtǇ͛s pƌoposals ǁeƌe Ŷot populaƌ ǁith iŶdustƌǇ pƌaĐtitioŶeƌs. TheǇ said: ͚it 
could be very damaging to how this market develops for customers if we saw an arbitrary 
cap imposed before we see how customers use their freedom or how providers innovate to 
ŵeet theiƌ Ŷeeds͛. Fuƌtheƌ, iŶtƌoduĐiŶg a Đhaƌge Đap oŶ dƌaǁdoǁŶ faĐilities is ͚uŶŶeĐessaƌǇ 
ďeĐause ŵaƌket foƌĐes ǁill iŵpose aŶ effeĐtiǀe Đap͛. A paƌtiĐulaƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁas a Đhaƌge Đap 
on drawdown products with built-in guarantees which the industry believes will be popular 
ǁith Đustoŵeƌs. “teǀeŶ CaŵeƌoŶ, ƌegulatoƌǇ stƌategǇ diƌeĐtoƌ at AegoŶ, said: ͚These 
valuable options come at a cost which may not fit within an arbitrary charge cap. This new 
ŵaƌket Đould ďe stuŶted ďefoƌe it eǀeŶ takes off.͛ AlaŶ Highaŵ said: ͚A Đhaƌge Đap ǁould ďe 
complex to implement across the range of retirement products and could stifle innovation 
at aŶ eaƌlǇ stage of deǀelopŵeŶt͛.288 
Speaking in the House of Lords in June 2015, Lord David Freud, Minister of State for Welfare 
‘efoƌŵ, said: ͛We aƌe goiŶg to see hoǁ the ŵaƌket deǀelops. It has oŶlǇ ďeeŶ goiŶg foƌ tǁo 
months and, if it looks appropriate, we will introduce charge caps. We are meeting the 
industry and working with them to make sure they do produce the right level of charging 
aŶd ǁe aƌe aďle to ŵoŶitoƌ that͛. Loƌd Keith BƌadleǇ, theŶ Laďouƌ͛s shadoǁ Pensions 
Minister, ƌeŵiŶded Loƌd Fƌeud of BaƌoŶess AltŵaŶŶ͛s ǀieǁs ďefoƌe ďeĐoŵiŶg PeŶsioŶs 
Minister when she said that a Đap oŶ dƌaǁdoǁŶ Đhaƌges ǁas iŵpoƌtaŶt ͚so that Đustoŵeƌs 
aƌe Ŷot ƌipped off͛ aŶd that ͚a Ϯ% a Ǉeaƌ Đhaƌge just to keep Ǉouƌ peŶsioŶ iŶǀested aŶd to 
have access to it would take away much of the investment return and be a terrible deal for 
customers͛. Liď Deŵ Loƌd Mike GeƌŵaŶ asked the ŵiŶisteƌ: ͚MǇ Loƌds, at all stages ďetǁeeŶ 
the peŶsioŶ saǀeƌ͛s poĐket, the iŶǀestŵeŶt aŶd ďaĐk agaiŶ, theƌe aƌe hiddeŶ Đhaƌges aŶd 
fees. Does my noble Lord agree that there should be transparency for pension savers and 
theǇ should kŶoǁ ǁhat the hiddeŶ fees aŶd Đhaƌges aƌe?͛ Loƌd Fƌeud ƌespoŶded ďǇ saǇiŶg: 
͚We alƌeadǇ haǀe the poǁeƌ to liŵit oƌ ďaŶ deĐuŵulatioŶ Đhaƌges aŶd if ǁe see that 
pƌoǀideƌs aƌe ĐhaƌgiŶg eǆĐessiǀe fees, ǁe ǁill Ŷot hesitate to aĐt͛.289 
The Which? report published in JulǇ ϮϬϭϱ ƌeŶeǁed the ĐoŶsuŵeƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛s suppoƌt foƌ 
a charge cap. It said it wanted the Government and FCA to work with the industry to 
simplify charges and to introduce a charge cap for default drawdown products. 
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fees, City Wire, 6 March. 
288
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Again there was industry resistence to this proposal. Tom McPhail disagreed with a cost cap, 
saying that it would lead to savers becoming disengaged with their money. He said: ͚The 
only sustainable answer is that we have a transparently competitive retirement market 
where informed investors shop around for the solutions which will suit them best. 
Drawdown isn't just about the price, it is also about putting investors in control of their 
money and giving them access to online tools and calculators to help them manage their 
money effectively. The risk with a price-capped ͞default drawdown͟ is that investors won't 
be sufficiently aware of the risks they face of investment losses or of drawing their money 
out too quickly. A ͞default͟ dƌaǁdoǁŶ ƌisks iŶǀestoƌs sleepǁalkiŶg iŶto uŶeǆpeĐted 
investment losses. We would like to see the barriers to pension freedoms removed so that 
investors who have shopped around can move their money quickly and cheaply, without 
haǀiŶg to paǇ uŶƌeasoŶaďle eǆit peŶalties͛.290 
The Retirement Planner Inquiry for August 2015 asked advisers whether the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) should intervene and cap charges as recently proposed by Which?. 
The vast majority (68%) said no regulatory intervention was needed, 20% were unsure and 
12% thought it was warranted. A typical comment from an adviser supporting a cap was: 
͚EǀeŶ at ŵodest charges, if the client wants 5% income, this suggests a return of nearly 8% 
ǁill ďe Ŷeeded to ŵaiŶtaiŶ Đapital ǀalues. Chaƌges iŶ eǆĐess ǁill just deĐiŵate the fuŶd͛. 
Typical views from cap opponents were: 
 ͚DƌaǁdoǁŶ adǀiĐe ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts aƌe eǆtƌeŵelǇ ǀaƌied and individual and therefore 
charges would vary accordingly. It always makes sense to try and look for a simple 
and cost-effective wrapper charge with no add-ons – the more expensive solutions 
will have to become cheaper over time or will disappear, anǇǁaǇ͛.  ͚DƌaǁdoǁŶ has Ŷeǀeƌ ďeeŶ a Đheap pƌoduĐt. It is iŶheƌeŶtlǇ ƌiskǇ aŶd ƌeƋuiƌes a lot 
more work from the provider and adviser than an annuity. In a heavily regulated 
environment, people need to understand that they will have to pay for this. The 
products that provide the best value will dominate the market in the end. Or is 
WhiĐh? saǇiŶg theǇ doŶ͛t ďelieǀe iŶ fƌee ŵaƌket eĐoŶoŵiĐs?͛.  I doŶ͛t feel ƌegulatoƌǇ aĐtioŶ is ƌeƋuiƌed, ďut I do agƌee that soŵe of the dƌaǁdoǁŶ 
Đhaƌges aƌe eǆĐessiǀe͛.   ͚I oďjeĐt to any one person or group defining what is right for others. If a particularly 
wealthy individual with a particularly large fund is happy to pay particularly high 
Đhaƌges, ǁhǇ shouldŶ͛t he? He ŵaǇ ďuǇ aŶ £ϴϬϬ suit as opposed to oŶe fƌoŵ M&“. 
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He may buy a BMW as opposed to a Ford. Individual choice and freedom is 
ƌeƋuiƌed͛.291 
2.7 Product and provider regulation 
In general terms, product and provider regulation comes under the FCA͛s ĐoŶduĐt ƌisk 
regime which, in turn, relates to the FCA principle of treating customers fairly.292 The risk 
regime covers three main areas: 
 The way the product is being developed (research, knowing target market, customer 
understanding, risks)  The way the product is distributed to customers (training, do advisers understand 
the product that they are selling, are sales materials misleading?), and   The way the products are subsequently serviced/administered and monitored 
(service levels, claim rates, are products performing as customers have been led to 
expect). 
The FCA has seen fit to criticise the markets for annuities and structured products on all 
these grounds in recent years. 
In March 2015, the FCA published the Final Report of its Retirement Income Market 
Study.293  This followed a Thematic Review of annuities in February 2014 which found that 
the annuities market was not working well for most consumers.294 The Final Report 
ĐoŶfiƌŵed the FCA͛s pƌoǀisioŶal fiŶdiŶgs that the aŶŶuities ŵaƌket ǁas still Ŷot ǁoƌkiŶg ǁell 
for consumers. In particular: 
 Many consumers are missing out by not shopping around for an annuity and 
switching providers, and some do not purchase the best annuity for their 
circumstances: for example, those with certain medical conditions or lifestyle factors 
had missed out by not purchasing an enhanced annuity  Consumers are deterred from engaging with their options by the length and 
complexity of wake-up packs,295 or because they do not believe the sums involved 
make shopping around worthwhile 
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 CoŶsuŵeƌs͛ teŶdeŶĐǇ to ďuǇ pƌoduĐts fƌoŵ theiƌ eǆistiŶg pƌovider weakens 
competitive discipline on incumbent firms and makes it harder for challenger firms 
to attract a critical mass of customers  Consumers are highly sensitive to how options are presented to them. Savers 
reaching retirement will face a landscape that is more complex and will need support 
in making the right choices.  
The FCA͛s solutioŶs aƌe: 
 To require firms to provide an annuity quotation ranking so that consumers can 
easily identify if they could be getting a better deal by shopping around  To require firms to redesign their wake-up packs and to consider including 
signposting letters and standardised pensions statements, before trialing them on 
consumers  In the longer term, the creation of a pensions dashboard which will allow consumers 
to see all their pension pots in one place.296 
Although the FCA said that its ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs had ƌeĐeiǀed ͚ĐoŶsideƌaďle suppoƌt͛ fƌoŵ 
industry, some in the industry were disappointed. For example, Malcolm McLean, senior 
ĐoŶsultaŶt at BaƌŶett WaddiŶghaŵ, said: ͚Most disappointing of all is the pace at which 
change in a market, so clearly in need of change, is drifting along. The FCA plans to consider 
all this further and to run another customer survey as part of a wider review of its rules in 
the pension and retirement area later in the summer. It will probably be another year at 
least before the remedies kick in, making it eight years since the regulatory probe of the 
market began. Both the FCA and its predecessors have shown a distinct lack of appetite for 
decisive action in relation to annuities. And as far as I can see from this latest lengthy report, 
no sanctions appear to be being proposed against those providers whom the FCA had 
investigated and found evidence of poor practice, particularly where providers actively 
discouraged people from taking up enhanced annuity products, if not widespread 
ŵisselliŶg͛.297 
In March 2015, the FCA published its Thematic Review of Structured Products.298 Structured 
pƌoduĐts aƌe ͚securities whose cash flow characteristics depend upon one or more indices or 
that have embedded forwards or options or securities where an investor's investment 
return and the issuer's payment obligations are contingent on, or highly sensitive to, 
changes in the value of underlying assets, indices, interest rates oƌ Đash floǁs͛.299 Many 
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structured products involve guarantees. Examples are: capital-protected accounts which are 
used as a savings alternative to deposit accounts; and capital-at-risk products which are 
used as investment alternatives to shares or bonds. The FCA had serious concerns about the 
complexity and value of these products. 
The FCA found that retail customers generally struggle to understand the complex features 
common to many structured products and they find it difficult to compare alternatives. As a 
result, they frequently over-estimate the products' potential returns – by almost 10% of the 
assumed investment amount over five years. The FCA has concluded that, not for the first 
time, the structured product market is not working for investors: some firms are falling 
below the standards the FCA expects in their approach to the design, manufacture, 
packaging and distribution of structured products. 
The FCA argues that providers need to define at the product design stage a clear target 
market of end customers and identify what needs these products would serve. Structured 
products should have a reasonable prospect of delivering economic value to customers in 
the target market, which firms must be able to prove via robust stress testing – through to 
the end of their life cycle – as part of the product approval process. Providers also need to 
strengthen the monitoring of their products, including by ensuring distributors – such as 
financial advisers – have enough information about the product to sell it appropriately and 
that each product is being distributed to its identified target market. Firms need to provide 
customers with clear and balanced information on each product and any risks. Products that 
fail this process should not be manufactured nor distributed.  
At the EU level, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is in the process of 
finalising its rules on the implementation of MiFID II which will take effect from January 
2017. Most products which are not plain vanilla shares, bonds or UCITS funds300 will be 
classified as 'complex' products, since they haǀe a ͚stƌuĐtuƌe ǁhiĐh ŵakes it diffiĐult foƌ 
ĐlieŶts to uŶdeƌstaŶd the ƌisks iŶǀolǀed͛. This means that many of the products that have 
been designed for the UK retirement income market in the new pensions environment will 
be classified as 'complex', since they have been structured as non-UCITS retail schemes 
(NURS). This, in turn, will mean that non-adǀised ĐlieŶts ŵust take aŶ ͚appƌopƌiateŶess test͛ 
each time they purchase a NURS product.301 The extent of the appropriateness test will 
depeŶd oŶ the ĐoŵpleǆitǇ of the pƌoduĐt͛s uŶdeƌlǇiŶg iŶǀestŵeŶts, ďut, iŶ all Đases, pƌoduĐt 
providers would be responsible for assessing the knowledge and experience of individual 
retail customers before they are able to invest in the product. Product designers have used 
the non-UCITS route (a) to enable greater diversification than can be achieved by using 
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UCITs and (b) because certain asset classes, such as property, cannot be invested in via 
UCITS.302  
Some feel that the drawdown market could soon attract the attention of the FCA in the 
same way that the markets for annuities and structured products have. For example, Holly 
Mackay, founder of The Platforum and Boring Money, believes that providers need to 
simplify drawdown charges or the regulator will intervene. She said she found it impossible 
to compare the cost of drawdown of different providers because of the variety of charging 
structures and types of fees. Further, her recent consumer research confirmed levels of 
engagement and understanding of retirement products were still low and fuelling the 
problem was the opaqueness of pricing of retirement products. She said if providers fail to 
act to streamline their charges soon the FCA will step in and force them to do so, leaving no 
fuƌtheƌ ͚ǁiggle ƌooŵ͛: ͚Theƌe is a ƌeal ĐhalleŶge heƌe foƌ dƌaǁdoǁŶ pƌoǀideƌs: if they don't 
make [charges] clear, what we will see is what happened in the platform pricing arena 
ǁheƌe the ƌegulatoƌ Đaŵe aŶd [iŶteƌǀeŶed]͛.303  
2.8 How to deal with stranded pots 
There is a final issue that will be covered briefly in the Chapter and that is what happens 
when people move jobs. Should the pension pot stay in the leaving scheme, or should it 
folloǁ the ŵeŵďeƌ to the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s Ŷeǁ sĐheŵe, oƌ should it move to an aggregator 
scheme?  Or should there be another type of solution altogether? 
In Australia, scheme members tend to stay with the same scheme when they move jobs. In 
other words, the scheme follows the member: the member has one pot which they take 
with them when they change jobs. The same would hold for SAFE retirement plans in the 
US.304 By contrast, the UK second pillar pension system is a workplace-based system, with 
schemes typically set up by individual employers, although in a small number of cases, they 
are established on an industry-wide basis, such as the Universities Superannuation Scheme. 
This means that in most cases, people have to decide what happens to their accumulated 
pension pot when they change employers. The default is to do nothing and leave the pot 
where it is (if the scheme agrees to this). The pot then becomes known as a stranded pot. If 
people move jobs many times over their career – and the average is 10 or 11 times – then 
they could end up with a large number of stranded pots. This is not only administratively 
inconvenient, there is the real risk that people could lose track of all their pots and, equally 
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possible, schemes could lose track of their deferred members, which is likely to happen if 
people do not inform their previous schemes when they change address. 
A number of solutions have been proposed for dealing with this problem. 
The first is pot-follows-member. In this case, the pot, if it is below a certain size (£10,000), 
autoŵatiĐallǇ ŵoǀes to the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s Ŷeǁ sĐheŵe ǁheŶ he oƌ she ĐhaŶges joď. If it is 
above this size, the member has to specifically ask for the pot to be moved, unless the 
leaving scheme insists that the member takes their entire pot with them.  The size threshold 
is intended to deal with liquidity issues in the scheme. When someone moves, assets have 
to be sold and the cash value of the pot is transferred – it is rare for in specie transfers to 
take place. Schemes do not want to be in the position of having to sell illiquid assets to meet 
these transfers. They would prefer to do so with liquid assets which typically have lower 
returns than illiquid assets. So two of the key problems with pot-follows-member are 
switching costs and lower overall investment returns. If someone changes jobs many times, 
these two factors can materially reduce the value of the pension pot at retirement.   
The second solution is the aggregator model. In this case, when someone changes jobs, their 
pot is automatically transferred to an aggregator fund which collects all the stranded pots 
into a single fund. A small number of funds would be authorised to offer this service. This 
has the benefit of introducing significant scale economies by consolidating assets in a small  
number of large funds, gradually moving assets away from the long tail of 200,000 mostly 
very small schemes. The aggregator funds would also benefit from good governance and 
institutional investment management if they were set up along the same lines as the 
National Employment Savings Trust (NEST).305 Further, the switching costs would be lower 
than under pot-follows-member, since only the assets accrued in the ceding scheme need to 
be transferred when the member changes jobs, not the total assets accrued since the 
member started employment, as happens with pot-follows-member. There would be a 
default fund for those who make no active investment choice. A criticism of this model is 
that the member is unlikely to feel particularly engaged with this type of arrangement. 
However, the same criticism applies to the entire auto-enrolment process. 
The third solution is the Australian solution of scheme-follows-the-member or what is also 
known as one-member, one-scheme. The eŵploǇeƌ paǇs ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs iŶto the eŵploǇee͛s 
chosen scheme which follows the member when they change jobs. This approach deals with 
the problems of switching costs and potentially lower returns. But it has the administrative 
iŶĐoŶǀeŶieŶĐe of ƌeƋuiƌiŶg the eŵploǇeƌ to set up a diƌeĐt deďit foƌ eǀeƌǇ eŵploǇee͛s 
scheme. With a scheme run by the employer, the employer only needs to make a single 
payment covering all employees. The solution to this is to have a central clearing house into 
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ǁhiĐh the eŵploǇeƌ ŵakes a siŶgle paǇŵeŶt ǁhiĐh is theŶ alloĐated to eaĐh eŵploǇee͛s 
scheme.  
The one-member, one-scheme approach has been promoted by a number of industry 
practitioners, in particular Tom McPhail and John Lawson, head of pensions policy at Aviva. 
Mƌ MĐPhail aƌgues: ͚With the oŶe-member, one-scheme approach, whenever you change 
jobs, you can pick up the pension and take it with you and the new employer can pay into 
that scheme. This would bring a sense of continuity for the member and the default position 
should Ŷot ďe to keep ŵoǀiŶg ŵoŶeǇ aƌouŶd͛. 
In August 2013, the then Pensions Minister Steve Webb invited McPhail and Lawson to 
contact the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) to canvas support for the proposal. The 
CBI, while not fully endorsing the concept, accepted that that it was better for each saver to 
have a single well-managed pot.306 
The technology available to execute transfers has improved significantly in recent years as a 
result of the introduction of Origo, an open source, e-commerce service established on a 
not-for-profit basis by 12 life and pension companies at the instigation of the ABI. Origo 
ďuilt ͚OptioŶs͛ ǁhiĐh does peŶsioŶs tƌaŶsfeƌs aŶd ƌeduĐed the tƌaŶsfeƌ tiŵe fƌoŵ ϰ ŵoŶths 
to 9 days. Version 1 does pensions-to-annuities transfers (via the OMO). Version 2 does 
pension transfers in accumulation (e.g., from Aviǀa͛s to PƌudeŶtial͛s platfoƌŵͿ.  
Nevertheless, this system has been criticised because the life companies involved still make 
it hard for consumers to switch to a new provider, according to Ben Cocks of Altus Business 
Systems. This is because the new provider has to get the approval of the life offices to 
participate in the service and pay the fees they demand. In response to this, the Tax 
Incentivised Savings Association and the UK Funds Market Practice Group (which sets the 
ISO-based open technical standards for UK financial services) have established an open 
transfer framework that deals with all the technical and legal aspects of transfers. Different 
technology companies can then offer compatible transfer services and all participating 
companies can have an equal say in how the service operates. This approach has been used 
in the ISA transfer market and has increased the level of competition between ISA providers 
considerably. However, Origo and the life offices have so far refused to allow open transfers 
for pensions, despite the Department for Work and Pensions allowing the use of open 
standards for automatic pension transfers.307  
In October 2015, the Pensions Minister, Ros Altmann, announced that legislation dealing 
with stranded pots would be delayed in order to allow schemes to deal with other pressing 
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issues, such as the completion of auto-eŶƌolŵeŶt aŶd the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of ďoth ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd 
ĐhoiĐe͛ iŶ Apƌil ϮϬϭϱ aŶd the Ŷeǁ siŶgle-tier state pension in April 2016. 
2.9 Feedback from our interviews and responses to the consultation paper 
2.9.1 Feedback from our interviews 
2.9.1.1 Employers and consultants 
In our meetings with employers and their consultants, we discussed a broad range of issues 
concerning the products and services relevant for scheme members which we summarise 
under the following headings.  
What products/services might good employers be offering? 
Good employers will be looking for something that protects against the longevity risk of 
their former employees. 
This does not necessarily have to be a separate annuity – it could be a drawdown product 
that has a trigger point or crash barrier so that if the fund falls below a certain level this 
triggers automatic annuitisation. The idea would be to default DC members in: they do not 
have to actively join and could opt out at any stage. If the fund was falling due to market 
conditions, members might be offered the choice of annuitising or stopping/reducing 
withdrawals for a period.  
Employers are likely to be influenced by what their AE provider offers, so, as in the US, the 
market will be provider-led. Employers considering making drawdown available will want a 
fire wall between the employer and the provider, ensuring liability is transferred and there 
is no come-back for employers if things do not work out as well as members hoped. 
Employers have not yet come to a firm conclusion about whether their drawdown offering 
should be a retail solution or some sort of straight-through accumulation-to-decumulation 
process, involving scheme drawdown. The BT scheme, for example, is moving members into 
SIPPs for drawdown. This is a retail product, although the employer has negotiated the 
terms. So, employers can use their clout to negotiate better terms with one or more 
providers, which is what they do with other products made available through the workplace, 
e.g., insurance. 
Despite the lack of major launches, many respondents agreed on the merits of scheme 
dƌaǁdoǁŶ. OŶe said: ͚“Đheŵe peŶsioŶs aƌe ŵoƌe effiĐieŶt iŶ paǇŵeŶt. “Đheŵe dƌaǁdoǁŶ 
is a scheme pension without pooling. It provides better governance and economies of scale 
ďut doesŶ͛t giǀe iŶdiǀiduals the ĐhaŶĐe to eŶgage to the saŵe degƌee͛. AŶotheƌ said: ͚The 
governance of scheme drawdown is crucial and must mirror that of accumulation. If the 
Grand old Duke of York marched his men to the top of the hill, he should march them down 
agaiŶ͛. AŶd a thiƌd added: ͚“Đheŵe dƌaǁdoǁŶ͛s ďig adǀaŶtage is that it͛s doŶe ǁithiŶ a 
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peŶsioŶ fuŶd, so it͛s Ŷot affeĐted ďǇ ƌegulatoƌǇ Đapital ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts, ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ add ϭ.ϱ% to 
the cost, nor does it get into the grey area round advice – which is the case if a provider 
offers its retail drawdown product – usually a SIPP – to a member of a DC trust-based 
scheme. The chances are that this would – or certainly could – constitute regulated advice 
uŶdeƌ FCA ƌules͛. 
The potential for scheme drawdown to offer lower charges than retail products was 
considered crucial: 
 ͚If dƌaǁdoǁŶ Đosts ŵoƌe thaŶ ϭ%, it ǁoŶ͛t ǁoƌk. EŶd of͛.  ͚“Đheŵe deĐuŵulatioŶ is likelǇ to ďe the Đost foƌ aĐĐuŵulatioŶ plus up to 0.25% for 
added functionality, such as withdrawals. Retail decumulation total costs can be 
aŶǇthiŶg fƌoŵ Ϯ% to ϰ%͛.  ͚‘etail adǀiĐe adds ϭ% to the pƌiĐe. That ŵight ďe OK foƌ a oŶe-off transaction, but 
ǁhat if it͛s a dƌaǁdoǁŶ stƌategǇ ǁith aŶ additioŶal ϭ% foƌ adǀiĐe eaĐh Ǉeaƌ?͛ 
Another lesson from the US is that charges are regulated when members of 401k schemes 
roll-oǀeƌ iŶto theiƌ pƌoǀideƌ͛s I‘A.  
What are the risks with drawdown? 
We received the following comments: 
 ͚DƌaǁdoǁŶ is the ŵost ĐoŵpliĐated of the ĐhoiĐes that the eŵploǇeƌ/tƌustee ŵight 
offer – there is a need to consider where to invest and how fast to draw down. The 
main risk with drawdown is that the income might have to be reduced. It is 
important for schemes to suggest a ͚safe͛ leǀel of ǁithdƌaǁal͛.  ͚Hoǁeǀeƌ, it is Ŷot the tƌustees͛ ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ to set the withdrawal rate – this would 
ďe too ƌiskǇ͛.  ͚Whateǀeƌ the ǁithdƌaǁal ƌate suggested, it ŵust ďe ƌeǀieǁed ƌegulaƌlǇ – this 
cannot be set and forget – ƌeŵeŵďeƌ ǁhat happeŶed ǁith eŶdoǁŵeŶt ŵoƌtgages͛.  ͚It is ĐƌuĐial to ŵaŶage the ƌate ďeĐause, left to theiƌ oǁŶ deǀiĐes, iŶdiǀiduals ǁill 
panic if there is a market crash and cash out at the bottom of the market͛ (called 
composure risk by one participant).  ͚DƌaǁdoǁŶ iŶǀestŵeŶt stƌategies also Ŷeed to ŵatĐh the aŶŶuitǇ ƌate plus aŶ 
additional percentage to account for the absence of the mortality cross-suďsidǇ͛.   ͚Without ƌegulated adǀiĐe, people ǁill fiŶd it diffiĐult to ŵaŶage ŵultiple pots͛.  ͚OŶe of the ďiggest risks is the interaction with means-tested benefits – this is an 
aƌea that Ŷeeds a ŵassiǀe aŵouŶt of atteŶtioŶ͛. 
What are the risks with annuities? 
Longevity risk is the biggest concern for consultants. Deferred annuities are currently non-
existent. Sales of immediate annuities have collapsed – historically most people annuitised 
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by age 75. Pricing an annuity for someone who is still healthy at age 85 will look like poor 
value to the annuitant – insurers would expect them to live an additional 12 years on 
average. While it is easier to price a deferred annuity at age 65, consultants are not 
expecting many people will want to buy one – even if the product existed – because they 
ǁould feaƌ that theǇ ǁould ͚lose͛ the puƌĐhase pƌiĐe if theǇ died eaƌlieƌ. 
Insurers really do not like selling to people in their 80s because of cognitive decline. 
What will providers do?  
In general, all providers are very keen to offer drawdown because this is when the DC pot is 
at its largest, so will provide a good fee income. Providers in the AE market will be keen to 
retain these assets.  
Providers are likely to favour the sale of retail drawdown to retiring members – but if a 
major competitor offers scheme drawdown and this is seen to be better value for money, 
then they will do this too.  
Some providers are developing a 10-year investment/drawdown period with an annuity 
built in, although some consultants think 80-85 is too late to annuitise, preferring age 75 
(NEST is suggesting 85).308 
What are consultants doing? 
Most consultants are focusing only on advising on drawdown. Annuitisation is too far into 
the future to second-guess ǁhat the ŵaƌket foƌ lateƌ life aŶŶuities ǁill look like: ͚Theƌe͛s Ŷo 
point in designing a product today that tries to second-guess what a 65-year-old will need at 
age 75+. There will be a massive differential where medical underwriting is used at older 
ages – faƌ ŵoƌe sigŶifiĐaŶt thaŶ at the poiŶt of ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛.  
Some consultants that we talked to are advising employers with single-trust schemes. 
Previously, they would have put in place a third-party annuity bureau service. Now they are 
looking at other alternatives, but they do not want to retain the responsibility/liability and 
do not want to run any alternative themselves. 
One consultant is working on a design for drawdown to last 30 years, i.e., a ͚ŶotioŶal iŶĐoŵe 
foƌ life͛ pƌoduĐt. TheǇ ǁill use a ŵasteƌ tƌust aŶd ŵaŶage the tƌaŶsitioŶ fƌoŵ aĐĐuŵulatioŶ 
to decumulation, so the investment strategy is straight-through. This is important for the 
stability of the strategy, but also very important because it avoids out-of-market risk. Where 
a DC member buys a retail drawdown plan, it would be necessary to cash out of the 
accumulation scheme and reinvest in the new product. The plan is to match the investment 
strategy of the drawdown scheme with the tail end of the default accumulation fund.   
                                                     
308
 Discussed in Chapter 5. 
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The same consultant believes that, of the drawdown funds offered by providers, very few 
are suitable. Income needs to be reasonably stable, but not guaranteed – i.e., needs to 
reflect the actual experience of the fund – so, say, a 4% of original pot size set-and-forget 
model is flawed. If people want a guaranteed stable income, they need an annuity. 
This consultant also said that adequacy is an important issue. If people cannot afford to 
retire, they need to consider working longer and possibly contributing longer. The problem 
is that members will not know 5 years out when exactly they will retire, so planning is very 
tricky for both the employee and the employer. 
Scheme defaults  
Many employers are uncomfortable with the idea of scheme defaults. While they are 
concerned about the risks facing members, they appear to be equally concerned about their 
own risk/liability. In particular, they are concerned that anything they do would be 
perceived as advice by members. So not only are employers concerned about scheme 
drawdown, they would even be reluctant to support annuitisation. They realise that if things 
go wrong, ex-employees will be knocking on their door first. 
2.9.1.2 Providers and investment managers 
Our discussions with providers and investment managers is summarised here under the 
following headings. 
What about the quality assurance of products offered via, say, a decision tree? 
There was support for having the products listed in the decision tree classified as safe 
arbour products. This means that any adviser recommending these products cannot 
subsequently be sued for poor advice, after having determined their suitability for the 
client. So far the FCA has been reluctant to grant safe harbour status to UK investments, 
uŶlike the U“. We ǁeƌe told: ͚It is iŵpoƌtaŶt that ǁe tƌǇ aŶd get the FCA to appƌoǀe ďoth 
the decision tree and the default options at the end of the decision tree even if they are 
only the least woƌst optioŶs͛.  
But where do we set the bar for the products listed in the decision tree? Should the 
products that are listed ďe the ͚ďest͛ oƌ should theǇ ďe just ͚ǀeƌǇ good͛ oƌ ͚adeƋuate͛? A 
ǀieǁ offeƌed to us is that ͚theǇ should ďe ƌeasoŶaďle optioŶs, Ŷot detrimental, but not 
ŶeĐessaƌilǇ optiŵal, ďut Ŷot a ďad deĐisioŶ. TheǇ should ďe ͞good eŶough͛͟. 
However, any safe harbour products need to be carefully regulated. There needs to be a 
ŵeĐhaŶisŵ to eŶsuƌe these pƌoduĐts aƌe iŶdeed ͚good eŶough͛, siŶĐe there could be no 
Financial Ombudsman Service  referrals with safe harbour products (if their suitability for 
clients had been assessed). 
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Advisers, on the other hand, tend to suggest that everyone needs a perfect tailor-made 
solution. However, we were told that this ǁould ďe aŶ eǆaŵple of the Đase ǁheƌe ͚the ďest 
is the eŶeŵǇ of the good͛ – and, in any event, would be too expensive for most people.  
It was also pointed out that, while competition can be good, it can lead to a proliferation of 
essentially identical products which are marketed as being different. This leads to customer 
confusion.   
What investment strategies are appropriate in the new pensions regime? 
This turned out to be a difficult question to answer because it was not clear at the time of 
the interviews how consumers would behave following the introduction of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd 
ĐhoiĐe͛.  
Many of the people we interviewed believed that ͚lifestyle strategies and even TDFs are now 
out of date, but new investment strategies still need to deliver returns, although with 
reduced volatility. However, we will need to observe customer experience in decumulation 
before redesigning de-risking glide paths͛. 
It remains the case that diversification is the only low-cost way to reduce volatility. Other 
solutions to reduce volatility involve options and other derivatives, but these cost more than 
0.75%.  It was pointed out that a charge cap would reduce the scope to diversify risk and put 
products using derivatives to guarantee returns out of reach. It was also pointed out that 
the process of paying income to members is expensive, much more than the cost of 
collecting contributions. 
In terms of new product design, investment managers and consultants are designing 
drawdown products with long-term (30-year) investment horizons.  These would invest in 
fully liquid funds, so annuitisation could occur at any time, but these managers questioned 
whether there was any need to annuitise given the investment horizon. They pointed out 
that annuities were originally designed to last for 10-15 years, not 30.  The success of this 
strategy is predicated on the assumption that an investment-based product can be as 
effective as insurance in terms of hedging longevity risk. 
An example was JP Morgan which was designing a drawdown product with a cap on the 
maximum percentage of the fund that can be withdrawn, adjusted in line with fund 
performance, and a charge of 0.35% plus a cost per withdrawal.  It would probably need to 
be held within a SIPP which would add an additional layer of costs. It would be offered on 
both an advised and non-advised basis.  
What is the future of annuities? 
Insurers tended to argue that the value of annuities are now underappreciated due to 
Ŷegatiǀe ŶoƌŵiŶg. It ǁas agƌeed that the ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth of aŶŶuities ǁas high – and this 
ǁas ĐoŶfiƌŵed ďǇ the FCA͛s oǁŶ ƌeseaƌĐh iŶ DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϰ. Annuities are the only product 
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that can hedge individual longevity risk. It was agreed that there was a need to reinforce the 
value of annuities. This could be helped by rebranding them as a ͚guaƌaŶteed iŶĐoŵe foƌ 
life͛ pƌoduĐt. 
Some felt it was hard to see how annuities could be sold without advice, due to the 
complexity of the decisions that need to be made: level vs inflation-linked, single life vs joint 
life, standard vs enhanced; the latter needs individual underwriting, but this can now be 
processed quickly and cheaply using the common quotation form (available since 2008).  
However, this view contrasts with those who believe that these issues could be addressed 
using a well-designed decision tree. It was also pointed out that, before the introduction of 
͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛, NEST was going to operate an annuity clearing house using a filtered 
form (married v single, level v indexed) and an algorithm would recommend a particular 
provider, say, Prudential, from a panel of providers.   
Retail v scheme drawdown 
The standard drawdown product is retail. One of the biggest drawdown providers described 
how their company operates. Their main market is in advised drawdown. They also operate 
in the non-adǀised ŵaƌket ;ďeloǁ £ϭϬϬ,ϬϬϬͿ ǁheƌe theǇ offeƌ oŶlǇ ͚safe͛ fuŶds plus lots of 
guidance. They explain that if people need a guaranteed income, they should buy an 
annuity. Previously, this was the capped drawdown market, where the cap was a good 
safety net. They find there is difficulty in explaining volatility to customers and the 
consequential risk of overdrawing relative to the performance of the fund. They need to 
explain that the withdrawal rate cannot realistically be more than, say, 4-5%. But, they are 
conscious that another firm can always come along and say it can deliver 6%. 
Charging is problematic: any fixed charge significantly outweighs a percentage charge in the 
£30,000-£100,000 market. Also administration is more intensive for drawdown customers – 
customers usually contact the provider 2-3 times p.a. – far more than under accumulation.  
The same provider was also looking at scheme drawdown, but said it was hard to tell at this 
stage what DC scheme members will do. They said that it was virtually impossible to design 
a default, siŶĐe theƌe ǁeƌe too ŵaŶǇ ͚suďstaŶtial͛ ŵiŶoƌities ǁaŶtiŶg diffeƌeŶt thiŶgs: 
 Annuity  All cash  Drawdown  Drawdown plus annuity. 
Some providers told us that there was a false distinction between scheme (institutional) and 
retail drawdown in terms of value for money. This is because it is possible to get low-cost 
non-advised drawdown in the retail market at all-iŶ Đost of Ϭ.ϰϯ% ;e.g., FidelitǇ ͚diƌeĐt to 
Đustoŵeƌ͛Ϳ oƌ Ϭ.ϰϱ% ;e.g., AǀiǀaͿ. OŶe pƌoǀideƌ said: ͚We Ŷeed to rethink what economies of 
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sĐale ŵeaŶs iŶ a dƌaǁdoǁŶ ŵaƌket. This isŶ͛t aďout sĐheŵe ǀs. ƌetail; it͛s aďout sĐale iŶ 
teƌŵs of the iŶstitutioŶ ŵaŶagiŶg the ŵoŶeǇ͛. “iŵilaƌlǇ, aŶ iŶǀestŵeŶt ŵaŶageƌ told us: 
͚DƌaǁdoǁŶ ŵeaŶs aŶ iŶdiǀidual aĐĐouŶt, so it͛s Ŷot necessarily cheaper to distribute via a 
sĐheŵe ďeĐause of the Ŷeed foƌ paǇŵeŶt iŶto ďaŶk aĐĐouŶt͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁe ǁoŶdeƌed hoǁ 
different this was from how DB administration operates in the payout stage – DB schemes 
exploit economies of scale and lower costs using a third-party administrator (TPA), for 
example. 
If the client wants advice, this can raise the cost to around 2.ϱ%. Foƌ eǆaŵple, MetLife͛s 
guaranteed drawdown product costs up to 1.85% to cover the cost of the guarantees and 
the annual management charge, and another 0.5-0.75% for advice. Further, the drawdown 
rate is around 70% of an equivalent single-life annuity. 
We were told that there remain substantial barriers to getting employers to offer scheme 
drawdown:   
 Employers do not want the liability  Trustees (in single trust schemes) do not want the liability  There is also lack of clarity about regulation and uncertainty over liability for 
providers. 
2.9.1.3 Trade unions 
A panel of trade unionists and TUC officials (together with two representatives from 
consumer organisations) met with us on 12 January 2015 to address the following 
questions. 
Will longevity insurance remain an essential component of decumulation and if so why?  
This question elicited the following responses: 
 ͚People are generally positive about longevity insurance, but there is a limit to what 
they will pay for it͛  ͚What people really want from a pension is a secure and predictable income. I have 
never come across any trade union members complaining they do not have 
sufficient flexibility from a DB pension. Unless there is some kind of longevity 
protection, it is no longer a pension͛  ͚Annuity products are really good. But the market has ruined them. It is the way they 
sold them and the way they gamed them. The public have got this perception that 
they are terrible͛  ͚If Ǉou ask people if theǇ ǁaŶt aŶ aŶŶuitǇ theǇ saǇ Ŷo. If Ǉou doŶ͛t Đall it aŶ aŶŶuitǇ, 
but instead call it ͞income for life͟, then this is attractive͛  ͚There is still going to be a role for longevity insurance, but much latter. The aim 
should be to start an annuity at 75, 80, or 85 at the latest. The risk of income 
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drawdown is that people will leave the money invested. There is the issue of 
investment risk in the first five years or so after retirement͛  ͚We are expecting individuals to make rational decisions about different annuities, 
but it would be much better if schemes could do it. People want someone on their 
side making regular payments until they die. It makes sense for schemes to do it͛  ͚Theƌe ƌeŵaiŶs the pƌoďleŵ of people͛s ƌetiĐeŶĐe to ĐoŵŵittiŶg laƌge aŵouŶts of 
money to something they may not benefit from. My grandmother resisted buying a 
new settee at 75 because she felt she ǁouldŶ͛t get use out of it. I ǁould ǁoƌƌǇ that 
way of thinking would be amplified with committing large sums to buying an annuity 
that theǇ thiŶk theǇ ǁoŶ͛t ďeŶefit fƌoŵ foƌ ǀeƌǇ loŶg. Peƌhaps it ǁould ďe ďetteƌ if 
there was a way of gradually buying a longevity product over time͛  ͚Denmark with ATP has just one provider. Politically that is very hard to replicate in 
the UK͛. 
What are your views on defaults? 
We asked: ͚CaŶ Ǉou haǀe a siŶgle default optioŶ?͛. PaƌtiĐipaŶts aĐĐepted that theƌe had to 
ďe a ͚default pƌoĐess͛ ǁhiĐh ǁould ǁoƌk aloŶg the folloǁiŶg liŶes: ͚fƌoŵ ǁhat ǁe kŶoǁ 
about you, this is what we are going to do as a default. If you want to do something 
diffeƌeŶt, Ǉou Ŷeed to opt out͛. OŶe paƌtiĐipaŶt said it ǁould haǀe to ďe pot-size related. 
AŶotheƌ said: ͚It ǁould also Ŷeed to ďe age-related. At the moment for many people with 
DC pots, these represent a small proportion of their pension saving. That will change over 
time. A solution that works for those approaching retirement now is not a solution that 
ǁoƌks iŶ ϮϬ oƌ ϯϬ Ǉeaƌs͛ tiŵe. We Ŷeed to ďe ŵiŶdful that ϵϬ% of people ǁill do ŶothiŶg aŶd 
take the default route. Yet £20,000 saved by a low earner can be a higher proportion of 
their pension savings than £100,000 is for high earners. Defaults have to be mindful of that͛. 
AŶotheƌ paƌtiĐipaŶt took a diffeƌeŶt ǀieǁ oŶ the default: ͚I aŵ listeŶiŶg to this – is it not the 
case that an actual default, in the world we regrettably find ourselves in, is that the money 
remains invested? I do not think there can be a default to providing income. If the member 
does not make a decision, it remains invested until a member makes a decision. The reason 
people ďuǇ leǀel aŶŶuities is that people do Ŷot ǁaŶt to ďuǇ aŶŶuities at all. TheǇ didŶ͛t 
think they pƌoǀided ǀalue͛. 
Another participant (from a consumer organisationͿ ĐoŵŵeŶted: ͚If Ǉou default theŵ iŶto a 
product (such as drawdown), you are right squarely in the area of regulated financial advice. 
I think scheme trustees will be very frightened of doing that. They can do that and get 
regulated. I just think they will not want to be. The key problem is people who take the 
money and run ďeĐause theǇ do Ŷot kŶoǁ ǁhat else to do͛. The pƌeǀious speakeƌ 
ƌespoŶded: ͚If Ǉou default iŶto aŶ aŶŶuitǇ, Ǉou almost guarantee that people will opt out 
aŶd just take the ŵoŶeǇ͛. The fiƌst speakeƌ ƌeplied: ͚You should oŶlǇ default iŶto aŶ aŶŶuitǇ 
once they get the benefits of longevity pooling (at age 75, 80, or 85 whatever). Until then 
you should stay invested so the pot has the ĐhaŶĐe to gƌoǁ͛. 
169 
 
2.9.2 Responses to the consultation paper 
We summarise the responses to Questions 3-21 in the consultation paper. 
3. (a) Do you expect products with longevity insurance (e.g., a lifetime annuity) to 
remain an essential component of a well-designed retirement programme? 
All respondents agreed that some form of longevity insurance would be needed at some 
point in retirement. However, there was a diversity of opinion about how this should be 
achieved. The two most commonly suggested options were to purchase an annuity later in 
retirement or to purchase a deferred annuity, possibly via the payment of regular 
premiums. Product innovation would be needed to deliver such products in practice. 
3. (b) How should those individuals who continue to buy lifetime annuities be assisted to 
obtain the best value products for their circumstances?  
A quarter of respondents suggested explicitly that it would be necessary to have a 
combination of approaches to ensure that individuals who choose to buy annuities get value 
for money and purchase appropriate products. The range of suggestions from other 
respondents also suggested that no single option would be adequate. So to help individuals 
get best value from annuities, they would need a mixture of nudges, better education, 
better market provision and better advice/guidance. 
3. (c) If individuals do not purchase lifetime annuities, how does an individual hedge 
their longevity risk in retirement? 
Most respondents suggested that new products, typically some form of deferred annuity, 
would be necessary to help individuals hedge longevity risk if those individuals chose not to 
buy a conventional annuity at retirement. Without some form of annuity product, the main 
alternatives suggested were additional saving (and hence under-consumption) and/or 
reliance on family support.  
4. (a) Where annuities are purchased later in retirement, what are the most effective 
and efficient products for providing income in the period between retirement and the age at 
which the longevity insurance comes into effect? (b) Should such products have a maximum 
recommended level of income withdrawal? (c) If so, how should that level of income be 
determined?  
There was considerable agreement that drawdown was appropriate in the early period of 
retirement, with two-thirds saying this explicitly and the remainder suggesting approaches 
very similar to drawdown. Several suggested that drawdown products should or could have 
guarantees. There was also strong support for recommendations or guidance on the 
maximum that should be drawn down each year. Very few responses provided suggestions 
for how to calculate this maximum. There was little support for a compulsory maximum 
level of income drawdown. 
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5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of scheme drawdown (i.e., where the 
scheme provides an income to the retired member prior to the purchase of an annuity)? 
There were a variety of responses to this question and very few respondents were certain 
whether the advantages outweighed the disadvanges. Respondents were clear that scheme 
drawdown might have the advantages of lowering costs through economies of scale and 
providing better governance. However, economies of scale might be absent for small 
schemes which would find it difficult to cater for the diverse needs of different members. 
While improved governance would be an advantage for members, some schemes might 
struggle to take on the additional responsibility of looking after funds in the drawdown 
phase, and so this was potentially a disadvantage for the trustees, especially since the 
regulatory framework for this is not sufficiently clear. 
6. (a) Should decumulation default products provided by, say, large-scale master trusts, 
be subject to the same trustee-based governance and quality standards that apply to the 
accumulation default fund?  (b) Where decumulation products are offered by contract-based 
schemes, should they be included in the requirements for the new Independent Governance 
Committees to provide governance and quality standards and to assess value for money? 
Eighty-two per cent of responses accepted the principle of a default decumulation product, 
while 76% thought that the decumulation phase should be governed by the same 
governance standards in master trusts that apply to the accumulation default fund and 
should be overseen by IGCs in contract-based schemes. But a significant minority were 
unhappy with defaults, despite the fact that people were free to opt out of a default, and 
thought that IGCs were not appropriate, preferring instead to rely on existing FCA rules. 
7. (a) What could be the typical total expense ratio (TER) for a default drawdown 
product provided by a large-scale master trust?  (b) How might this TER compare with 
individual drawdown products sold in the retail market?  (c) Can you give any examples of 
TERs for retail drawdown products? 
Very few respondents were prepared to say what a typical total expense ratio should be for 
a default drawdown product. However, one respondent suggested that the TER should be 
no more than than 0.5 per cent, while another suggested it should be equal to accumulation 
TER plus 0.25 per cent. The small number of responses to this question noted that it is 
difficult to answer while new products are still being developed. Default products should be 
cheaper than retail products, but retail products, it was noted, can be expensive. 
8. (a) Should scheme default drawdown products be subject to the charge cap? (b) 
Should this be the same as for accumulation (i.e. 0.75%) or is there a case for a higher cap?  
If higher please explain why and what the difference might be? 
Sixty-three per cent of responses were against a charge cap on scheme default drawdown 
products, at least in the short run. 
171 
 
9. Retail drawdown products will be sold via regulated advice and they will be 
purchased via non-advice (execution-only). Is there a case for: (a) Higher quality controls and 
consumer protection in relation to risk and costs? Explain;  (b) Making retail products subject 
to a charge cap? Explain. 
Overwhelmingly, there was support for higher quality controls on sales of retail drawdown 
products, with 65 per cent of responses favouring this. However, there was virtually no 
support for a charge cap on retail drawdown products, on the grounds that it would stifle 
innovation, with two-thirds being explicitly against a cap. 
10.  What is the optimal investment strategy in scheme drawdown prior to the 
introduction of longevity insurance? 
The strongest theme from responses to this question was that the investment strategy in 
scheme drawdown prior to the purchase of longevity insurance should be fairly cautious, 
namely to provide growth of the fund while reducing risk, with 43 per cent explicitly naming 
this as the appropriate strategy. However, 29 per cent of respondents noted that individuals 
have different needs and so there was no single strategy that would be appropriate for all 
individuals. 
11.  What are the advantages and disadvantages of institutional annuitisation (i.e., 
where annuities are provided on a bulk basis either by the scheme (self annuitisation) or by 
an insurance company, rather on a retail basis as currently)? 
Institutional annuitisation has the obvious advantage of scale and potentially the 
disadvantage of not being suitable for the individual, if not individually underwritten.  
Another disadvantage was that the scheme would be creating DB-like liabilities and the 
question was raised about who would ultimately underwrite these liabilities (employer, PPF 
or state) if the scheme underestimated the longevity and investment risks. Some 
respondents were uncertain whether the advantages outweighed the disadvantages and 
overall there was no clear majority one way or the other. 
12.  Could institutional annuitisation deal with the individual underwriting of annuities 
and still encourage competition from providers in the open market to maximise consumer 
outcomes (e.g., in the case where a retired member has a medical condition which reduces 
their life expectancy)? 
The overwhelming majority of responses thought that institutional annuitisation could deal 
with individual underwriting and still encourage competition from providers. 
13.  (a) Would a market for advanced life deferred annuities be viable? (b) What is the 
likely demand for advanced life deferred annuities? 
Sixty per cent of respondents thought that there could be a market for advanced life 
deferred annuities, but it is clear that there would be significant problems to be overcome 
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to achieve this. To make the product more attractive, some respondents suggested it could 
be paid for in instalments. 
14.  Is there likely to be demand for inflation protection? 
There was virtually unanimous support for the idea of inflation protection, but respondents 
doubted whether individuals would pay the high price needed to buy it. 
15.  What are your views on the proposals by HM Treasury to allow annuities to have 
more flexible payment terms by: (a) allowing lifetime annuities to decrease, (b) allowing 
lump sums to be taken from lifetime annuities, (c) removing the ten-year guarantee period 
for guaranteed annuities, (d) allowing payments from guaranteed annuities to be paid to 
beneficiaries as a lump sum, where they are under £30,000? 
There was a clear majority in favour of some or all of these options to increase the flexibility 
of aŶŶuities͛ paǇŵeŶt teƌŵs, ǁith ϲϴ peƌ ĐeŶt of ƌespoŶses suppoƌtiŶg at least oŶe of the 
options. But many respondents also raised significant concerns that such products would 
increase complexity and potentially confuse customers: in addition to this, many of the 
suggested products would only be suitable for a small component of the market. So, at best, 
one would say that there was qualified support. 
16.  What are your views on U-shaped or J-shaped annuities? 
There were mixed views on the provision of U- or J-shaped annuities, with responses fairly 
evenly divided between those for and those against. A particular issued raised was where 
the minimum of the U should be. It was also suggested that these more complicated income 
streams could be achieved by more straightforward mixtures of drawdown and 
annuitisation. 
17.  Should DC retirement products and decumulation strategies be linked to the single 
tier state pension? If so, how? 
Respondents disagreed on whether retirement products should be linked to the state 
pension. While many thought that it was a good idea in principle, there were issues about 
complexity of pensions in practice, which might make linking the two infeasible. 
18.  What other retirement products do you expect to become available? Please provide 
details if possible. 
A range of products were suggested, including new (flexible) annuity products and new 
(guaranteed) drawdown products. Products which combined more basic products were also 
suggested,  such as those combining drawdown and annuities. Several responses suggested 
products involving long-term care assurance. 
19.  Is theƌe a Đase foƌ desigŶatiŶg ĐeƌtaiŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt pƌoduĐts as ͚safe haƌďouƌ͛ 
products? Explain. 
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There was a small majority of respondents in favour of designating retirement products as 
safe harbour products, but there were strong views both for and against. 
20.  Following the impact of the Budget 2014 tax changes on annuity providers, do you 
have any concerns about supply-side contraction or other developments in the annuity 
market that might make it less competitive?  
Respondents were unanimous that the market would probably get smaller and less 
competitive as a result of the 2014 Budget changes. 
21. (a) What is the best way to deal with stranded pots? Explain. (b) Two approaches 
haǀe ďeeŶ put foƌǁaƌd to date: ͚aggƌegatoƌ͛ aŶd ͚pot-follows-ŵeŵďeƌ͛. Do Ǉou haǀe 
pƌefeƌeŶĐe foƌ oŶe oǀeƌ the otheƌ? EǆplaiŶ. ;ĐͿ Would ͚sĐheŵe-follows-ŵeŵďeƌ͛ ďe feasiďle? 
Explain. 
The majority of responses were in favour of pot-follows-member to deal with stranded pots, 
although 25 per cent favoured aggregation (with a limited number of aggregators). An 
alternative was a central clearing house or virtual or notional aggregation via a central 
database. There was little support for scheme-follows-member: a number of respondents 
said the issue of costs to employers was believed to be so great that it was considered 
infeasible, while another said that given the recent changes it is too late to be considering 
this. 
2.10 Analysis and Recommendations 
2.10.1 Analysis 
As we stated at the beginning of this Chapter, an effective and efficient retirement income 
plan iŶ the Ŷeǁ ǁoƌld of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ ǁill ďe oŶe that iŵpleŵeŶts a retirement 
financial strategy – comprising an investment strategy, a withdrawal strategy, and a 
longevity insurance strategy – using products that offer: 
 Accessibility – the degree of flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis  Inflation protection either directly or via investment performance, with minimal 
involvement by individuals who do not want to manage the investment risk  Longevity insurance 
which are combined together in an arrangement that:  
 Benefits from institutional design, governance, and pricing  Is simple to understand, transparent and low-cost  Requires minimal consumer engagement  Benefits from a low-cost delivery system. 
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Longevity insurance needs to be a key component of any good retirement income solution. 
Indeed, we believe that any retirement income plan that does not involve longevity 
insurance is seriously flaǁed, siŶĐe it fails to aĐhieǀe a peŶsioŶ sĐheŵe͛s pƌiŵaƌǇ goal of 
providing retirement income security for as long as the scheme member lives.  
2.10.1.1 The problems with existing products and their providers 
Since no single product offers accessibility, inflation protection and longevity insurance, a 
well-designed retirement income plan needs to involve an appropriate combination of 
annuity and drawdown products.  
Annuities and drawdown have different advantages and disadvantages which can be 
summarised as follows: 
 Standard annuities give higher more stable (life-long) income than drawdown, but 
no flexibility or death benefits. However, Wadsworth et al. (2001) argue that 
investment-linked annuities fully hedge longevity risk, while also benefiting from 
both the mortality premium and higher average returns than fixed annuities. Tom 
Boardman (2006) shows how death benefits can be built into annuities.309  Drawdown gives more volatile incomes, greater flexibility and death benefits, but no 
longevity insurance. While people might well like the flexibility of drawdown, this 
flexibility comes at a cost, either in terms of higher charges or lower average 
incomes compared with an annuity. Yet it appears to be a cost that people are 
prepared to pay. According to Rowena Griffiths, director at Female Financial 
MaŶageŵeŶt: ͚If the pƌoduĐt suits theiƌ Ŷeeds, theǇ teŶd to ďe happǇ to paǇ the 
Đhaƌge͛.310 In addition, people also like the idea of guarantees on capital or income 
or both. They also appear to be prepared to pay heavily for these. Yet products with 
guarantees could be up to twice as expensive as products without guarantees.311 
The 2014 Budget changed the balance away from annuities in favour of drawdown 
products. This change in balance was reinforced by the announcement on 29 September 
2014 ending the 55% tax charge
312
 on the residual pension fund when the member dies 
after 6 April 2015. This made pensions wealth inheritable if held in a drawdown product, but 
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 Mike Wadsworth, Alex Findlater, and Tom Boardman (2001) Reinventing Annuities, Staple Inn Actuarial 
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not in an annuity. Sales of annuities have more than halved since the Budget 
announcement. The inheritability of pension wealth is being emphasised at the expense of 
the longevity insurance that a pension is intended to provide. 
This is potentially damaging for the sustainability of income at higher ages, since if people 
rely only on drawdown, more of them are likely to run out of money before they die than 
leave assets to inherit – recall the average pension pot is £28,000 and can be accessed from 
the age of 55. It also reduces the effectiveness of the annuity product as a longevity risk 
sharing device since it (a) reduces the overall size of the annuity pool and (b) shifts the pool 
towards the select group of voluntary and more healthy annuitants, thereby making them 
more expensive.313 
Further, annuities are either being publicly trashed or treated as just another, not especially 
good value product along with a number of others that might be considered for inclusion in 
a retirement financial strategy, without mentioning, or if mentioned underplaying, their 
unique ability to hedge longevity risk. 
Typical are the following media comments: 
 ͚Annuities stink. That is the general message from consumer groups, regulators and 
the UK Government, which last year legislated to remove the de facto obligation on 
retirees to use their pension savings to buy one͛.314  ͚One of the great benefits of the new pension freedoms is that they make it easier 
for savers to take an income from their retirement fund without buying an annuity. 
While an annuity pays a guaranteed income for life, it does so at the cost of 
surrendering your savings at the outset; when you die, there is nothing to pass on to 
your family. The alternative offered by the new freedoms is to retain ownership of 
your pension savings but draw an income from them, either by taking income from 
investments, such as dividends, or withdrawing some of the capital. Either way, 
there should be money left to pass on to your family͛.315  
While, in the second of these comments, the longevity risk feature of annuities is mentioned 
iŶ passiŶg, it is doǁŶplaǇed iŶ faǀouƌ of the iŶheƌitaďilitǇ of the peŶsioŶ pot. It͛s ƌatheƌ like a 
commercial aircraft designer who pays little attention to landing the plane safely at the end 
of the journey on the grounds that such a small proportion of the total journey time is 
deǀoted to laŶdiŶg that it ĐaŶ ďe igŶoƌed. It͛s ƌight at the eŶd aŶǇ ǁaǇ aŶd the iŶflight 
experience is much more important. 
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Even more significantly, the same sort of dismissive comments about annuities are being 
made by senior people in the investment management industry, which, for the first time in 
history, is able to compete unrestrictedly with the insurance industry to manage retirement 
assets. Typical are these comments by Martin Gilbert, chief executive and co-founder of 
AďeƌdeeŶ Asset MaŶageŵeŶt ǁƌitiŶg iŶ the FiŶaŶĐial Tiŵes ;eŵphasis addedͿ: ͚Foƌ the fiƌst 
time, individual investors have full and free access to their pension pots rather than being 
compelled to use the bulk of those funds to buy an annuity͛.316 
Any close observer of the pensions industry will be aware of the long-standing running 
battle between the investment management industry and the life assurance industry to 
ŵaŶage peŶsioŶ sĐheŵe ŵeŵďeƌs͛ assets. The situatioŶ used to ďe ĐleaƌĐut: the foƌŵeƌ 
(which included the investment management divisions of life insurers) ran the money during 
accumulation, while the latter managed the money in decumulation, mainly via life 
annuities, since only authorised and appropriately capitalised insurers are allowed to sell 
annuities in the UK.   
Fund managers have long complained about the lack of a level playing field. Their various 
trade bodies have spent years promoting the merits of drawdown products, claiming that 
this would encourage innovation. Here, for example, is an extract from the report 
commissioned by the European Fund and Asset Management Association in 2009 which 
clearly fails to acknowledge the unique role that annuities play in providing a life-long 
income in retirement:317 
The regulatory framework in Europe should find a reasonable balance 
between satisfying the concerns of policymakers and addressing the needs 
of retirees. Enforcing compulsory conversion of pension savings into 
annuities does not give individuals the level of flexibility needed to choose 
the best approach to suit their circumstances and risk tolerance. This is 
particularly the case given the very different range of retirement income 
likely to be available, ranging from a very strong support from state and/or 
salary-related pension schemes through to greater reliance on a defined-
contributions savings pot. 
Ideally, regulatory frameworks across Europe should support, on equal 
terms, both annuities and other payout solutions. Restrictions on non-
annuity products should be relaxed and pooled, non-pooled and hybrid 
solutions should enjoy equal tax treatment. 
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A more balanced regulatory framework for the payout phase of funded 
pension schemes would spark innovation in the European financial market 
aŶd stiŵulate the ĐƌeatioŶ of paǇout pƌoduĐts tailoƌed to ŵeet iŶdiǀiduals͛ 
retirement needs. Competition between providers of payout products 
would also increase, thereby lowering the cost of products. The evidence 
from countries where drawdown plans and other non-pooled solutions are 
not hindered by legislative or tax rules, highlights the benefits of 
innovation and competition. 
Less restrictive rules and regulation towards non-pooled solutions would 
also create incentives for the financial services industry to create a variety 
of standardised pooled, non-pooled and integrated payout products, 
designed especially for retirement. As such pre-packaged solutions are 
likely to include a range of choices with respect to risk attitude and 
preferences regarding the structure of periodic payments, improved 
information requirements, advice and financial education should assist 
individuals in deciding how to invest their accumulated pension savings. In 
addition, appropriate default options should be in place to help individuals 
who cannot or do not want to choose between the available payout 
products. 
If nonetheless compulsion is still favoured, then the upper age limit for 
compulsory annuitisation should be pushed towards 85 in order to achieve 
a right balance between the objectives of securing a sufficient level of 
retirement income and protecting retirees from longevity risk at very old 
ages. This can be achieved by using some part of the accumulated assets 
to buy a deferred annuity starting payments at age 85 or requiring a 
switching of assets into annuities at that age. 
One possible compromise between compulsion and a more liberalised 
market would be only to make pooled solutions mandatory if a basic 
standard of living is not available from other annuity-like sources, such as 
state pension, defined benefit schemes etc. Above that minimum level, 
individuals should be allowed to make a free decision for themselves given 
both that individual circumstances will vary considerable and that it is 
difficult to set regulatory restrictions that do not end up becoming 
burdensome for individuals. 
 
The 2014 Budget has opened up the management of UK retirement assets to all comers. The 
investment management industry claims that consumers will benefit from new products 
which provide higher expected returns and greater flexibility than annuities, Martin Gilbert, 
in the same article in the Financial Tiŵes, ĐoŶfiƌŵs that: ͚The fuŶd ŵaŶageŵeŶt iŶdustƌǇ is 
working to develop transparent and attractive investment vehicles to win this important 
Ŷeǁ ďusiŶess͛. A suƌǀeǇ of iŶǀestŵeŶt adǀiseƌs ďǇ “tate “tƌeet fouŶd that ϳϬ% pƌediĐted aŶ 
increase in product development involving capital and income guarantees. There was 
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expected to be, by contrast, very little innovation in annuities, except for U- and J-shaped 
annuities.318  
However, some commentators question whether much innovation has actually taken place. 
Toŵ MĐPhail aƌgues: ͚“iŶĐe the Budget, ǁe haǀe seeŶ deǀelopŵeŶt ǁoƌk oŶ hǇďƌid 
retirement income products which use complex investment guarantees and hedging 
strategies. So far we have not seen anything which appears to deliver a better mix of 
guarantees and potential investment returns than simply splitting a retirement fund 
ďetǁeeŶ aŶ aŶŶuitǇ foƌ ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ aŶd a dƌaǁdoǁŶ foƌ fleǆiďilitǇ͛.319 
AŶotheƌ iŵpoƌtaŶt issue is Đost. This is ƌeĐogŶised ďǇ MaƌtiŶ Gilďeƌt iŶ his FT aƌtiĐle: ͚We are 
stewards of other people͛s ŵoŶeǇ, ǁith aŶ aĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ aŶd ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ to those 
individual savers to deliver a valuable service at a fair price. Our interests must be aligned 
ǁith the iŶteƌests of ouƌ ĐlieŶts, aŶd tƌaŶspaƌeŶtlǇ so….This aiŵ foƌ tƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ is ŵoƌe 
easily stated than delivered. In addition to the fees charged by the fund manager for 
iŶǀestiŶg the ŵoŶeǇ, the iŶdiǀidual͛s peŶsioŶ plaŶ pƌoǀideƌ, fiŶaŶĐial adǀiseƌ oƌ iŶǀestŵeŶt 
platform will usually charge fees that may be as large or larger than the underlying fund 
Đhaƌge. AŶd theƌe aƌe tƌaŶsaĐtioŶal Đosts that aƌe…ƌaƌelǇ ǁell uŶdeƌstood, iŶĐludiŶg ďƌokeƌ 
ĐoŵŵissioŶ…[W]e ŵust ďe opeŶ aŶd tƌaŶspaƌeŶt, Ŷot least aďout the fees aŶd all otheƌ 
Đosts that aƌe ďoƌŶe ďǇ the ĐlieŶt…[F]ee stƌuĐtuƌes oŶ fuŶds should align the fund 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt ďusiŶess͛s iŶteƌests ǁith those of the ĐlieŶts͛.  
Yet, there is, very little evidence that this improved transparency over charges is taking 
place,320 despite attempts by Daniel Godfrey, chief executive of the investment maŶageƌ͛s 
trade body, the Investment Association, to move the investment management industry very 
slowly in that direction, as, for example, with the publication of a position paper Meaningful 
Disclosure of Costs and Charges in February 2015.321 Such was the hostility to such moves 
from member firms of the Investment Association that Mr Godfrey was forced to resign in 
October 2015. A senior investment ŵaŶageƌ told the FiŶaŶĐial Tiŵes: ͚He lauŶĐhed 
initiatives on transparency of fees and fund performance and remuneration, which are all 
important, but there are other bigger issues out there that matter to our institutional 
ĐlieŶts, suĐh as the peŶsioŶs tiŵe ďoŵď͛. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to the FT, ͚ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout the diƌeĐtioŶ 
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of the tƌade ďodǇ͛ ǁeƌe ƌaised ďǇ Aberdeen Asset Management, Fidelity, Henderson Global 
Investors, Invesco Perpetual, Investec Asset Management, Legal & General Investment 
Management, M&G  and Schroders.322  
The iŶǀestŵeŶt ŵaŶageŵeŶt iŶdustƌǇ is saǇiŶg ǀeƌǇ ĐleaƌlǇ that ͚fees and fund 
performance͛ aƌe ƌeallǇ seĐoŶd-order issues. Yet, David Ferguson, Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe of ͚ǁƌap͛ 
speĐialist NuĐleus, has ďƌaŶded ƌetail fuŶd ŵaŶageŵeŶt ͚out of ĐoŶtƌol͛ and called for it to 
catch up with good practices in the institutional sector. There was over reliaŶĐe oŶ ͚ƌisk-
ƌated͛ fuŶds, aĐĐoŵpaŶied ďǇ pooƌ peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe aŶd high Đhaƌges. He said: ͚Wheƌe the 
institutional market is tight and responsive, the retail market is slack and sluggish. 
IŶstitutioŶal ĐlieŶts ǁouldŶ͛t toleƌate the pƌiĐiŶg, the aĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ or the performance of 
the ƌetail seĐtoƌ, so ǁhǇ should Ǉouƌ Đustoŵeƌs?͛.323 
When it comes to insurers, it is evident that the insurance industry has no intention of 
lettiŶg ͚asset ŵaŶageƌs eat theiƌ diŶŶeƌ͛.324 They are taking full advantage of the natural 
inertia of their customers to stay with their existing provider when they move from the 
accumulation to the decumulation stages of their pension scheme. To switch the scheme to 
an investment maŶageƌ, the ŵeŵďeƌ ǁould haǀe to ͚take fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe aŶd ŵoǀe to a 
retail-ďased platfoƌŵ͛, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to Paul BuĐkseǇ, head of UK defiŶed ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ at 
investment maŶageƌ BlaĐk‘oĐk. Hoǁeǀeƌ, a ƌeluĐtaŶĐe to paǇ foƌ fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe ͚ŵaǇ leaǀe 
slim pickings for asset managers that do not have a large UK life insurance company as a 
paƌeŶt oƌ aƌe uŶaďle to foƌge a ƌelatioŶship ǁith oŶe͛. Fuƌtheƌ, people ǁho haǀe ďeeŶ auto-
enrolled in a default investment fund are unlikely to suddenly want to become heavily 
involved in investment decisions after retirement and are therefore likely to stay with their 
current provider, according to Robert Holford, principal at Spence Johnson. Mr Holford 
believes that investment managers without a platform will only be able to gain some market 
share if they partner with pensions companies that do not have a particular investment 
expertise in-house oƌ ǁith the ŵasteƌ tƌusts, suĐh as NE“T oƌ The People͛s PeŶsioŶ. “peŶĐe 
Johnson predicts that there will be £125 billion under management in master trusts by 
2025. The level of fund management fees charged is also likely to have an impact on the 
market share achieved by investment managers. According to Lorna Blyth, investment 
stƌategǇ ŵaŶageƌ foƌ ‘oǇal LoŶdoŶ͛s peŶsioŶs ďusiŶess, theƌe is a Ϭ.ϳϱ% higheƌ fee Đhaƌged 
by external managers on Royal London͛s peŶsioŶ platfoƌŵ thaŶ that foƌ iŶteƌŶallǇ ŵaŶaged 
funds, which explains why the in-house funds were gaining a greater market share.325 
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“o at the ǀeƌǇ staƌt of the ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ iŶitiatiǀe, ǁe haǀe the folloǁiŶg. AŶŶuities 
are being trashed in the media and the investment management industry is reluctant to 
acknowledge that there is any role for annuities in retirement income plans. At the same 
time, there are serious question marks over the effectiveness and cost of the alternative 
retirement income solutions being offered by the investment management industry. The 
insurance industry and the investment management industry are at loggerheads with each 
other. The insurance industry is relying on customer inertia rather than good valued 
decumulation products to capture market share. At the same time, it is bifurcating between 
pure insurance companies and those insurers which have investment management 
divisions, such as Legal & General and Aegon, which see the greatest growth prospects in 
investment management rather than in insurance. This explains why Legal & General and 
Aegon have both decided to resign from their trade body, the ABI.326 
This is not good news for consumers. Both annuities and drawdown products are necessary 
to provide a good outcome for pensioners uŶdeƌ ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛. And this means that 
both life insurers and investment managers are needed to offer effective and good value 
annuities and drawdown products. This, in turn, means that the insurance and investment 
management industries need to cooperate as well as compete in order to improve customer 
outcomes. To illustrate, a deferred annuity is potentially an ideal asset in a drawdown 
programme. It would require investment managers to partner with insurance companies to 
provide deferred annuities. The investment management industry is unable to sell products 
that provide longevity insurance, since these can only be provided by authorised life offices. 
This cooperation is simply not happening, although NEST has announced that it will look for 
such a partnership.327 In addition, annuities need to be rebranded as ͚guaranteed income 
foƌ life pƌoduĐts͛,328 and deferred annuities need to be rebranded as ͚loŶgeǀitǇ iŶsuƌaŶĐe͛. 
Even if it can be agreed that both annuities and drawdown products are necessary to 
provide an effective retirement income solution and that there is evidence of a partnership 
developing between insurers and investment managers, there are a whole range of other 
issues that need to be resolved before we can be confident that consumers have a good 
choice of retirement income solutions. These relate to the withdrawal strategy, the 
investment strategy, and the longevity insurance strategy. Our interviewees indicated that 
the following factors were important to take into account: 
 If drawdown is offered by schemes, consultants believe it is important for the 
scheme to suggest, but not set a safe withdrawal rate. Further, the suggested rate 
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must be reviewed regularly. Consultants are also concerned that if scheme members 
have complicated arrangements, such as multiple pots, and do not take advice, these 
members could soon find themselves in trouble in terms of increased tax liability and 
loss of means-tested benefits etc329   The appropriate investment strategy should balance the demands for both flexibility 
and a secure income for life that covers at least essential life-long expenditure   When it comes to annuitisation to deal with the longevity risk, the later that this is 
deferred, the more challenging it becomes due to issues of pricing and cognitive 
impairment  The most common age suggested by the consultants we interviewed for triggering 
annuitisation was 75 and this could be paid for in a number of ways: (a) set aside 
10% of the fund at retirement (to buy an annuity at 75) and keep it in a reserve fund, 
(b) pay a monthly premium during drawdown, (c) buy a deferred annuity at 
retirement, or (d) buy a series of annuities over, say, 5 years. 
2.10.1.2 Issues with the arrangements for delivering retirement income 
The first point to clarify is about nomenclature. Only arrangements for delivering retirement 
income schemes which involve longevity insurance (in the form of current or deferred 
annuities) should be allowed to Đall theŵselǀes ͚peŶsioŶ sĐheŵes͛.  AƌƌaŶgeŵeŶts ǁhiĐh do 
Ŷot iŶǀolǀe loŶgeǀitǇ iŶsuƌaŶĐe should Ŷot ďe alloǁed to Đall theŵselǀes ͚peŶsioŶ sĐheŵes͛, 
ďut should ďe ƌeƋuiƌed to use aŶotheƌ Ŷaŵe, suĐh as ͚drawdown ŵaŶageŵeŶt sĐheŵes͛. 330 
In other words, the teƌŵ ͚peŶsioŶ sĐheŵe͛ should ďe a pƌoteĐted Ŷaŵe. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, 
arrangements which do not involve longevity insurance should be classified as complex and 
high risk from a regulatory standpoint. 
Turning to delivery systems, efficiency requires economies of scale. This is one of the most 
effective ways of keeping costs low. So products delivered by institutional delivery systems 
can be offered at lower cost than retail delivery systems. One overarching goal of innovation 
should therefore be to change the retail model for DC decumulation into an institutional 
model, in terms of product design, delivery and cost. This was a key lesson from auto-
enrolment. 
On the other hand, some providers told us that there was a false distinction between 
scheme (institutional) and retail drawdown in terms of value for money because drawdown 
involves individual accounts and it is possible to get low-cost non-advised drawdown in the 
retail market.  
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So there is a difference in view amongst industry practitioners about which type of 
arrangements would be more effective for delivering retirement income. We therefore 
need a clearer picture of the economics of scheme vs retail drawdown. 
The disagreement might well be moot, however, since there has been little evidence since 
the 2014 Budget of new institutional delivery systems being offered.  Two probable reasons 
are that the industry has been given so little time to implement the changes and that there 
has been so much uncertainty about how consumers would respond to the Budget changes. 
In short, no one has had the time or incentive to invest in new delivery systems.  
2.10.1.3 The criteria for safe harbour status 
There was support amongst those we interviewed for certain products to be classified as 
safe harbour products. Such products Ŷeed to ďe ͚good eŶough͛, siŶĐe theƌe Đould ďe Ŷo 
Financial Ombudsman Service referrals with safe harbour products, i.e., advisers, having 
confirmed their suitability, could not be sued for recommending them to clients. Bearing in 
ŵiŶd that ͚the ďest is ofteŶ the eŶeŵǇ of the good͛, ǁe ǁould aƌgue that, foƌ ŵost 
Đustoŵeƌs, the ͚ďest pƌoduĐts͛ aƌe those that ǁill ďe ͚good eŶough͛ to ďe Đlassed as safe 
harbour products for use in safe harbour retirement income plans.331 
This, in turn, would require products to be rated according to a set of agreed criteria. These 
would relate to how effective and efficient the products were in delivering the outcomes 
claimed for them.   
We suggest the following criteria: 
 Design and construction – There needs to be a much clearer picture of how products 
are designed and constructed, especially if they involve guarantees. For example, if 
the guarantees are hedged with options, there needs to be clarity over whether the 
options are exchange traded or over-the-counter and, if the latter, the nature of the 
counterparties. It also is critically important that the charges, particularly for 
guarantees, are not excessive  Investment strategy – It needs to be made clear how the investment strategy meets 
the aims claimed for the product. The circumstances under which the investment 
strategy fails to meet these aims also needs to be specified  Projected real returns – Providers of drawdown products should present stochastic 
projections of the range of likely real outcomes (i.e., incomes adjusted for inflation 
and total charges and costsͿ that theiƌ pƌoduĐts Đould deliǀeƌ ďased oŶ the pƌoduĐt͛s 
underlying investment strategy 
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 Safe harbour retirement income plans combine safe harbour products with financial help or guidance 
(which includes confirming the suitability of the product for the client). This will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
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 Accessibility – The degree of flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis  Longevity protection – The degree of longevity protection afforded by the product, 
illustrated by the probability of running out of money at different ages for a range of 
possible withdrawal strategies. Also included here will be the impact of the amount, 
if any, paid on death  Value for money – The benefits and costs of the product need to be clearly stated 
and the balance between them assessed.332   
We should establish minimum standards for each of these criteria. Any product satisfying 
these minimum standards could be classified as a safe harbour product. Defaqto recently 
launched a provider rating service.
333
 What should be considered is a product rating service 
along similar lines. 
2.10.1.4 A metric for measuring value for money 
There needs to be an agreed metric for measuring value for money, but first we need to 
ƌeĐogŶise hoǁ ĐhalleŶgiŶg the ĐoŶĐept is. Despite ĐoŶstaŶt ƌefeƌeŶĐes to ͚ǀalue foƌ ŵoŶeǇ͛, 
policy-makers and regulators have yet to define clearly and fully what this means in relation 
to DC retirement income products.  
Nevertheless, two broad definitions from government agencies, used in non-pensions policy 
areas, provide a good starting point:  
 The NatioŶal Audit OffiĐe:  ͚Good ǀalue foƌ ŵoŶeǇ is the optiŵal use of ƌesouƌĐes to 
aĐhieǀe the iŶteŶded outĐoŵes. ͞Optiŵal͟ ŵeaŶs ͞the ŵost desiƌaďle possiďle giǀeŶ 
eǆpƌessed oƌ iŵplied ƌestƌiĐtioŶs oƌ ĐoŶstƌaiŶts͟. Value foƌ ŵoŶeǇ is Ŷot aďout 
aĐhieǀiŶg the loǁest iŶitial pƌiĐe͛. 334  HM TƌeasuƌǇ: ͚Value foƌ ŵoŶeǇ is Ŷot aďout aĐhieǀiŶg the loǁest iŶitial pƌiĐe: it is 
defiŶed as the optiŵuŵ ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of ǁhole life Đosts aŶd ƋualitǇ͛. 335 
While these definitions are clear and simple, they are nevertheless challenging in the 
context of DC retirement products.  
What is required is a policy and regulatory definition of value for money that cannot be 
gamed, as argued in the Murray Report.336 Murray said the measurement of value for 
ŵoŶeǇ ŵust ďe ďased oŶ ͚credibility and transparency: make relevant information public; 
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 Value for money is discussed further in the next Section. 
333
 Professional Adviser (2015) Defaqto launches pension ratings service, 1 May. 
334
 The definition is in relation to public sector commissioning; http://www.nao.org.uk/successful-
commissioning/general-principles/value-for-money/  
335
  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/Reg_Prop_and_VfM-November04.pdf 
336
 This is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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avoid room for gaming the process; and ensure metrics are clear, simple, difficult to dispute 
aŶd diffiĐult to ŵaŶipulate͛ ;p.ϭϭϰͿ. 337 
A 2014 Pensions Institute Report, VfM:  Assessing Value for Money in Defined Contribution 
Default Funds, 338  argued that value reflects a range of features, including the 
appropriateness of the product structure for the target market, the price, a dynamic 
iŶǀestŵeŶt stƌategǇ ;as opposed to ͚set aŶd foƌget͛Ϳ, effeĐtive communication, efficient 
administration, and good institutional-quality governance. While we agreed that cost is not 
the only consideration, we continue to believe that it is hugely important, especially when 
comparing products with similar objectives, such as SIPPs and drawdown funds. 
Given its multi-dimensional nature, it is clearly impossible to find a single measure that 
captures all the different aspects of value for money. However, we believe that there is a 
measure that provides a good starting point and that is the ͚ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth͛ ;MWͿ of a 
product. This is the ratio of the expected present value of payouts on the product to the 
price; in other words, it is the ratio of what you get back over time to what you put in. MW 
will always be less than 10Ϭ% to alloǁ foƌ the pƌoǀideƌ͛s adŵiŶistƌatiǀe Đosts aŶd pƌofit, ďut 
if the MW is high, then this implies that the value for money of the product is high. 
MW can be used to compare different retirement income products, but we need a 
benchmark for comparison.  We believe that the most obvious benchmark is provided by a 
life time annuity. This is because it provides a life-long income (hence satisfying the primary 
purpose of a pension scheme) and it is easy to understand how it is constructed. Moreover, 
the MW concept was invented for annuities. 339 
For annuities, the empirical evidence shows that the MW of annuities is fairly high,340 but 
we would add the following caveats: the annuity type must be appropriate for the 
individual, medical underwriting is applied where appropriate, and the open market option 
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 The 2014 Final Report of the Financial System Inquiry in Australia, known as the Murray Report after its 
Chair, David Murray; 
 http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf 
338
 Debbie Harrison, David Blake, and Kevin Dowd (2014) VfM: Assessing Value for Money in Defined 
Contribution Default Funds, Pensions Institute, January; www.pensions-
institute.org/reports/ValueForMoney.pdf 
339
 Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks (2002) AŶŶuitǇ PƌiĐes, MoŶeǇ͛s Woƌth aŶd ‘eplaĐeŵeŶt ‘atios: UK 
experience 1972 – 2002, Centre for Market and Public Organisation Working Paper No. 02/051, University of 
Bristol, September; http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/cmpo/migrated/documents/wp51.pdf 
340
 Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks (2009) MoŶeǇ͛s Woƌth of PeŶsioŶ Annuities, Department for Work and 
Pensions, Research Report 563; Matteo Aquilina, Robert Baker and Tommaso Majer (2014)  The Value for 
Money of Annuities and Other Retirement Income Strategies in the UK,  Occasional Paper No.5, Financial 
Conduct Authority, December (https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-
5.pdf) 
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is used to secure a competitive rate.
 341
 Nevertheless, many people regard the product as 
unattractive. This is due to a combination of the irreversible nature of the purchase,342 lack 
of trust in the industry, and historically low rates, which, in turn, are due to external factors 
such as increasing longevity and low interest rates as a result of quantitative easing.  
Foƌ dƌaǁdoǁŶ pƌoduĐts, assessiŶg ǀalue foƌ ŵoŶeǇ is still a ͚ǁoƌk iŶ pƌogƌess͛, Ŷot least 
because the charges for drawdown are reported in different ways – e.g., annual 
management charge, annual fund management charge, total expense ratio, ongoing charges 
figure, reduction in yield – none of which is as informative as MW.   
The standard MW formula would have to be modified in the case of drawdown to reflect 
both the flexibility of being able to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis and the death 
benefits. In a financial engineering sense, this flexibility can be expressed in the form of 
options. Each period while alive, the drawdown customer draws down a regular pre-agreed 
income (say, based on GAD rates), but also has the option to withdraw up to the entire 
remaining pot. These options are valuable and, if exercised, add to the MW of drawdown, 
but reduce the present value of all the remaining regular income payments. The options 
could be valued using standard option pricing methods. The MW formula should also 
incorporate penalties for withdrawal strategies that lead to the pension pot being depleted 
before the member dies (e.g., in the form of a penal negative cash flow for these periods). 
Death benefits can be valued using the same framework. 
While, the MW formula provides a measure of expected value, it does not take risk into 
account. Since drawdown products need to generate a sufficient additional return over the 
risk-free rate to beat the benchmark return on an annuity which benefits from the mortality 
premium, the risk of drawdown products could be expressed in terms of the likelihood of a 
potential shortfall relative to an annuity.343 
The need for better benchmarking to be able to assess value for money was discussed on a 
panel at the 2015 NAPF annual conference. Under the new DC governance rules, trustees 
are required to prepare a report on value for money and compare their offering with what 
other schemes provide. But the panel said it was very challenging and expensive to get 
hands on the data to do this. Lynne Rawcliffe, BASF pension manager, believes the data 
could be provided by the regulator, especially for trustees of small schemes that do not 
want to pay additional costs. Tim Banks, pension strategies group managing director at 
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 The FCA now requires insurers to provide an annuity ranking table with a quotation, so individuals can see 
how the roll-over rate compares. The aim is to encourage more shopping around, but it is too soon to tell if 
this will prove effective in what has historically been a stubbornly passive purchase market. 
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 Although this will change once the secondary annuity market starts in 2017. 
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 A simple measure of this would be the size of the area under the downward sloping annuity line in Figure 
3.4 relative to the total area of the fanchart. 
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AllianĐeBeƌŶsteiŶ, said: ͚We Ŷeed ŵoƌe tƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ aŶd haǀe ďetteƌ ďeŶĐhŵaƌkiŶg that is 
theŶ doǁŶ to eaĐh sĐheŵe to deĐide ǁhat theiƌ settiŶg ǀalue is͛.344  
2.10.1.5 Measuring and reporting charges, and a charge cap 
There needs to be a commonly agreed method for measuring and reporting the charges for 
all retirement income products. Currently, charges are either not reported at all or, if they 
are reported, they are reported in a range of different ways – sometimes the same term is 
used, but what is included is different – so that a comparison between products is difficult if 
not impossible. Further, if charges are reported, they are generally not reported in full. 
For example, there is no explicit charge reported for life-time annuities. An annuity buyer 
pays a preŵiuŵ aŶd ƌeĐeiǀes aŶ iŶĐoŵe stƌeaŵ aŶd is Ŷeǀeƌ told ǁhat the ͚Đhaƌge͛ is. Yet 
depending on how the annuity is sold, a sales agent might receive a 1-3% commission. This 
would be the case with a non-advised sale. MW was invented in part to deal with this issue, 
but the MW measure for an annuity takes into account much more than any commission or 
other charge. Administration costs and provider profit are included in the MW figure, for 
instance. As mentioned in the previous section, drawdown, by contrast, has a number of 
different ways of reporting charges, but they all give different answers and none can be 
regarded as giving a complete measure of the total costs borne by the customer.  
In our view, the charge measure should cover all the costs borne by the customer either 
directly or indirectly. The costs chould ďe ƌepoƌted iŶ the foƌŵ of ďoth a ͚ƌate of Đost͛ – 
which could then be deducted from the gross rate of return to give a net rate of return – 
and as a monetary amount – which can then be compared with the monetary value of the 
Đustoŵeƌ͛s fuŶd. 
Foƌ eǆaŵple, the Đost of ǁithdƌaǁiŶg fuŶds, the platfoƌŵ Đhaƌge aŶd aŶǇ adǀiseƌ͛s fee 
should be included in the cost measure. Also the following investment costs should be 
included:345 
 Visible cash costs (Level 1 costs) 
o Commissions 
o Taxes 
o Fees 
o Custodial charges 
o Acquisition costs  Hidden cash costs (Level 2 costs) 
o TƌaŶsaĐtioŶs Đosts of tuƌŶoǀeƌ, suĐh as ďid‐ask spƌead 
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 Reported in Stephanie Baxter (2015) NAPF 2015: Schemes need better benchmarking to judge value, 
Professional Pensions, 15 October. 
345 See David Blake (2014) On the Disclosure of the Costs of Investment Management, Pensions Institute 
Discussion Paper PI-1407, May; http://www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp1407.pdf 
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o Transactions costs in underlying funds 
o Undisclosed revenue  HiddeŶ ŶoŶ‐Đash Đosts ;Leǀel ϯ ĐostsͿ 
o Market impact 
o Information leakage 
o Market exposure 
o Missed trade opportunity or market timing costs 
o Delay costs. 
In terms of charge capping, we note that there is now a charge cap of 0.75% on auto-
enrolment scheme accumulation default funds. This does not currently include transaction 
costs, although the FCA and DWP plan to revisit this issue. If transactions costs are included, 
will the cap remain at 0.75%? 
What would be included in a charge cap on a decumulation default strategy if it were to be 
introduced? We believe that at, a minimum, the following should be included in scheme 
drawdown: 
 The total expense ratio or ongoing charges figure on the default investment strategy 
(including the costs of any guarantees)  Transactions costs (what is covered to be agreed)  Cost per ad hoc withdrawal subject to a maximum number of withdrawals. 
The following additional costs would apply with retail drawdown: 
 Platform charge  Adviser fee. 
It was clear from our discussions with industry practitioners that there was a very strong 
view that any charge cap on drawdown products – including even on a default decumulation 
product – would reduce the scope to diversify risk, put guaranteed drawdown products out 
of reach, and stifle innovation.  
There was equally strong support for a charge cap from consumer champions. They pointed 
out that the same sort of objections were made to the idea of a charge cap in default funds, 
yet we know that high charges are the surest form of consumer detriment and they 
compound dramatically over time.  OŶe told us: ͚all ǁe haǀe at the ŵoŵeŶt is a 
proliferation of expensive retail drawdown products which are being sold to individuals in 
place of annuities. There is also no real innovation, just a repackaging of existing multi-asset 
funds. A charge cap would in fact be a spur to innovation and would be one of the 
mechanisms that would help encourage institutional as opposed to retail solutions. The 
consequence of not having a charge cap will be a proliferation of thousands of non-
innovative retail products which it will be prohibitively disruptive to then attempt to 
aggregate. An eventual cap will then be introduced, as in accumulation, which, in order to 
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avoid damage to the multitude of providers, will just shave off the extreme excesses. That is 
why we have ended up with a UK charge cap for accumulation at 0.75%, while in Sweden 
charges are at 0.2% (and heading below) for a country where the scale is, in principle, much 
loǁeƌ thaŶ the UK͛. 
We therefore believe that it would be reasonable to have a charge cap in due course on a 
simple default decumulation product. Such a charge cap would be relatively straightforward 
to justify if it can already be justified in the accumulation stage. If charges are linked to asset 
values, the charge is maximised at the point of retirement when the pension pot is at its 
highest, implying that the revenue received by decumulation product providers is front 
loaded. This contrasts with the providers of accumulation products whose revenues are 
back loaded, but can still run a profitable business. It would also be useful for product 
providers to be aware that a charge cap was going to be imposed, so that they are not 
surprised as in the case of the cap on the default investment strategy in auto-enrolment. 
2.10.1.6 Product and provider regulation 
Annuities are amongst the oldest financial products in the world and structured products 
are amongst the newest. Both have a critical role to play in the new pensions environment. 
Yet in the months leading up to the introduction of the new regime, the FCA found serious 
flaws in their design and delivery. This suggests that there is an important role for product 
regulation, given how poor most customers are at assessing the efficiency and effectiveness 
of financial products. We are not proposing regulation for its own sake, only in the case 
where consumers are particularly vulnerable. Even where consumers are generally good at 
assessing value themselves, such as in the case of food, they are still vulnerable to fraud, as 
in the case of the 2013 horsemeat scandal346 and need the protection of the Food Standards 
Agency.347 
There could also be a role for provider regulation. Mick McAteer, director of the Financial 
Inclusion Centƌe, aƌgues: ͚asset ŵaŶageƌs [if theǇ get iŶǀolǀed iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe 
pƌoǀisioŶ] ǁill Ŷeed to ďe suďjeĐt to pƌudeŶtial ƌegulatioŶ as aŶŶuitǇ pƌoǀideƌs aƌe͛. He 
believes that investment managers would find it challenging to design products that had 
higher ƌetuƌŶs thaŶ aŶŶuities oǀeƌ the loŶg teƌŵ. He ĐoŶtiŶued: ͚We Ŷeeded ƌefoƌŵ, but I 
think we are replacing something that is suboptimal with something that is catastrophic. We 
risk undermining the progress made with auto-enrolment and I feel that uncertainty and 
laĐk of ĐoŶfideŶĐe ƌeǀeƌses tƌust͛.348 
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 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_meat_adulteration_scandal 
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 http://www.food.gov.uk/ 
348 Reported in Helen Morrissey (2015), Asset managers should be subject to retirement income regulation, 
Professional Pensions, 11 February. 
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2.10.1.7 Modelling outcomes 
An important part of determining whether a product meets the safe harbour criteria is 
ŵodelliŶg outĐoŵes aŶd this ƌeƋuiƌes ŵakiŶg pƌojeĐtioŶs of futuƌe ƌetuƌŶs oŶ the pƌoduĐt͛s 
investment strategy. 
Traditionally, the modelling of outcomes of retail financial products in the UK has been very 
poor, since it involved the deterministic projections of returns. As Andrew Storey, technical 
sales director at eValue, saǇs: ͚WouldŶ't it ďe gƌeat if markets performed in exactly the way 
they had done in the past? If, every year, equities managed to generate the 5% real return 
they have averaged since 1899, then advising on income drawdown would be a piece of 
cake? But as we all know, markets don't work in straight lines, even though a surprising 
number of projection tools, offered by big-name organisations, behave as though they 
do….Sequencing risk is one of the biggest challenges facing drawdown investors. It is not 
just a question of what returns an investor gets over their retirement, but the sequence in 
which these returns happen. As any adviser knows, suffer a couple of bad years in the early 
stage of drawdown and a client will never get their financial plan back on track. Yet many 
modelling tools being used by advisers today do not make any allowance for the fact that 
markets are complex, irregular and ever changing. It goes without saying that projections 
based on Excel spreadsheets – amazingly still used by a surprising number of advisers – are 
destined to be inaccurate from the outset. Base your projections on historical averages and 
theǇ aƌe guaƌaŶteed to set the ĐlieŶt off ǁith iŶaĐĐuƌate iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͛. Mƌ “toƌeǇ ĐoŶĐludes 
that ͚Adǀiseƌs aƌe puttiŶg theŵselǀes aŶd theiƌ ĐlieŶts at ǀeƌǇ seƌious ƌisk if theǇ do Ŷot 
understand the considerable difference in the accuracy of the best and the worst financial 
ŵodelliŶg tools oŶ the ŵaƌket͛.349  
In October 2015, the FCA released a Consultation Paper in which it stated it was concerned 
that pƌoduĐt pƌoǀideƌs͛ pƌojeĐtioŶs of ǁhat ƌetiƌees can expect to receive if they buy certain 
products are too high, and it wants to standardise the process.350 In particular, it was 
concerned that firms using higher projections may be able to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage over their competitors. Since April 2014, the FCA requires firms to make 
projections using three deterministic rates 2%, 5% and 8%, denoted the lower, maximum 
intermediate and upper projection rates. Firms are required to produce projections of 
future benefits for pension products that reflect the investment potential of the product, 
subject to the maximum rates. However, the FCA has discovered that there are two 
different ways of calculating the maximum intermediate rate.  
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For example, suppose two firms assume gilt returns of 3% p.a., and equity returns of 7% p.a. 
A customer buys a product that is invested 30% in gilts and 70% in equities. Firm 1 caps the 
equity return at 5% and uses a projection rate for the product averaging 4.4% (i.e., 30% of 
3% plus 70% of 5%). Firm 2 calculates the average projection rate for the product as 5.8% 
(i.e., 30% of 3% plus 70% of 7%), but then caps this at 5%. Over a 20-year investment 
horizon, the retirement income would be 12% higher under Firm 2's projection compared 
with Firm 1. We also pointed out earlier the problems with ͚TǇpe A CƌitiĐal Yield͛ aŶalǇsis 
which is again a feature of using deterministic projections. 
These examples illustrate the ludicrousness of deterministic projections. Projections must 
be stochastic and the uncertainty around the projections must be illustrated –  we favour 
fancharts – as we showed in Section 2.5 above. 
In September 2013, the Pensions Institute set out a methodology to model the quantifiable 
uncertainty associated with DC pension products and illustrated it with projections from the 
PensionMetrics model.351 The methodology established 16 good practice principles in 
modelling DC pension products as shown in Table 2.7. These principles could be adapted for 
modelling the outcomes with annuity and drawdown products. 
 
Table 2.7: Good practice principles in modelling DC pension products 
1. The underlying assumptions in the model should be plausible, transparent and 
internally consistent.  
2. The ŵodel͛s ĐaliďƌatioŶs should ďe appƌopƌiatelǇ audited oƌ ĐhalleŶged, aŶd the 
model͛s pƌojeĐtioŶs should ďe suďjeĐt to ďaĐktestiŶg.  
3. The model must be stochastic and be capable of dealing with quantifiable 
uncertainty.  
4. A suitable risk metric should be specified for each output variable of interest, 
especially one dealing with downside risk. Examples would be the 5% value-at-risk 
and the 90% prediction interval. These risk metrics should be illustrated graphically 
using appropriate charts.  
5. The quantitative consequences of different sets of member choices and actions 
should be clearly spelled out to help the member make an informed set of decisions. 
6. The model should take account of key member characteristics, such as occupation, 
gender, and existing assets and liabilities.  
7. The ŵodel should illustƌate the ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes of the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s attitude to risk for 
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Table 2.7: Good practice principles in modelling DC pension products 
the plaŶ͛s asset alloĐatioŶ deĐisioŶ. It should also shoǁ the ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes of 
changing the asset allocation, contribution rate and planned retirement date, 
thereby enabling the member to iterate towards the preferred combination of these 
key decision variables.  
8. The model should take into account the full set of plan charges.  
9. The model should take account of longevity risk and projected increases in life 
eǆpeĐtaŶĐǇ oǀeƌ the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s lifetiŵe.  
10. The model should project both at-retirement pension outcomes and post-retirement 
outcomes. The risks associated with the following strategies should be clearly 
illustrated:  
a) the risk of taking a level rather than an index-linked annuity in terms of a 
reduced standard of living at high ages;  
b) the risks associated with drawdown strategies in terms of taking out more from 
the fund initially than is justified by subsequent investment performance.  
11. The model should consider the pre- and post-retirement periods in an integrated 
way. This is necessary to avoid undesirable outcomes at a later date – such as a big 
fall in the standard of living in retirement. It will also help to determine what 
adjustment in member choices – in terms of higher contribution rate, an increased 
equity weighting and later retirement – are needed to avoid this.  
12. The model should consider other sources of retirement income outside the 
ŵeŵďeƌ͛s oǁŶ peŶsioŶ plaŶ. These iŶĐlude the state peŶsioŶ aŶd hoŵe eƋuitǇ 
release. A well-designed DC model will also help with lifetime financial planning.  
13. The model should reflect reality as much as possible and allow for such extraneous 
factors as unemployment risk, activity rates, taxes and welfare entitlements.  
14. Scenario analysis and stress testing are important. For any given scenario, one 
should also:  
a) Make key assumptions explicit;  
b) Evaluate key assumptions for plausibility; and  
c) Stress test assumptions to determine which really matter and which do not. This 
allows the modeller to determine the important assumptions and focus on 
getting them (as ŵuĐh as possiďleͿ ͚ƌight͛.  
15. The model will need to be updated periodically and the assumptions changed. Such 
modifications should be carefully documented and explained in order to make sure 
the model retains its credibility with users.  
16. The model should be fit for purpose.  
Kevin Dowd and David Blake (2013) Good Practice Principles in Modelling Defined Contribution Pension Plans, 
Pensions Institute Discussion Paper PI-1302, September;  
http://www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp1302.pdf 
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2.10.1.8 Stranded pots 
The current system whereby job movers leave behind stranded pots which can all too easily 
be forgotten about is simply too inefficient to be acceptable. However, each of the three 
solutions that have been proposed for dealing with this problem have weaknesses. 
The pot-follows-member model has the disadvantage of requiring assets to be sold and 
rebought when someone changes jobs. The switching costs involved and the high weight in 
low-yielding liquid assets that schemes need to hold in anticipation of these switches will 
have a material effect in reducing the value of the pension pot at retirement. The 
aggregator model involves lower switching costs than pot-follows-member, but does have 
the advantage of economies of scale. 
A third solution, scheme-follows-the-member or one-member, one-scheme, deals with the 
problems of switching costs and potentially lower returns, but requires a central clearing 
house to operate effectively. Further, this solution would not be able to exploit economies 
of scale if there remains a large number of company-based schemes, many of which might 
be quite small. However, this solution becomes considerably more attractive if there are a 
small number of very large schemes. Now this might be the natural outcome of the auto-
enrolment process as the Pensions Institute predicted in its 2014 report VfM: Assessing 
Value for Money in Defined Contribution Default Funds: ͚We expect five or six trust-based 
multi-eŵploǇeƌ sĐheŵes to doŵiŶate the ŵaƌket ďǇ ϮϬϮϬ….“iŶgle eŵploǇeƌ sĐheŵes are 
likely to transfer to multi-employer arrangements once employers have removed their 
defined benefit liabilities from the balance sheet, at which point they will be able to 
disŵaŶtle theiƌ DB tƌustee iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe͛.352 This outcome would considerably lower the 
cost of the clearing house and make greater use of other scale economies. However, the 
model does involve a movement away from work-based pension schemes which have been 
the foundation stone of supplementary pension provision in the UK for the last 150 years. 
 
2.10.2 Recommendations 
Our discussion in this Chapter leads us to make the following 10 recommendations. 
Recommendation 2.1: Implementing the retirement financial strategy  
We recommend that providers offering retirement income solutions make clear to 
custoŵers hoǁ their solutioŶs for iŵpleŵeŶtiŶg the custoŵer͛s retireŵeŶt fiŶaŶcial 
                                                     
352 Debbie Harrison, David Blake, and Kevin Dowd (2014) VfM: Assessing Value for Money in Defined 
Contribution Default Funds, Pensions Institute, January; www.pensions-
institute.org/reports/ValueForMoney.pdf. This prediction was reinforced by a subsequent report: Debbie 
Harrison and David Blake (2015) The Meaning of Life: An Uncertain Future for the Traditional Life Company 
BusiŶess Model iŶ the UK͛s Pƌiǀate “eĐtoƌ PeŶsioŶs Maƌket, Pensions Institute, November; 
http://www.pensions-institute.org/reports/MeaningOfLife.pdf 
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strategy – comprising an investment strategy, a withdrawal strategy, and a longevity 
insurance strategy – make use of products that offer: 
 Accessibility – the degree of flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis  Inflation protection, either directly or via investment performance, with minimal 
involvement by individuals who do not want to manage the investment risk  Longevity insurance. 
We recognise that there may be important differences in implementation strategy and 
disclosure requirements, depending on the distribution channel, i.e., these will be different 
where a customer pays a fee for a personal recommendation – selected from the retail 
product market and ďased oŶ aŶ adǀiseƌ͛s uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the Đustoŵeƌ͛s Đoŵplete 
financial position/objectives – and where a trustee (or governance) committee offers a 
decumulation product to auto-enrolled members (which might also be via a default or 
default pathway). It is also important to bear in mind that many customers in the mass 
market may not have a clear retirement financial strategy.353 
 
Recommendation 2.2: Terminology  
We recommend that the pensions industry reviews the terminology it uses in order to 
both modernise the language and bring greater clarity to customers. In particular: 
 Arrangements which do not involve longevity insurance should not be allowed to 
call theŵselves ͚peŶsioŶ scheŵes͛, ďut should ďe reƋuired to use another name, 
such as ͚drawdown managemeŶt scheŵes͛. The terŵ ͚peŶsioŶ scheŵe͛ should ďe a 
protected name  Annuities should be rebranded as ͚guaraŶteed iŶcoŵe for life products͛, aŶd 
deferred annuities need to be rebranded as ͚loŶgevitǇ iŶsuraŶce͛  Arrangements which do not involve longevity insurance should be classified as 
complex and high risk from a regulatory standpoint. 
 
Recommendation 2.3: Criteria for granting safe harbour status to key retirement income 
products 
We recommend that regulators agree a set of criteria for granting safe harbour status to 
key retirement income products. Providers and advisers could not subsequently be sued 
for offering or recommending a safe harbour product, having first determined its 
suitability for a client as part of a safe harbour retirement income solution. 
                                                     
353
 These issues are considered in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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We recommend the following criteria are used to do this: 
 Design and construction – There needs to be a much clearer picture of how 
products are designed and constructed, especially if they involve guarantees. For 
example, if the guarantees are hedged with options, there needs to be clarity over 
whether the options are exchange traded or over-the-counter and, if the latter, the 
nature of the counter-parties involved. It is also critically important that the 
charges, particularly for guarantees, are not excessive  Investment strategy – It needs to be made clear how the investment strategy 
meets the aims claimed for the product. The circumstances under which the 
investment strategy might fail to meet these aims also needs to be specified  Projected real returns – Providers of drawdown products should present stochastic 
projections of the range of likely real outcomes (i.e., income adjusted for inflation 
and total charges and costs) that their products could deliver based on the 
product͛s uŶderlǇiŶg iŶvestŵeŶt strategǇ  Accessibility – The degree of flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis  Longevity protection – The degree of longevity protection afforded by the product, 
illustrated by the probability of running out of money at different ages for a range 
of possible withdrawal strategies. Also included here will be the impact of the 
amount, if any, paid on death  Value for money – The benefits and costs of the product need to be clearly stated 
and the balance between them assessed.  
The regulator should establish minimum standards for each of these criteria. Any product 
satisfying these minimum standards could be classified as a safe harbour product. As part 
of the process of product regulation, a product rating service should be established to 
assess whether products satisfy the minimum standards. 
If the regulator fails to do this, the industry itself could establish a quality mark for in-
retirement products – the Retirement Quality Mark (RQM) – as recommended in December 
2015 by the Board of the Pension Quality Mark (PQM), building on the experience of the 
PQM and PQM READY quality mark.354 The RQM would: 
 Provide strong governance to in-retirement products so they operate in the 
Đustoŵeƌs͛ ďest iŶteƌests Ŷot just at the poiŶt of sale, ďut oŶ aŶ oŶ-going basis  Ensure there are high quality, clear and actionable member alerts  Ensure that default investment options are well governed and appropriately 
designed, and  Provide value for money to savers.  
                                                     
354
 Board of the Pension Quality Mark (2015) Developing a Retirement Quality Mark, Consultation Paper, 
December.  
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Recommendation 2.4: Modelling outcomes for different retirement income products 
As indicated in Recommendation 2.3, an important aspect of product design and 
construction is modelling outcomes. We recommend that: 
 The use of deterministic projections of the returns on products should be banned  They should be replaced with stochastic projections that take into account 
important real world issues, such as sequence-of-returns risk, inflation, and 
transactions costs in dynamic investment strategies  There should be a commonly agreed parameterisation for the stochastic projection 
model used, i.e., a ͚staŶdard ŵodel͛ should ďe developed355  There should be a commonly agreed set of good practice principles for modelling 
the outcomes from retirement income products, as outlined in Table 2.7. 
 
Recommendation 2.5: Establishing a metric for measuring product value for money 
We recommend that the regulator establishes a metric for measuring product value for 
money that would: 
 Reflect the benefits and costs of the product and the balance between them  Reflect key risks  Have credibility and transparency  Be clear, simple, difficult to dispute and difficult to manipulate (i.e., avoid room for 
gaming the process). 
An example of such a metric would be the ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth ;MWͿ of a pƌoduĐt, ǁhiĐh is the 
ratio of the expected present value of payouts on the product to the price, with due 
allowance made for the greater flexibilities of some products in terms of accessibility and 
death benefits. The MW of a product could be measured relative to the benchmark 
provided by a lifetime annuity. Similarly, the risk of a product could be expressed in terms of 
the likelihood of a potential shortfall relative to a lifetime annuity. 
 
Recommendation 2.6:  Measuring and reporting charges and other costs 
We recommend that: 
 A standardised method for measuring the charges (and other costs) for all 
retirement income products is introduced. The measure should cover all the costs 
                                                     
355
 As iŶ the Đase of “olǀeŶĐǇ II, pƌoduĐt desigŶeƌs ǁould ďe fƌee to use aŶ ͚iŶteƌŶal ŵodel͛, so loŶg as theǇ 
explained the differences between this and the standard model. 
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borne by the customer either directly or indirectly, including operational 
(administration) costs, fund management (including transaction and guarantee) 
costs, and delivery (platform) costs  A standardised method for reporting the charges (and other costs) for all 
retirement income products is introduced.  
Chaƌges aƌe a keǇ aspeĐt of a pƌoduĐt͛s ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth. TheǇ Đould be reported in the form 
of ďoth a ͚ƌate of Đharge͛ – which could then be deducted from the gross rate of return to 
give a net rate of return – and as a monetary amount – which can then be compared with 
the ŵoŶetaƌǇ ǀalue of the Đustoŵeƌ͛s fuŶd. 
 
Recommendation 2.7: Candidate products for safe harbour status 
Subject to meeting Recommendations 2.3 – 2.6 and to meeting suitability requirements, 
we recommend that the regulator grants safe harbour status to the following products 
used to provide retirement income: 
 In the annuities class:  
o Lifetime annuities (with/without capital protection) – fixed and inflation-
linked 
o Investment-linked annuities (with a minimum income underpin and 
with/without capital protection) 
o Enhanced annuities  In the drawdown class: 
o Capped drawdown (with a minimum income underpin)  In the hybrid class: 
o Variable annuities (with a minimum income underpin) 
o Guaranteed drawdown (with a minimum income underpin). 
It is important that there is full transparency over the product design and over charges for 
each of the above products – and that the charges are demonstrably not excessive. 
 
Recommendation 2.8: Provider regulation and the economics of both institutional 
solutions and retail retirement income solutions 
We recommend that the regulator: 
 Aligns provider regulation with Recommendations 2.1 – 2.7  Reviews the economics of both institutional solutions and retail retirement income 
solutions, and  
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 Encourages the use of institutional solutions over retail solutions where it can be 
demonstrated that these provide better value. 
 
Recommendation 2.9: Capping charges 
We recommend that, in due course, a charge cap should be imposed on a simple default 
decumulation product. The regulator should undertake preliminary work on what a 
reasonable level for the charge cap would be. 
At a minimum, the following should be included in any cap: 
 The total expense ratio or ongoing charges figure on the default investment strategy 
(including the costs of any guarantees)  Transactions costs (what is covered to be agreed)  Cost per ad hoc withdrawal subject to a maximum number of withdrawals. 
The following additional costs would apply to any cap for retail drawdown: 
 Platform charge  Adviser fee if any. 
We do not have a view on the size of the charge cap or when it should be introduced. 
However, if there is little further evidence of innovation, there would be little point in 
delaying its introduction. Of course, products outside the decumulation default would not 
be subject to a charge cap. 
 
Recommendation 2.10: Stranded pots 
We recommend that the Government investigates the feasibility of introducing one the 
following two models for dealing with the issue of stranded pots: a) the aggregator model 
and b) the scheme-follows-member or the one-member, one-scheme model.   
While both have disadvantages (principally switching costs and the requirement for a 
central clearing house, respectively), they are both consistent with a transition of the UK 
pension system towards a small number of large trust-based schemes – which might be the 
natural outcome of the auto-enrolment process, an outcome that the Government should 
encourage.  
The pause on dealing with this issue, announced by the Government in October 2015, gives 
the Government an opportunity to completely rethink the problem of stranded pots. 
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3. Supporting savers to make the right choice at retirement for them and 
their family and how to build on the lessons of auto-enrolment 
'But ǁhat aŵ I to do?' said AliĐe. 'AŶǇthiŶg Ǉou like͛, said the FootŵaŶ, 
and began whistling.  
Lewis Carroll (1865), Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
 
We will investigate whether it is possible to design a set of good decumulation defaults and 
default pathways at retirement which will be suitable for most savers, in the same way that 
a good default investment strategy in the accumulation phase can be designed. Even if this 
is possible, we accept that it is likely that more people might opt for a different retirement 
income plan than the estimated 10% of people who reject the default accumulation fund. 
For example, some retirees might be in poor health and so might choose to access their 
funds in full at the date of retirement – or over as short a period as possible (staggered to 
avoid paying unnecessary income tax). Given the complexities of retirement expenditure 
decision making, we will examine the support in terms of guidance, help and advice that 
savers need in order to make the right choices for them and their family.  Building on the 
lessons of auto-enrolment, we will examine what nudges would be useful to move people 
towards making decisions that are in their best long-term interests. We will also consider 
the barriers, especially the regulatory barriers, to implementing a default. The overriding 
question that we seek to answer in this Chapter is this: Is it possible to design safe harbour 
retirement income plans which combine safe harbour products with financial help or 
guidance (that confirms the suitability of the product for the client) in order to provide 
retirement income journeys that are good enough for most of Middle Britain? 
3.1 Introduction 
The optimal drawing down of retirement assets is a considerably more complex activity than 
the initial task of accumulating those assets. The two main reasons for this are, firstly, that 
most savers will not have a good understanding of many of the risks outlined in Table 1.2 
and, secondly, the impact of those risks will differ for different people depending on their 
circumstances. People, for example, differ in terms of the size of their pension pot, the 
availability of alternative sources of income and wealth, their liabilities, their health status, 
their family circumstances, their tax position, and their risk appetite and risk capacity. The 
new flexibilities announced by the 2014 Budget will introduce additional complexity and 
uncertainty both to the final phase of the of the accumulation stage of DC pension schemes 
and to the retirement income market itself (i.e., the decumulation stage).  
In this Chapter, we examine different ways of segmenting the retirement income market. 
We look at different spending types, different behavioural types, and the different 
resources and needs of the different market segments. We propose a retirement 
expenditure and investment plan that helps to overcome the behavioural barriers that many 
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people face that prevents them making decisions that are in their best long-term interests. 
Next, we consider a range of defaults and default pathways that have been proposed to 
nudge people onto an optimal decumulation strategy. We then turn to the information, 
guidance and advice that are available for consumers and examine the suitability of each. 
We examine the role of advisers in the new pensions environment and the impact of 
technology on advice. Despite Government efforts to provide information to pension savers, 
we ask whether there is an advice gap for certain segments of the market. The different 
charging models used by advisers are investigated. The implications of this for a default 
pathway are considered. This is followed by an investigation of potential consumer 
vulnerability and the proposed regulatory responses to this. Access and exit charges became 
prominent issues in the months followiŶg the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ aŶd ǁe 
consider media and Government reactions to these. We also discuss pension fraud and the 
questions of customer engagement and customer responsibility. Monitoring of the pension 
reforms will be important and we consider proposals about how to do this. The self-
employed and non-eligible job holders for auto-enrolment are also examined. We end the 
Chapter by briefly examining the experience of other countries. 
3.2 Understanding the retirement savings market 
We begin with some recent surveys of savers covering their attitudes and plans for 
retirement income.  
In November 2014, the Pensions Policy Institute published an analysis, commissioned by 
Fidelity Worldwide Investment, of the decisions people will need to make, following the 
introduction of the new pension regime, when they are approaching, at the point of, and 
during retirement.356 The ƌepoƌt fouŶd that ͚ŵaŶǇ of those ƌeaĐhiŶg ƌetiƌeŵeŶt ǁith a DC 
[defined contribution] pension pot will have a greater number of options to choose from 
about how they access their savings. This could make their decisions far more complicated, 
pushing the burden of managing these risks further onto pension savers, and, in some cases, 
extending the need for ongoing decision making duƌiŶg ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛. The ƌepoƌt also fouŶd 
that ͚deĐisioŶs aďout aĐĐessiŶg DC peŶsioŶs aƌe ĐoŶsideƌed the ŵost ĐhalleŶgiŶg of peŶsioŶ 
aŶd ƌetiƌeŵeŶt deĐisioŶs aŶd otheƌ ŵajoƌ fiŶaŶĐial deĐisioŶs fƌoŵ aĐƌoss the life Đouƌse͛. 
This is because people will have to uŶdeƌstaŶd ͚Đoŵpleǆ aŶd uŶĐeƌtaiŶ͛ faĐtoƌs suĐh as 
inflation, investment and longevity risks (and the other risks in Table 1.2) and many people 
do not have the financial capability or numeracy skills to do this adequately. The report 
ĐoŶĐludes that: ͚those with low levels of numeracy will find decisions about accessing 
pension savings particularly challenging, but will be at greater risk if they also do not have 
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 Pensions Policy Institute (2014) Transition to Retirement - How Complex are the Decisions that Pension 
Savers Need to Make at Retirement?, November; http://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/press/press-
releases/t2r-how-complex-are-the-decisions-that-pension-savers-need-to-make-at-retirement 
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the security of being able to fall back on a secure source of private pension income in the 
foƌŵ of aŶ iŶdeǆed DB [defiŶed ďeŶefit] peŶsioŶ͛. 
Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA),357 the PPI found that 
people reaching state pension age (SPA) over the next ten to fifteen years vary considerably 
in their pension and non-pension savings. It identified the groups at greatest risk of making 
pooƌ deĐisioŶs ǁheŶ theǇ ƌeaĐh “PA ͚if theǇ aƌe Ŷot offeƌed adeƋuate suppoƌt, eitheƌ 
thƌough guidaŶĐe aŶd adǀiĐe oƌ thƌough the pƌoǀisioŶ of suitaďle defaults͛. It pƌediĐted that 
700,000 people reaching SPA over the next 10-ϭϱ Ǉeaƌs ;ϭϮ% of the totalͿ ǁill ďe at ͚high 
ƌisk͛ of ŵakiŶg pooƌ deĐisioŶs ǁheŶ theǇ ƌetiƌe; this gƌoup has sigŶifiĐaŶt DC saǀiŶgs 
(between £19,400 and £51,300), but no additional DB pension. A further 1.6 million (29% of 
the totalͿ ǁill ďe at ͚ŵediuŵ ƌisk͛; this gƌoup has £ϲ,ϯϬϬ oƌ less iŶ DC saǀiŶgs aŶd little oƌ Ŷo 
additional DB pension.  
In March 2015, the International Longevity Centre – UK (ILC-UK) also published a report 
based on an analysis of ELSA data.358 The study analysed the outcomes of four different 
approaches to using DC pension wealth: (a) annuitising, (b) blowing the pot on big ticket 
items, (c) putting everything into a savings account, and (d) leaving the fund invested and 
using drawdown.   
The report found that: 
 Even if all those approaching retirement were to annuitise, over half of them (1.1 
million people) will not be able to secure an adequate income (defined as 70% of 
final salary), unless they use non-pension assets or receive additional benefits on top 
of the state pension  In a scenario where the DC pot is used to buy big ticket items, an additional 350,000 
people (1.4 million people in total) will not be able to secure an adequate income in 
retirement  Putting everything in a savings account also risks people running out of money 
before they die. The report predicted that average replacement rates could fall from 
66% to 49%. Given that people typically underestimate their life expectancy by 
upwards of four years, spending savings too early is a real possibility  Leaving the fund invested also risks people running out of money before death as 
well as exposing individuals to substantial income volatility. Within a balanced fund 
of 60% bonds and 40% equities, the report estimated that average annual income in 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt Đould ǀaƌǇ ďetǁeeŶ £ϭϴ,ϬϬϬ aŶd £ϭϮ,ϬϬϬ, depeŶdiŶg oŶ the fuŶd͛s 
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 ELSA is the largest survey of people living in England aged between 55 and 74. In total, there are 6 million 
people in this age range and 2 million of them have DC pension pots and are yet to retire. 
358
 Heƌe TodaǇ, GoŶe Toŵoƌƌoǁ. Hoǁ TodaǇ͛s ‘etiƌeŵeŶt ChoiĐes Could AffeĐt FiŶaŶĐial ‘esilieŶĐe Oǀeƌ the 
Long Term, 16 March 2015;  
http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/images/uploads/publication-pdfs/Here_today,_gone_tomorrow_1.pdf 
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performance.  If individuals are unprepared for such volatility, it would be akin to 
significant year-on-year income shocks (e.g., incomes being lower by 30% one year 
compared with the previous year) which could adversely impact living standards. 
The prospects are even worse for the 850,000 individuals who will rely mainly on a DC 
pension but have low levels of financial capability. In all the four scenarios above, they will 
end up with replacement ratios below 40%.  
The report warned that ͚suĐh iŶĐoŵe falls ĐoŵiŶg at the eŶd of life Đould haǀe disastƌous 
implications resulting in individuals cutting back on expenditure just at a time when they 
may need it most, i.e., to maintain basic living standards as well as paying for long-term 
Đaƌe͛. 
In January 2015, the Pensions Policy Institute published the results of a set of in-depth 
interviews with 55 DC pension savers aged 55 to 70.359 The interviews were conducted by 
Ignition House and sponsored by State Street Global Advisors. The purpose of the interviews 
was to determine the preferences for how these savers would draw a retirement income, 
the financial trade-offs that they are willing to make, and the default products and 
strategies that could best support them. The new flexibilities are popular with DC savers. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ ͚oŶĐe theǇ ďegiŶ to uŶdeƌstaŶd the full sĐale of ĐhoiĐes aŶd tƌade-offs involved in 
deciding how to access their DC pension pots at retirement, they can quickly become 
daunted. This suggests that disengagement and inertia amongst consumers from April 2015 
is a key risk without the provision of effective default strategies and appropriate guidance 
and advice. The idea of their pension scheme or existing provider offering a default 
investment or drawdown option into retirement resonated with DC savers, with some 
believing that providers even had a ͞duty͟ to offer this – though they recognised the 
importance of wider individual and household circumstances and the need for there to be 
soŵe eleŵeŶt of ĐhoiĐe foƌ those ǁho ǁaŶt it͛. 
The PPI identified a number of specific risks facing savers: 
 Reluctance or inability to plan beyond the next few years, which means locking into a 
specific course of action either before or at retirement is generally unpopular  PeƌĐeptioŶs that theƌe aƌe ͚safeƌ͛ oƌ ͚ďetteƌ͛ iŶǀestŵeŶts theǇ ĐaŶ use outside of 
pensions, which, when probed, are based on misguided beliefs or have not been 
properly thought through  Poor understanding of both spending needs throughout retirement and likely life 
expectancy and, in particular, the probability of living beyond age 85, which means 
DC savers are likely to underestimate the importance of longevity insurance 
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 Pensions Policy Institute (2015) Transition to Retirement - Supporting DC members with Defaults and 
Choices Up To, Into, and Through Retirement: Qualitative Research with Those Approaching Retirement, 
January; http://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/publications/reports/transition-to-retirement-defaults 
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 Lack of engagement (even very close to retirement) – leading to the potential for 
consumer detriment if the defaults available are not suitable and designed in the 
best interest of savers. 
Digging deeper into investment issues, the study found that the participants are not 
currently well-equipped to make investment choices. In particular, they are not confident 
about investing in equity-ďased pƌoduĐts. The iŵpliĐatioŶ is that ͚left to theiƌ oǁŶ deǀiĐes, 
paƌtiĐipaŶts ǁould pƌoďaďlǇ put theiƌ fuŶd iŶ ͞safe͟ iŶǀestŵeŶts [i.e., iŶǀestŵeŶts ǁith 
capital protection] oƌ leaǀe it ƌolliŶg iŶ theiƌ peŶsioŶ͛.  PaƌtiĐipaŶts aƌe geŶeƌallǇ ƌeluĐtaŶt to 
make up-front commitments about when they might be willing to lock their money in to a 
particular strategy. They are also reluctant to hand over significant sums of capital in the 
early years of retirement to another party. However, after some prompting, most 
participants would be willing to trade off more risk and indeed some flexibility for the 
possibility of higher returns. With further prompting, many participants would typically 
choose a low or medium risk portfolio.360 
IŶ teƌŵs of dƌaǁiŶg fƌoŵ the peŶsioŶ pot, paƌtiĐipaŶts plaĐe a high ǀalue oŶ ͚ease of aĐĐess 
aŶd fleǆiďilitǇ to ĐhaŶge the aŵouŶt of iŶĐoŵe͛: theǇ ǁould ͚pƌefeƌ to aĐĐess theiƌ peŶsioŶ 
pots on an ad hoc basis or take money out of these tax efficiently, but there was confusion 
aďout hoǁ to do this͛. It was likely that they would draw a level income or take more 
income early on.  
Participants had a poor understanding of longevity risk and hence a low awareness of how 
loŶg the peŶsioŶ pot Ŷeeded to last. The ĐoŶĐept of loŶgeǀitǇ iŶsuƌaŶĐe ͚ǁas uŶdeƌstood 
aŶd ƌesoŶated, ďut a keǇ ďaƌƌieƌ ǁill ďe the Đost of this͛. PaƌtiĐipaŶts ͚Đould see the ŵeƌits of 
securing an income at some point in the future when they were no longer willing or able to 
make decisions on the pot any more. However, they were very unwilling to precommit to 
purchasing an annuity to do this. In addition, they would want to retain as much flexibility as 
possible, so were not warm to the idea of automatic conversion or rollover to a guaranteed 
income in later life, especially if this meant locking into an annuity. They would prefer to 
leave their options open for as long as possible, and are unlikely to want to commit to the 
option of securing an income uŶtil theǇ aƌe iŶ theiƌ ϳϬ͛s oƌ ďeǇoŶd͛. Neǀeƌtheless, ŵaŶǇ 
paƌtiĐipaŶts ͚ǁeƌe ǁaƌŵ to the ĐoŶĐept of a gƌadual paǇŵeŶt foƌ a loŶgeǀitǇ iŶsuƌaŶĐe 
pƌoduĐt, ǁith paƌtiĐipaŶts ďeiŶg aďle see hoǁ this Đould help theŵ to ďuild up a ͞safetǇ Ŷet͟ 
against the risk that they live too long or take out too much income. The biggest barrier 
mentioned would be the cost, with the majority feeling that ongoing premiums of between 
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 The low-risk portfolio consisted mainly of bonds with some shares and had an expected return of 4%, just 
enough to beat inflation, but in a bad year could lose 10% of its value. The medium-risk portfolio consisted of 
60% shares and 40% less risky assets and had an expected return of  5-6%, more than enough to beat inflation, 
but in a bad year could fall by 15-20%. With prompting, participants could be persuaded to move away from 
an all-cash portfolio, which while not falling in value in nominal terms, would generate returns of only 1-2% 
which would not be sufficient to keep up with inflation. However, there was a reluctance to move to a high-
risk portfolio (with 80% in shares) where the expected return was 6-7%, but in a bad year could fall by 25-30%. 
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£500 and £1,000 per annum, starting at age 65, were not seen as an unreasonable amount 
to secure a lifetime income, e.g. £5,000 peƌ aŶŶuŵ, fƌoŵ age ϴϱ oŶǁaƌds͛.361 But, ͚afteƌ 
ĐoŶsideƌiŶg these Đosts, soŵe still theŶ felt that it ǁould ďe too ŵuĐh of a ͞gaŵďle͟ aŶd 
theǇ ǁould pƌefeƌ to take theiƌ ĐhaŶĐe oŶ ƌuŶŶiŶg out of ŵoŶeǇ͛. Death ďeŶefits aƌe ǀiewed 
as a ͚ŶiĐe to haǀe͛, ǁith iŶdiǀiduals ŵoƌe ǁilliŶg to take ŵoƌe iŶǀestŵeŶt ƌisk foƌ theiƌ 
partner than their children. 
The PPI believes that defaults are a good way of dealing with these problems. The two main 
justifications are that: (a) most participants did not know and were not interested in how 
their pensions were currently invested in the accumulation phase and (b) they can also be 
overwhelmed by the number and complexity of choices around drawing down income. They 
were also currently in a default through auto-enrolment. So the reason for having a default 
in the accumulation phase would also appear to hold for the decumulation phase: it is 
unlikely that people will develop the necessary skills and knowledge to manage investment 
choices in the decumulation phase. But despite support for the idea of defaults, participants 
also wanted some alternatives in recognition of the differing circumstances people face in 
retirement. Nevertheless it was clear that people needed support to make the trade-offs 
that the new world of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ ǁill ďƌiŶg: ͚giǀeŶ the eǆistiŶg laĐk of 
understanding around the underlying investments in default funds, and what the funds are 
seeking to achieve, it will be important that any defaults and alternatives offered are clearly 
branded and communicated in terms of their objectives and risk-leǀel͛. 
The PPI proposes that policy makers, regulators and the pensions industry should work 
together to address these issues. Alistair Byrne, senior DC strategist at State Street Global 
Adǀisoƌs, added: ͚We Ŷeed to ďegiŶ puttiŶg iŶ plaĐe aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶts to iŵpleŵeŶt the 
͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd Đhoice͛ reforms now, and the PPI's research provides strong evidence to build 
on. It's clear that default investment strategies in DC plans need to cope with uncertainty 
around when people will retire and how they will access their retirement savings. The 
industry needs to put in place well-governed retirement income defaults that provide 
members with value for money and flexible access to their assets, without overwhelming 
theŵ ǁith Đoŵpleǆ ĐhoiĐes͛. 
The uncertainty over how retirement income will be taken is confirmed by a poll conducted 
by True Potential, the results of which were published in February 2015.362 The poll of 2,000 
pension savers found that 76% of those aged 55-64 did not yet know how they will take an 
income from their pension, rising to 82% for those over 65. Only 5% planned to buy an 
annuity, although 40% of respondents believed a consistent income was the most important 
factor in retirement. Of those of working age, 20% said they had not thought about a 
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These premiums were generated by discussions that took place in the participant meetings, rather than 
being based on calculations around realistic premiums for this type of longevity insurance. 
362
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Most over-55s undecided on retirement route – poll, Professional 
Adviser, 23 February. 
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pension, with higher percentages amongst the young: 29% of those aged 18-24 and 24% of 
those aged 25-34. 
A survey conducted by Fidelity Worldwide Investment for its Class of 2015 report published 
in March 2015 found that only 14% of 525 people interviewed in January 2015 who will be 
retiring in the next year had done any significant research about their options.363  A further 
10% were waiting to be contacted by their product provider. While most respondents (65%) 
felt confident about managing their finances, many had not yet considered the basic 
elements of a retirement income plan. One in ten thought they could make withdrawals 
from their scheme without needing to contact their provider to establish terms of access. A 
further 7% reported that they had not even thought about this. In addition, many people did 
not understand the tax implications of the new pensions regime, with 42% not knowing the 
threshold at which pension lump sums are taxed and 10% believing they can access their 
whole pot tax-free. While 56% of those polled said they would access their pension as a cash 
lump sum, with 18% planning to access more than the tax-free amount, only 4% said they 
would withdraw the entire pot in one go. Annuities were being considered by 22% of those 
not wishing to withdraw all of their pot, 25% said they would transfer to a drawdown 
product, 17% will leave their pension invested and defer taking it, and 13% will use a 
combination of a drawdown pension and an annuity. Another 20% were still undecided. 
AlaŶ Highaŵ, theŶ FidelitǇ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt diƌeĐtoƌ, said: ͚These deĐisioŶs aƌe Đoŵpleǆ aŶd ǁe 
would urge people to seek the appropriate expert help and advice in order to ensure they 
get the most from their retirement savings; be it through careful research or through an 
adǀiseƌ…..if theǇ aƌe less ĐoŶfideŶt. It is alaƌŵiŶg that theƌe is a ĐeƌtaiŶ haƌd Đoƌe of people 
taking an approach to retirement that they would not take to their everyday life. With 
neither a rainy day fund, nor idea of a budget nor, indeed, an intention of establishing the 
best deal or checking the small print on their funds, this group is vulnerable to making a 
pooƌ ĐhoiĐe that Đould Đost theŵ deaƌlǇ iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt….[Fuƌtheƌ], the taǆ iŵpliĐatioŶs of 
aĐĐessiŶg Ǉouƌ peŶsioŶ Đould ďe the ďiggest issue foƌ this set of ƌetiƌees͛.364 
In September 2015, Retirement Advantage released the results of a survey, conducted by 
YouGov, where the over 50s were asked what they would like from their retirement income 
pƌoduĐt. The fiŶdiŶgs iŶdiĐate that ͚the Ŷeed foƌ fleǆiďilitǇ aŶd the desiƌe foƌ ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ aƌe 
valued equally by consumers, though when pressed, certainty is considered more important 
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 Reported in: Michael Klimes (2015) Just one in seven retiring this year have researched options, 
Professional Pensions, 23 March; Jack Jones (2015) One in ten retiring this year expect whole pot to be tax-
free, Professional Pensions, 10 March; Carmen Reichman (2015) Fifth of near-retirees still clueless about tax 
on pension withdrawals, research, Professional Adviser, 10 March. 
364
 Vince Smith-Hughes, head of business development at Prudential, has also warned that the majority of 
people accessing their pensions for the first time will be overpaying tax, particularly if they withdraw large 
sums of cash. This is because HMRC requires providers to apply an emergency tax code on sums withdrawn if 
theǇ do Ŷot haǀe the Đustoŵeƌ͛s Ŷoƌŵal iŶĐoŵe taǆ Đode. ‘epoƌted iŶ CaƌŵeŶ ‘eiĐhŵaŶ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ PƌudeŶtial 
sounds emergency tax warning on pension pot withdrawals, Professional Adviser, 1 April.  
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thaŶ fleǆiďilitǇ͛. AƌouŶd a Ƌuaƌteƌ ǁaŶted aďsolute ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ aŶd ǁeƌe ƌeluĐtaŶt to take aŶǇ 
risk whatsoever with their pension savings, but most were happy to take some investment 
risk. The implication of the findings, according to Andrew Tully, pensions technical director 
at ‘etiƌeŵeŶt AdǀaŶtage, is that ͚ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ǁaŶt it all, aŶd as ǁe kŶoǁ, Ŷeitheƌ aŶ aŶŶuitǇ 
nor a drawdown product on their own meet the need for certainty and flexibility. But a 
ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of ďoth pƌoduĐts ĐaŶ…. Combining annuities and drawdown into one product, 
offered under drawdown rules, opens up a whole new way of thinking about flexibility of 
iŶĐoŵe iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛.365  
In March 2015, Franklin Templeton released the results of its Retirement Income Strategies 
and Expectations (RISE) survey of 2,000 adults.366 It found that only 25% of respondents 
(mainly from the highest income groups) planned to leave some of their pension pot 
invested on the stock market after they retire, while 42% thought the stock market was 'too 
risky' as a retirement strategy, and 33% felt they did not have the knowledge to choose the 
right investments. The main concern was the possible decline in the value of the pension 
pot: 80% of respondents stated that they would be worried about a 20% decline in their 
pension savings, while 44% would be concerned about a 5% fall. There was a clear 
preference for low-risk investments: 73% said they were leaning towards a low-risk 
approach to their retirement investments, while 88% said stock market investing had no, or 
only a limited, role to play in retirement saving due to the perceived risks. The key preferred 
alternatives were tax-efficient vehicles, such as independent savings accounts (ISAs), 
favoured by 40% of respondents, while 26% thought property would be a part of their 
retirement portfolios.  
A survey by J.P. Morgan Asset Management reported in February 2015 revealed poor 
investor understanding of how investments generate the income that will be needed to pay 
for goods and services in retirement. According to Jasper Berens, head of UK funds at JP 
MAM: ͚GiǀeŶ the ƌeleŶtless ŵedia atteŶtioŶ that ƌeĐoƌd loǁ iŶteƌest ƌates haǀe ƌeĐeiǀed 
over the past couple of years, I was genuinely flabbergasted to learn that less than half of 
UK investors (44%) Đould ĐoƌƌeĐtlǇ eǆplaiŶ the teƌŵ ͞iŶĐoŵe iŶǀestiŶg͟,…It seeŵs to ďe the 
case that, while many investors acknowledge the importance attached to generating income 
foƌ theiƌ poƌtfolios, too feǁ aĐtuallǇ kŶoǁ hoǁ to aĐhieǀe this outĐoŵe͛.367 A ͚ǁoƌƌǇiŶg͛ ϯϴ% 
of respondents plan to rely on savings accounts as their 'preferred' source of income, 
despite the below-inflation returns that these generate.  
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Andrew Tully (2015) The whole package: Annuities and drawdown side by side, Retirement Planner, 22 
September. 
366
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Most retirees have 'no intention' to stay invested – poll, Professional 
Adviser, 31 March. 
367
 Jasper Berens (2015) Alarm bells: The growing income investor knowledge gap, Professional Adviser, 27 
February. 
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A survey of 1,000 relatively well-off people aged over 55 conducted in March 2015 found 
the average pension pot was £87,500 and the average amount people expected to take in 
income each year was £9,000. Even with a growth rate of 5% per annum, this means that 
the average pot will only last 10 years. Half of those nearing retirement (i.e., aged 55-64) 
were unable to predict how long their pension income would last. Not everyone surveyed 
had a pension pot: almost 20% would have to rely solely on a state pension. Around one 
third would need to continue working to support their retirement expenditure, while 50% 
could rely on property and other savings.368 
A survey held in April 2015 by website RetireEasy of 1,572 well-off pre-retirees – who are 
aged 58 on average, plan to retire partially at 61 and have average private pension assets of 
£146,000 – found that most felt well prepared for the new pensions regime, despite the fact 
that only 34% had been contacted by their pension provider about the changes. Despite 
this, 68% said they were aware of the changes and potential charges. The survey found that 
28% plan to withdraw funds before they reach 65. Of those, 90% are only going to withdraw 
the 25% tax-free maximum lump sum. The same percentage said that they do not have 
plans to buy an annuity with the remainder of their fund. A similar proportion (91%) of 
those surveyed plan to supplement their income by working part-time in retirement. Three-
quarters (78%) are either fully or partly aware of the difference between capped and flexi-
access drawdown. More than one in eight (84%) think that ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ is a ͚good 
idea', although 72% do not plan to take advantage of the freedoms.
369
 
The above surveys covered the national population as a whole.  Collectively, they reveal that 
people welcome the new pension flexibilities, but many – especially in the middle market 
group lying between those who will rely mainly on the state for their retirement income and 
the well off – will find themselves poorly equipped to make best use of them, not least 
because they hold beliefs and preferences which are mutually inconsistent, a condition that 
psǇĐhologists Đall ͚ĐogŶitiǀe polǇphasia͛.  
Does the picture become clearer if  we segment the market more finely?  
3.3 Segmenting the retirement income market 
When segmenting the retirement income market, we need to recognise that people differ 
both in their types and in their resources. 
3.3.1 People differ in their types  
We consider two ways of segmenting the market according to type of customer. 
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 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Retirees banking on 10% withdrawal rate 'will dƌaiŶ pots iŶ a deĐade͛, 
Professional Adviser, 8 April.  
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 Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) Well-off retirees on top of freedoms despite 'poor provider contact', 
Professional Adviser, 15 April. 
208 
 
3.3.1.1  Segmentation by type of spender 
The first way is to segment DC savers according to their spending objectives. This is the 
approach taken in the Aon DC Member Survey. In December 2014, the results of a 
nationwide survey of over 2,000 occupational DC scheme members by YouGov was 
published. The survey was conducted between September and October 2014 and sponsored 
by Aon Hewitt and Cass Business School.370 It identified five types of spender as shown in 
Table 3.1.  
͚CeƌtaiŶtǇ seekeƌs͛, ǁho aĐĐouŶt foƌ ϯϱ% of the total, ǁaŶt aŶ aŶŶuitǇ so that theǇ ĐaŶ haǀe 
a secure stable guaranteed iŶĐoŵe foƌ life. ͚“teadǇ speŶdeƌs͛, aĐĐouŶtiŶg foƌ aŶotheƌ ϯϱ%, 
want the same outcomes as certainty seekers. They want an annuity in all but name, but 
they intend to continue investing their money in retirement to generate a stable income: 
͚While theƌe aƌe ƌeĐogŶised doǁŶsides to conventional annuities, with price, compulsion, 
lack of flexibility and no terminal value all cited as negatives in the current system, there is 
clearly also a continued appetite foƌ aŶ ͚aŶŶuitǇ-like͛ appƌoaĐh͛ aĐĐoƌdiŶg to the suƌǀeǇ. 
Fifteen perceŶt aƌe Đlassified as ͚fleǆiďilitǇ foƌeŵost͛. This gƌoup ǁill ďe ƌelǇiŶg oŶ the state 
pension and other sources of income to meet their core expenditure needs and will draw 
fƌoŵ theiƌ DC pot as aŶd ǁheŶ Ŷeeded. ͚EaƌlǇ speŶdeƌs͛, aĐĐouŶtiŶg foƌ ϭϬ% of the total, 
want either to draw down as soon as possible to spend or invest in assets such as property, 
or continue to invest their pot to generate income, while enjoying higher spending in the 
eaƌlieƌ Ǉeaƌs of ƌetiƌeŵeŶt. The fifth gƌoup, Đalled ͚ƌesidual ƌeƋuiƌed͛, ĐoŵpƌisiŶg ϱ% of the 
total ĐaŶ ďe suďdiǀided iŶto eitheƌ ͚Đaƌe ĐoŶsĐious͛ oƌ ͚ďeƋuest dƌiǀeŶ͛. Both gƌoups plaŶ to 
continue investing during retirement to generate a stable income either to provide for 
possible care costs or to make bequests to the family.  
The proportions of the population comprising these different spending types appear to be 
ďƌoadlǇ ĐoŶfiƌŵed ďǇ otheƌ ƌeĐeŶt suƌǀeǇs. Foƌ eǆaŵple, AegoŶ͛s Second UK Readiness 
Report,371 published in November 2014, found that 40% of retirees want a guaranteed 
retirement income for life, while 30% said that they would like some combination of a 
guaranteed income and a cash lump sum. Just 16% said they would take their pension as a 
cash lump sum. Similarly, a study by ILC-UK called Making the System Fit for Purpose,372 
published in January 2015, found that 70% of those approaching retirement wished to use 
their pension pot to provide a guaranteed life-long and inflation-protected income. Just 7% 
reported that they would use their pot to buy a car or pay for a holiday, while 5% said they 
would prefer to pay off their debts.  
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 http://www.aon.com/unitedkingdom/defined-contribution/dc-member-survey.jsp. Also reported in Sophia 
Singleton (2014) What do DC scheme members really want?,  Pensions Age, December. 
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Table 3.1: Types of DC saver according to their spending objectives 
Type Definition % of total 
Certainty-seeker Want an annuity so that they can have a secure, 
stable, guaranteed income for life 
35 
Steady spender Want the same outcomes as certainty seekers. But, 
they plan to continue investing their money in 
retirement to generate this stable income. 
Essentially, they want an annuity in all but name 
35 
Flexibility foremost Anticipate continuing to invest and will dip into 
these savings as and when needed. They are likely to 
be planning to rely on state pension and other 
sources of income to support their retirement 
15 
Early spender Want to take their retirement savings in one 
(partially taxable) lump sum, or in a series of 
payments soon after retirement (perhaps to reduce 
the tax impact) 
10 
Residual required  Want to ensure a significant element of pension 
savings towards the end of their lifetimes for long-
term care or bequest to family 
5 
Source: Aon DC Member Survey, December 2014 
 
The Aon DC Member Survey also provides insights into how people plan to take money from 
their pot. Fifty percent of those surveyed said they would use drawdown either in whole or 
in part. Of this sub-sample, 20% said they would like the drawdown and investments 
managed within their current scheme, 17% said they would like them managed by another 
pension provider such as an insurance company, 25% said they would manage the process 
themselves with the aid of an adǀiseƌ, aŶd aŶotheƌ Ϯϱ% said theǇ ǁould ͚go it aloŶe͛. 
The survey also asked about drawdown concerns and elicited the following responses to the 
ƋuestioŶ ͚ǁhiĐh of the folloǁiŶg ǁould ǁoƌƌǇ Ǉou the ŵost ǁith ƌegaƌd to Ǉouƌ dƌaǁdoǁŶ 
pot?͛: 
 29% – running out of money before I die  26% – my money not growing as fast as I need it to in order to meet my income 
needs  25% – seeing the value of my pension fund fall in value, even temporarily, due to 
poor investment returns  11% – not being able to access my pension fund when I need to 
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 7% – none of the above would worry me  1% – doŶ͛t kŶoǁ. 
What is concerning about these findings is that most people do not appear to be worried 
about running out of money before they die – even when they are explicitly asked –  and 
this after all is the main protection a properly designed pension plan provides. The key 
explanation for this appears to be that death is an event too distant for many people to be 
concerned about. This is a behavioural problem which needs a behavioural solution. 
 
3.3.1.2  Segmentation by behavioural type 
The second way of segmenting the market is by behavioural type.373   
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in their best selling 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions 
about Health, Wealth and Happiness define two very different types of consumers – ͚eĐoŶs͛ 
aŶd ͚huŵaŶs͛. IŶ a ƌetiƌeŵeŶt eǆpeŶdituƌe ĐoŶteǆt, ͚eĐoŶs͛ aƌe fullǇ ƌatioŶal life-cycle 
fiŶaŶĐial plaŶŶeƌs. ͚HuŵaŶs͛, ďǇ ĐoŶtƌast, tƌǇ to ŵake the ďest deĐisioŶs foƌ theŵselǀes, ďut 
are subject to behavioural traits that limit their ability to implement their plans. Thaler and 
“uŶsteiŶ ďelieǀe that ǀeƌǇ feǁ people aƌe ͚eĐoŶs͛ aŶd theiƌ ďook pƌoǀides eǆaŵples of hoǁ 
to Ŷudge ͚huŵaŶs͛ iŶto ŵakiŶg optimal choices. 
If people ǁeƌe ͚eĐoŶs͛ Đapaďle of ďehaǀiŶg ƌatioŶallǇ aŶd were sufficiently well informed, 
they could calculate the risk-return tradeoff between an annuity and drawdown and choose 
which was initially better for them and, more importantly, when it was optimal to switch 
from drawdown to an annuity to guarantee they will not outlive their resources. Econs will 
ďe ǀeƌǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout this. But ŵost people aƌe ͚huŵaŶs͛ ǁho Ŷeitheƌ ďehaǀe ƌatioŶallǇ, 
nor have the technical skills to evaluate the risk-return tradeoff, nor, indeed, many of the 
other risks listed in Table 1.2. Humans have behavioural biases which prevent them 
ďehaǀiŶg ƌatioŶallǇ. OŶe paƌtiĐulaƌ eǆaŵple is ǁhat eĐoŶoŵists Đall the ͚aŶŶuitǇ puzzle͛, the 
reluctance of many humans to buy annuities.374 
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There are a range of behavioural reasons why retirees do not tend to voluntarily annuitise a 
sufficient proportion of their retirement wealth:375  
 Aversion to planning – particularly in respect of large infrequent transactions   Related to this is aversion to paying for advice  Inertia and procrastination: people have to make the active decision to start a 
retirement expenditure plan or purchase an annuity and the default position is to do 
nothing  Poor financial literacy: many, if not most, people do not recognise the importance of 
securing a basic understanding of retirement income provision and planning and, as 
a consequence, are not sufficiently competent to manage the conversion of their 
investments to income in old age or are unwilling to make the effort to understand 
unfamiliar products376  This is compounded by poor estimates of life expectancy and poor understanding of 
the variability of actual lifetimes: in short, a poor understanding of the nature of 
longevity risk377   Aversion to dealing with complex problems involving a sequence of choices  Related to this is the issue of choice overload – having so many choices that you end 
up making no choice at all378   Illusion of control: people like to feel in control of their capital, but annuitisation 
leads to aŶ appaƌeŶt a ͚loss of ĐoŶtƌol͛  Unwillingness to contemplate unpleasant events, e.g., dying and leaving behind 
dependants  Overconfidence: many people underestimate how much they need to live on after 
retirement379   Related to this is lack of self-control. A particular advantage of an annuity is that it 
acts as a valuable pre-commitment device (i.e., is a very valuable behavioural tool). 
An annuity helps control spending in retirement. Many people are unable to control 
their spending. A survey by Aviva in April 2014 reveals that 61% will find it difficult to 
                                                     
375
 A similar list of behavioural traits is given in: ideas42 (2015) Freedom and Choice in Pensions: A Behavioural 
Perspective, Association of British Insurers, February, http://www.ideas42.org/publication/view/freedom-and-
choice-in-pensions-a-behavioral-perspective/; and Barclays Wealth (2015) Humanising Pensions: 
Understanding the Behavioural Effects of Freedom in Pension Choice. 
376
 The Government has encouraged improvements in financial education for years now. See, e.g., HM 
Treasury (2008) Thoresen Review of Generic Financial Advice: Final Report, March. 
377
 These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
378
 Sheena Iyengar and Emir Kamenica (2010) Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset Allocation, 
Journal of Public Economics, 94, 530-539; ideas42 (2015) Freedom and Choice in Pensions: A Behavioural 
Perspective, Association of British Insurers, February. 
379 
Overconfidence is very common in human decision making. It is particularly common in investment decision 
making by both retail and institutional investors. Over-confidence can be explained by biased self-attribution, 
whereby individuals update their beliefs about their own ability as being attributable to skill following good 
outcomes, but due to bad luck after bad outcomes. They become more overconfident after good past 
performance, but not less confident after bad past performance. 
212 
 
resist spending the pension pot. They could spend their money too quickly in 
retirement and be reduced to living on the single tier state pension of £155.65 per 
week from April 2016.380 This could involve a massive reduction in their standard of 
living and they will not even have a rainy day fund to fall back on. A more extreme 
example is people who are desperate for money at any price as the recent pay day 
loan and pension liberation cases show  Too much self-control. There will also be people with the opposite set of behavioural 
traits, those who take excessive precautions and put everything into a rainy day fund 
and hence spend their money too slowly. Such people could have enjoyed a higher 
standard of living in their retirement had they had an annuity, taking comfort from 
the fact that next month another annuity payment will come in should they live that 
long  Hyberbolic discounting:381 this leads to a poor understanding of the distant future 
and a poor understanding of the effects of inflation in reducing purchasing power 
over time: economists call this latteƌ pheŶoŵeŶoŶ ͚ŵoŶeǇ illusioŶ͛382  Mental accounting. Individuals tend to assign assets to different mental accounts 
suĐh as ͚assets aǀailaďle foƌ ĐuƌƌeŶt eǆpeŶdituƌe͛ aŶd ͚assets aǀailaďle foƌ futuƌe 
eǆpeŶdituƌe͛. IŶ terms of the decumulation of pension assets, the pension pot at 
retirement is likely to be assigned by individuals using mental accounting to the first 
of the above mental accounts if it can be taken as a lump sum and to the second if it 
has to be taken as an annuity. Individuals who employ mental accounting are likely 
to value the annuity less than they value the lump sum  Framing effects: retirees can be unduly influenced by the way things are 
communicated to them. If an annuity is explained in an investmeŶt fƌaŵe ;͚aŶ 
aŶŶuitǇ is like a ďoŶd, ďut Ǉou ǁill lose Ǉouƌ eŶtiƌe iŶǀestŵeŶt if Ǉou die͛Ϳ, theŶ 
people are likely to view an annuity as a highly risky investment, but if an annuity is 
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 This is the maximum: many people will not get this. It has been estimated that more than a million people 
will not get the full single tier pension when it is introduced on 6 April 2016. Only 45% of people retiring before 
ϮϬϮϬ ǁill ƌeĐeiǀe the full aŵouŶt ;‘epoƌted iŶ “aƌah O͛GƌadǇ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ ͚NastǇ shoĐk͛ as a MILLION people ŵiss 
out on full pension, Daily Express, 13 January).   
381 
Most people tend to discount (i.e., reduce the value of) future outcomes because they are impatient: one 
apple today is valued more than one apple tomorrow. Some people might even prefer one apple today over 
two apples tomorrow. At the same time, the very same people might appear to be willing to display much 
more patience when choices have to be made at some distance in the future. Given the choice between one 
apple in 100 days and two apples in 101 days, such people would choose to wait 101 days and receive the two 
apples.  This behaviour is consistent with hyperbolic discounting: people have a high short-term discount rate 
and a lower long-term discount rate. Hyperbolic discounting leads to behaviour that is inconsistent over time. 
The apparent long-term patience disappears when the long term becomes the short term. After 100 days, 
people choose the one apple rather than wait one more day to get two apples. Hyperbolic discounters prefer, 
for example, a nominal annuity over an index linked annuity since it gives them more money up front and they 
discount future inflation risk. 
382
 Money illusion is the tendency of people to think in nominal or money terms rather than in real terms that 
takes inflation into account. Many people would prefer to have a nominal rate on their bank account of 5% 
when inflation is 6% to a return of 2% when inflation is 1%. 
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eǆplaiŶed iŶ a ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ fƌaŵe ;͚aŶ aŶŶuitǇ alloǁs Ǉou to ŵaiŶtaiŶ your standard 
of liǀiŶg iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt foƌ hoǁeǀeƌ loŶg Ǉou liǀe͛Ϳ, theŶ people aƌe likelǇ to haǀe a 
much more favourable view of an annuity. Similarly, choices can be framed in a way 
that Đauses people to oǀeƌǀalue the ͚laƌge͛ luŵp suŵ iŶ theiƌ peŶsioŶ fuŶd at 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt aŶd uŶdeƌǀalue the ͚sŵall͛ aŶŶuitǇ. The eŵphasis oŶ the peŶsioŶ pot size 
rather than the income in retirement is very bad from a behavioural perspective. To 
many people, a pot size of £28,000 sounds like a lot of money, but it is not when it 
has to possibly last for the next 30 years or more  Susceptibility to negative norming, e.g., concerning annuities. Annuities have a bad 
press in most countries. It is interesting to contrast this with the positive view of DB 
pension schemes which effectively auto-enrol all pensioners into an annuity. More 
importantly, studies show that annuities that are bought on the open market by 
people in good health – rather than the internal or rollover annuities bought by the 
existing customers of an insurance compaŶǇ͛s aĐĐuŵulatioŶ fuŶd ǁheŶ theǇ ƌetiƌe – 
represent good value of money.383  Recent research by the Financial Conduct 
AuthoƌitǇ ;FCAͿ has shoǁŶ that the ͚ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth͛384 of annuities between 2006 
and 2014 to be very high at 94% for a 65-year old, confirming previous UK studies.385 
Further, the chance of running out of money with an annuity before you die is zero. 
This is not true with drawdown.  The FCA study shows that a drawdown scheme that 
takes the same amount of money at age 65 as an annuity and has a 1% charge has an 
11% chance of running out of money before age 85. But as we saw from some of the 
above surveys, many people heavily discount this possibility  Related to framing and negative norming is herding or peer effects: if dominant 
members of a peer group, such as employees near retirement at a company, trash 
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 It is important to recognise that standard annuities do not represent good value for people in poor health. 
Indeed, there is evidence that as many as 600,000 people in poor health have been mis-sold an annuity. They 
should have been sold an enhanced annuity which took account of their health status. As a result of 
ĐaŵpaigŶs, suĐh as the DailǇ Telegƌaph͛s JustiĐe foƌ AŶŶuitǇ ViĐtiŵs ĐaŵpaigŶ, the FiŶaŶĐial OŵďudsŵaŶ 
Service is considering whether insurance companies should be made to compensate victims without recourse 
to the courts. Compensation could vary between 20 and 50% of the original price of the annuity (Reported in 
Katie Morley (2015) Pension redress owed to 600,000, Daily Telegraph (Your Money), 14 March). 
384
 The ͚ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth͛ of aŶ aŶŶuitǇ eƋuals the ratio of the expected present value of the future annuity 
payments to the purchase price. It takes into account the life expectancy of the annuitant as well as the 
interest rate on assets – typically Government bonds – used to ŵake the aŶŶuitǇ paǇŵeŶts. The ŵoŶeǇ͛s 
worth will always be less than 100% due to administrative costs and the costs of the capital that the insurer 
incurs. Increasing life expectancy and falling interest rates in recent years have reduced the ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth. 
The FCA shows that the increase in life expectancy between 2006 and 2014 has reduced the annuity amount 
by 7%, while the fall in interest rates has reduced the annuity amount by 11%. 
385 
Matteo Aquilina, Robert Baker and Tommaso Majer (2014) The Value for Money of Annuities and Other 
Retirement Income Strategies in the UK, Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional Paper No. 5, December; 
Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks (2008) Annuity Markets, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Edmund Cannon and 
Ian Tonks (2009) MoŶeǇ͛s Woƌth of PeŶsioŶ AŶŶuities, Department for Work and Pensions, Research Report 
No. 563; Amy Finkelstein and James Poterba (2002) Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Annuities Market, 
Economic Journal, 112, 28-50.  
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annuities, then this could lead to a herd effect whereby no members of the group 
choose to buy annuities  Loss aversion: many individuals wish to avoid making losses and so try not to put 
themselves into a position where losses might occur, even if this means foregoing 
laƌge gaiŶs ǁith a high pƌoďaďilitǇ. A ĐoŵŵoŶ ǀieǁ is that ͚aŶŶuities aƌe a gaŵďle͛. 
The probability of dying very soon after purchasing an annuity is very low, but this 
probability is likelǇ to ďe oǀeƌestiŵated, so the ͚loss͛ is peƌĐeiǀed to ďe high: ͚ǁhat 
dǇiŶg aŶd losiŶg all ŵǇ Đapital too!͛. Conversely, the significant probability of 
outliǀiŶg oŶe͛s ƌesouƌĐes if oŶe does Ŷot aŶŶuitise is uŶdeƌestiŵated, so the ͚gaiŶ͛ is 
perceived to ďe loǁ. HeŶĐe the ͚gaiŶ͛ fƌoŵ aŶŶuitisiŶg ǁill giǀe oŶlǇ a sŵall ǁelfaƌe 
ďeŶefit, ǁhile the ͚loss͛ fƌoŵ dǇiŶg eaƌlǇ will have a large welfare loss. Loss aversion 
is not by itself a sign of irrational behaviour. However, the tendency to overestimate 
the probability of low-probability events and underestimate the probability of high-
probability events is certainly irrational  Finally, there is regret or disappointment aversion: individuals might choose to avoid 
making a decision because they might regret or be disappointed by the 
consequences of that decision. Again the decision not to buy an annuity might be the 
result of this type of aversion.386 
3.3.2 People differ in their resources and needs  
The other important way of segmenting consumers is by resources and needs.  This is one of 
the ways in which the FCA classifies consumers into 10 types. The FCA's Consumer Spotlight 
identifies two types of consumer who are retired:387 
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Loss aversion differs in a subtle way from regret aversion. With loss aversion, individuals are risk-seeking in 
the domain of losses and risk averse in the domain of gains, relative to an exogenous reference point. Regret 
aversion implies individuals anticipate ex-ante the regret they will feel ex-post if they made a suboptimal 
decision; in this case, the reference point is the best decision that could have been made and this reference 
point is endogenous in the decision process.   
387
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) FCA reveals ten types of consumer in bid to drive product design, 
Professional Adviser, 19 January. The remaining 8 types are: Affluent and ambitious - mostly aged between 35 
and 60, they have high incomes, own their homes and work full-time. They are highly educated and financially 
confident, Mature and savvy - confident and well informed about financial services, has higher incomes and 
savings than average, and is in full-time work; Living for now - people on low incomes, most working or 
studying, are internet-savvy but less confident about financial matters - although they will take more risks than 
average consumers; Striving and supporting - mostly in work and with low incomes, more than half of this 
group have dependent children, risk averse but can struggle with bills or fall behind with payments; Starting 
out - slightly below average income, but technologically advanced with a high level of education, this group 
consists mostly of under 45s who are single and without children, almost all are renting; Hard pressed - on low 
incomes, many struggling with everyday expenses, Many also have no savings or investments, and are not 
confident with financial decisions; Stretched but resourceful - likely to own their home, and many have 
savings, investments and pensions, half have children at home and are generally confident about financial 
matters, but time-poor;  Busy achievers - those on high household incomes, with mortgages, pensions and 
215 
 
 Retired with resources 
o These are mostly retired homeowners who are risk averse and rarely in debt, 
with high savings and a range of financial products and typically well 
iŶfoƌŵed oŶ fiŶaŶĐial ŵatteƌs. TheǇ Đoŵpƌise tǁo gƌoups kŶoǁŶ as ͚ŵass 
afflueŶt͛ aŶd ͚high Ŷet ǁoƌth͛  Retired on a budget 
o These are mostly over 65 with low incomes, who are careful with their money 
and stay loyal to providers. They have limited access to services and 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ. TheǇ aƌe also kŶoǁŶ as the ͚ŵass ŵaƌket͛. 
Many of the people surveyed in the above studies belong to this second category.  
We can divide income needs into three broad categories: 
 ͚esseŶtial͛ iŶĐoŵe: the iŶĐoŵe ƌeƋuiƌed to Đoǀeƌ the ƌetiƌee͛s ŵiŶiŵuŵ ďasiĐ 
eǆpeŶdituƌe Ŷeeds oƌ ͚heatiŶg aŶd eatiŶg͛ as it ǁas desĐƌiďed to us  ͚adeƋuate͛ iŶĐoŵe: the iŶĐoŵe ƌeƋuiƌed to aĐhieǀe a ŵiŶiŵuŵ lifestǇle that is 
acceptable in retirement  ͚desiƌed͛ iŶĐoŵe: the iŶĐoŵe ƌeƋuiƌed to aĐhieǀe the full lifestǇle to ǁhiĐh the 
retiree aspires. 
Table 3.2 shows household expenditure by gross income quintile group for those aged 65-
74. We could, for example, interpret the income needs of the bottom quintile as essential. 
This amounts to £198 per week per household (or £167 per week per individual). This is 
approximately equal to the state pension and other benefits received by a recently retired 
couple (£191).388 We could interpret the middle quintile as having an adequate income of 
£484 per week per household (or £249 per week per individual) and the top quintile as 
having a desired income of £920 per week per household (or £350 per week per individual).  
A survey from Which? Consumer Insight Tracker released in March 2015 found that 66% of 
those aged 50-64 are concerned about how much money they will need in retirement. 
Further, only 41% of retired people say they are living comfortably on their pension.
389
 The 
survey, conducted by Populus, interviewed a representative sample of 2,251 UK adults 
online between 17th - 18th September 2014 and 2,088 UK adults online between 16th - 
18th January 2015. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
some savings, they are in work, albeit largely part-time, with children at home, they can access information 
and services easily but for them time is very limited.  
388 
DWP PeŶsioŶeƌs͛ IŶĐoŵe “eƌies, July 2014. 
389 
http://www.which.co.uk/news/2015/03/which-calls-for-additional-pension-reforms-397246/ 
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Table 3.2: Household expenditure by gross income quintile group where the household reference person is aged 65 to 74, 
2011-2013 (£ per week, United Kingdom) 
  
  
  
  
Lowest 
twenty 
per 
cent 
 
Second 
quintile 
group 
Third 
quintile 
group 
Fourth 
quintile 
group 
Highest 
twenty 
per 
cent 
All 
House-
holds 
Lower boundary of group (£ per week)a   
 
265 462 696 1,078 
 
Weighted average number of persons per household  1.2 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.6 1.8 
Commodity or service  Average weekly household expenditure (£) 
1 Food & non-alcoholic drinks  35.10 49.70 61.90 70.70 93.20 55.60 
2 Alcoholic drinks, tobacco & narcotics  6.90 9.30 12.80 14.50 19.00 11.10 
3 Clothing & footwear  7.50 11.90 21.40 24.80 41.00 17.30 
4 Housing(net)b, fuel & power  40.20 49.70 52.90 66.10 86.10 53.60 
5 Household goods & services  10.60 23.60 33.30 39.00 60.10 27.90 
6 Health  3.10 5.80 8.60 13.10 12.60 7.50 
7 Transport  15.50 40.40 66.40 86.40 143.00 55.50 
8 Communication  6.80 9.70 11.20 14.10 17.80 10.70 
9 Recreation & culture  28.30 48.10 87.50 93.00 140.90 66.50 
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10 Education  - [0.30] [0.30] [3.00] 11.90 1.60 
11 Restaurants & hotels  11.70 23.90 38.60 49.20 80.40 32.80 
12 Miscellaneous goods & services  15.60 23.00 33.90 45.30 100.60 33.10 
1-12 All expenditure groups  181.20 295.30 428.70 519.20 806.80 372.90 
13 Other expenditure items  16.50 33.20 55.10 62.10 113.10 45.30 
Total expenditure (£) 197.70 328.50 483.80 581.30 920.00 418.20 
Average weekly expenditure per person (£)  167.10 194.20 249.00 256.90 350.30 234.60 
Notes: This table is based on a three year average. 
a
 Lower boundary of 2013 gross income quintile groups (£ per week). 
b
 Excluding mortgage interest payments, council tax and Northern Ireland rates. 
Source: ONS, Family Spending 2013 
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The Aon DC Member Survey discussed earlier appears to suggest that attitudes to both the 
standard of living in retirement and the age at which retirement takes place are changing. 
The great retirement deal that the babyboomers could get, namely a pension of two-thirds 
of final salaƌǇ fƌoŵ age ϲϱ, is Ŷo loŶgeƌ ƌegaƌded as ƌealistiĐ. The suƌǀeǇ suggests theƌe is ͚a 
ǁelĐoŵe seŶse of ƌealisŵ aŵoŶg eŵploǇees aďout theiƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt pƌospeĐts͛. NeaƌlǇ ϱϬ% 
of respondents expect a pension of between 21% and 50% of their final salary. Similarly, 
50% expect to retire between 66 and 70, while 10% anticipate working until their 70s. While 
50% still expect to fully retire from all paid work when they leave full time employment, 
around 40% anticipate easing into retirement by do some part-time work; however, 5% 
expect they will not be able to ever retire.   
3.3.3 Implications of the market segmentation analysis 
Together these surveys build up a very interesting picture about savers at retirement. The 
mass affluent and high net worth segments of the market appear to have the confidence 
and ability to manage the drawdown of its retirement assets effectively. One of their main 
concerns will be inheritance planning. Those at the other end of the wealth distribution will 
have small DC pension pots that would buy very low annuities.390  Much of their retirement 
income will be provided by the state and the freedom to choose how to spend these small 
pension pots will probably be more valuable than a small addition to the state pension that 
an annuity would buy. Their main concern will be to act in a way that does not increase their 
income tax or reduce their welfare benefits. However, it is those in between – the mass 
market that is Middle Britain – who face the biggest challenges from pension ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd 
choiĐe͛. The surveys show that this group:  
 are uncertain about when they will retire  have a poor understanding of their spending needs throughout retirement, but value 
ease of access and the flexibility to change the amount of income they draw  lack engagement (even very close to retirement)   are reluctant or unable to plan ahead  are reluctant to do research, e.g., on the tax implications of withdrawing cash  have a poor understanding of life expectancy and, in particular, the probability of 
living beyond age 85, which means DC savers are likely to underestimate the 
importance of longevity insurance  are unwilling to give up their lump sum at retirement in exchange for an annuity  are unwilling to pre-commit to the purchase of an annuity even at high ages  are warm to the concept of a gradual payment for a longevity insurance product, 
ǁith paƌtiĐipaŶts ďeiŶg aďle see hoǁ this Đould help theŵ to ďuild up a ͚safetǇ Ŷet͛ 
against the risk that they live too long or take out too much income 
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 They might also have some DB pension as well, although, in due course, this source of retirement income 
will disappear as private-sector DB pension provision comes to an end. 
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 although some are confident about managing their finances, many appear to be very 
poorly equipped to make investment choices   prefer low-risk investments  are likely to be confused by the range of new products and delivery options for 
receiving retirement income  at high risk of making poor decisions  welcome guidance and advice, but are not prepared to pay much for it  need support to make trade offs  feel theiƌ eŵploǇeƌ oƌ peŶsioŶ sĐheŵe pƌoǀideƌ has a ͚dutǇ͛ to offeƌ a default 
drawdown option in retirement, but it must be well designed and they also want 
alternatives to a default. 
We also need to be aware that there is a difference between what people say they will do 
and what they actually do. The above surveys suggest that many DC savers plan to act quite 
rationally. They imply that life time annuities ought to remain an important feature of 
retirement incomes. However, the survey conducted by ILC-UK also found that people had a 
poor understanding of their retirement income options. Only 50% of those with a DC 
pension said they understood what an annuity is, only 20% understood what an enhanced 
annuity is, and only 35% said they understood what income drawdown is.391  
In addition, financial advisers did not expect annuity sales to be high in future. An Aegon 
adviser survey392 of 200 financial advisers found that only 2% of advisers expected annuities 
to be the market leading product by 2025. One in three believed that risk-managed funds 
would become the leading product, while 28% thought that guaranteed investment 
strategies would lead the product list. So there also appears to be a big disconnect between 
what savers say they will do and what advisers believe that savers will do. Nick Dixon, Aegon 
iŶǀestŵeŶt diƌeĐtoƌ, said: ͚It͛s Ŷoǁ Đleaƌ that ŵost [adǀiseƌs] Ŷoǁ thiŶk soŵe foƌŵ of 
income drawdown or phased retirement will overtake traditional annuities before long. 
Flexible guarantees, risk-managed funds, and income funds are all becoming central to 
adǀiseƌs͛ toolkits as theiƌ ĐlieŶts look to take adǀaŶtage of the Ŷeǁ fleǆiďilities͛. An 
implication of this is that many people will not see the need for longevity insurance, because 
they cannot imagine the consequences of running out of money before they die.  Yet, if they 
did run out of money before they died, it is equally likely that they would regret this and 
accept that the strategy that led to this unfortunate circumstance was sub-optimal in the 
long run.  
One of the most important facts to recognise is that the alternatives to annuitisation – 
principally income drawdown – involve more risk, often much more. People can only get a 
higher return than an annuity by taking on more risk and the extra return is not guaranteed. 
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http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/index.php/publications/publication_details/making_the_system_fit_for_purpose 
392
 Reported in Professional Adviser, 7 January 2015. 
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Almost immediately after the Budget, scheme members were being encouraged to take on 
more risk.393 Drawdown also has higher charges, in particular, fund management charges.394 
In addition, there are drawdown products that guarantee a minimum income, but long-term 
guarantees of this kind can be very expensive.  
So we are confronted with the following potentially toxic combination: people who do not 
fully understand the risks that they face, being offered a wide range of retirement income 
products and solutions, but with a poor understanding of how these products and solutions 
can help them manage those risks and also their costs. How do we deal with this? First, we 
should recognise that most people should not be expected to manage the risks in Table 1.2 
themselves. This means that the provider must design products and solutions that 
effectively manage these risks.395  Second, we need to recall that one of the important 
lessons from behavioural economics is that too much choice is a bad thing. This means that 
we should consider introducing defaults with a small number of default pathways (using 
decision trees) that will lead to good retirement income solutions for people given their 
circumstances. This will help to overcome the problems of choice overload and poor value 
for money. 
The use of defaults in decumulation builds on the lessons of auto-enrolment in the 
accumulation phase of DC schemes introduced in October 2012. However, there are 
important differences arising from the greater complexity of decumulation decision making.  
First, in the accumulation stage, a single default investment strategy could be designed that 
would be adequate foƌ ŵost people. BeĐause people͛s ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes diffeƌ, it is uŶlikelǇ 
that ǁe ǁill ďe aďle to desigŶ a siŶgle ;͚oŶe size fits all͛Ϳ default deĐuŵulatioŶ stƌategǇ that 
would suit most people.  
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 Fund management charges are included in the total expense ratio (TER). But what is included in the TER are 
only the visible costs in fund management. There are also a significant number of hidden costs as reported in 
David Blake (2014) On the Disclosure of the Costs of Investment Management, Pensions Institute Discussion 
Paper PI-1407, May. The investment management industry is now beginning to acknowledge that these hidden 
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We misled savers for 20 years over hidden fees, says fund boss, Daily Telegraph, 11 February). In February 
2015, the Investment Association issued a position paper Meaningful Disclosure of Costs and Charges; 
http://www.theinvestmentassociation.org/assets/files/consultations/2015/20150210-
iacostsandchargesreport.pdf 
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 At the very minimal, the products and solutions need to have (a) accessibility, (b) investment returns in 
excess of inflation and (c) longevity insurance (see Chapter 2). 
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Second, in the accumulation stage, people could be auto-enrolled onto the DC scheme 
default investment strategy without the need for very much information, guidance or 
advice. This is clearly not the case with decumulation. The Government has introduced the 
͚guidance guarantee͛, a new service called Pension Wise that is free, impartial and aims to 
help individuals consider their options and make informed choices.396  However, we need to 
assess ǁhetheƌ ͚guidaŶĐe͛ – which is a non-regulated activity in the UK – is adequate for the 
purpose, in which case the customer can avoid the expense of taking ͚adǀiĐe͛ – which, 
depending on the type of advice, can be a regulated activity in the UK – from a qualified 
financial adviser.397 
Third, in the accumulation stage, people are auto-enrolled at a natural point in their career, 
i.e., when they have made the decision to start a new job and expect to be filling in forms, 
etc. There is no a similar clear-cut point in decumulation, especially if people have 
accumulated a number of pension pots over their career. Any default would, in general, 
need to be triggered by the member.  
We also need to overcome the behavioural barriers that people face which prevent them 
making decisions that are in their best long-run interests, that is, decisions that their older 
selves will appreciate that their younger selves made, rather than decisions they will 
suďseƋueŶtlǇ ƌegƌet. Fuƌtheƌ, iŶ a ǁoƌld of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ aŶd Ŷo ĐoŵpulsioŶ, ǁe 
need to find ways of nudging people towards the best default for their circumstances. 
Finally, we need to determine whether there are any regulatory barriers that impede the 
effectiveness of the default, the guidance/advice or the nudging and, if there are, then they 
need to be identified and removed. 
Befoƌe doiŶg all this, ǁe ďƌieflǇ ĐoŶsideƌ iŶitial Đustoŵeƌ ƌeaĐtioŶ ǁheŶ ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd 
ĐhoiĐe͛ fiƌst staƌted. 
 ͵.͵.Ͷ Initial customer reaction to the introduction of Ǯfreedom and choiceǯ 
There was a great of interest from customers when the new pension regime was introduced 
on Flexiday, 6 April 2015. There were around 60,000 phone calls and 10,000 emails and 
letters per day to providers, more than double the usual number providers typically receive. 
Most callers just wanted information, but a number of people exercised their new freedoms 
and cashed in at least part of their pension pot.  The money was spent on a wide range of 
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consumer items, most notably, a speedboat, a cruise on the Queen Mary, a Bentley, a 
holidaǇ hoŵe iŶ FƌaŶĐe aŶd a Đhild͛s ǁeddiŶg; soŵe paid off debt.398   
Tom McPhail, head of pensions ƌeseaƌĐh at Haƌgƌeaǀes LaŶsdoǁŶ, said: ͚It ǁill take soŵe 
time for a clear pattern to emerge in terms of how investors are looking to use the new 
freedoms. Initial demand has been focused on an investment income rather than buying an 
annuity, though we do expect this balance to swing back to some extent in the weeks to 
come. Relatively few people are asking to take all their money out; we'll be tracking the 
sums involved, however, in the main, we expect it to be at the smaller end of pension pot 
sizes͛.399 
Table 3.3: What customers telephoned Hargreaves Lansdown about on 6 April 2015 
 Topping up/opening a SIPP 8.2% 
 Taxation (of drawing a pension) 8.7% 
 Ad-hoc lump sum withdrawals 16.9% 
 Drawdown 42.1% 
 Annuities 9.8% 
 Taking tax-free cash only 6.6% 
 Taking all their pension pot in one go 7.7% 
  
A breakdown of the calls Hargreaves Lansdown received on 6 April is shown in Table 3.3. 
Only 7.7% of calls concerned accessing the entire pot. Its customer preferences for products 
in the first two weeks following  Flexiday  were as follows: over 85% were about drawdown, 
around 6% about uncrystallised funds pension lump sums (UFPLS) and only around 7.5% 
were about annuity purchase.400 
An analysis of client calls to Fidelity Worldwide Investment concerning the new pensions 
freedoms revealed the following:401 
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Reported in Natasha Browne (2015) Providers pick up 60,000 calls a day after flexibilities take effect, 
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research, 7 April. 
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 Email communication from Tom McPhail, 22 April 2015. 
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 Reported in Professional Adviser (2015) Advice rule irritates DB savers as pension freedom trends emerge, 
19 May. 
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 Dominant drawdown: 61% of calls to telephony teams were from customers wanting 
to enter drawdown and take tax-free cash  Drawdown deferrers: Half of drawdown customers were deferring income, with 
many taking the tax free cash element  Allowance impact: More customers were seeking information around the lifetime 
allowance  Overstated cash claims: Just 6% wanted to cash out, of which small pots made up 
half this statistic  Annuities agenda: 'In' proved as popular as 'out', with 3% of customers enquiring 
about cashing in their annuity and a further 3% wanting to purchase one. 
Only 1% of the clients of retirement adviser My Pension Expert chose to cash in their 
pensions completely. Once the tax and longevity risk implications were explained, the 
majority of its clients avoided the lump sum option in favour of drawdown and annuities.402 
WithiŶ tǁo ŵoŶths of FleǆidaǇ, the pƌopoƌtioŶ of “Đottish Widoǁs͛ Đustoŵeƌs lookiŶg to 
take their pensions as cash had fallen from 70% to 50%. Around 85% of requests were for 
pots of less than £30,000, with an average withdrawal of £20,000. Robert Cochran from the 
company said: ͚It's still too eaƌlǇ to dƌaǁ defiŶitiǀe ĐoŶĐlusioŶs aďout the loŶgeƌ teƌŵ 
impact of pension freedoms due to the pent up demand of those who deferred until April 
ϲth to aĐĐess theiƌ ŵoŶeǇ….Hoǁeǀeƌ, ouƌ site aĐtiǀitǇ data also tells us that Đustoŵeƌs aƌe 
still looking for more help in making the right decisions, given the wide range of options now 
aǀailaďle to theŵ͛.403 Blackrock reported that 1,152 over-55s had accessed their BlackRock 
workplace pension pots (valued at £13.4m) over the same period and 83% took all their 
pension saving in cash. One client withdrew £300,000, and while 25% of this was tax-free, 
the rest would be taxed at a marginal rate of 45%.404 
In June 2015, the chancellor George Osborne announced that 60,000 pension savers had 
withdrawn more than £1 billion from their pension pots in the first month of ͚freedom and 
choice͛, an average of £17,000 each. He said: 'These unprecedented freedoms have been 
ǁidelǇ ǁelĐoŵed…It is a sigŶ that this is a ƌeal suĐĐess, ďut ǁe haǀe to ŵake suƌe that 
people get the best advice, that the market responds and that companies up their game in 
helping customers make use of these freedoms. We will be watching these things very 
ĐaƌefullǇ͛.405  
                                                     
402
 Reported in Professional Adviser (2015) Tax hit dissuading savers from taking pensions as cash, 19 May. 
403
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The amount withdrawn in the first two months was £1.8bn according to data released by 
the Association of British Insurers (ABI).  The details are as follows: 
 Savers took out more than £1bn in 65,000 cash withdrawals from their pension pots. 
The average pot taken was £15,500. Most were uncrystallised funds pension lump 
sum (UFPLS) withdrawals  Savers took out £800m from income drawdown policies in 170,000 withdrawals  Savers put in £630m to buy 11,300 annuities and a further £720m to buy 10,300 
income drawdown policies  The average annuity was purchased with £55,750 and the average fund put into 
drawdown was £69,900. 
So 52% of the total sales were annuities and 48% drawdown. This compares with 2012, the 
peak year for annuity sales in the UK when monthly sales were £1.2bn (90% of the total) and 
only £0.1m per month was put into income drawdown products (10% of the total).406   
The amount withdrawn in the first three months was £2.5bn according to the ABI, 
equivalent of £27m a day.407  The details are as follows: 
 Savers took out more than £1.3bn in 65,000 cash withdrawals from their pension 
pots. The average pot taken was £15,000. Most were UFPLS withdrawals.   Savers took out £1.1bn from income drawdown policies in 264,000 withdrawals, 
with an average payment size of nearly £4,200.  Savers put in £990m to buy 17,800 annuities and a further £1.3bn to buy 19,600 
income drawdown policies.   The average annuity was purchased with £55,600 and the average fund put into 
drawdown was £68,000  55% of annuities were bought from the existing provider, compared with 45% of 
drawdown products. 
The amount withdrawn in the first six months was £4.7bn according to the ABI.408  The 
details are as follows: 
 Cash withdrawals: 
o £2.5bn was paid out in 166,700 cash lump sum payments, with an average 
payment of just under £15,000 
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o £2.2bn was paid out via 606,000 income drawdown payments, with an 
average payment of £3,600 
o In 95% of cases where savers accessed a cash lump sum, they withdrew the 
entire fund. Four in five cash lump sums were paid to those under 65, with 
three in five under 60  For funds being invested: 
o £2.85bn was invested in 43,800 income drawdown products, an average fund 
of almost £65,000; 60% of people changed provider when buying an income 
drawdown policy 
o £2.17bn was invested in around 40,600 annuities, making the average fund 
invested nearly £53,300; 40% of customers who bought an annuity changed 
provider. 
So 60% of sales were drawdown and 40% were annuities. ABI director for long term savings 
policy, Dr Yvonne Braun, said: ͚Despite soŵe ƌiŶgiŶg the death kŶell foƌ aŶŶuities, this seeŵs 
to have been premature. An increasing number of people are recognising the value of a 
guaranteed income, with annuity sales rising this quarter. There are also initial signs that the 
number of people accessing their pension pot as cash is beginning to settle down, with 
laƌgeƌ pots ĐoŶtiŶuiŶg to ďe used to ďuǇ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe pƌoduĐts͛. 
In August 2015, Royal London discovered from a survey it conducted that 69% of people 
making use of the pension freedoms took their pension pot as a cash lump sum. Of these, 
16% said they would use the cash to clear their mortgage or other debts, while 23% 
intended to put the money into a bank, building society or cash ISA account which was likely 
to pay a lower rate of return than their pension pot was earning. The remainder planned to 
use an alternative savings or investment vehicle.  The company called on the FCA to increase 
awareness of the tax implications of cashing out a pension pot at retirement. Fiona Tait 
from the company said she ǁas ǁoƌƌied the ƌesults ƌefleĐted a ǁideƌ iŶdustƌǇ tƌeŶd: ͚‘oǇal 
London does want the pension freedoms to work, but not at the financial detriment of 
customers. Where customers are looking to pay off debts or spend the money on a vital 
purchase, the tax charge may well be a price worth paying. However, if the intention is for 
the cash to just stay in a savings account, consumers are potentially paying a tax charge for 
no additional financial benefit. Having extra focus in the retirement risk warnings framework 
would help to ensure that customers appreciate all the options they have within their 
existing pension. This is particularly important for those customers who are not willing or 
aďle to aĐĐess fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe͛.409  OŶ the otheƌ haŶd, a suƌǀeǇ of )uƌiĐh͛s ĐlieŶts, also 
published in August 2015, found that only 9% of over-55s had accessed their pension pots. 
The rest were either not ready to make a decision, were keeping their pensions invested 
and spending other assets like cash savings first, or were worried that they could run out of 
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money.
410
  According to calculations made by Hargreaves Lansdown for for BBC News, the 
Treasury will net an extra £700m in tax in 2015-2016 as a result of the cash withdrawals.411  
Paul GƌeeŶ fƌoŵ “aga said: ͚It's gƌeat to see so ŵaŶǇ people takiŶg adǀaŶtage of the Ŷeǁ 
pension freedoms and that people are being savvy with savings and shopping around for the 
best deal. David Cameron and George Osborne were right to trust people with their own 
money. Treating adults like adults leads to better outcomes for society and individuals – we 
haǀe happǇ ĐitizeŶs aŶd a ǁelĐoŵe ďoost foƌ the eĐoŶoŵǇ͛.412 
However, others have warned warned against using amounts withdrawn as a 'measure of 
success' of pension freedom. For example, Adrian Walker, retirement planning manager at 
Old Mutual Wealth, said: ͚The UK has a pƌoďleŵ ǁith saǀiŶg, Ŷot speŶdiŶg, so Đaƌe Ŷeeds to 
be taken when deciding how to measure the success of the pension freedoms. I would 
suggest that a more appropriate measure of success will not come for many years, when 
those people who have withdrawn money from their pensions are still enjoying the 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt theǇ plaŶŶed aŶd saǀed ŵaŶǇ Ǉeaƌs foƌ͛.  Toŵ MĐPhail also poiŶted out that ͚less 
than one in ten of people [are] currently choosing to buy an annuity, compared to eight or 
ŶiŶe iŶ ϭϬ oŶlǇ a Đouple of Ǉeaƌs ago͛, iŵplǇiŶg that ŵost people eǆeƌĐisiŶg theiƌ peŶsioŶ 
freedoms are not protected from outliving their resources.413 
The Retirement Planner Inquiry for August 2015 invited advisers to provide feedback on how 
their clients were using drawdown products. Only 3% of advisers reported that their clients 
were choosing to take income from natural yield414 only, 15% said clients were drawing 
from capital, and the remainder (82%) said it was a combination of income and capital. 
Long-established drawdown clients tended to restrict income drawn down to no more than 
natural yield, while high-net worth individuals ͚teŶd Ŷot to ƌeƋuiƌe a ŵoŶthlǇ iŶĐoŵe 
dƌaǁdoǁŶ aŶd as suĐh the ŵajoƌitǇ stƌip out gaiŶs fƌoŵ Đapital gƌoǁth ǁheŶ appƌopƌiate͛.  
The iŶƋuiƌǇ also fouŶd that ͚the populaƌitǇ of multi-asset funds is set to increase as more 
people remain invested throughout their retirement. Many fund managers have launched 
or repurposed multi-asset fuŶds to Đapitalise oŶ peŶsioŶs fƌeedoŵ͛. Aƌound 40% of advisers 
had increased allocations to multi-asset funds since April 2015 or were planning to do so. 
The main reason was to increase diversification and reduce the volatility of the fund value. 
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Around 17% of advisers were also recommending enhanced income funds where yield could 
be as high as 7%, while another 50% said they were considering doing so.415  
3.3.5 Initial scheme reaction to the introduction of Ǯfreedom and choiceǯ 
A survey of 70 trustees and advisers by Linklaters in May 2015 found that nearly 20% of 
ĐoŵpaŶǇ DC peŶsioŶ sĐheŵes ǁill offeƌ fleǆiďle dƌaǁdoǁŶ as a ƌesult of the ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd 
ĐhoiĐe͛ ƌefoƌŵs, ǁhile 46% will offer some degree of access to the UFPLS option, though the 
majority preferred a one-off withdrawal. A survey from Sackers of more than 50 UK 
schemes also in May 2015 found that two-thirds of DC schemes were offering members 
some form of pension flexibility. Of these, 94% were allowing members to cash out their 
pots through the UFPLS, while only 14% were providing flexi access drawdown. Of the one-
third of schemes not currently offering any flexibility, 54% said they were considering it, 
while 38% said they had no plans to do so.416  
However, trust-based DC schemes appeared to be more conservative in their approach than 
contract-based sĐheŵes aŶd ǁeƌe still iŶ a ͚ǁait-and-see ŵode͛ ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg at-retirement 
options, according to Nils Johnson, director of retirement at Spence Johnson. He anticipated 
that oǀeƌ the Ŷeǆt thƌee Ǉeaƌs, ͚Đash aŶd dƌaǁdoǁŶ͛ ǁould ďeĐoŵe the tǁo ŵaiŶ optioŶs 
being offered.417  
Otheƌs agƌeed that ͚Ŷoǁ is Ŷot the ƌight tiŵe [foƌ tƌust-based DC schemes] to offer in-house 
dƌaǁdoǁŶ͛. According to Richard Butcher, managing director of independent trustee PTL: 
͚TheǇ͛ǀe got Ŷo ĐoŵŵeƌĐial iŵpeƌatiǀe to do this… so theǇ ǁeƌe Ƌuite happǇ to ǁait aŶd see 
what happens. IŶ aŶǇ eǀeŶt, [sĐheŵes Ŷot offeƌiŶg dƌaǁdoǁŶ] hasŶ͛t fƌustƌated ͞freedom 
and choice͟ ďeĐause people haǀe alǁaǇs had the ƌight to statutoƌǇ tƌaŶsfeƌ͛. Gƌegg 
MĐClǇŵoŶt, head of ƌetiƌeŵeŶt saǀiŶgs at AďeƌdeeŶ Asset MaŶageŵeŶt, said: ͚It͛s suĐh a 
ďig ĐhaŶge, isŶ͛t it? Theƌe aƌe so ŵaŶǇ ƋuestioŶs aƌouŶd the oŶgoiŶg poteŶtial ƌole of 
tƌustees that I doŶ͛t thiŶk it͛s a suƌpƌise that theƌe͛s Ŷot ďeeŶ a ƌapid ŵoǀe toǁaƌds a post-
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt fƌaŵeǁoƌk foƌ sĐheŵe ŵeŵďeƌs….MǇ oǁŶ ǀieǁ is that it ǁould ďe uŶfaiƌ to 
point the finger at trustees, because they are trying to manage a situation which has 
changed overnight without consultation, and something that potentially fundamentally 
ĐhaŶges the Ŷatuƌe of a peŶsioŶ͛. 
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There are five reasons why trust-based DC schemes are not currently offering drawdown to 
their members:418 
1. Sponsor reluctance – enterprise risk 
Providing drawdown means trustees and sponsors will be taking on more enterprise 
ƌisk ;oƌgaŶisatioŶal ƌiskͿ. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to ‘iĐhaƌd ButĐheƌ: ͚Theiƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ is foƌ the 
welfare and wellbeing of their staff – not people who retired 30 years ago. I think 
most trustees of single-eŵploǇeƌ sĐheŵes said: ͞We doŶ͛t Ŷeed to do this, ǁe doŶ͛t 
paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ǁaŶt to do it, theƌe͛s a ƌisk to doiŶg it, so ǁhǇ should ǁe ďeaƌ that ƌisk 
aŶd Đost? Let͛s just leaǀe it to the ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ŵaƌket͟. It͛s goiŶg to ďe the laƌge 
schemes that do it if anybody does it. J.P. Morgan got quite well advanced with their 
plans on it, ďut theŶ the AŵeƌiĐaŶs deĐided agaiŶst it ďeĐause of eŶteƌpƌise ƌisk͛. 
“teǀe Budge, pƌiŶĐipal DC aŶd saǀiŶgs at MeƌĐeƌ UK, agƌeed: ͚CleaƌlǇ theƌe͛s a 
nervousness in the market in terms of clients and schemes wanting to offer some 
flexibility but, because of the nature of drawdown, it exposes members to a lot more 
ƌisk iŶ teƌŵs of ƌuŶŶiŶg out of ŵoŶeǇ͛. 
 
2. Governance challenges 
In-house drawdown also creates an ongoing governance challenge for trustees. As 
Gƌegg MĐClǇŵoŶt eǆplaiŶs: ͚GeŶeƌallǇ speakiŶg, tƌustees͛ joďs stopped at ƌetiƌeŵeŶt 
and so [in-house drawdown would represent] a big shift towards the trustees having 
a significant role in governing optioŶs foƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe͛. 
 
3. Lack of appetite from members 
There is little demand from members for drawdown – most retirees have been 
taking their DC benefits as cash, since they have very small DC pots (although they 
may also have a DB scheme).  
 
4. Lack of product innovation 
Pension scheme members would like both flexibility and security of income, but as 
Gƌegg MĐClǇŵoŶt said: ͚That͛s Ŷot stƌaightfoƌǁaƌd to aĐhieǀe, so I͛ŵ sǇŵpathetiĐ to 
the challenges trustees are facing. In terms of the product side of things, asset 
managers are developing income products and multi-asset products, but that 
product innovation is at a relatively early stage, not least because those at 
retirement at the moment are, according to all the evidence, tending to take cash in 
larger quaŶtities thaŶ iŶǀestiŶg iŶ ŵaƌkets͛. “teǀe Budge agƌeed: ͚Theƌe͛s defiŶitelǇ a 
laĐk of pƌoduĐt iŶŶoǀatioŶ. I doŶ͛t thiŶk aŶǇoŶe͛s at fault heƌe, theƌe just hasŶ͛t ďeeŶ 
ŵuĐh tiŵe to put thiŶgs togetheƌ͛. 
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5. Lack of scale 
The final issue relates to the inability of many schemes to generate sufficient scale to 
provide true value for money with in-house drawdown. Helen Ball, head of defined 
contribution at Sackers, argues that only the big master trusts or perhaps some of 
the very largest single-employer schemes will ever be able to achieve the necessary 
sĐale: ͚Oǀeƌ tiŵe, it is ŵoƌe likelǇ that theǇ͛ll thiŶk aďout soŵe of the Ŷeǁ 
flexibilities, ďeĐause theǇ͛ǀe the sĐale to pƌoǀide the fuŶdiŶg to do it͛. 
A way around this problem in due course would be to work with an established provider of 
dƌaǁdoǁŶ solutioŶs. Mƌ ButĐheƌ eǆplaiŶs: ͚The tƌust Đould ďuddǇ up ǁith a ĐoŵŵeƌĐial 
provider or perhaps a commercial master trust, so the individual can move across from the 
single-employer trust to a commercial master trust aŶd gaiŶ aĐĐess to dƌaǁdoǁŶ͛. 
The slow response of trust-based DC sĐheŵes to ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ ǁas ĐoŶfiƌŵed ďǇ 
Willis Toǁeƌs WatsoŶ͛s Pensions Flexibility Study published in January 2016. Of the 222 
trust-based schemes surveyed, 61% did not provide access to any form of flexible 
drawdown, 7% provided flexi-access drawdown within their trust, while the rest (32%) 
allowed members access to a drawdown facility by transferring their assets to one or more 
pre-selected drawdown providers. However, 71% of the schemes allowed members access 
to one lump-sum payment without the member having to transfer their DC assets, while 
19% allowed up to two withdrawals. Further, 62% of the trust-based schemes continued to 
target tax-free cash and annuity purchase as their default option for members. This 
contrasts with the contract-based schemes surveyed, where 80% were offering a blended 
strategy that aims to accommodate a range of member-retirement choices.419 
The May 2015 Linklaters survey cited above found that around 70% of trustees and advisers 
agreed that DB pension scheme members should be allowed to transfer out, with 44% of 
employers having already been contacted by members about moving their pot.420 However, 
there was little sign that DB schemes would offer such flexibilities as drawdown at this 
stage. In September 2015, Aon Hewitt published the results of a survey of more than 200 DB 
schemes. Eight out of ten have taken some action in response to the new regime. One third 
automatically provide retiring members with transfer quotes, and a further 20% intended to 
do so soon; 40% of schemes providing quotes in retirement packs also offered members 
access to financial advice. It was mainly the larger schemes that were doing this. Ben Roe, 
head of liaďilitǇ ŵaŶageŵeŶt at AoŶ Heǁitt, said: ͚Laƌge sĐheŵes haǀe geŶeƌallǇ ďeeŶ at the 
forefront of introducing risk reduction measures, so not surprisingly they have also led on 
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drawdown, Professional Pensions, 26 January. 
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making changes in response to the Budget, as more than a third are planning to quote 
transfers in the retirement pack. This, in turn, can lead to significant savings against funding 
and long-term targets. There is evidence that some companies are also taking advance 
credit for likely liabilitǇ gaiŶs iŶ theiƌ pƌofit aŶd loss͛. But the suƌǀeǇ fouŶd less thaŶ ϭϬ% of 
schemes were making any additional support available to members at retirement. Mr Roe 
said: ͚What is disappoiŶtiŶg is the ƌelatiǀelǇ loǁ Ŷuŵďeƌs of sĐheŵes ǁhiĐh aƌe offeƌiŶg 
meaningful support to members on what is now a more complex decision for them. Not 
only does additional support lead to better member decisions but our statistics show that 
this also leads to more members taking a transfer, which ultimately means more cost and 
risk ƌeduĐtioŶ foƌ ĐoŵpaŶies͛.421  
An analysis of requests for information made by Portal Financial between September 2014 
and September 2015 on behalf of its clients to their pension schemes indicated that scheme 
members could wait up to three months to receive the information in the case of DB 
schemes and up to 5 weeks in the case of DC schemes. Managing director Jamie Smith-
ThoŵpsoŶ said: ͚CuƌƌeŶtlǇ, ŵaŶǇ peŶsioŶ sĐheŵes aƌe uŶaďle, oƌ uŶǁilliŶg, to suppoƌt the 
new pension flexibilities and, therefore, members of these schemes need to transfer to a 
provider that can. However, a transfer cannot take place until we are in receipt of the latest 
information and, only at that point, can we provide the necessary advice on a possible 
transfer. It is, therefore, incredibly important that it is provided in a timely manner. Clients 
simply don't understand the delays, as it just doesn't seem possible to them that their 
financial services providers don't have the information at the touch of a button. The delays 
can be very stressful and many scheme providers urgently need to improve their response 
times. We believe that action is necessary and pension transfers should be as simple as 
ĐhaŶgiŶg ďaŶk aĐĐouŶts ǁith Đleaƌ seƌǀiĐe leǀels aŶd tiŵiŶgs that Ŷeed to ďe adheƌed to͛.422  
3.4  A retirement expenditure and investment plan that helps to overcome behavioural 
barriers 
To overcome the behavioural barriers which prevent people behaving optimally in 
retirement, we need a plan to help people manage their retirement expenditure. One 
example of such a plan is a SPEEDOMETER (or Spending Optimally Throughout Retirement) 
retirement expenditure plan.423 The term SPEEDOMETER is used to reflect the fact that 
spending optimally is related to the speed with which assets are drawn down and a 
SPEEDOMETER is a useful device both for measuring and influencing speed.   
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GiǀeŶ that ŵost people aƌe ͚huŵaŶs͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚eĐoŶs͛, ǁe should ƌeĐogŶise that the 
retirement stage of a pension plan is just too complex for most people to deal with without 
any outside support. We also need to recognise that retirees: have different expenditure 
needs during different phases of their retirement and need to pace their spending 
throughout retirement in order to optimise the use of their lifetime assets and income and 
their ability to make intended bequests. It is important to recognise that a retiree needs to 
work out the desired spending pattern in retirement before deciding on the appropriate 
investment strategy for their pension pot.  
With these considerations in mind, a SPEEDOMETER plan has the following five components 
– aŶd is aŶ eǆaŵple of ǁhat is kŶoǁŶ as a ͚laǇeƌiŶg͛ plaŶ:  
1. First, make a plan. This can be done, either by being auto-enrolled into one as part of 
the retirement planning service offered by the plaŶ ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ĐoŵpaŶǇ, oƌ ďǇ aŶ 
online or telephone-based service providing generic financial information and 
guidance, or, if wealth permits, involving a financial adviser whose role is to assist 
with making and implementing the plan and conducting annual reviews. Key 
components of the plan are budgeting and projecting expenditure. The remaining 
components implement the plan. Ideally, planning should occur throughout the 
accumulation phase. It is very important as retirees approach retirement for 
planning to take place to determine the optimal age for securing a guaranteed life-
long income. 
2. “eĐoŶd, seĐuƌe ͚esseŶtial͛ iŶĐoŵe. The plaŶ Ŷeeds to take a holistiĐ appƌoaĐh to 
managing all assets and income sources in retirement and not just pension assets 
and income, with the aim of securing, as a very minimum, a core inflation-protected 
iŶĐoŵe suffiĐieŶt to alloǁ the ƌetiƌee to ŵeet ͚esseŶtial͛ Ŷeeds foƌ the ƌeŵaiŶdeƌ of 
their life.  
3. Thiƌd, haǀe iŶsuƌaŶĐe aŶd a ͚ƌaiŶǇ daǇ͛ fuŶd to Đoǀeƌ ĐoŶtiŶgeŶĐies. The plaŶ uses 
insurance, when available and cost effective, to cover contingency events, such as 
repairs to white goods, central heating and car. Some expenditures in retirement will 
ďe luŵpǇ ;e.g., holidaǇs aŶd Đaƌ puƌĐhaseͿ, so it is iŵpoƌtaŶt to haǀe a ͚ƌaiŶǇ daǇ͛ 
fund of liquid assets in order to retain as much flexibility as possible with retirement 
assets. The lower the level of insurance used, the greateƌ the ͚ƌaiŶǇ daǇ͛ fuŶd Ŷeeds 
to be. Care costs are potentially the greatest spike to expenditure. There is currently 
a limited insurance market for care costs other than immediate-needs annuities that 
can be purchased when retirees enter care homes. This lack of pre-funded long-term 
care insurance requires the mass affluent to retain a considerable fund against this 
possibility.424 For those with limited means, the state will provide care and this 
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illustrates the need for retirees to be aware of how they can maximise means-tested 
benefits to their advantage. 
4. Fouƌth, seĐuƌe ͚adeƋuate͛ iŶĐoŵe.  Many people will, of course, wish to secure a 
higher standard of living in retirement than the essential level if they have sufficient 
resources to meet their needs and wishes throughout retirement, including desired 
bequests.  
5. Fifth, aĐhieǀe a ͚desiƌed͛ staŶdaƌd of liǀiŶg aŶd ŵake bequests. The plan offers a 
simplified choice architecture for managing any residual wealth with the aim of 
aĐhieǀiŶg a ͚desiƌed͛ staŶdaƌd of liǀiŶg iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt, ǁhile alloǁiŶg paƌt of the 
ƌeŵaiŶiŶg ǁealth to ďe ďeƋuested at a tiŵe of the ƌetiƌee͛s Đhoosing.  
A SPEEDOMETER plan deals with the behavioural traits that people face: 
 Critically, the plan utilises inertia and procrastination, since, once enrolled, 
individuals do not tend to change their minds  The plan accepts individuals suffer from overconfidence and have self-control 
problems and would benefit from using commitment devices  If annuities are used in stages 4 and 5 of the plan, they could be  capital-protected or 
money-back annuities, since these deal with the aversion to losing control of and the 
fear of loss of capital on early death. Such annuities have the following advantages: 
o They remove the single biggest consumer objection to annuities:                                
͚If I die sooŶ afteƌ I ƌetiƌe, the aŶŶuitǇ pƌoǀideƌ ǁill keep ŵǇ fuŶd͛ 
o The ͚liǀe oƌ die͛ guaƌaŶtee of gettiŶg Ǉouƌ ŵoŶeǇ ďaĐk pƌoǀides a siŵple 
underpin  
o They are very easy to explain and for consumers to understand 
o A lump sum repayment rather than the continuation of current income for a 
guaranteed period of 5 or 10 years is easier for people to understand and is 
generally more highly valued 
o The cost of the guarantee is transparent and allows consumers to make an 
informed choice. 
o They automatically phase pension funds into full annuitisation (up to the limit 
specified by the annuitant). 
o They remove a significant barrier to pre-ƌetiƌeŵeŶt saǀiŶg: people ǁoŶ͛t saǀe 
ǀoluŶtaƌilǇ if theǇ doŶ͛t ďelieǀe that it paǇs to saǀe.  The phasing of annuitisation deals with the aversion to making large transactions 
and possible regret about getting the timing wrong 
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 The plan is a universal one, although only the mass affluent will be in a position to 
make use of all five stages. Except for plan members who reveal themselves to be 
extremely risk averse, the annuity will not be the most prominent feature of the plan 
for the mass affluent in their early years of retirement. For most mass affluent plan 
members, what will be discussed first will be the management of retirement assets 
in accordance with the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s attitude to ƌisk. AŶŶuities ǁill ŵeƌelǇ ďe oŶe 
component of the management of retirement assets. This helps to overcome 
framing effects.  
3.5  Defaults and default pathways 
In this Section, we examine some proposals for defaults and default pathways that reflect 
differing individual and household circumstances. In particular, we need to consider how 
nudging and the use of a choice architecture in decision making – ideally also combined with 
guidance or advice – ĐaŶ ďe used to help ͚huŵaŶs͛ ŵake optimal solutions for themselves. 
3.5.1 Default and default pathways with SPEEDOMETER plans 
It would clearly be better if a retirement expenditure plan like the SPEEDOMETER plan were 
to be adopted by a fully engaged consumer working closely with an adviser. But could 
someone who was not engaged or not willing to seek advice be auto-enrolled or defaulted 
onto the plan?  
The experience of auto-enrolment in accumulation would suggest that the best if not the 
way that a plan like SPEEDOMETER will work for the mass market is if they are automatically 
enrolled into one during a pre-retirement guidance or advice surgery arranged through their 
employer, their pension provider or following a discussion with Pension Wise. There needs 
to be a co-ordinated approach to overcome inertia and procrastination, the two key 
behavioural barriers to effective decision making. Similar strategies can be used to get them 
to start the plan as was used to get employees to start a SAVE MORE TOMORROW (or 
“MA‘TͿ plaŶ, e.g., sigŶ up Ŷoǁ foƌ a plaŶ that staƌts oŶ the ƌetiƌeŵeŶt date iŶ siǆ ŵoŶths͛ 
time, with the option to drop out at any time beforehand.425 Everyone would have the right 
to opt out until the point at which longevity insurance kicks in. 
For the mass affluent and high net worth segments of the market, the first key nudge of the 
plan is to get pre-retirees to talk to an independent financial adviser. The extent and timing 
of the annuitisation will depend on the initial assessment by the adviser and the subsequent 
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realised investment performance. Couples will need more flexibility than singles. High net 
worth retirees will need more flexibility than the mass affluent.  
For all market segments, the guidance or advice surgery needs to collect information on: 
 Pension pot size  Other sources of lifelong income (especially any state and defined benefit  pension)  Other sources of wealth (such as housing equity)  Liabilities (e.g., mortgage, credit card debts)  Health status  Family circumstances, including bequest intentions   Given other income sources, health status and family circumstances, decide the 
levels of expenditure that are considered essential, adequate and desired  Tax position  Risk attitude  Risk capacity. 
Given this information, the following default pathway can be established:426 
 Given total assets and liabilities, decide whether or not to use part of the pension 
pot to pay off any debts (e.g., mortgage)  Decide how to fund essential life-long expenditure if this is above the level that can 
be supported by the state and DB pensions. The only secure way of doing this is via 
an index-linked lifetime annuity or a guaranteed drawdown product offering 
inflation uprating.427 There might well be a temptation to delay the purchase of an 
annuity if the individual retires at an early age and the value of the annuity does not 
look ͚good͛ at this age, ďut it ƌeŵaiŶs a ŵatteƌ of ǁheŶ, not if, part of the pension 
pot is used to provide a secure life-long income to meet essential expenditure – if 
esseŶtial ƌeallǇ ŵeaŶs ͚esseŶtial͛ – unless the member is single and in extremely 
poor health. If the member is partnered, a joint life annuity should be considered.  Decide on the level of insurance to cover contingencies or alternatively the size of 
the ͚ƌaiŶǇ daǇ͛ fuŶd aŶd iŶ ǁhat tǇpe of liƋuid iŶǀestŵeŶt this ǁill ďe held. The 
member should be aware that any cash withdrawn from the pension pot above the 
tax-free amount might have tax consequences 
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 Decide how to fund adequate expenditure needs. There are two possible solutions 
depending on the degree to which the member wishes to guarantee the level of 
adequate expenditure. The first solution, for those wishing to have an absolute 
guarantee, involves annuitising another segment of the pension pot. The annuity 
could be a capital protected, inflation-linked, fixed, investment-backed, variable or 
enhanced, depending on the degree of risk tolerance, level of wealth and health 
status of the member. The second solution, for those who want more flexibility and 
do not believe that annuities represent good value for money or who are prepared 
to reduce their expenditure if investment performance is poor, involves a drawdown 
programme with this segment of the pension pot invested in, for example, an 
͚iŶĐoŵe fuŶd͛ that pƌedoŵiŶaŶtlǇ geŶeƌates iŶĐoŵe, although has soŵe gƌoǁth 
potential.  A further alternative is guaranteed drawdown428  Decide how to fund a desired standard of living and make planned bequests.  
DepeŶdiŶg oŶ ƌisk attitudes, the iŶǀestŵeŶt is likelǇ to ďe soŵe kiŶd of ͚diǀeƌsified 
gƌoǁth fuŶd͛ ǁith dƌaǁdoǁŶ as aŶd ǁheŶ ƌeƋuiƌed. Hoǁeǀeƌ, to eŶsuƌe that theǇ 
are met on a life-long basis, the residual pension pot devoted to these expenditures 
would need to be annuitised. There are three ways of doing this: use a percentage of 
the pension pot (e.g., 10%) to buy a deferred annuity coming into force at, say, 75 or 
80 if the plan member lives that long, pay for the deferred annuity in monthly 
instalments (this deals with the behavioural problem of giving up a capital sum), or 
hold a reserve fund which is used to buy an annuity at age 75 or 80. The advantage 
of this third method is that there is more flexibility over when the annuity is 
purchased. The disadvantage is that the member will not know what the income 
from the annuity will be until it is purchased. Guaranteed drawdown is again an 
alternative to annuitisation  Decide on any further annuitisation (e.g., into a voluntary life annuity or an 
immediate-needs annuity to cover long-term care costs) to reduce the variability 
around the level and timing of any desired inheritance. 
When should the default process begin, given the reality that for many people, retirement 
does not occur on a single date, but instead is a process that is phased in? The default in 
contract-based schemes is that the funds stay with the provider. The same is true in trust-
based schemes, although trustees have the power to force decumulation when a member 
reaches a certain age – in other words, they could inform the member that they will arrange 
the purchase of an annuity for the member unless they hear otherwise. It seems 
appropriate that the member should trigger the default process. This is why some call this a 
͚Ƌuasi-default͛ ƌatheƌ a tƌue default ǁhiĐh ƌeƋuiƌes Ŷo aĐtioŶ at all ďǇ the ŵeŵďeƌ.429 
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Ideally, the plan also involves annual reviews with the adviser covering: needs (including 
medical and care needs), state benefits, drawdown strategies for non-pension assets (such 
as housing equity release), inheritance, and tax. A key task of the adviser is to assess the 
initial attitude to risk of the member in order to determine the appropriate investment 
strategy for assets that have not been annuitised and to consider whether this has changed 
since the last annual review.  
It is also important to take actual investment and health experience into account at each 
annual review. Similarly, it is important to recognise that attitudes themselves can be 
flexible. Attitudes to annuitisation can also change. Once a retiree has held an annuity for 
some time, they can appreciate better the value of annuitisation and be less averse to 
further annuity purchases.430   
If the member does not have an adviser, it should still be possible for the member to choose 
from a set of well-designed default pathways using a decision tree. 
 
3.5.2 Other default proposals 
3.5.2.1 Age UK proposal 
In December 2014, Age UK proposed a default plan with the following components:431 
 Maximise state pensions and means-tested benefits  Gain a full picture of all pension and other assets  Consider merging small pots  Be aware of taxation  Consider using DC pensions to repay expensive debt  Maximise income from other financial assets  Decide on which retirement income product:  
o Consumers will need to decide (with or without the help of a financial 
adviser) whether they prefer the lower secure lifetime income from an 
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annuity or take the risk that entering an income drawdown plan could see 
them having to reduce their income or run out of money. For some, they may 
want to choose a mixture of these two options or enter income drawdown 
with a view to buying an annuity at a later date  Take difficult decisions about income drawdown:  
o Consumers should try and avoid high-charging income drawdown products 
and understand how their pension should be invested and how much they 
want to withdraw each year to avoid running out of money. They should 
think about what income they would live on if their DC pension ran out. 
These decisions will be difficult for them to undertake on their own  Shop around for an annuity and declare medical details to qualify for a higher rate  Integrate decisions about small DC pots with decisions about state pensions: It is 
essential that decisions about how to access small DC pension pots are aligned and 
integrated with decisions about when to access state pensions and whether to use 
some or all of their DC pot to buy additional state pension.432 
3.5.2.2 The Strategic Society Centre (SSC) 
In a report published in March 2015, Default Reform: Preventing Low Incomes with an 
Automatic Income Plan, the SSC proposes a default ͚autoŵatiĐ iŶĐoŵe plaŶ͛ that ǁould 
deliǀeƌ ͚pƌediĐtaďle, seĐuƌe ;guaƌaŶteedͿ aŶd good-ǀalue iŶĐoŵe͛ iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt. 433  It 
believes that this is necessary to protect savers who have little experience of investment. 
The ““C͛s oǁŶ ƌeseaƌĐh fouŶd that only a quarter of 55- to 65-year-olds keeps track of the 
stock market, while only one in three say they are aware of inflation levels. Furthermore, 
only 12% of low-income pensioners have an investment product and 34% do not even have 
a savings account. Jaŵes LloǇd, ““C diƌeĐtoƌ aŶd authoƌ of the ƌepoƌt, saǇ: ͚The ƌesults of 
the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s Apƌil peŶsioŶs ƌeǀolutioŶ ǁill ultiŵatelǇ depeŶd oŶ the fiŶaŶĐial 
capability and decision-making of millions of UK workers. However, this detailed research on 
the financial capability of DC pension savers approaching retirement shows worrying levels 
of financial disengagement, raising questions as to how effective people will be in seeking 
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good-value, appropriate products throughout retirement, that protect them from changes 
iŶ iŶflatioŶ aŶd iŶǀestŵeŶt ƌisk….Ouƌ ƌeseaƌĐh suggests the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s peŶsioŶ 
freedoms could repeat the experience of countries like Australia, where ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd 
ĐhoiĐe͛ for retirees has ultimately resulted in lower incomes and growing calls for refoƌŵ͛. 
The ƌepoƌt ǁaƌŶs that theƌe is a ͚sigŶifiĐaŶt ƌisk that the Apƌil ϮϬϭϱ ĐhaŶges to DC peŶsioŶ 
taǆatioŶ ǁill ƌesult iŶ aŶ iŶĐƌease iŶ peŶsioŶeƌ poǀeƌtǇ͛ ǁith ŵaŶǇ peŶsioŶeƌs ƌuŶŶiŶg out of 
money before they die. 
 
3.5.2.3 Adrian Bouldingǯs three step proposal434 
In January 2015, Adrian Boulding, chairman of the Pension Quality Mark, proposed a default 
that uses MĐKiŶseǇ͛s ϯ ǆ ϯ ƌule: 
 Give people a set of three choices   Then another set of three choices (based on the first choice)   Followed by no more than a set of three choices. 
In a retirement income context, savers are given the following three choices about their 
pension pot: 
 Take it all at once   Leave it all invested and draw a regular income   Give it to an insurance company and get an income for life. 
If the saver chooses the second option, the next set of choices relate to the type of 
investment fund they want to use: 
 Low risk, drawing 4% a year   Medium risk, drawing 5% a year   High risk, drawing 6% a year. 
The third set of choices relate to protecting against the pension pot running out before the 
member dies: 
 Make a single payment of £5000 to an insurance company, which will guarantee 
payments of £200 per month starting at the age of 85   Regular payments of £25 a month to an insurance company, which will again 
guarantee payments of £200 per month starting at the age of 85   Do nothing and rely on other sources of income 
Mr Boulding also proposes minimum standards for flexible drawdown products: 
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http://www.pensions-insight.co.uk/Story.aspx?storyCode=1474426&source=Adestra 
239 
 
 A simple fund range   Low charges   A suggested withdrawal rate   A slick operation for changing monthly payments or taking one-off lump sums   Ongoing reviews   Strong governance. 
 
3.5.2.4 Retirement Security Project  proposal: Automatic Trial Income435 
A study from the Retirement Security Project in Washington DC in 2008 proposes that 
͚WheŶ theǇ ƌetiƌe, iŶdiǀiduals ǁould haǀe a pƌopoƌtioŶ of theiƌ DC pot alloĐated to a tǁo-
year trial annuity unless they opted out. After two years, the annuity would convert to a 
permanent one, unless members dropped out. Employers would choose both the annuity 
provider and negotitate a group annuity rate. They would also choose the type of annuity, 
suĐh as leǀel oƌ iŶdeǆ liŶked͛. 
 
3.5.2.5 Michael Johnsonǯs auto-protection proposal 
Michael Johnson from the Centre for Policy Studies published  Auto-protection at 55 in 
February 2015. The proposal – which could also be called auto-annuitisation – is for a 
default option for people approaching private retirement age whereby their pension pot 
would be automatically enrolled in a not-for-profit national auction house for index-linked 
annuities, the same model that is used in Chile. This would stop them running down their 
savings too quickly. 
Mr JohŶsoŶ aƌgues that: ͚Theƌe aƌe legitiŵate ĐoŶĐeƌŶs that soŵe people ŵaǇ fail to 
purchase suitable retirement income products. People approaching retirement need to be 
encouraged to purchase retirement income products that limit downside risks, notably 
longevity, investment and inflation risks that almost all of us are incapable of managing by 
ourselves. People would either opt-out or find themselves with a deferred lifetime annuity, 
which would be a joint-life policy if they are married. That is exactly what goes on in several 
other countries, places like Singapore and Switzerland. All aspiring annuity providers, which 
could include the state, would be required to participate [in the auction]. Initially only a 
limited number of standardised single and joint-life, inflation-protected lifetime and 
deferred annuity contracts would be listed. Pre-auction aggregation of small pots by the 
house ǁould eŶĐouƌage stƌoŶgeƌ ďids͛.436 
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There was little industry support for this proposal. A Pensions Buzz poll in Professional 
Pensions showed that only 25% of respondents supported the idea of defaulting people into 
an index-linked annuity.437  
Supporters of the proposal made the following comments: 
 Although they will need to understand what this means for them (and their spouse) 
assuŵiŶg it͛s a siŶgle life aŶŶuitǇ?  As long as the default includes a market listing of the available annuities and the 
default is the best value after they have completed a health assessment  But we have seen how politics can override good sense  Freedom of choice is important, but a sensible default option that works for most is 
even more important  I would also remove the option to take any tax-free cash and the op-out option!  
Maybe this would encourage them to remain in contact with administrators  It is surprising this was not introduced in 1997, when limited price indexation (LPI) 
became compulsory for DB Schemes  Something is better than nothing even if it is a very small growth  There is a need for a great deal of education here  Yes there should be a default option. For most ordinary working people, the new 
͚fƌeedoŵs͛ ǁill pƌeseŶt a hoƌƌifǇiŶg dileŵŵa about financial matters that they just 
do not understand. 
Opponents of the proposal made the following comments: 
 A thousand times no!  Inflation-linked annuities would be appalling value for money, 
and would lead to more pensioner poverty than just leaving them to use their own 
common-sense (and their computer)  And they should be required to make a calculated decision on something as 
important as this. This default option is unlikely to be the best one  Annuity rates – especially if inflation linked are very poor value  As that is definitely not what most people want or need, it is a daft idea  Definitely not. These are apt to be particularly poor value for money  Depends on individual circumstances. A default approach would encourage lack of 
involvement in a vital decision  Few members are likely to purchase an annuity on reaching retirement age  Firstly, index linked annuities are of questionable value. Secondly, there is no need 
for a default at retirement. People will have to make a choice, otherwise they get 
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nothing, and I would favour forcing a choice rather than drifting into an unsuitable 
option. Why have ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ if you are going to do otherwise?  IŶ a ǁoƌld ǁheƌe the ŵaŶtƌa has loŶg ďeeŶ ͚fƌeedoŵ of iŶdiǀidual ĐhoiĐe͛ this is 
possible the most ridiculous and repellent suggestion yet  Individuals need time to decide what benefits are right for them – defaulting them 
into an arrangement which may not be appropriate for them, and 
difficult/impossible to get out of  Inflation linked annuities are poor value. You have to live for about 15 years to break 
even. What about ill-health, lifestyle, joint? Who chooses the provider? There should 
ďe Ŷo defaults. We Ŷeed to eŶĐouƌage eŶgageŵeŶt. If people aƌe ƌeadǇ, oƌ doŶ͛t 
want to receive a retirement income, it shouldŶ͛t ďe foƌĐed oŶ theŵ. Would tƌustees 
take on the liability for making financial decisions for members, which turn out to be 
wrong? They had better increase their liability insurance PDQ. MADNESS  It is bad enough that the majority get lumped into a default fund that someone has 
decided is best for them!  Make them do something if they want to take money  Members have to make a choice at this point, even if their understanding is not 
great  Surely the Budget 2014 changes have overtaken this approach?  The annuity should be flat rate  The bewildering landscape of pensions along with jargon and policies of big pension 
providers will be such that savers are bamboozled into following a route they did not 
wish to. Only by the time they realise it will be too late to reverse  The choice should be between capped drawdown and an annuity, with the pot 
remaining invested if the member fails to make a choice  There should be no default option; whilst it is just about supportable from an 
investment angle, the retirement choice has to be individual. The decision is too 
important – at some point the individual has to take ownership for their future  They must show the options and let the member choose  They need to be forced to decide or the pension system will get the blame when 
theǇ feel theǇ haǀe lost out iŶ soŵe ǁaǇ, doŶ͛t deĐide theŶ ŶothiŶg Đoŵes Ǉouƌ ǁaǇ 
in retirement, that should get the message through  This is a backwards step and unlikely to be the best option for members. Inflation-
linking is a gambol [sic] and the provider is the bookmaker  This seems reasonable enough, but great care must be taken to ensure that the 
default is always one of the best value annuities available on the market, otherwise 
theƌe͛ll ďe teaƌs  This would be far too prescriptive  Why? It is better if they make an active choice with the right advice. 
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In the light of these criticisms, on 6 March 2015, Mr Johnson changed his default from an 
annuity to drawdown, whereby 5% of the pension pot is drawn down each year from the 
age of 55, unless the member instructs otherwise. His justification for the change was that 
he had given insufficient weight to the value of flexibility. The revised proposal could have 
automatic annuitisation later in retirement.438  
Supporters of layering plans, such as the SPEEDOMETER retirement expenditure plan, would 
aƌgue that ďoth of Mƌ JohŶsoŶ͛s pƌoposals ǁeƌe iŶ faĐt seŶsiďle, ďut foƌ diffeƌeŶt segŵeŶts 
of retirement expenditure. The proposal to default into an index-linked annuity is sensible 
for essential expenditure. As pƌeǀiouslǇ ŵeŶtioŶed, if ͚esseŶtial͛ ŵeaŶs ǁhat it saǇs, theŶ 
there is no real flexibility in how to meet it. Further, if essential expenditure is inflation 
linked, as it will be and is required for as long as the member lives, then there is no real 
alternative to buying an an index-linked annuity, however ͚expensive͛ this may be, or a 
guaranteed drawdown product offering inflation uprating. Just because something is 
͚eǆpeŶsiǀe͛, does Ŷot ŵeaŶ that it is ďad ǀalue. Flexibility, on the other hand, is valuable 
when it comes to meeting adequate and desirable expenditure and contingent expenditure 
such as a repair bill. However, there would probably be disagreement with one aspect of the 
proposal and that is about the starting time. It would not make sense to begin the 
decumulation process at age 55 regardless of the wishes of the member. It should start 
when the member wants it to start. 
3.5.2.6 Automatic deferred annuitisation 
With this proposal, starting at some age, typically in the 40s, an increasing share of pension 
contributions would go to purchasing units of a deferred annuity that would be received 
when the person retired and started receiving benefits.439   
The idea comes from the US and the first company in the US to introduce it – with the name 
Lifetime Income Strategy – was United Technologies (UT), an aerospace and building 
technology company with around 200,000 employees. 440  UT automatically enrolls 
employees into the strategy, which was designed by AllianceBernstein, unless they choose 
to remain in their existing equity, bond or target-date mutual fund until they retire at an 
assuŵed age of ϲϱ. At age ϰϴ, the eŵploǇee͛s saǀiŶgs aƌe gƌaduallǇ ŵoǀed iŶto ǀaƌiaďle 
annuities with a guaranteed minimum level of lifetime income for life from age 65. The 
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variable annuities continue to invest in equities and bonds – although in decreasing 
amounts – but also guarantee that employees can withdraw a minimum sum each year, 
even if the market crashes. By the time the employees reach 60, all the investments have 
been switched into a secure income fund. 
The annual income is a fixed percentage of the market value of the secure income fund. For 
example, if the fund was valued at $200,000 and the payout rate was set at 5% – which is 
based on the average rate at which the deferred annuities are acquired by UT over time – a 
65-year old retiree could withdraw $10,000 annually for the remainder of their life, 
irrespective of market conditions, including the case where the account becomes depleted. 
The level of guaranteed income is ƌeĐalĐulated aŶŶuallǇ oŶ the eŵploǇee͛s ďiƌthdaǇ oƌ ǁheŶ 
new contributions are made. Three insurers – Prudential (US), Lincoln Financial and 
Nationwide (US) – ďid eǀeƌǇ Ƌuaƌteƌ foƌ UT͛s aŶŶuitǇ ďusiŶess aŶd the aŶŶuities aƌe iŶsuƌed 
up to a cap by state guaranty associations.  Employees can choose a joint benefit to cover a 
partner, in exchange for a lower payout rate. Further, any residual fund on death can be 
bequested. 
The fees are lower than for standard variable annuities whose fees have been described as 
͚Ŷotoƌious͛. Woƌkeƌs ďeloǁ age ϰϴ paǇ Ϭ.ϭϯ% p.a. Đhaƌges oŶ the uŶdeƌlǇiŶg iŶdeǆ fuŶds. 
The insurance cover provided in the secure income fund costs 1% p.a. So total costs, 
including investment and insurance fees, are 0.21% of the fund value at age 48, rising to 
1.24% at age 60 and above. Fees of this size take a substantial amount out of the value of 
the pension pot when compounded over a 30 year retirement, but it would be worse if the 
retiree took out a large lump sum part of the way through retirement since they would be 
paying for a longevity protection guarantee that they never used.  
Although UT was the first US company to use automatic deferred annuitisation, it is not the 
first to combine target-date funds and annuities. Prudential (US) has offered this 
combination under its IncomeFlex plan since 2008. In this case, the fixed minimum payout is 
5% p.a. irrespective of market conditions. This guarantee costs 1% on top of fund 
management fees. More than 73,000 employees in more than 7,000 pension schemes 
participate in the plan, with some now being auto-enrolled. According to a survey of more 
than 500 large US employers conducted by Aon Hewitt in 2012, 16% offer products within 
their 401(k) plans, such as annuities, that allow retirees to receive a lifelong income stream. 
The survey revealed that more employers would offer such insurance-related options if US 
regulators made it easier for them to do so. Employers are concerned about breaching their 
fiduciary duties to employees, given the much higher probability of insurance company 
insolvency in the US than in the UK. 
The success of automatic deferred annuitisation in the US is very encouraging and suggests 
that, if it can work in the US, it can also work in the UK. 
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3.5.2.7 The Murray Reportǯs proposal for a comprehensive income product for retirement 
In November 2014, the Australian Government published the Final Report of the Financial 
System Inquiry,441 known as the Murray Report after its Chair, David Murray. The Report 
proposes a default pathway for both the accumulation and decumulation stages – see 
Figure 3.1. 
The Report argues (p.91) that: 
Greater use of risk pooling could significantly increase retirement incomes 
generated from accumulated balances. This could allow individuals to 
allocate consumption throughout their lives better (greater dynamic 
efficiency) by reducing the savings required to achieve a target level of 
income in retirement. This could be achieved by:  
Removing barriers to new product development.  
Using behavioural biases to encourage rather than discourage the use of 
products that provide longevity risk protection.  
This recommendation would involve trustees pre-selecting a 
comprehensive income product for retirement (CIPR) option for their 
members. Pre-selected options have been demonstrated to influence 
behaviour but do not limit personal choice and freedom. They would bring 
the policy philosophy at retirement closer to that of the accumulation 
phase.  
Managing longevity risk through effective pooling in a CIPR could 
significantly increase private incomes for many Australians in retirement 
and provide retirees with the peace of mind that their income will endure 
throughout retirement, while still allowing them to retain some flexibility 
to meet unexpected expenses. An enduring income stream would give 
retirees the confidence to spend in retirement, which would help to sustain 
economic growth as the population ages and reduce the extent to which 
longevity risk falls on the taxpayer. 
The Murray Report proposal is an attempt to reverse the experience in Australia of 50% of 
Australians taking a lump sum at retirement and 25% of these running out of funds before 
they reach 70.  
 
 
 
                                                     
441 
http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf 
245 
 
Figure 3.1: A default pathway for Australian pension scheme members
442
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IŶ OĐtoďeƌ ϮϬϭϱ, the AustƌaliaŶ GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt aĐĐepted ŵost of the MuƌƌaǇ ‘epoƌt͛s 
recommendations, in particular:443 
Inquiry Recommendation 11 — The retirement phase of superannuation  
Require superannuation trustees to pre-select a comprehensive income 
pƌoduĐt foƌ ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt. The pƌoduĐt ǁould ĐoŵŵeŶĐe oŶ the 
ŵeŵďeƌ͛s iŶstƌuĐtioŶ, oƌ the ŵeŵďeƌ ŵaǇ Đhoose to take theiƌ ďeŶefits iŶ 
another way. Impediments to product development should be removed.  
The Government agrees to support the development of comprehensive 
income products for retirement and will facilitate trustees pre-selecting 
these products for members.  
Tƌustees͛ pƌe-selection of such products will help guide members at 
retirement. Comprehensive income products for retirement could improve 
outcomes for retirees, including through increased private retirement 
incomes, increased choice and better protection against longevity and 
other risks.  
The range of products available at retirement is currently narrow and does 
Ŷot alǁaǇs ŵeet iŶdiǀiduals͛ Ŷeeds aŶd pƌefeƌeŶĐes.  
We will continue work to remove impediments to retirement income 
product development.  
Further consultation is required to develop a principles-based framework 
for pre-selection of a comprehensive retirement income product by 
superannuation trustees. This framework will be developed with regard to 
the outcomes of the Tax White Paper process and the Retirement Income 
Streams Review.  
David Murray said he was pleased the Government had agreed to remove impediments to 
the development of annuity and annuity-like products, as well as mandate that all pension 
sĐheŵes ͚soft default͛ ŵeŵďeƌs iŶto a CIP‘ ǁheŶ theǇ stop ǁoƌkiŶg iŶstead of offeƌiŶg 
them a lump sum. The proposals were also supported by Challenger, Australia's largest 
pƌoǀideƌ of aŶŶuities. Its Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe BƌiaŶ BeŶaƌi said: ͚CIP‘s ǁill help people ŵaŶage 
complex decisions at retirement by allowing retirees to opt-in to a retirement solution, 
which suits their circumstances including a stable income stream, flexibility and longevity 
ƌisk pƌoteĐtioŶ͛.  Daǀid KŶoǆ, seŶioƌ aĐtuaƌǇ at MeƌĐeƌ, said ŵaŶdatiŶg CIP‘s ǁas ͚oŶe of the 
ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt steps͛ the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt Đould take to iŵpƌoǀe the sǇsteŵ. However, David 
WhiteleǇ, IŶdustƌǇ “upeƌ Austƌalia Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe, said it ǁould ďe ͚aďsolutelǇ ĐƌitiĐal͛ that 
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there be strong oversight to ensure default-account-based pensions are designed to be in 
the best interest of retirees rather than market providers.444 
 
3.5.3 Support for a default 
Academic behavioural economists have supported defaults for a long time.445 Think tanks 
and wide segments of industry also support the use of defaults. 
 
3.5.3.1 Pensions Policy Institute446 
The PPI argues that industry needs to put in place well-governed retirement income defaults 
that provide members with value for money and flexible access to their assets, without 
overwhelming them with complex choices. The interviews it conducted with DC savers 
fouŶd that ŵaŶǇ ǁeƌe ͚dauŶted͛ ďǇ the aƌƌaǇ of ĐhoiĐes oŶ offeƌ aŶd ǁaŶt pƌoǀideƌs to offeƌ 
them a default investment or drawdown choice, alongside appropriate guidance and advice. 
IŶdeed, ŵaŶǇ thought that pƌoǀideƌs had a ͚dutǇ͛ to offeƌ a default, although theǇ also 
recognised the need for some element of choice for those who want it. 
The PPI͛s pƌoposed default had the following key features: 
 Simplicity – defaults should aim to broadly meet a range of needs for most of the 
people most of the time  Value – defaults need to provide good quality and value for money. Value for money 
is a likely consequence of solutions being designed to deliver good outcomes for the 
majority, as opposed to being highly bespoke and more expensive to deliver. 
Solutions that work for the majority will also benefit from economies of scale  Freedom to opt out – default arrangements should not lock individuals in, but 
flexibility may be more of a priority in the earlier years of retirement than it is in the 
later years  Clear choice architecture – the default is one option located within a set of 
stƌaightfoƌǁaƌd alteƌŶatiǀes that ǁoŶ͛t oǀeƌǁhelŵ saǀeƌs. 
It also identified six principles to inform the design of default retirement solutions: 
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1. Living longer than expected and running out of money is the key risk in retirement 
and a critical input into retirement income solutions 
2. Savers should expect to spend most or all of their pension pots during their 
retirement 
3. Income should be stable and sustainable 
4. Managing investment risk is crucial as volatility can be especially harmful in income 
drawdown-type arrangements 
5. Providers should look to offer flexibility and portability wherever possible 
6. Inflation risk should be managed but not necessarily hedged. 
 
3.5.3.2 The International Longevity Centre – UK  
The ILC-UK supports a default strategy with annuities playing a key role:447 
In the face of complexity, many individuals are likely to do nothing which 
means that their retirement incomes will be dependent on whatever 
happens to the fund. We would argue that for a significant number of 
people, and especially for those who have high DC wealth concentrations, 
buying an annuity is still the right option and should form the backbone of 
any default strategy. However, annuitising is likely to remain an 
irreversible decision, so individuals need to be given appropriate warning 
that they will have part of their fund annuitised (perhaps 75% of the fund 
so as to retain some flexibility) if they do nothing. For this reason, 
ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ŵust ďe giǀeŶ a Ǉeaƌ͛s ǁaƌŶiŶg, aŶd the default ŵust Ŷot kiĐk 
in before they reach their respective State Pension Age. Up until this age, 
the pension fund should be invested in a balanced portfolio of safe and 
risky assets to allow for continual growth in the fund. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, it ƌeĐoŵŵeŶds that aŶŶuities ŵust ďe ƌeďƌaŶded as ͚safe guaƌaŶteed iŶĐoŵe foƌ 
life͛ pƌoduĐts. 
 
3.5.3.3 The Strategic Society Centre (SSC) 
The March 2015 report of the SSC discussed above was followed up by an empirical study 
published in July 2015 which showed that the level of wellbeing experienced in retirement 
was related to the level of guaranteed income they enjoyed in retirement.448 The SSC 
analysed data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing on over 2,000 retirees in 
England in receipt of a private pension. The analysis found statistically significant positive 
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 The International Longevity Centre – UK (2015) Heƌe TodaǇ, GoŶe Toŵoƌƌoǁ. Hoǁ TodaǇ͛s ‘etiƌeŵeŶt 
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 Will Parry and James Lloyd (2015) Income Security and a Good Retirement, Strategic Society Centre, 14 July;  
http://strategicsociety.org.uk/income-security-and-a-good-retirement/#.Vaasr60w-70 
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ƌelatioŶships ďetǁeeŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s leǀel of pƌiǀate peŶsioŶ income and a range of 
retirement outcomes such as: 
 Spending habits (such as being able to go to the cinema or own a mobile phone)  Sense of autonomy and control  Life satisfaction  Participation in community and civic society. 
However, the analysis also found that the level of financial wealth was not associated with 
any of these outcomes. 
At the same time, the SSC published a policy paper which considered the implications of the 
ƌeseaƌĐh foƌ UK pƌiǀate peŶsioŶ poliĐǇ aŶd foƌ the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s positioŶ of Ŷeutrality 
regarding how individuals use their DC pension savings.449 The paper argues that by 
adopting a position of neutrality, the Government may oversee reductions in the wellbeing 
of the older population as a result of the April 2015 changes to rules on DC pension savings. 
The main policy recommendation is that the Government should ensure that a decent 
guaranteed income is the default option for DC pension savers. Other recommendations 
include: 
 Actively promote the receipt of a guaranteed income in pension policy to improve 
the well-being of retirees  Educate savers before retirement about the role of guaranteed income for a good 
retirement  Include information about the importance of guaranteed income to wellbeing in 
retirement in Pension Wise guidance and information  Undertake regular research into the effect of the April 2015 changes on older 
people͛s ǁellďeiŶg. 
“tepheŶ Loǁe, gƌoup ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs diƌeĐtoƌ at Just ‘etiƌeŵeŶt, said: ͚This ƌepoƌt 
provides unprecedented insights into how people derive wellbeing from guaranteed income 
throughout their retirement. With so much attention being focused on the option to access 
pension savings as cash, the findings demonstrate the real benefits of treating pension 
savings as just that – a source of guaranteed pension iŶĐoŵe foƌ life͛.450  
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3.5.3.4 National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) 
A report published by the NAPF in January 2015 as part of its Understanding Retirement 
‘eseaƌĐh Pƌogƌaŵŵe ĐoŶĐluded: ͚To giǀe saǀeƌs the ďest possiďle ĐhaŶĐe of ŵaŶagiŶg theiƌ 
money, we will need to give them three things: 
 Clear pathways that are easy-to-understand and provide access to good-value 
solutions  Visible and easy-to-obtain guidance that makes savers aware of their options, and  High-quality products designed to meet the needs of savers. 
The NAPF͛s oǁŶ ƌeseaƌĐh shoǁed that ͚ϴϮ% of the ƌetiƌed aŶd ϳϴ% of the ǁoƌkiŶg people iŶ 
this group said they would rather have a secure income for retirement than a pot to dip 
iŶto͛, iŵplǇiŶg that ͚lifetiŵe aŶŶuities ƌeŵaiŶ the ŵost oďǀious ŵeĐhanism for achieving 
this͛.451 Gƌahaŵ Vidleƌ, diƌeĐtoƌ of eǆteƌŶal affaiƌs at the NAPF, ĐoŶĐludes that ͚ǁhat's ƌeallǇ 
Ŷeeded is a default ƌetiƌeŵeŶt pathǁaǇ͛.452 
We participated in a NAPF seminar on 27 January 2015 which discussed the above report. 
We list the key comments made at the seminar: 
 Government talk is about ͚freedom and choice͛, but the pensions industry (schemes, 
employers, providers) believes that there is a pressing need for default solutions that 
combine drawdown with longevity insurance  The mass market is the group with the most urgent need for default solutions  There is a real danger that if people are not nudged/defaulted, they will withdraw all 
of theiƌ pot ďeĐause theǇ ďelieǀe that theǇ ĐaŶ ͚do ďetteƌ͛ theŵselǀes aŶd also 
because they do not trust pension providers. The biggest danger is that they will fall 
victim to scams  The idea is to establish a simple set of default pathways. Possibly three options. But 
many will choose the middle option, which in effect becomes the default-default  There needs to be realism about the extent of member engagement. The reality is 
that most are defaulters – they will not engage. Fiduciaries (trustees and investment 
governance committees (IGCs)453) will have to choose the default. This will be low-
risk because they will be worried about liability 
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 We Ŷeed to deĐide ǁhat ͚good͛ looks like. It has to ďe good foƌ the ŵajoƌitǇ, it 
cannot be good for everyone. It needs to be well understood (in term of risks, 
guarantees, etc), demonstrate value for money and have clear guidelines on the 
maximum percentage of the fund that can be withdrawn. So the default-default 
might be capped drawdown plus longevity insurance  The NAPF research shows that consumers in mass market want a secure lifetime 
iŶĐoŵe, ďut this is ŵade ŵoƌe diffiĐult ďǇ the ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ ƌegiŵe, the laĐk 
of affordable regulated advice, and the lack of suitable products  Consumers do not understand the implications of marginal tax rates or longevity risk 
(the dispeƌsioŶ aƌouŶd the aǀeƌageͿ. “o the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ŵessage ͚it͛s Ǉouƌ ŵoŶeǇ͛ 
ƌeƋuiƌes a ĐoŵpliĐated Đaǀeat ͚… ďut suďjeĐt to ŵaƌgiŶal taǆ ƌates aŶd to hoǁ loŶg 
Ǉou ǁill liǀe͛ etĐ. GuidaŶĐe is Ŷot eŶough – people need clear and simple to 
understand solutions; most will not engage  There is no need for policy intervention to allow defaults, as schemes can do this 
now (according to a pensions lawyer present)  Many employers/schemes will not want responsibility for default products – they 
need a third-party solution, i.e., to make the default a transfer to an outside scheme 
– most likely a master trust  Governance is crucial. There is a vital role for DC scheme trustees and IGCs. There 
also needs to be strong backing from regulators and policy-makers. We need to build 
oŶ the NAPF͛s ƋualitǇ ŵaƌk. Hoǁeǀeƌ, theƌe aƌe seƌious ĐhalleŶges: 
o Putting the right governance in place will be challenging – the governance 
issues are far more complicated than with accumulation 
o Who is responsible for governance? Employers unlikely to want this liability; 
trustees/IGCs will be worried about liability too 
o The NAPF͛s ƋualitǇ ŵaƌk iŶǀolǀes a Đhaƌge Đap, Ǉet theƌe is ǁidespƌead 
provider/adviser opposition to a charge cap in decumulation  It was noted that there is very little sign of product innovation. This was put down to 
first-mover disadvantage in a completely new landscape  There was general view that longevity insurance needs to be sorted out at the point 
of retirement/drawdown, with around 10% of the pot being used for a deferred 
annuity   There needs to be a minimum degree of engagement with members, since schemes 
do not knoǁ ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ďaŶk aĐĐouŶt details ďeĐause ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs Đoŵe ǀia the 
eŵploǇeƌ͛s paǇƌoll sǇsteŵ  Camilla Barry, partner at Macfarlanes, argued that a default option would help to 
remove the risk that trustees and employers face in terms of making decisions and 
giǀiŶg adǀiĐe: ͚It ŵaǇ ďe useful to thiŶk aďout haǀiŶg a default as ǁell as pathǁaǇs. 
People that don't make choices would be tipped into the default option which may 
be capped drawdown with the purchase of deferred annuity  – a model product that 
will woƌk foƌ ŵost people͛. PatƌiĐk Heath LaǇ, Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe offiĐeƌ at B&CE, said 
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͚ǁhile tƌustees ǁould Ŷeed to ask people ǁhiĐh ƌoute theǇ ǁould ǁaŶt to do doǁŶ, 
theǇ ǁould also haǀe to piĐk a ĐeŶtƌalised ƌoute ǁith aŶ eleŵeŶt of ƌisk ƌeŵoǀed͛.454 
3.5.3.5 National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) Consultation 
Further support for a default option was contained in response to a NEST consultation 
released in March 2015.455 Paul Todd, assistaŶt diƌeĐtoƌ of iŶǀestŵeŶts at NE“T, said: ͚Theƌe 
is a remarkable consensus for big groups of people who have been automatically enrolled 
for some straightforward choice architecture and not too much confusing choice and 
definitely, in large groups, the Ŷeed foƌ default pathǁaǇs… I thiŶk the tǁo ŵaiŶ thiŶgs ǁhiĐh 
have come out are the need for flexibility in the early years of retirement and the point that 
people at some point in their accumulation phase need to get some insurance for living 
longer than expected. I think the emerging consensus was that at some point you need to 
proteĐt people fƌoŵ loŶgeǀitǇ ƌisk͛. 
 
3.5.3.6 Steve Webb  
While Steve Webb, the former Pensions Minister, dismissed the idea of creating an at-
retirement default withdrawal system, he has conceded that this might be appropriate at a 
lateƌ tiŵe iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt: ͚It is good to give people financial flexibility in their early 60s, but 
the question is whether we want people to have to make active financial decisions 
throughout what could be a 30-Ǉeaƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛.456 
 
3.5.4 Opposition to a default 
A Pensions Buzz poll in Professional Pensions in March 2015 showed that a significant 
minority opposed a default retirement option.457 IŶ ƌespoŶse to the ƋuestioŶ ͚“hould theƌe 
ďe a default foƌ DC ŵeŵďeƌs ǁheŶ theǇ ƌeaĐh ƌetiƌeŵeŶt age?͛, ϰϵ% aŶsǁeƌed ͚Ǉes͛, ǁhile 
ϰϲ% said ͚Ŷo͛, ǁith the rest undecided. The main reason given for supporting the default 
was the recognition that many people, while needing an income product, did not want to or 
ǁeƌe Ŷot aďle to ŵaŶage theiƌ iŶǀestŵeŶts, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ as theǇ got oldeƌ: ͚As aŶ iŶdustƌǇ, 
we ŵust ďe aďle to desigŶ aŶ ͞aŶŶuitǇ plus͟ pƌoduĐt͛, ďut ͚the default should eǆist as a 
safety net, as a last ƌesoƌt͛. TǇpiĐal ƌeasoŶs foƌ opposiŶg the default ǁeƌe: ͚Default optioŶ 
absolves individuals of responsibility. Who takes ownership and deals with problems caused 
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ďǇ laĐk of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg?͛ aŶd ͚A oŶe-size-fits all approach would disadvantage a large 
ŵiŶoƌitǇ of ƌetiƌees͛. 
The poll also showed strong opposition to a default retirement option that was not initiated 
by the scheme member. Responses to the ƋuestioŶ ͚If theƌe ǁeƌe suĐh a default, ǁhat 
should it ďe?͛ ǁeƌe: 
 64% – stay invested until member makes an active decision  13% – index-linked annuity  9% – capped drawdown followed by annuitisation at 75  9% – flat annuity  4% – capped drawdown  2% – cash/cash-like fund. 
The general view was that peoples' circumstances were too varied and complex to create a 
comprehensive default suitable for everyone. 
3.6. Information, advice and guidance 
An important feature of the success of any retirement expenditure plan will be the 
information, advice and guidance received by the member. While this would appear to be 
obvious, there are important regulatory distinctions between information, advice and 
guidance in the UK. It is possible that customers will get confused by the distinctions. 
 
3.6.1 The distinction between information and advice 
The FCA͛s guidaŶĐe ĐoŶsultatioŶ Retail Investment Advice: Clarifying the Boundaries and 
Exploring the Barriers to Market Development458 in July 2014 defined the difference 
ďetǁeeŶ ͚iŶfoƌŵatioŶ' aŶd ͚iŶǀestŵeŶt adǀiĐe'. The diffeƌeŶĐe iŶǀolǀes aŶ eleŵeŶt of 
opinion or judgement on the part of the adviser, either in person or online. The provision of 
information, such as facts about the performance of investments, the terms and conditions 
of investment contracts, or the price of investments, does not constitute giving regulated 
advice if the investor alone decides whether to act on the basis of this information. 
Regulated advice, on the other hand, involves recommending a course of action or giving an 
opinion or making a judgement on the merits of, say, buying or selling an investment.  If 
information is provided in a way that seeks to influence or persuade, then it may be 
classified as regulated advice. For example, if the provision of information about the price of 
an investment is given at the same time that the firm is indicating that it is a good time to 
buy, then this may constitute regulated advice.  
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Two additional criteria need to be taken into account before deciding whether or not 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ is Đlassified as ƌegulated adǀiĐe: ͚suitaďilitǇ͛ aŶd ͚appƌopƌiateŶess͛: 
 If, ďased oŶ a ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ of a peƌsoŶ͛s ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes – which would cover their 
knowledge and  experience in the investment field, their financial situation, including 
ability to bear losses, and their investment objectives, including risk tolerance – an 
iŶǀestŵeŶt is pƌeseŶted as ďeiŶg ͚suitaďle͛, theŶ this ŵaǇ still ĐoŶstitute a peƌsoŶal 
recommendation and, hence, regulated advice, even if the firm has a clear, 
prominent and understandable disclaimer stating that no advice or recommendation 
is being given. A suitability report needs to consist of three elements at a minimum: 
the ĐlieŶt͛s oďjeĐtiǀes, ǁhǇ the adǀiĐe is suitable, and what could be the 
disadvantages. The suitability test also applies to a firm that sells and manages 
investment products  Whetheƌ a pƌoduĐt is ĐoŶsideƌed ͚appƌopƌiate͛ foƌ a Đustoŵeƌ ǁill depeŶd solelǇ oŶ 
their knowledge and experience in the relevant investment field. Customers might 
have to demonstrate that they have sufficient knowledge and experience to 
understand the risks attached to any product they are considering buying.  
 
Table 3.4: Pre-sale suitability and appropriateness assessments under MiFID II 
 
Type of sale Type of 
product 
Test required Factors to be considered 
Advised Complex 
 
 
 
Suitability Knowledge and  experience in the 
investment field 
 
Financial situation, including ability to 
bear losses 
 
Investment objectives, including risk 
tolerance 
Non-complex 
Non-advised Complex Appropriateness Knowledge and  experience in the 
investment field 
 
Non-complex 
 
 
None None 
Source: Financial Services Consumer Panel (2015) 
 
Although assessing product suitability for a particular client does not constitute advice, it 
will still be necessary to do this to determine whether a firm is able to recommend the 
puƌĐhase of a ͚Đoŵpleǆ͛ MiFID ;Maƌkets iŶ FiŶaŶĐial IŶstƌuŵeŶts DiƌeĐtiǀeͿ  pƌoduĐt. UŶdeƌ 
MiFID II, which is due to come into force in January 2018, it is expected that many pension 
255 
 
products, such as drawdown, ǁill ďe Đlassified as ͚Đoŵpleǆ͛ ǁhiĐh ŵeaŶs that theǇ ĐaŶŶot 
be sold on a non-advised (i.e., execution-only) basis to inexperienced investors. Instead, 
providers will have to conduct an ͚appropriateness test͛ to assess whether the customer is 
in the position to make an informed decision about the product. But the test will not 
determine whether the product is suitable for their particular circumstances. Table 3.4 
summarises these requiƌeŵeŶts. The oŶlǇ ͚ŶoŶ-Đoŵpleǆ͛ pƌoduĐts oŶĐe MiFID II Đoŵes iŶto 
effect will be plain vanilla shares, bonds and unit trusts. 
According to Matt Connell, head of regulatory developments at Zurich UK Life, advisers 
could be required to assist providers in their appropriateness testing. Advisers who offer 
both non-advised and fully advised services could be asked to help providers with some of 
the iŶfoƌŵatioŶ gatheƌiŶg aďout Đustoŵeƌs. He said: ͚The idea is if Ǉou haǀe a [peŶsioŶ] 
wrapper that includes guaranteed returns, it is a bit like a derivative. Products that are more 
expensive, but with less volatility, might be less risky for consumers, but the question is do 
consumers understand them. It's bringing the whole channel closer together. There will be 
more requirements on product providers and advisers to talk to each other on a non-
advised basis. Consumers will enter conversations with providers over appropriateness not 
with the adviser, but then may have to go back to the adviser if the provider says 'no'. 
Advisers should think about how they collect information and send it to providers. They may 
haǀe to Đaptuƌe iŶfoƌŵatioŶ foƌ ǁhiĐh theǇ do Ŷot Ǉet haǀe the ƌight sǇsteŵs iŶ plaĐe͛. The 
practical consequence of this is that, once MiFID II comes into force, most customers might 
not be able to buy a drawdown or other complex product without first taking advice. 
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to the FCA: ͚PeŶsioŶs liďeƌalisatioŶ Đould giǀe ƌise to Ŷeǁ ƌisks of iŶappƌopƌiate 
sales of insurance-based investments to consumers, as well as MiFID II iŶǀestŵeŶts͛.459  The 
Tax Incentivised Savings Association (TISA) is concerned about how MiFID II will operate in 
practice, particularly in terms of appropriateness, suitability and product governance. It said 
it would establish guidelines on how advisers and providers should address these issues. In 
particular it will look at: 
 The definition of complex versus non-complex products  What does best practice look like for product governance?  What does it mean by target market? What will it look like?  Information flows between manufacturer (i.e., provider) and distributor?  How can technology be used and what will the impact be?  What is the impact on execution-only closed-end funds?  What will appropriateness look like in practice?  What are the implications for clients? 
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JeffƌeǇ MusheŶs, teĐhŶiĐal diƌeĐtoƌ at TI“A, said: ͚The diƌeĐtiǀe ŵakes it ǀeƌǇ Đleaƌ that 
firms, which manufacture or distribute a product, will also be expected to have appropriate 
organisational arrangements that specifically address the issue of product governance. 
Whilst there has always been a requirement to understand the products under advice, this 
is now required to be more organised and formal, thus, the directive increases expectations 
oŶ eǆistiŶg sǇsteŵs aŶd ĐoŶtƌols͛.460  
The FCA has a long-standing concern about the failure of the industry to meet suitability 
ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts. IŶ ϮϬϭϭ, it issued a ͚Deaƌ CEO͛ letteƌ to ǁealth ŵaŶageŵeŶt fiƌŵs, folloǁiŶg a 
previous suitability review. Its 2015-16 business plan released in March 2015 announced a 
theŵatiĐ ƌeǀieǁ of ͚iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶts iŶ suitaďilitǇ staŶdaƌds aĐƌoss ǁealth ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛, 
foĐusiŶg oŶ ŵaŶaged poƌtfolios aŶd theiƌ suitaďilitǇ iŶ ƌespeĐt of ĐlieŶts͛ ƌisk pƌofiles, 
attitudes to risk, and capacity for loss.  
The FCA is particularly concerned that the proliferation of new complex retirement products 
could confuse older consumers who have little experience in taking decisions about their 
iŶĐoŵe aŶd ǁho tǇpiĐallǇ uŶdeƌestiŵate theiƌ loŶgeǀitǇ: ͚Fiƌŵs ŵaǇ deǀelop deĐuŵulatioŶ 
products or services that could highlight certain product features or the price at the expense 
of other important information, or be difficult to compare due to hidden costs and fees and 
include barriers to exiting, There is also a risk that these could result in increasingly complex 
products or a mix of products that require ongoing servicing and potentially higher costs, 
ǁhiĐh soŵe fiŶaŶĐial adǀiseƌs ŵaǇ ƌeĐoŵŵeŶd iŶ a ďid to geŶeƌate higheƌ fees͛. AĐĐoƌdiŶg 
to Neil WalkliŶg, fƌoŵ ƌegulatoƌǇ ĐoŶsultaŶĐǇ Boǀill: ͚The FCA is still finding some firms have 
not done much to improve suitability standards and the way they gather information from 
ĐlieŶts. Theƌe is the seŶse [the FCA has] ƌuŶ out of patieŶĐe͛.461   
In December 2015, the FCA published the findings from its thematic review of the suitability 
of retail investment portfolios provided by wealth management and private banking 
firms.462  Although a number of firms had taken steps to demonstrate that their clients' 
portfolios are suitable, the FCA found that, in 60% of the sample portfolios they 
investigated, the composition of the portfolios they managed did not truly reflect the 
investment needs and risk appetite of their customers, especially those who have a limited 
capacity for, or desire to expose themselves to the risk of, capital loss. Many firms also still 
have to make substantial improvements in gathering, recording and regularly updating 
customer information to support the investment portfolios they manage for customers. The 
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FCA also warned firms that they need to ensure that their governance, monitoring and 
assessment arrangements are sufficient to meet their regulatory responsibilities in relation 
to suitability. 
The FCA investigated 150 files from 15 firms. It found that: 
 23% indicated a high risk of unsuitability  37% were unclear  41% showed a low risk of unsuitability. 
Megan Butler, FCA director of supervision, investment, wholesale and specialists, said:  
͚GettiŶg suitaďilitǇ ƌight is fuŶdaŵeŶtal to pƌoǀidiŶg a poƌtfolio ŵaŶageŵeŶt seƌǀiĐe that 
meets customeƌs' Ŷeeds͛.463 
The FCA has five key tests for investment advice: 
1. Does the service being offered constitute a recommendation? 
2. Is the recommendation in relation to one or more transactions in financial 
instruments? 
3. Is the recommendation at least one of the following: 
a. presented as suitable 
b. based on the consideration of the person's circumstances 
4. Is the recommendation issued otherwise than exclusively through distribution 
channels or to the public? 
5. Is the recommendation made to a person in his capacity as one of the following: 
a. an investor or potential investor 
b. an agent for an investor or potential investor. 
If the aŶsǁeƌs to all these ƋuestioŶs is ͚Ǉes͛, theŶ it is iŶǀestŵeŶt adǀiĐe. 
In January 2015, the FCA released a complete list of its definitions of advice.464 These are 
listed in Table 3.5.465 Between the clear and unambiguous extremes of execution-only and 
personal recommendation/regulated advice come generic advice or information, focused 
advice (which is requested by the customer) and simplified advice (a service specified by the 
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firm, but falling short of regulated advice although might involve a personal 
recommendation). 
Taďle 3.5: FiŶaŶĐial CoŶduĐt AuthoƌitǇ͛s defiŶitioŶs of adǀiĐe 
1 Execution-only  
 
A service consisting of the execution and/or reception 
and transmission of client orders relating to particular 
fiŶaŶĐial iŶstƌuŵeŶts at the ĐlieŶt͛s iŶitiatiǀe. The fiƌŵ 
does not give any advice on investments or assess 
appropriateness.  
2 Generic advice  
 
Advice or information that does not relate to a particular 
investment or does not otherwise meet one of the 
characteristics of regulated advice.  
3 Focused advice or  
limited advice  
 
 
Advice focused on the provision of personal 
recommendations relating to a specific need, designated 
investment, or certain assets.  As requested by the 
customer. 
4 Simplified advice 
 
Advice focused on the provision of personal 
recommendations relating to a specific need, designated 
investment, or certain assets.  The firm sets out the 
boundaries of the service it provides and uses 
streamlined and/or automated advice processes to 
provide customers with a personal recommendation, 
based upon their personal and financial circumstances. 
5 Personal 
recommendation 
 
A recommendation relating to taking certain steps in 
respect of a particular investment, made to a person in 
their capacity as an investor or potential investor (or their 
agent), which is presented as suitable based on a 
ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ of the peƌsoŶ͛s ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes.  
6 Regulated advice  
 
Advice relating to a particular investment given to a 
person in their capacity as an investor or potential 
investor (or their agent) and relates to the merits of them 
buying, selling, subscribing for, or underwriting (or 
exercising rights to acquire, dispose of, or underwrite) the 
investment.  
Source: Derived from FCA Finalised Guidance 15/1 (2015, pp. 2-3) 
 
3.6.2 Generic advice  
In 2007, the Treasury conducted an experiment on the effectiveness of generic financial 
advice as part of Otto Thoresen's review of generic financial advice.466 Around 5,000 people 
took part in a 12-week trial involving a free, impartial generic financial advice service 
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providing information and guidance on money matters. The service was offered by A4e (as 
Money Fitness) and Consumer Direct (in partnership with Citizens Advice). The preliminary 
findings revealed that many people lack the confidence to buy savings and investment 
products without advice, and do not have a clear idea of which products would suit them. 
However, generic financial advice can act as a prompt for people to take action. Within a 
week of using the service, 80% of the people who took part in the experiment had taken at 
least one follow-up action, with 20% contacting a new supplier of financial products.  
The results of the exercise indicate that generic financial advice is potentially beneficial to all 
demegraphics, not just low-income groups.467 
 
3.6.3 Guidance 
͚GuidaŶĐe͛ is Ŷot speĐifiĐallǇ listed iŶ Taďle ϯ.ϱ. The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt is offeƌiŶg a fƌee ͚guidaŶĐe 
guaƌaŶtee͛, Đalled PeŶsioŶ Wise, to all those aďout to dƌaǁ oŶ theiƌ peŶsioŶ pot.468  The 
guidaŶĐe offeƌed ďǇ PeŶsioŶ Wise ǁill iŶǀolǀe takiŶg stoĐk of people͛s assets aŶd liaďilities 
and explaining the options available to them. This is achieved through a six-step process 
ǁhiĐh ͚help Ǉou uŶdeƌstaŶd hoǁ to tuƌŶ Ǉouƌ peŶsioŶ pot iŶto iŶĐoŵe foƌ Ǉouƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛: 
1. Check the value of your pension pot  
2. Understand what you can do with your pension pot  
3. Plan how long your money needs to last  
4. Work out how much money you'll have in retirement  
5. Watch out for tax  
6. Shop around for the best deal.469 
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In terms of content, a guidance session will:
470
 
 inform consumers of the scope, purpose and limitations of the session  inform consumers about the pension entitlement and other personal and financial 
information that the designated guidance provider may request from them during 
the session  request information from the consumer about their accumulated pension pots  ƌeƋuest iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aďout the ĐoŶsuŵeƌ͛s fiŶaŶĐial aŶd personal circumstances that 
is relevant to their retirement options  alert the consumer to other sources of information and advice as appropriate and at 
relevant points during the session  identify for the consumer and provide them with information about: 
o the options relevant to the consumer 
o to the extent that they are releǀaŶt to the ĐoŶsuŵeƌ͛s optioŶs 
o the potential tax implications or debt obligations  set out the next steps for the consumer  provide consumers with a record of their guidance session. 
The Pension Wise service is run by two designated guidance providers The Pensions 
Advisory Service (TPAS) which offers phone-based guidance and Citizens Advice (CA) which 
offers face to face guidance sessions,
471 
each lasting 45 minutes. The FCA has introduced the 
following standards for designated guidance providers:472   
 ensure that the guidance is impartial, consistent, of good quality and engaging across 
the range of delivery channels  create consumer trust and confidence in the designated guidance providers and 
content of the guidance so that consumers actively use the service  ensure that the framework works for both contract-based and trust-based pension 
schemes  deliver helpful guidance for consumers that considers their retirement options and 
refers them to specialist advice or information where appropriate. 
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Individuals delivering the guidance must: 
 have the skills, knowledge and expertise necessary for the discharge of their 
responsibilities – including good interpersonal skills (including listening skills and 
verbal communication skills) – and have knowledge that includes the following: 
o the different types of pension schemes 
o the impact of fees and charges for both accumulation and decumulation 
pension products 
o the options available to consumers when accessing their pension savings 
o the factors relevant to the selection of options when accessing pension 
savings, including the impact of guarantees, special features, restrictions or 
conditions, protected rights, and exit charges 
o the tax treatment of pensions and income generally 
o the circumstances when a consumer may require further specialist help, for 
example debt advice, or regulated advice  cover other issues that are relevant to consumers considering their retirement 
options, for example, long-term care needs, sustainability of income in retirement 
and life expectancy, and  understand the conduct that a designated guidance provider may engage in. 
Consumers must have access to a complaint management system that is fair, consistent and 
prompt. The Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman (PHSO) will handle any 
complaints about Pension Wise as a last resort. Initially, there was no recourse for people 
who receive guidance from TPAS or CA, since neither guidance nor the designated guidance 
providers are regulated by the FCA.473 However, in July 2015, the FCA – which has been 
made responsible by the Treasury for setting standards for the delivery and for monitoring 
the delivery of the guidance – clarified the issue by stating that where redress is due, it will 
be paid by TPAS or CA. The FCA said it can 'make recommendations' to the Treasury and the 
PH“O to oƌdeƌ guidaŶĐe pƌoǀideƌs to paǇ out: ͚We eǆpeĐt a ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ to ŵake 
redress to be comparatively rare. We would expect such a recommendation to follow our 
general process for making recommendations with the calculation of the level of redress 
based on the size of detriment experienced. Where a consumer has already received 
adequate redress, as set by the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, we would 
not require it to be paid agaiŶ as a ƌesult of ouƌ ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ͛.474 
In July 2015, the FCA announced that it would, for the first time, distinguish between advice 
and guidance in the way it records complaints.  Previously, the FCA categorised complaints 
against financial services firms under the headings 'misleading advice/guidance', 'arranging', 
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262 
 
or 'inappropriate sales technique'. Going forward, it said it would categorise complaints as 
either 'unsuitable advice' or 'unclear guidance/arrangement'. This will give the regulator a 
clearer picture about how many complaints were made specifically about regulated financial 
advice and how many related to guidance, Christopher Woolard, director of strategy and 
ĐoŵpetitioŶ at the FCA, said: ͚Ouƌ ƌules ǁill help deliǀeƌ the ƋuiĐkeƌ, easier and fairer 
resolution to complaints that consumers want. Getting this right is also vital for firms. A 
properly resolved complaint can keep a customer happy, and protect the firm's reputation. 
But, more than that, effective complaints handling systems can act as an early warning 
sǇsteŵ foƌ fiƌŵs͛.475 
Early evidence suggests that affluent investors were not using Pension Wise. A survey by 
Suffolk Life of its own relatively well-off clients who started a drawdown programme during 
April and May 2015 found that only 2% contacted Pension Wise. Three quarters took advice, 
while the rest acted without seeking advice. The average fund size of a Suffolk Life SIPP is 
around £330,000.476   
In July 2015, the Treasury announced that Pension Wise had delivered 18,000 guidance 
appointments since its launch. It also reported that 925,000 visitors had visited the Pension 
Wise website. However, this was only 15% of the total appointments available. Hargreaves 
Lansdown has previously said that only one in seven of its customers were using the 
service.477 Also in July 2015, the Government announced that the minimum age for 
accessing Pension Wise was being reduced from 55 to 50.478  
A survey of 700 companies by Close Brothers Asset Management in August 2015 found a 
third did not have a clear understanding about Pension Wise or how it could help retirees, 
while 13% did not feel confident recommending the service. Only 9% said it has been a huge 
support in offering help to employees. Jeanette Makings, head of financial education 
seƌǀiĐes at Close Bƌotheƌs, said: ͚Fouƌ ŵoŶths afteƌ the peŶsioŶ ƌefoƌŵs ǁeƌe iŶtƌoduĐed, 
it's clear that there is still some confusion. It's crucial that if employers are directing their 
staff towards Pension Wise, they really understand the support it can provide and that the 
guidance it gives is not advice and so should sit alongside financial advice rather than 
competing ǁith it͛.  OŶ the otheƌ haŶd, the suƌǀeǇ also fouŶd that ϮϬ% of ĐoŵpaŶies ǁeƌe 
actively trying to improve their support network for staff approaching retirement, while 37% 
said the reforms had encouraged them to play a greater role in financially educating their 
eŵploǇees. Ms MakiŶgs said: ͚OptioŶs at ƌetiƌeŵeŶt haǀe ďeĐoŵe all the ŵoƌe Đoŵpleǆ, 
and education is the key to helping employees navigate their new freedoms. A financial 
education programme – whether this is through seminars, clinics or one-to-one advice – can 
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help to build up understanding and engagement and can lead to them taking action to 
iŵpƌoǀe theiƌ fiŶaŶĐial ǁellďeiŶg͛.479  
Research published by the NAPF in October 2015 revealed that only 10% of people 
considering their retirement options had turned to Pension Wise, although 20% of people 
who had accessed their pension pot had used the service. The research was based on a 
focus group of people who had accessed some or all of their pot, and had used Pension 
Wise. According to Graham Vidler, NAPF diƌeĐtoƌ of eǆteƌŶal affaiƌs: ͚The pƌoďleŵ is Ŷot oŶe 
of quality of service, because late on in the process we started nudging people towards 
Pension Wise, and when they went and investigated, they liked what they saw. The problem 
is one of awareness and knowing the service is there and can be used. We really need to 
crack through because at the moment there's a service out there that is not being used by 
people ǁho iŶ ŵost Đases Đould do ǁith soŵe eǆpeƌt guidaŶĐe aŶd suppoƌt͛. IŶstead, people 
were using informal sources of support such as the media, family, and friends. There is a big 
group of people who are looking at their options and they do not know what to do. One of 
our responders, June from Bristol, was typical – she said she felt ͞paƌalǇsed͟ ďǇ the choices 
oŶ offeƌ͛.480 
In September 2015, TPAS reported that those who used the service recently were most 
concerned about avoiding tax, accessing pension freedoms, and the lifetime allowance. 
They were also considering their options more carefully than those who approached TPAS at 
the ďegiŶŶiŶg of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ iŶ Apƌil ϮϬϭϱ and were looking to access their money 
as ƋuiĐklǇ as possiďle. Chaƌlotte JaĐksoŶ, head of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aŶd guidaŶĐe, said: ͚What ǁe 
are seeing now is that people are more considered and taking their time. Around 20% of 
people are saying to us they want a combination, the security of an annuity and a degree of 
fleǆiďilitǇ͛.481  
In December 2015, the Government announced that Pension Wise guidance was costing 
£496 per client to deliver. The cost of the service in 2015-16 was £39.4m, with advisers 
contributing £4.7m. Steven LeǀiŶ, Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe of Old Mutual Wealth͛s iŶǀestŵeŶt 
platfoƌŵ, said this ƌepƌeseŶted ͚pooƌ ǀalue͛ Đoŵpaƌed ǁith full peƌsoŶalised adǀiĐe, ǁhiĐh 
cost around £175 per hour. He said the industry needed to see better value for the £4.7m it 
is being asked to contribute.482 
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Steve Webb, now policy director at Royal London, believes that the resources put into 
Pension Wise would have been better used giving retirees vouchers for financial advice: 
͚GiǀeŶ the teŶs of ŵillioŶs that haǀe ďeeŶ speŶt oŶ PeŶsioŶ Wise, ŵaǇďe that ŵoŶeǇ should 
have been spent on £500 advice vouchers, so you can access financial advice and start to 
understand the value of the service. That might be the direction the Government should be 
goiŶg iŶ͛.483  In January 2016, the FCA said it would support a move for Pension Wise to 
provide a more personalised service for its clients.484 
3.6.4 The implications for members of DC schemes 
The Aon DC Member Survey, published in December 2014, of 2,000 occupational DC scheme 
members made the following predictions (which turned out to be a fairly accurate indicator 
of what actually happened in the first few months after Flexiday):485 
 Only 12% of the respondents to the suƌǀeǇ said that theǇ ǁould ŵake use of a ͚ǁeď-
ďased GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt guidaŶĐe seƌǀiĐe͛.  One third of the survey respondents intend to make important decisions about their 
retirement on their own, or with the help of friends and family. But the very high 
proportion of DC members that currently invest in their default DC investment 
option probably indicates that members do not engage much with the investment 
process prior to retirement.  Another quarter of the respondents said that they would seek the help of an 
independent financial adviser (IFA).  
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to Keith ChuƌĐhouse, diƌeĐtoƌ of Chapteƌs FiŶaŶĐial, it is ǀeƌǇ likelǇ that ͚foƌ soŵe, 
this guidance [from Pension Wise] will be extremely useful, for others it will be like receiving 
the instructions for a flat paĐk fuƌŶituƌe uŶit͛.486  According to financial solutions firm LEBC, 
the guidaŶĐe guaƌaŶtee ǁill do little ŵoƌe thaŶ deteƌ people fƌoŵ ͚doiŶg stupid thiŶgs͛ ǁith 
their pension pots, it will not help them plan for their retirement.487 
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TISA, in an initiative supported by 50 firms and trade bodies, wants the FCA to introduce a 
͚ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͛ staŶdaƌd foƌ the deliǀeƌǇ of guidaŶĐe to ĐoŶsuŵeƌs.488 This is because the 
rules around simplified advice and the boundary between guidance and advice are ͚just Ŷot 
Đleaƌ͛. The initiative, part of the Savings and Investments Policy Project (TSIP), wants the FCA 
to establish a set of 'kitemarks', using, for example, decision trees, which will help advisers 
guide consumers based on what 'people like you' should do. Currently, adviseƌs aƌe ͚too 
afƌaid͛ to guide ĐoŶsuŵeƌs uŶless it is paƌt of full ƌegulated adǀiĐe. 
In May 2015, MGM Advantage released the results of a survey conducted by ComRes of 
1,000 UK residents aged 55 and over who are not retired. The survey found that 65% 
thought that financial advice at the point of retirement should be compulsory. Only 11% 
said theǇ ǁeƌe ͚ǀeƌǇ Đoŵfoƌtaďle' ŵaŶagiŶg theiƌ peŶsioŶ iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt, ǁhile ϯϱ% said theǇ 
were not comfortable doing this and indicated they needed on-going advice. Andrew Tully, 
peŶsioŶs teĐhŶiĐal diƌeĐtoƌ at MGM AdǀaŶtage, said: ͚People aƌe ŵakiŶg diffiĐult, life-
changing decisions, made all the more complex by the new pension rules. We're seeing the 
majority of people recognise that without financial advice they may fail to realise the full 
implications and make decisions that end up costing them dearly. The Pension Wise 
guidance service is a good starting point for people. The service can help people understand 
the options available, but it may not be enough to help them make the choice that's right 
foƌ theiƌ peƌsoŶal ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes…We Ŷeed to ĐoŶtiŶue to ǁoƌk haƌd to pƌoŵote the 
benefits of people actually taking the next step and getting proper regulated financial 
advice. This is the only way we can remove the status quo, ensure we improve the 
outcomes for people at-retirement and make sure the new rules benefit as many of them as 
possiďle͛.489 
In May 2015, IFA software provider Intelliflo published the results of a survey of 1,000 adults 
earning at least £40,000 on their attitude to regulated financial advice. Around 39% said 
they would need a pension pot of at least £100,000 before they would consider seeking 
regulated financial advice, while 24% said between £50,000 and £100,000, 11% between 
£25,000 and £50,000, 11% between £10,000 and £25,000, and 14% if they had less than 
£10,000. However, 43% of respondents said they intended to manage their pension pot 
themselves.490 
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3.6.5 The implications for members of DB schemes transferring to DC schemes 
The Pension Schemes Act 201ϱ distiŶguishes ďetǁeeŶ ͚fleǆiďle͛ oƌ ͚safeguaƌded͛ ďeŶefits.491 
Flexible benefits comprise DC and cash balance benefits, while safeguarded benefits are DB 
benefits. The Act gives members a statutory right to transfer each category of benefit from 
their current scheme to another scheme. Members with DB benefits must have ceased 
accrual and made an application to transfer those benefits (following receipt of the 
statement of entitlement). Schemes do not have to provide the new flexibilities themselves. 
Further, existing scheme rules may not permit them. To enjoy the new flexibilities, members 
might have to transfer their benefits to another provider. However, if trustees do wish to 
offer the new options, they can now amend the scheme rules by resolution (with employer 
consent) or use a statutory override of the scheme rules.  
Trustees are required to give the following information to members with DC benefits at 
least four months before their retirement date: 492 
 A statement of the options available to the member under the scheme rules  A statement that they have the opportunity to transfer flexible benefits to one or 
more different pension providers  A statement that different pension providers offer different options in relation to 
what the member can do with the flexible benefits, including the option to select an 
annuity  A statement that different options have different features, different rates of 
payment, different charges and different tax implications  A copy of the guidance that explains the characteristic features of the options that 
has been prepared or approved by the regulator  An estimate of the value (or cash equivalent transfer value (CETV) if relevant) of the 
affeĐted ŵeŵďeƌ͛s fleǆiďle ďeŶefits ;if the ďeŶefits aƌe ͚tƌaŶsfeƌƌaďle ƌights͛ iŶ 
accordance with the disclosure regulations), the date that this was calculated, an 
explanation that this is not guaranteed and information about any guarantees or 
features, restrictions or conditions that could affect the value, and  A statement that there may be tax implications associated with accessing flexible 
benefits, that income from a pension is taxable and that the rate at which income 
from a pension is taxable depends on the amount of income that the member 
receives from their pension and other sources. 
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See The Pensions Regulator (2015) Regulatory Guidance: DB to DC Transfers and Conversions, April; 
http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/db-dc-transfers-conversions-regulatory-guidance.pdf 
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 The Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes (Disclosure of Information) (Amendment) Regulations 2015  
(https://www.gov.uk/Government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/405622/occupational-and-
personal-pension-disclosure-of-information-draft-amendment-regulations-2015.pdf); The Pensions Regulator 
(2015) Communicating with Members about Pension Flexibilities, March 
(http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/draft-essential-guide-pension-flexibilities-march-2015.pdf) 
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In the case of DB benefits, trustees are required to inform members that they have the right 
to DB benefits and how they can access information about them. Trustees must also direct 
members to Pension Wise on the options available to them, provide them with generic risk 
warnings on each option, and inform them that they should consider taking independent 
advice to help them decide which option is most suitable for them if they have flexible 
benefits, and must do so if they have safeguarded benefits. 
A poll of consultants to DB schemes conducted by Towers Watson showed that many 
members want to know what their transfer value is. Trustees should therefore consider the 
most cost-effective way of doing this, such as adding transfer values to all retirement letters 
rather than responding to individual requests. The poll indicated that around 20% of 
schemes had decided to automatically quote transfer values at retirement, 40% had decided 
not to, and around 40% were still undecided.493 
FidelitǇ͛s ‘etiƌeŵeŶt “eƌǀiĐe aŶŶouŶĐed iŶ OĐtoďeƌ ϮϬϭϱ that theƌe had ďeeŶ a ͚sigŶifiĐaŶt 
iŶĐƌease͛ iŶ iŶteƌest iŶ DB-to-DC transfers since April 2015, although the take-up had been 
small so far: 12% of its calls were about this topic. Richard Parkin, head of retirement at 
Fidelity International, expected partial transfers to become more popular than full transfers: 
͚If Ǉou haǀe £Ϯϱ,ϬϬϬ [iŶ DB ďeŶefits] aŶd Ǉou tƌade iŶ £ϱ,ϬϬϬ foƌ a pot of ŵoŶeǇ, it's ŵuĐh 
easier to have conversations about that, because you're not giving up your guaranteed 
incoŵe͛. “oŵe Đustoŵeƌs ǁeƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout the taǆ tƌeatŵeŶt of theiƌ DB ďeŶefits 
when they die, believing that it would be better to transfer to DC. Others just wanted to get 
their hands on the cash. But overall, there has also been a general increase in interest in 
pension planning since April. Mƌ PaƌkiŶ ǁeŶt oŶ to saǇ: ͚OŶe thiŶg I'ǀe staƌted to thiŶk aďout 
recently is that, as an industry, we're very nervous about DB-to-DC transfers because of 
what's happened in the past. We've tended to say that we can't do it – but that doesn't 
mean we shouldn't check. Are trustees or sponsors of DB plans really serving members 
properly by not looking at whether a transfer value makes sense? For example, if members 
are single or sick – or both – then DB may not be giving them value. We should be giving DB 
ŵeŵďeƌs ŵuĐh ďetteƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt help ƌatheƌ thaŶ just saǇiŶg ͞Ǉou'ǀe got a gold-plated 
pension, so you're lucky͟. DB is gƌeat ƋualitǇ, but you can't just make the assumption that 
that's always the case. Plan sponsors have an interest in doing that, because if they can 
reduce their liabilities in a way that also works for the members, then it's good for both 
sides͛.494  
Matthew Arends, partner at Aon Hewitt, speaking at the NAPF annual conference in 
October 2015, said that while transfer quote requests had risen since Flexiday, fewer than 
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 Reported in Lydia Rowson  (2015) Emerging reality on pension freedom - What can sponsors and trustees 
expect in the new pensions world?, Towers Watson Trustee Briefing, 8 June. 
494 
Reported in Stephanie Baxter (2015)DB to DC transfer enquiries double in just one month, Professional 
Pensions, 3 November. 
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1% of members had actually taken up the option. He questioned whether only 1% of people 
are better off by transferring out of their DB scheme. He argued that DB schemes needed to 
employ different communications methods – such as telephone and online chat facilities as 
well as online modellers – if members are to understand options such as transfers to DC 
schemes. He pointed out that 40% of schemes that provide CETVs to members also provide 
access to independent financial advice, but despite this, take up of this advice remains 
low. 495  However, in December 2015, Xafinity reported that the number of people 
transferring out of DB pension schemes each month had doubled since January.496  
The FCA͛s ƌeǀieǁ of eŶhaŶĐed tƌaŶsfeƌ ǀalues ;ETVsͿ puďlished iŶ JulǇ ϮϬϭϰ fouŶd that 
advisers had failed to assess whether the transfer was suitable for customers for a number 
of reasons including: 
 generic templates which were inadeƋuatelǇ ͚tailoƌed͛ so the adǀiĐe did Ŷot ƌefleĐt 
speĐifiĐ ŵeŵďeƌ ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes oƌ giǀe suffiĐieŶt pƌioƌitǇ to the ŵeŵďeƌs͛ oǁŶ 
requirements  advice where the outcome focused solely on critical yield analysis497 without full 
consideration of wider member circumstances   not establishing adequately the level of risk a member is willing and able to take  fund recommendations which did not match the assessed risk profile of the member  the use of default receiving schemes (in some cases, with uncompetitive charging 
stƌuĐtuƌesͿ aŶd liŵited ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ of the suitaďilitǇ of a ŵeŵďeƌ͛s otheƌ eǆistiŶg 
pension arrangements, and   limited consideration of the tax and, in a small number of cases, means-tested 
benefit implications of accepting the offer.498  
There were also failures concerning disclosure, such as: 
 incomplete record keeping  the ͚aŶŶuitǇ ƌisk͛ of tƌaŶsfeƌ fƌoŵ DB to DC Ŷot ďeiŶg fullǇ eǆplaiŶed  over-eŵphasis oŶ the possiďle ͚fleǆiďilitǇ͛ uŶdeƌ a DC sĐheŵe iŶ uŶdeƌtakiŶg the 
transfer analysis 
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 Reported in Helen Morrissey (2015) NAPF 2015: New communication approach needed for DB-DC transfers, 
Professional Pensions, 16 October.  
496 
Reported in Professional Pensions (2015) Defined benefit transfers double since January, 3 December. 
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The critical yield is the investment return which is required in the new arrangement to match the existing 
scheme benefits. The analysis also makes a number of assumptions about factors which will impact on both 
the pension received from the DB scheme and the cost of matching the benefits. This will include assumptions 
made about the various indices which will impact on the revaluation of the pension and also factors such as 
gilt yields which will impact on the conversion of the pension fund to an income.   
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  Financial Conduct Authority (2014)  Enhanced Transfer Value Pension Transfers, Thematic Review TR14/12, 
July. 
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 offers being structured against a reduced transfer value and therefore appearing 
artificially generous, and   Ŷo ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ of the ŵeŵďeƌs͛ additioŶal ǀoluŶtaƌǇ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ ;AVCͿ fuŶds as 
part of the advice process.  
Clive Adamson, director of supervision at the FCA, said: ͚TƌaŶsfeƌƌiŶg fƌoŵ a DB to a DC 
scheme is an important decision for consumers. It is disappointing that our review saw 
failings in the advice given, particularly when incentives [such as a direct cash offer499] have 
been provided to transfer. All firms active in this complex area of pension transfer activity 
should think very carefully about the quality of the advice process and assurance framework 
ƌeƋuiƌed to deliǀeƌ faiƌ Đustoŵeƌ outĐoŵes͛.500  
The same FCA review found that 59% of members who accepted an ETV from a DB scheme 
did so as aŶ ͚iŶsisteŶt ĐlieŶt͛ agaiŶst theiƌ adǀiseƌ͛s ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ.501  The FCA wants 
advisers to ensure they have recorded the client's reasons for wanting to transfer out of the 
scheme and have discussed the risks involved as well as alternative options.  
Those who want to transfer pension pots worth less than £30,000 are not required to take 
advice. While this would lead to cost savings for trustees, it was not without risk for scheme 
members.  According to Stephen Green, senior coŶsultaŶt at Toǁeƌs WatsoŶ: ͚The faĐt that 
advice isn't required for small pensions does not mean that this is a decision to be taken 
lightly – especially where people have little else besides their state pension to fall back on. 
But if someone's other final salary pensions will provide them with a good income in any 
case, their desire to swap a small pension for a pot of capital that they can access as they 
like ŵaǇ haǀe oǀeƌƌiddeŶ aŶǇ fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe Ŷot to do so.͛502  
The situation could be even worse for people living abroad who want to transfer their UK 
pension scheme. According to a FCA rule update published in July 2015, they might have to 
pay twice for advice. This is the interpretation given by Intelligent Pensions technical 
director, Daǀid TƌeŶŶeƌ: ͚While most focus has been on the definition of safeguarded 
benefits and the need for a pension transfer specialist, there is a small section in the FCA 
feedback document which seems to have passed without comment. This is the section 
dealing with overseas residents and that they may end up having to pay for two advisers 
and therefore paying twice͛. This is because there are two stages in the advice process: (a) is 
a transfer suitable? and (b), if it is, where should the money be transferred to? The FCA 
points out that UK-authorised advisers may not have knowledge of local tax regimes and 
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 The practice of offering cash has now been outlawed. 
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Reported in Laura Miller (2014) FCA probe slams ETV pension transfer advice, Professional Pensions, 24 July. 
501 AŶ ͚iŶsisteŶt ĐlieŶt͛ is soŵeoŶe ǁho aĐts agaiŶst soŵe eleŵeŶt of the adǀiĐe ƌeĐeiǀed. TǇpiĐallǇ the adǀiĐe 
was to remain in the DB scheme, but the member transferred despite this recommendation.   
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Quoted in Natasha Browne (2015) FCA introduces emergency rules to prevent mis-selling from April, 
Professional Pensions, 26 January 2015. 
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pension rules, and says that it is in discussion with the DWP to consider whether 
amendments should be made to the rules for non-UK ƌesideŶts. Mƌ TƌeŶŶeƌ added: ͚While 
we can have some sympathy with clients needing to pay two advisers, it is absolutely 
essential that the requirement for a UK-registered transfer specialist is retained. We have in 
the past seen overseas advisers transferring DB values into QROPS [Qualifying Recognised 
Oǀeƌseas PeŶsioŶ “Đheŵe] ǁith Ŷo ďeŶefit ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ aŶd the oŶlǇ ͞ƌeasoŶ ǁhǇ͟ giǀen 
being that they are no longer in the UK, so they would not want their pension to remain in 
the UK. A professional firm will set up an arrangement with offshore specialists to ensure 
that the UK adviser understands all of the relevant aspects of the overseas jurisdiction, and 
the ƌesultiŶg teaŵ ǁill ďe stƌoŶgeƌ thaŶ the suŵ of the tǁo paƌts͛. The keǇ ƌeasoŶ ǁas to 
pƌoteĐt ĐoŶsuŵeƌs: ͚We ǁeƌe appƌoaĐhed ďǇ a Đouple ǁho had eŵigƌated to Duďai, ďut 
decided it was not right for them. They were only in Dubai for two years, but this was long 
enough for a local adviser to transfer benefits from two DB schemes (one the NHS Pension 
Scheme), and to deduct 12% in hidden charges. It is essential that the rules are not watered 
doǁŶ iŶ aŶǇ ǁaǇ͛.503 
In July 2015, the Government accepted that some consumers were frustrated by the new 
legislative and regulatory requirements to seek financial advice in certain circumstances, 
although it said there was no legal requirement to follow the advice offered. It believed 
theƌe ǁas ͚iŶsuffiĐieŶt ĐlaƌitǇ͛ oŶ ǁheŶ adǀiĐe ǁas ƌeƋuiƌed aŶd said that this issue ǁould ďe 
raised as part on a Treasury consultation on pension transfers and early exit charges.
504
 
Also in July 2015, The Pensions Regulator (TPR) announced that it was considering bringing 
its guidance to pension scheme trustees on communicating the new retirement flexibilities 
into line with the FCA rules. Previous TPR guidance was to give members only generic 
information if they were considering accessing their pension pot, while the FCA rules say 
providers of contract-based products must give tailored risk warnings. The reason for the 
iŶitial diffeƌeŶĐe ǁas that tƌustees ǁeƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout ͚stƌaǇiŶg too Đlose to giǀiŶg 
fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe͛ ǁhiĐh Đould ďe aǀoided ďǇ giǀiŶg oŶlǇ geŶeƌiĐ warnings. Going forward, 
particularly for large DC schemes and master trusts that plan to offer the full suite of 
drawdown options to members, TPR will discuss with the DWP and the FCA whether 
tƌustees ͚should also ďe able to offer specific risk warnings which would be as similar as 
possiďle to the FCA's seĐoŶd liŶe of defeŶĐe foƌ pƌoǀideƌs͛. TP‘ ďelieǀes it is ͚iŵpoƌtaŶt foƌ 
ƌegulatoƌs to ǁoƌk togetheƌ to ŵake suƌe theƌe ǁas Ŷo ƌegulatoƌǇ gap͛.505 
 
                                                     
503 
Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) Overseas residents hit with double pension transfer advice charge, 
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 Reported in Scott Sinclair (2015) Govt says savers in a muddle over mandatory advice rules, Professional 
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3.7 Opportunities for advisers 
The new pensions environment was seeŶ ďǇ soŵe as a ͚huge oppoƌtuŶitǇ͛ foƌ adǀiseƌs. Not 
the least of these was Steve Webb when he was Pensions Minister. Speaking at the 
Retirement Planner Forum and Awards 2014,506 Mƌ Weďď said ͚the guidaŶĐe guaƌaŶtee 
would only get people to the starting line, giving them just a basic understanding of what 
their options are and issues such as taxation and longevity. [T]here was only so much that 
could be covered in such a limited conversation, which would only equip them with the very 
basics of retirement planning. There are some in the advice community who see this as a 
threat. I see it as a huge opportunity. I liken the guidance guarantee to wine tasting and you, 
the advisers, are a vintage wine. When people realise what choices they have; when there is 
innovation in product, which I am sure there will be; when people start to consider all their 
retirement wealth and income and all their partner's retirement wealth and income and all 
the different permeations of the new freedoms they have got, I think many people will want 
to talk fuƌtheƌ to soŵeoŶe ǁho ĐaŶ help aŶd that seeŵs to ŵe to ďe aŶ adǀiseƌ…ǁho ĐaŶ 
giǀe theŵ peƌsoŶal tailoƌed adǀiĐe͛.507  
 
3.7.1 Opportunities for advisers in regulated advice 
Others agree and see an important role for regulated advice going forward. For example, 
DuŶĐaŶ Jaƌƌett, ƌetail ŵaŶagiŶg diƌeĐtoƌ at AegoŶ, said: ͚There's a massive opportunity for 
advisers, as 65% of people don't understand the pension reforms and even those who do 
are likely to require support selecting the right combination of income products. Advice has 
never been so important and to help advisers we've introduced Your Retirement Planner to 
bring customer options to life and the tool responds based on the combination of income 
options they select. We expect advised customers will want to take full advantage of the 
new flexibilities and combine a range of diffeƌeŶt iŶĐoŵe optioŶs͛. AegoŶ said ĐoŶsuŵeƌs 
using the site direct would be more likely to seek regulated advice afterwards.508 
“iŵilaƌlǇ, ‘iĐhaƌd Nuttall, head of ĐoŵpliaŶĐe poliĐǇ at “iŵplǇBiz Gƌoup, said: ͚It is eǆpeĐted 
that one of the main outcomes for these individuals [from the guidance guarantee] will be 
to obtain regulated financial advice. For those firms wishing to engage in this activity, it 
represents a great opportunity. Where individuals require, or are guided towards, regulated 
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financial advice, the Money Advice Service will have a directory of advisers for the individual 
to aĐĐess͛.509 
“taŶdaƌd Life͛s head of platfoƌŵ aŶd ǁealth propositions, David Tiller, also believes that 
pensions freedom has handed advisers their biggest business opportunity ever on account 
of ͚the faĐt that peŶsioŶs ĐaŶ Ŷoǁ ďe faŶtastiĐ foƌ ǁealth tƌaŶsfeƌ aŶd suppoƌtiŶg the Ŷeǆt 
geŶeƌatioŶ oŶ theiƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt saǀiŶgs is a ĐoŵpelliŶg oppoƌtuŶitǇ to opeŶ ĐlieŶts͛ eǇes to 
the art of financial planning͛.510  According to Mr Tiller, retirement planning has become 
much more complex, but it is filled with opportunity for three reasons: 
1. Baby boomers reaching retirement means demand will remain at an all-time high for 
some time. 
2. These people are the wealthiest retirees this country has ever had. 
3. For many, choices are now so complex they may find it challenging to get good 
outcomes by themselves. 
Mr Tiller estimates that drawdown was about 5% of adviser business in 2014, but by 2024, it 
could be 80% of adviser business. He believes that the key to coping with this increase in 
deŵaŶd is ǁhat he Đalls a ͚ĐeŶtƌalised ƌetiƌeŵeŶt pƌopositioŶ͛, ǁhiĐh ǁill Đoǀeƌ: 
 Tax advice policy – having established client needs around income and wealth 
transfer, working out the best tax wrapper to take this from. Subject to using tax 
allowances, this is often going to mean taking from the pension last (turning 
previous advice on its head)  Cashflow modelling – how much income can they take given total assets and any 
goals on wealth transfer. With the removal of GAD limits, many advisers are using 
GAD as a proxy, but we are seeing different standardised approaches to projecting 
assets and sustainability of income  Investment advice – creating an investment strategy for clients who may live off 
their portfolio for 30 years is a sophisticated multi-goal investment challenge. Many 
advisers have already developed disciplined CIP [centralised investment proposition] 
processes around accumulation; it is now about doing the same thing for 
decumulation  Accessing investment solutions – creating a decumulation CIP will inevitably demand 
accessing new investment solutions that manage volatility and sequence-of-returns 
risk in retirement (pound cost ravaging)511 
                                                     
509
 Richard Nuttall (2015) Everything advisers need to know about Pension Wise, Professional Adviser,  23 
January; see Appendix. 
510 
David Tiller (2015) Has pensions freedom given advisers their biggest opportunity yet?, Retirement Planner, 
25 June. 
511
 Sequence-of-returns risk is explained in Chapter 2. 
273 
 
 Withdrawal policy – setting clear customer expectations of how their income will 
change over time – streamlining annual reviews as expectations already set and 
avoiding difficult conversations when significant changes happen as the customer 
expectations set. 
The new pension freedoms have encouraged a number of advisers to extend the range of 
services they offer to well-off clients, with a new focus on wealth management and financial 
planniŶg. Theƌe had alƌeadǇ ďeeŶ a ŵajoƌ ĐhaŶge iŶ adǀiseƌs͛ ďusiŶess ŵodels folloǁiŶg the 
introduction of the Retail Distribution Review (RDR)512 in 2013, with a move to discretionary 
services and away from the low end of the advised market. Examples include: 
 Brewin Dolphin expands financial planning business (May 2014)  Rathbone launches private office (February 2015) and acquires independent financial 
advice network Vision Group (October 2015)  Charles Stanley refocuses business entirely on wealth management (April 2015)  IŶǀesteĐ Wealth lauŶĐhes pƌiǀate offiĐe foƌ ͚uŶdeƌ-seƌǀed͛ iŶǀestoƌs ǁith a ŵiŶiŵuŵ 
of £10m (April 2015). 
By contrast, life assurers – which traditionally had a dominant role in providing retirement 
income solutions – have responded to the new pension environment by offering a 'vertically 
integrated' service that has been put together through acquisitions. Examples include: 
 Old Mutual acquires the Intrinsic network (July 2014) and launches national advice 
business called Old Mutual Wealth Private Client Advisers (October 2015)  Standard Life buys adviser Pearson Jones with the aim of building up a face-to-face 
advisory service in addition to telephone and online advisory services. The new 
service will be called 1825  (February 2015).513 
In November 2015, Tilney Bestinvest and Saga introduced a financial planning and 
investment service offering regulated advice, guidance and execution-only services to the 
over-50s. The service is aimed at the estimated 12.5 million people who have made no 
financial plaŶ foƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt. Custoŵeƌs ĐaŶ ͚do it oŶ theiƌ oǁŶ͛ ǁith fƌee oŶliŶe aŶd 
telephone support, take one-off guidance, or have a longer-term relationship with a 
professional adviser. Initial adviser charges range from between 1% and 3% – depending on 
complexity – plus ongoing fees of between 0.75% and 1.25% per year. Nici Audhlam-
GaƌdiŶeƌ, “aga IŶǀestŵeŶt “eƌǀiĐes ŵaŶagiŶg diƌeĐtoƌ, said: ͚BǇ ĐoŵďiŶiŶg TilŶeǇ 
Bestinvest's investment expertise with Saga's 60-year history of improving the lives of the 
over-50s, we have created a service that will help make investment easier to understand 
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and more accessible, particularly for those who have been underserved by the financial 
seƌǀiĐes iŶdustƌǇ iŶ the past͛. Custoŵeƌs ǁill also haǀe aĐĐess to fleǆi-access drawdown.514 
Another trend that is developing is increasing collaboration between advisers and 
accountants as the demand for tax planning increases following the introduction of 
͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛. These fiŶdiŶgs Đaŵe fƌoŵ a poll of ϭϮϬ adǀiseƌs ĐoŶduĐted ďǇ 
Prudential in August 2015. Vince Smith-Hughes, director of business development at 
PƌudeŶtial, said: ͚PeŶsioŶ fƌeedoŵ has uŶdeƌliŶed the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of iŶdepeŶdeŶt fiŶaŶĐial 
adǀiĐe….Maƌkets ǁhiĐh ŵight haǀe ďeeŶ Đlosed ďefoƌe aƌe poteŶtiallǇ opeŶiŶg up, ďut theƌe 
is a realisation that advisers may need additional expertise. Working with the ICAEW 
[Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales] financial services faculty, we 
hope to explore the opportunities presented by pension freedom legislation for advisers and 
aĐĐouŶtaŶts͛.515 
 
3.7.2 Opportunities for advisers in simplified advice 
JohŶ Poƌteous, head of ĐlieŶt pƌopositioŶ at ToǁƌǇ, aƌgues that ͚siŵplified adǀiĐe is a Đleaƌ 
missing link between guidance and full advice, but there are numerous challenges, 
'ǀalidatioŶ' [oƌ suitaďilitǇ] aŵoŶg theŵ…. [T] teĐhŶologǇ-led innovation around the principle 
of simplified advice creates an opportunity for firms to reach out to different client 
segŵeŶts͛.516 
The greater use of existing IT and computer-generated advice is critical to the success of 
simplified advice,517 not least because of the significant decline in advisers post-RDR to 
around 22,500.518 The FCA has offered help to advisers to build simplified advice models, by 
giving them an 'informal steer' on, for example, how to clarify the boundary between 
guidance and advice. This is part of its Project Innovate and will be managed through 
Innovation Hub, launched in October 2014. Innovation Hub was set up both to help firms 
negotiate the regulatory landscape and to allow the FCA to assess what it can do to promote 
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innovation in financial services.
519
 This is iŶ ƌespoŶse to adǀiseƌs͛ feaƌs aďout possiďle 
͚sǇsteŵatiĐ ŵis-selliŶg͛ usiŶg siŵplified adǀiĐe ŵodels.520 
At the lower end of the market, companies, such as Scottish Widows, have established 
online guidance and a call centre to help those who want to transfer, but do not have a 
financial adviser. Peter Glancy, head of corporate propositions at Scottish Widows, said: 
͛TƌaditioŶallǇ, it has ďeeŶ people ǁith huŶdƌeds of thousands of pounds who really know 
what they are doing [using drawdown]. Now we are going to be working with people who 
just want to get some money out and may be putting it into drawdown by default without 
realising the tax implications. We need to make suƌe ǁe͛ƌe eŶgagiŶg ǁith theŵ ŵoƌe 
iŶtuitiǀelǇ aŶd Ŷot alloǁiŶg theŵ to do aŶǇthiŶg sillǇ͛.521 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Prudential has launched a non-advised drawdown product for 
customers who want to take advantage of pensions freedom, but choose not to consult an 
adviser. Its Pension Choices Plan offers access to its PruFunds range, its Dynamic Portfolios, 
and its cash fund.  The minimum investment is £25,000.522 Similarly, Zurich has launched a 
non-advised drawdown product with a minimum investment of £30,000, as has Blackrock.523 
AegoŶ͛s oŶliŶe ‘etiƌeŵeŶt ChoiĐes platfoƌŵ has a dƌaǁdoǁŶ optioŶ ǁhiĐh ƌeƋuiƌes 
customers to take advice, but the firm is planning to introduce a simplified non-advised 
version. 
Just Retirement has launched a simplified telephone-based advice service for providers to 
offer to their clients when they retire. Stephen Lowe, group external affairs director, said:  
͚The seƌǀiĐe is desigŶed foƌ ĐlieŶts ǁith siŵple, stƌaight-forward needs and savings of 
between £30,000 to £40,000. It's aimed at life companies that want to ensure their pension 
savers are more actively engaged in the decision-making process at retirement, while 
passing on the responsibility for the regulated advice. Charging structures for the service will 
be agreed with the individual life companies and will be charged separately from other 
products, but clients will only have to pay if they act on the recommendation. Clients opting 
for the service will receive personal recommendations about how to use their pension 
savings to generate income or access lump sums. The advice will also look at whether clients 
should keep funds invested based on their attitude to risk and capacity for loss or whether 
they should defer taking benefits. Simplified advice is set to be a cost-effective way of giving 
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retirees, who usually wouldn't choose to engage in accessing advice, the helping hand they 
are going to need in the future. The majority of these Middle Britain pension savers won't 
have complex requirements, so a simplified advice service should ďe a good optioŶ͛.524  
Hargreaves Lansdown has introduced a restricted advice service which has allowed it to 
simplify its fee tariff and remove the minimum portfolio size for advice. It will now advise 
clients over the telephone, regardless of the size of their portfolio, for a minimum fee of 
£495. Face-to-face advice costs a minimum of £1,495.525 
AlliaŶĐeBeƌŶsteiŶ͛s ‘etiƌeŵeŶt Bƌidge pƌoduĐt, ǁhiĐh Đoǀeƌs ŵeŵďeƌs ďetǁeeŶ age ϱϱ aŶd 
7ϱ, iŶĐludes ͚eŵďedded adǀiĐe͛. Tim Banks, managing director of the Pensions Strategies 
Gƌoup, said: ͚You ĐaŶ take out aŶǇ aŵouŶt of ŵoŶeǇ Ǉou like as Đash aŶǇ tiŵe, ďut the 
iŵpaĐt of Ǉou takiŶg additioŶal luŵp suŵs is Đleaƌ, ďeĐause Ǉou sell ͚uŶits͛ iŶ the fuŶd aŶd 
ĐaŶ see ǁhat iŶĐoŵe Ǉou aƌe sǁappiŶg foƌ Đash.͛ 526 
3.7.3 The frequency of advice 
There is also a question about how often advice is needed. Many advisers felt that there is 
more to retirement planning than can be covered in a single meeting. For example, Buck 
CoŶsultaŶts said: ͚The iŵpliĐatioŶ…that the guidaŶĐe…ĐaŶ ďe delivered on one occasion, at 
which the member will take decisions on all aspects of their retirement planning, is not 
credible - even if the expected outcome, in most cases, is that the member will choose to 
select a packaged solution. [Employers could hold] regular informal discussions with groups 
of employees on pensions matters [so when specific situations arise, individuals can take 
professional advice which can be] focused and kept to a minimum, [thereby reducing 
costs]͛.527  
Clients apparently want to receive communications from their advisers 11 times a year, 
according to a survey of client satisfaction conducted by NPG Wealth Management, SEI and 
Scorpio Partnership in which 3,113 investors globally were questioned. Clients who only see 
their relationship manager 6 times a year gave a poor satisfaction score. On the other hand, 
more than 13 annual contacts was considered too much. Most 'heavily invested' clients 
preferred to deal directly with their adviser, while those with less than a quarter of their 
assets with a wealth management firm prefer to contact product specialists or use a digital 
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service. The two main reasons for a contact were to discuss overall progress and to consider 
relevant portfolio changes.528  
Others suggest less frequent contact is acceptable if this is what the client wants. According 
to Paul Harrison, head of business consultancy at Prudential, advisers should tailor their 
ongoing services to their clients and do not need to see all of them annually to satisfy an 
unwritten rule about treating active customers fairly. While the core service a firm offers 
should be consistent – and have the charging structure for it – advisers should think about 
modifying how often they see their clients and through which channels in order to free up 
capacity. For instance, some clients may not require annual check-ups and could be seen 
every two or three years. Others could be serviced over the phone or online to supplement 
face-to-face meetings. Nevertheless, many advisers are concerned about the FCA͛s attitude 
to adviser charging for ongoing advice. In its reviews of the implementation of RDR in April 
and December 2014, the FCA found evidence of firms receiving an ongoing adviser charge, 
while not providing a genuine service in return. It said that the value of an ongoing advice 
seƌǀiĐe aĐted as aŶ ͚iŵpoƌtaŶt ŵotiǀatoƌ͛ iŶ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs' deĐisioŶs to paǇ foƌ fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe 
in the first place.529 
3.8 The impact of technology on advice 
Technology was at the heart of affordable advice, according to a poll of advisers conducted 
during a Professional Adviser web-seminar on 6 October 2015. Around 91% of advisers 
polled thought technology was important or extremely important when trying to provide 
affordable advice. Just 3% thought it was unimportant and the rest were non-committal.530   
 
3.8.1 Platforms 
 ͚Platfoƌŵs ǁill ďe the pƌiŵaƌǇ faĐilitatoƌ foƌ ŵaŶǇ peŶsioŶers and advisers in managing 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt fuŶds͛, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to Alistaiƌ WilsoŶ, head of ƌetail platfoƌŵ stƌategǇ at )uƌiĐh. 
Adǀiseƌs Ŷeed to ďe aǁaƌe of the fuŶĐtioŶalitǇ of diffeƌeŶt pƌoǀideƌs͛ platfoƌŵs iŶ teƌŵs of: 
 Access to income through flexible access drawdown, some may also offer annuities  Taking the whole pot as a cash lump sum  Partial (ad-hoc) lump sums without crystallising the pot  Existing capped drawdown plans on their platform going forward  Transfers of existing capped drawdown plans on to their platform 
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Mƌ WilsoŶ adds: ͚Wheƌe a ĐlieŶt ǁaŶts to haǀe a fiǆed ŵoŶthlǇ paǇŵeŶt, this should be 
relatively simple, but where the payments may include ad hoc requests, the dynamics 
become very complex. Understanding what at first glance appears to be a piece of trading 
functionality becomes ever more important. And so, it is important to look in detail at the 
challenges relating to platform functionality and associated costs when taking an income, 
especially if these costs change if income is stopped, reduced or restarted. Add to this, 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the ͞iŶ-flight͟ eǀeŶts suĐh as Đoƌpoƌate aĐtioŶs aŶd the iŵpaĐt these ĐaŶ 
have on income, there is an increasing amount to ďe ĐoŶsideƌed…PƌoǀidiŶg ĐlieŶts fasteƌ 
access to their cash, or at the very least, not imposing processes that delay access, comes to 
the foƌe. ClieŶts doŶ͛t eǆpeĐt teĐhŶologǇ to sloǁ doǁŶ aĐĐess aŶd, for some platforms 
ǁhiĐh doŶ͛t pƌefuŶd soŵe tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs, this is eǆaĐtlǇ ǁhat ĐaŶ happeŶ….The pƌoďleŵ is 
further compounded by the fact that many clients will be expecting to stagger their entry 
into retirement, such that, at the same time as withdrawing funds as efficiently as possible 
across tax wrappers, they may also still be making contributions. It goes without saying 
clients are not going to be happy to have to pay extra and wait longer for their cash if they 
Đould also faĐe a sĐeŶaƌio ǁheƌe theƌe is iŶsuffiĐieŶt Đash to paǇ iŶĐoŵe oŶ tiŵe….Those 
platforms that support cash management automation will come into their own with pension 
fƌeedoŵs, pƌoǀidiŶg ĐlieŶts aŶd adǀiseƌs ǁith aŶ additioŶal safetǇ Ŷet͛. The folloǁiŶg Đosts 
also need to be taken into account: setting up and management of pension income, ongoing 
fees foƌ effeĐtiǀelǇ ͚paǇƌoll͛ adŵiŶistƌatioŶ, ad-hoc payments, and additional costs when 
releasing individual pots.531  
Richard Budnyj, director of Platform Action, considers the pricing challenges facing  
platforms in the post-RDR world. The client needs to pay for the services offered by the 
adviser (if the client is advised), the investment manager and the pƌoduĐt pƌoǀideƌ͛s 
platform. Mr Budnyj discusses these in turn: 
 Advisers: 
o Pre-RDR, advisers typically received 50bps in commission from the product 
provider. Post-RDR, though many advisers have fared well by adapting their 
business models and segmenting their clients to focus on those who believe 
in the service value they bring, not enough clients have been willing to pay 
directly for advice. As a result, we have seen a rationalisation of advisers. We 
are also left with a great swathe of clients who, due to the size of their 
investment pots, are not a viable proposition for advisers anymore, but who 
do need advice. Yes, there are people out there who can 'DIY', but a large 
population have been left in limbo, leading many providers to see this as an 
opportunity and set up direct-to-consumer (D2C) propositions 
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 Investment managers: 
o The investment managers have had to deliver new fund classes, but overall 
one could argue they have not had to cut their cloth to the same extent as 
providers are having to. I suspect they'll argue they are about value and that 
the net return given to investors is the most important thing. As an investor, I 
am happy to pay the value premium  Product providers 
o The product provider level is where we are seeing significant pressure for 
reductions in price, with some calling it a race to the bottom. But for how 
long can they sustain this position? We currently have a number of smaller 
independent wrap platforms who arguably have the right business model but 
are struggling to make profit because they don't yet have the required scale. 
To succeed long-term, they need to increase assets under management and 
their low-cost base means the break even point is far lower than platforms 
with a life company heritage. But, given the huge influx of assets onto 
platforms in recent years, successful independent platforms are likely to be 
those which can now attract assets transferred from other platforms. For the 
platforms which have grown out of traditional life companies, although they 
have the scale in terms of assets, they also have the high costs associated 
with servicing legacy business and so are also struggling to make a profit. 
These companies are under greater pressure to scale further as their 
breakeven point is much more challenging. 
 Mr Budnyj believes that updated technology alone cannot create long-term profitability for 
many platforms and he proposes two solutions: greater operational efficiency within the life 
companies (with new digital technology at the core) and consolidation with the smaller 
players, through mergers and acquisitions.532 
Standard Life͛s David Tiller also predicts a contraction of the platform market from 25 to 
about 15 platforms by 2018, but only around six of these will cater to advisers. He warns 
advisers to avoid being trapped in dying platforms which may find it hard to find a buyer. 
This is because rival platforms would find it difficult to integrate systems and so would only 
be interested in the assets not the rest of the business. Adviser platforms would therefore 
haǀe to sǁitĐh to a DϮC oƌ ǁoƌkplaĐe ŵodel oƌ ďeĐoŵe ͚zoŵďies͛, ĐlosiŶg to Ŷeǁ ďusiŶess 
but limping on as has happened in Australia. Advisers who become trapped in such 
platforms risk falling behind their competitors which have their clients' assets invested on 
more modern platforms. Mr Tiller argues that there are nine things advisers should be 
looking for in their platforms: 
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1. The advisers using the platform have progressive business models, are successful, 
compliant and are growing ahead of the market 
2. Operating a successful UK adviser platform is core to the business strategy and 
commercial model of the platform owner 
3. The platform has access to capital funding from committed long-term owners 
4. The platform has seen sustained new business growth from advisers, as opposed to 
direct or workplace assets 
5. The platform has a stable pricing position and business strategy 
6. The platform has maintained a consistent level of service and support for advisers as 
it has grown 
7. There is a track record of continuous enhancement of the platform, such as by 
investment in the underlying technology 
8. The platform has a clear business plan and roadmap of further development for 
advisers 
9. The platform has proactively embraced the RDR and helped advisers adapt to it.533 
Average platform costs have fallen by 18% over the last five years, according to a study 
published in July 2015 by Steve Nelson and Terry Huddart called Platform Pricing 
Prophecies: Past, Present and Phuture.534 For an average sized portfolio of £200,000, the 
annual platform cost has fallen since 2011 from 0.38% to 0.31%, or by £140.  The main 
explanations for this are: RDR, competitive pressure, a focus on due diligence among 
advisers, and a significant migration of assets to platforms enabling scale economies to be 
passed on to customers.  
Nevertheless, it is hard for advisers to compare platform costs and this could help to explain 
why cost appears to be low on advisers list of priorities when recommending a platform, 
ǁith the studǇ fiŶdiŶg ͚Ŷo ƌeal eǀideŶĐe poiŶtiŶg to a dispƌopoƌtioŶate aŵouŶt of assets 
floǁiŶg iŶto Đheapeƌ pƌopositioŶs͛. IŶstead, adǀiseƌs Đhoose platfoƌŵs ďased oŶ faĐtoƌs 
other than price, such as suitability to their clients and their own business requirements. 
The study predicts that the price falls seen in recent years will come to an end as platforms 
fail to see them translating into more business. On the other hand, the study argues that the 
asset management charge is an item to look at if the cost to the customer is to be reduced 
fuƌtheƌ: ͚let's ďe hoŶest, theƌe is ŵoƌe fat to Đut heƌe͛.535 
As a result of price pressures, poor back-office systems, and outdated front-end 
technologies, some even predict that platforms in their current form are finished. This is the 
view of the lang cat consultancy in its report Platforms are Dead published in October 2015. 
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Mike Baƌƌett, ĐoŶsultaŶĐǇ diƌeĐtoƌ at the laŶg Đat, said: ͚We'ƌe ĐoŶǀiŶĐed that platfoƌŵs –  
at least in the guise that we've known them for the last decade and a half – are dead. With 
most of the sector's 25 platforms now operating for at least a decade, more should be 
running at a profit and with clear strategic objectives and charging structures. There's an 
urgent need for platforms to improve back-office systems and processes to reduce costs, 
and to improve their online offerings. In several cases, a platform's customer portal requires 
you to use a PC with Internet Explorer, and even then you can only get a valuation. That's 
just crazy. In a digital world, customers expect much more and a number of direct platforms 
aƌe staƌtiŶg to addƌess this͛. Mr Barrett also agrees that future platform consolidation is 
liŵited ďǇ teĐhŶologǇ: ͚With siǆ ŵaiŶ suppliers providing the necessary systems for most 
platforms – Bravura, FNZ, GBST, IFDS, JHC Figaro and SEI – and with re-platforming between 
providers operating different systems so difficult, this Đould affeĐt ĐoŶsolidatioŶ͛. He does, 
however, believe that an increasing demand for advice following Flexiday have thrown a 
lifeliŶe to platfoƌŵs: ͚Those platfoƌŵs that eŶaďle adǀiseƌs to deliǀeƌ theiƌ adǀiĐe 
pƌopositioŶ iŶ a ŵaŶŶeƌ ďefittiŶg the digital age ǁill flouƌish͛.536 
AŶ eǆaŵple of aŶ oŶliŶe platfoƌŵ lauŶĐhed to giǀe sĐheŵe ŵeŵďeƌs aĐĐess to ͚fƌeedoŵ 
aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ is Bigďlue TouĐh ϰlife fƌoŵ AoŶ EŵploǇee BeŶefits. The folloǁiŶg seƌǀiĐes ǁill ďe 
offered to those reaching retirement: an annuity broking service to compare prices and 
select the provider and annuity which matches their needs; flexible drawdown, access to 
cash and a range of investment funds and strategies; online modelling tools; and access to 
adǀiĐe if Ŷeeded. Deďďie FalǀeǇ, head of DC pƌopositioŶ, said: ͚With increased freedoms 
since April this year, there is now a great deal, more choice, but this needs to be supported 
and guided responsibly. Bigblue Touch 4life helps members make sense of their options. It 
allows them to make fully informed decisions and to structure their retirement savings in a 
ǁaǇ that has pƌeǀiouslǇ ďeeŶ iŵpossiďle͛.537  
In January 2016, Zurich reported the results of a survey of 120 advisers which found that  
64% of them were reassessing their platforms as a result of concerns over functionality and 
the range of products on offer. Pension freedoms have put greater demand on providers for 
additional services, such as automated processing of funds and being able to split funds over 
different risk profiles.  Advisers want the platform they use: 
 To offer the full range of drawdown options (flexi-access/ capped / UFPLS) – Advisers 
are most worried about whether or not their platform offers all products accessible 
through pension freedom. Legally all products do not have to be provided, so some 
platforms have decided to offer a selection only, However, advisers seem to mind, as 
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45% thought this issue was very important, compared with only 6% who said this 
was unimportant  To allow the adviser to amend income levels online – Equally important for advisers 
is whether they can make adjustments to their clients' income levels online. For 18%, 
it was of utmost importance.  To allow the adviser to select more than one model investment portfolio538 for an 
individual client – Pension planning can involve a range of different risk profiles, as it 
combines long and short-term planning. Advisers wanted to be able to have multiple 
portfolios on the go. The majority of advisers were concerned about this, while 8% 
thought it very important.539 
3.8.2 Robo-advice  
 ͚‘oďo-advice' is portfolio management advice, typically derived from Modern Portfolio 
Theory (MPT),540 with the following characteristics:541 
 Automated with little, or no, human intervention  Delivered online  Self-service  Use algorithms to match portfolios to clients, based on assessed risk tolerance and 
other factors such as age, and  Confined to relatively simple portfolio construction matters. 
It therefore operates without the features of traditional face-to-face advice, namely 
questioning, explaining, reassuring and guiding clients. However, some believe that the term 
robo-advice is a misnomer. An example is Adam Jones, senior consultant at Altus Consulting, 
ǁho ďelieǀes that it should ďe sepaƌated iŶto tǁo ĐoŵpoŶeŶts, ͚autoŵated adǀiĐe͛ aŶd 
͚autoŵated iŶǀestiŶg͛. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to Mƌ JoŶes, ͚the fiƌst of these is the autoŵated oƌ paƌtlǇ 
automated delivery of the advice process. Many of the solutions still involve real advisers to 
some extent, but aim to take the steps of the advice process that we know and love, and 
execute them automatically. This is creating propositions which are cheaper to operate for 
fiƌŵs aŶd thus Đheapeƌ to pƌoĐuƌe foƌ Đustoŵeƌs….IŵpoƌtaŶtlǇ, this tǇpe of seƌǀiĐe is ŵost 
definitely regulated financial advice. It results in a personal recommendation and carries 
ǁith it all of the liaďilitǇ assoĐiated ǁith that…. [The] seĐoŶd tǇpe of pƌopositioŶ is a seƌǀiĐe 
where the customer picks a goal, a timeframe and a risk rating. The customer is then 
presented with a suggested portfolio (usually from a range of pre-packaged investment 
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solutions) and a proposed investment amount. If the investor chooses to go ahead, their 
contributions are invested into the selected portfolio and it is managed for them in line with 
the agreed investment strategy, rebalancing as required. Importantly, clients using these 
services do not provide lots of information about themselves, and the companies providing 
these services usually argue that they do not constitute regulated advice, as they are not 
providing a personal ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ͛.542 
Robo-advice has been used in the US since around 2005. The key US providers are Financial 
Engines543 with assets of $104bn and an annual charge of $150 per year, Guided Choice with 
assets of $12bn and an annual charge of $500, Vanguard͛s Personal Advisor Services with 
assets of $10bn and a charge of 30bps, and Wealthfront with assets of $2bn and a charge 
of  25bps. In the case of Vanguard, clients need a minimum of $50,000. Vanguard also offers 
more human intervention than the existing offerings: clients with more than $500,000 will 
have a dedicated adviser, while those with less have a team to draw on. Advisers will design 
a financial plan for the client based on attitude to risk, objectives and investment horizon. 
Clients can monitor theiƌ poƌtfolio͛s peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe aŶd ǁill ƌeĐeiǀe a ƋuaƌteƌlǇ ƌepoƌt.  FuŶd 
management charges are in addition and, the case of the Vanguard funds, range from 5bps 
to 19bps. 
In May 2015, the US financial regulators – the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority – issued a warning to investors and advisers to 
beware the limitations of automated investment tools:544 
 Be aware that an automated tool may rely on assumptions that could be incorrect or 
do not apply to your individual situation. For example, an automated investment 
tool may be programmed to use economic assumptions that will not react to shifts in 
the market  Which questions the tool asks and how they are framed may limit or influence the 
information you provide. Be aware that a tool may ask questions that are over-
generalised, ambiguous, misleading, or designed to fit you into the tool's 
predetermined options  An automated investment tool may not assess all of your particular circumstances, 
such as your age, financial situation and needs, investment experience, other 
holdings, tax situation, willingness to risk losing your investment money for 
potentially higher investment returns, time horizon for investing, need for cash, and 
investment goals. 
Pauline Vamos, CEO of the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, speaking at 
the NAPF annual conference in October 2014, said that Australians had already moved 
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towards self-service pension advice models. She warned that internet-based comparison 
sites were driving decisions, rather than third-paƌtǇ adǀiseƌs: ͚You doŶ't kŶoǁ ǁho the 
oƌgaŶisatioŶ is ďehiŶd the Đoŵpaƌatoƌ….UŶless Ǉou Đaptuƌe the ŵeŵďeƌ eaƌlǇ iŶ teƌŵs of 
giving them simple advice services, simple tools that they will use, they will soon be able to 
get those sorts of services outside. And that may not be in the best interests of the 
ŵeŵďeƌs͛.545 
Robo-advice is not yet common in the UK, although a number of companies have set up in 
recent years to offer simplified advice. We report the following developments: 
 Nutmeg was the first to launch in 2011-12  Wealth Horizon started in 2014 with a portfolio structuring service on the Parmenion 
platform on the basis of simplified advice for clients with assets between £10,000 
and £150,000, with a charge of 0.75% annually (plus a 0.25% set-up fee in year one). 
Advice is delivered online and, where required, over-the-phone by CF30 registered 
advisers  Wealth Wizard. In August 2015, insurer LV= bought a majority stake. It said it would 
inject additional capital to assist with its plaŶs to deǀelop a ͚ǁhite-laďel͛ autoŵated 
advice platform and expand its own CORA (clear online retirement advice) service. 
‘iĐhaƌd ‘oǁŶeǇ, ŵaŶagiŶg diƌeĐtoƌ foƌ life aŶd peŶsioŶs at LV=, said: ͚The ǁaǇ 
people fund their retirement is changing and so is the way that people access their 
savings. This deal is a great opportunity for us to support the development of digital 
solutioŶs to ŵeet the eǀolǀiŶg deŵaŶds of ƌetiƌiŶg ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛546   Saidso, owned by Chapters Financial, offers an online, three-stage financial planning 
service charging £299 for a full report which records users' circumstances, 
objectives, attitudes to investment risk and tolerance to loss before suggesting 
solutions. It caters for retirement, investment and protection needs  Postcard Planning which has a minimum charge of £149 for investment, retirement 
or regular savings advice, and a maximum charge of around £5,000 for wealthier 
clients  EĐheloŶ WealthĐaƌe͛s Fiǀeƌ-a-Day which charges an upfront fee of 0.5% plus an 
ongoing flat rate of 0.7% (0.25% of which represents the cost of advice)547   In August 2015, BlackRock announced that it had bought a San Francisco-based 
robo-adviser which it will use to give mass affluent clients 'holistic' personalised 
advice on their investment and pension accounts and the management of taxes 
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accrued in their portfolios. It will recommend BlackRock's multi-asset model 
portfolios and investment products, as well as the products of other asset managers. 
FutureAdvisor will operate within BlackRock Solutions, BlackRock's technology and 
risk business. Tom Fortin, head of retail technology, said: ͚As deŵaŶd foƌ digital 
wealth management grows, we believe that our combined offering will accelerate 
our partner firms' abilities to serve the mass affluent in a convenient, scalaďle ǁaǇ͛. 
The nascent robo-advice market in the UK is typically associated with giving 
simplified advice, but BlackRock believes that the acquisition of FutureAdvisor is 
ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith its ͚ŵissioŶ to help ĐlieŶts solǀe theiƌ ŵost Đoŵpleǆ iŶǀestŵeŶt 
challeŶges thƌough teĐhŶologǇ͛548   Intelliflo plans to launch a simplified advice service for advisers which will be 
embedded in its existing Personal Finance Portal (PFP). This will enable advisers to 
service a broad base of clients, regardless of the size of their assets. The service will 
use investment risk profiling tools and several pre-defined investment portfolios. It 
will also allow the construction of bespoke risk-rated portfolios by advisers for their 
iŶdiǀidual ĐlieŶts. The tool ǁill ͚ƌed flag' ĐlieŶts with high value assets or 
requirements that are not straight-forward, automatically directing them to their 
adviser to seek more personal advice. Nick Eatock, Intelliflo's executive chairman, 
said: ͚It's a foƌŵ of ƌoďo-advice that keeps the adviser central to the pƌoĐess͛549   Towry is launching online services for clients, to supplement its existing face-to-face 
restricted advice service. Clients will be able to make transactions electronically. Rob 
DeǀeǇ, Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe, said: ͚We, like ŵaŶǇ otheƌ ǁealth ŵanagers, have been a 
face-to-face driven service. The whole of the services industry is changing, people's 
expectations are changing. The iPad has changed everything. We need to respond to 
that͛550   Charles Stanley is also investigating the possibility of introducing a low-cost 
automated advice service551 as is Investec Wealth & Investment   In January 2016, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds and Santander UK announced that 
they were entering the robo-advice market in an attempt to reconnect with the 
lower value mass market customers they dropped following the Retail Distribution 
Review.552  FinaMetrica has launched a robo-advice toolkit targeting investors with under 
£100,000 to invest. Investor Profiler creates investor scores which link to a range of 
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multi-asset portfolios. The tool is intended for advisers who have clients with simple 
investment goals, or for use by directly consumers. It bases its investor scores on a 
12-question scientific risk tolerance test and questionnaire, which takes into account 
investors' time horizons, capacity for loss, risk tolerance, knowledge of investments 
and investment experience.553 
There are very mixed views about the value and future of rob-advice in the UK. We now 
consider these. 
Mark Loosmore, executive general manager (wealth) at technology group IRESS, argues that 
most consumers are now very comfortable with accessing information online and with using 
price comparison websites. An IRESS report entitled Data, Disruption and the Digital 
Consumer found that 80% of consumers now carry out research online before making a 
significant purchase or investment decision, 39% said it makes interacting with firms more 
convenient, 21% said it speeded the process up, and almost a quarter said they wanted to 
view their financial world – bank accounts, mortgages, investments, insurance – in one 
place. The report found that consumer appetite for both conducting financial activity online 
and seeking financial advice varies depending on wealth and the type of transaction: 25% of 
respondents across all income groups are willing to pay for financial advice, while this figure 
rises to 42% in the case of those with a household income above £60,000. Mr Loosmore 
ďelieǀes ͚theƌe is aŶ oppoƌtuŶitǇ foƌ adǀiseƌs heƌe: as ǁell as haƌŶessiŶg the ďeŶefits of 
digital in their own work, they can also shape their proposition to help efficiently deliver this 
stǇle of adǀiĐe to a ǁideƌ audieŶĐe…[D]igital oƌ ͚ƌoďo' adǀiĐe ĐaŶ ďe iŵpleŵeŶted as paƌt of 
a ͚ŵeŶu' of optioŶs, ǁith the aďilitǇ to sǁitĐh ĐhaŶŶels as ƌeƋuiƌed…PeƌsoŶal iŶput ǁill 
always be necessary, but this could then be focused on taking the time to develop 
ƌelatioŶships ǁith the ĐlieŶt͛.554 
Andrew Storey, technical sales director at eValue, believes that advisers who harness the 
power of technology will outpace their rivals: 
The good news is that the robo-adviser can be harnessed to work for flesh-
and-blood adviser, rather than against it. In fact, used correctly, 
technology-based solutions can be a valuable tool for segmenting an 
adviser's customer base and servicing legacy clients. Forward-looking 
advisers will be able to white-label simplified advice propositions offered 
by networks, platforms and providers, and will be able to offer customers 
simplified advice for between £150 and £250. 
By partnering with an organisation that has already done the due diligence 
on the algorithms and messages under the bonnet of the system, advisers 
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can be comforted they are not exposing themselves to unnecessary 
regulatory risk. 
Not only can robo-advice provide an adviser with a revenue source in itself, 
but it should also be a way to filter large volumes of individuals – whether 
direct clients or those engaged with through the workplace – and identify 
those nuggets that can be turned into valuable full advice clients. 
Simplified robo-advice systems will present anyone with complex affairs or 
large portfolios towards messages telling them need to speak to a financial 
adviser. The workplace, in particular, could prove to be a rich seam of new 
business for advisers that adapt to this new technology..555 
 
Bruce Moss, strategy director at eValue, believes that robo-advice could help to solve the 
pensions freedom advice/guidance conundrum:  
Robo-advice has frequently been seen as a threat to advisers, or as sub-
standard and gimmicky. This is wrong and seriously misses the important 
point that robo-advice is a complement to traditional advice. Robo-advice 
not only caters for clients who have traditionally been financially inefficient 
for advisers to serve, it also allows adviser firms to deal with volumes that 
are way beyond their existing capacity. 
The phase the UK is currently in is similar to that which happened in the US 
some seven years ago. When robo-advice started in the US, it mostly 
focused on investing new money without reviewing existing investments. 
In the main, robo-advice in the US has been targeted at the younger 
investor as a low cost pre-packaged investment option, but even if advisers 
use the technology to reach the masses, it is still far from a threat to 
advisers on either side of the Atlantic. 
The robo-advice process is simple and short. A few simple questions and a 
risk assessment questionnaire, a stochastic forecast to help investors 
understand what the outcome might be, and a recommendation of a 
model portfolio of mostly ETFs [exchange traded funds] to keep the costs 
down. 
It is a process that is not exactly rocket science and can be easily applied in 
the UK….FiƌstlǇ, it is Ŷot ǀeƌǇ diffiĐult to Đƌeate an investment robo-advice 
process which ticks all the regulatory boxes. Secondly, it is only really 
necessary because the dividing line between information/guidance and 
advice is unclear. Essentially, the more help given to the consumer, the 
more likely it is that the line between guidance and advice may be crossed. 
In spite of the FCA's attempts to clarify the distinction between guidance 
and advice, it remains a grey area which may ultimately be decided by the 
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courts. The distinction between online guidance and robo-advice needs 
legal clarity as the market develops. 
Robo investment advice is undoubtedly useful as a means of resolving an 
area of regulatory uncertainty and providing a source of income for adviser 
fiƌŵs fƌoŵ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ǁho it ǁould otheƌǁise ďe uŶeĐoŶoŵiĐ to seƌǀe…  
To understand the real potential of robo-advice, we need to understand 
what it can do to meet the biggest challenge facing the financial services 
industry today in the UK – that of pensions freedom. Every year more than 
300,000 people retire with defined contribution (DC) pensions. Many have 
comparatively small funds of circa £50,000. With a typical fee of over 
£1,200 plus VAT for conventional "at-retirement" advice, the fee aversion 
of most consumers at present seems very understandable. 
Beyond being able to reduce the cost of advice dramatically to around 
£150, robo-advice has the capability to handle hundreds of thousands of 
cases a year – a feat which would be impossible by conventional means. 
The numbers needing robo-advice will grow rapidly because all those 
retirees who don't buy an annuity at outset will potentially need ongoing 
advice on how to invest and drawdown their retirement savings over the 
rest of their lives. This combination of high volume and low cost is the real 
advantage of robo-advice. 
As with almost all innovations, there are some potential downsides, but 
they can all be managed. Robo-advice cannot handle complex cases, but it 
can handle the majority. In those complex cases, conventional advice can 
be offered with a substantial discount as a considerable amount of 
information captured by the robo-advice process can be made available to 
a human adviser. 
The process must be very well-designed and a good model is vital, for any 
weaknesses in the model will continue to be replicated. Validation checks 
and monitoring are essential with borderline cases being identified and 
reviewed. There is also the risk that consumers may struggle to understand 
and use robo-advice, but innovative design and gamification techniques556 
can help to engage consumers. 
Robo-advice is important because it helps address the greatest challenge 
faced by our industry – helping consumers make wise retirement 
choices.557 
 
                                                     
556
 GaŵifiĐatioŶ teĐhŶiƋues applǇ ͚game-design elements and game principles in non-game contexts..[and] 
strive to leverage people's natural desires for socialising, learning, mastery, competition, achievement, status, 
self-expression, altruism, or closure. [They] use rewards foƌ [those] ǁho aĐĐoŵplish desiƌed tasks͛ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamification). 
557
 Quoted in Bruce Moss (2015) Untapped potential: Understanding the real power of robo-advice, 
Professional Adviser, 12 October. 
289 
 
Jaŵie Fiǀeash, Đhief opeƌatiŶg offiĐeƌ at The People͛s Pension, believes that there is no 
reason why pension scheme members could not receive advice for less than £100 per head: 
͚I aŵ suƌpƌised tƌustees aƌe Ŷot thiŶkiŶg aƌouŶd adǀiĐe….We see Ŷo ƌeasoŶ ǁhǇ Ǉou ĐaŶŶot 
get advice to your members for less than a £100 each. So we are committed to looking at 
hoǁ ǁe ĐaŶ do that aŶd aƌe lookiŶg at digital adǀiĐe as a solutioŶ͛. He said that the pensions 
industry was behind other sections of the financial sector in its use of modern technology 
aŶd Đould leaƌŶ fƌoŵ the U“: ͚I thiŶk ǁe ǁill see a lot eŵeƌge fƌoŵ the ŵaƌket iŶto this 
space and there is a lot of learning from the US where they use robo-advice a lot. We think 
that Ǉou ĐaŶ get the Đost of adǀiĐe doǁŶ thƌough soŵe digital solutioŶs͛.558  
In November 2015, Vanguard released the results of a survey of 70 UK wealth managers. 
Around 40% viewed robo-advice as a threat, while a similar 40% viewed it as an opportunity 
to increase efficiency and attract new clients. The rest said the impact would be minimal. 
JaŶiŶe MeŶasakaŶiaŶ, head of ǁealth foƌ VaŶguaƌd UK, said: ͚The adǀeŶt of the ƌoďo-advice 
age is creating significant hype and so it is not surprising that wealth managers are 
considering the impact over the long-term. What we do know is that technology is here to 
stay, so wealth managers will need to consider how to embrace the advantages of 
technology whilst still emphasising the personal, trust and relationship-based parts of their 
ǀalue pƌopositioŶ͛.559 
Also in November 2015, Finametrica published a report entitled The Robo Revolution. The 
report argued that rob-adǀiĐe is ͚paƌadigŵ ĐhaŶgiŶg͛ aŶd ͚the ŵost sigŶifiĐaŶt deǀelopŵeŶt 
in the delivery of financial advice in the past thƌee deĐades͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, it Ŷoted that the 
biggest obstacle facing robo-advisers is the same one facing the entire financial services 
sector, namely the cost of acquiring new clients. This is estimated to be £200 per client in 
the UK, a suŵ ǁhiĐh is ͚ďeǇoŶd the ŵeaŶs͛ of ŵaŶǇ adǀisoƌǇ fiƌŵs and explains their slow 
growth. The way around this, according to the report, lies in the white label market via 
channels that target communities, such as corporations, community groups, and even 
ďloggeƌs: ͚The Đost of aĐƋuiƌiŶg a Đustoŵeƌ ǁithiŶ a ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ is a fƌaĐtioŶ [of the Đost] of 
going to the wider market. We all know this to be true – it is why financial advisers join the 
golf Đluď….IŵagiŶe, foƌ a ŵoŵeŶt, the iŵpaĐt of Apple offeƌiŶg fiŶaŶĐial seƌǀiĐes thƌough a 
ƌoďo eŵďedded iŶto the opeƌatiŶg sǇsteŵ of its iPhoŶes aŶd iPads͛. 
Another big challenge in the UK are the regulatory hurdles. The report states that the 
autoŵated ŵodels that do eǆist opeƌate at the ͚loǁest leǀels͛ of ƌestƌiĐted, foĐused, oƌ 
siŵplified adǀiĐe aŶd aƌe ͚ďasiĐallǇ tƌaŶsaĐtioŶal ŵaĐhiŶes͛: ͚‘oďo-advisers aspiring to rise 
any further up the ladder towards more sophisticated advice which includes a portfolio 
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ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ ďeĐoŵe Đaught iŶ a stƌaŶge Đlash of ƌegulatoƌǇ aŶd ĐoŵpliaŶĐe ƌegiŵes͛.  
These include not only the FCA and the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), but also EU 
legislation, such as MiFID II which has expanded the extent of its ͚appƌopƌiateŶess' test.  
Nevertheless, the report sees robo-adǀiseƌs as the solutioŶ to the adǀiĐe gap ͚as theǇ haǀe 
sĐalaďilitǇ aŶd ĐaŶ seƌǀiĐe Đustoŵeƌs at loǁ Đost͛ aŶd ĐaŶ help to ͚deŵoĐƌatise' fiŶaŶĐial 
advice.560 
Chris Woolard said the FCA, via its Project Innovate, is keen for firms to come to market with 
robo-adǀiĐe ŵodels, so that fiƌŵs aƌe aďle to deliǀeƌ ƌegulated adǀiĐe ͚ŵoƌe ĐheaplǇ, 
effiĐieŶtlǇ aŶd effeĐtiǀelǇ͛ ďǇ eŵploǇiŶg a ͚ŵiǆtuƌe of teĐhŶologǇ aŶd huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs͛. 
However, Mr Woolard did accept that financial services firms were reluctant to introduce 
Ŷeǁ adǀiĐe ŵodels ďeĐause of ͚ŶeƌǀousŶess͛ about the boundaries separating advice and 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ. He said the FCA ǁas seekiŶg to ĐlaƌifǇ its defiŶitioŶs of ͚ƌegulated adǀiĐe' aŶd 
͚peƌsoŶal ƌecommendations' to help firms develop new, lower cost, distribution models 
with confidence.561 
The FCA hosted a forum on robo-advice at the end of September 2015. The FCA said it 
wanted the industry to provide more people with access to financial 'help', whether advice 
or guidance. It was therefore planning future policy work around both simplified advice and 
simplified regulation to make it easier for firms to develop solutions.  
The following issues emerged at the forum: 562 
 The Government is keen to support fintech (financial technology) 
o Harriett Baldwin, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, said the 
Government ƌeĐogŶises ͚fiŶteĐh is good Ŷeǁs foƌ all ĐoŶĐeƌŶed͛ aŶd ǁill 
suppoƌt iŶŶoǀatioŶ iŶ the seĐtoƌ ͚iŶ aŶǇ ǁaǇ ǁe ĐaŶ͛. The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt 
recognises that too many consumers are put off by the cost of advice and 
hopes to find ways to deliver financial help more cheaply through the use of 
technology  Safe haven for product testing 
o The Government and FCA want to create a 'safe haven' for firms to test new 
products on consumers without the regulatory backlash if something goes 
wrong. The FCA wants to hear ideas built with the intention to act in the best 
interest of the consumer and will vet the ideas it allows in 
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 Do people need advice or guidance? 
o The Government is looking at how guidance providers, such as the Money 
Advice Service and Pension Wise, can be made more effective for consumers. 
People who fall into the advice gap may not actually need advice, instead 
they might need guidance  Is there a role for pure robo-advice? 
o Delegates agreed robo-advice was needs-based, making it suitable for people 
with a well-defined need. However, most forms of automated advice 
currently in the market are a combination of an online process and human 
interaction. They use hurdle questions to identify clients with complex needs 
and refer them to a human adviser. Some delegates thought certain areas of 
advice, such as DB-to-DC transfers, could never be automated as they are too 
complex  What type of consumers love robo-advice? 
o According to Charlie Nicholls, managing partner of Money on Toast, there are 
four types of consumer groups: self-directed, validators, delegaters, and 
avoiders. Self-directed and avoider types do not need or cannot be helped, 
respectively. Validators and delegaters are interested in to varying degrees 
but may be confused about their finances. They want help and as such are 
the target group for robo-advice. Mr Nicholls said: ͚‘oďo-advice is needs-
based. It's suitable for low- and high-value investment. Just because HNWs 
[high net worth investors] are served well by the traditional financial advice 
market doesn't mean robo can't go into that market and take a large market 
shaƌe͛  Bridging the affordability and accessibility gap 
o Keith Richards, chief executive of the Personal Finance Society, believes that 
automated services will form a key part in bridging the affordability and 
accessibility gap created after advisers moved upmarket following the RDR. 
He also believes that robo-adǀiĐe is ͚ĐoŵpliŵeŶtaƌǇ ƌatheƌ thaŶ a thƌeat [to 
regulated advice]. We have seen a number of regulated firms have integrated 
robo or automated solutions into their processes. Simplified advice was put 
into RDR as [a means] to bridge the advice gap. We do have challenges we 
have to address including perception, affordability and accessibility [for 
which] we need diffeƌeŶt ŵeĐhaŶisŵs͛  Role of the FOS 
o Ian McKenna, director of the Finance and Technology Research Centre, 
argued that the FOS needs to be reformed if robo-advice is to stand a chance 
of flouƌishiŶg iŶ the UK. He said it ǁas opeƌatiŶg a ͚ϮϬth ĐeŶtuƌǇ ŵandate in 
the Ϯϭst ĐeŶtuƌǇ͛ aŶd Ŷeeds to ďe ƌefoƌŵed to alloǁ loǁ-cost advice 
solutions to enter the UK market. The only thing preventing the growth of 
robo-advice in the UK is stringent regulatory standards around consumer 
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protection, in particular, around ͚assessiŶg suitaďilitǇ, peŶsioŶ sǁitĐhiŶg aŶd 
self-defeatiŶg tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs͛.   
Delegates at an Intelliflo conference in June 2015 were warned that advisers who fail to 
embrace technology, and do all their business face-to-face and via paper, will lose out to 
more tech-savvy firms which better serve pensions freedom clients. Jane Hodges, chief 
operating officer at Alexander House Financial Services, also said that the sheer number of 
people who will need retirement income advice following the introduction of pensions 
freedom means advisers need to think differently about how to use their skill set to help the 
maximum number of clients.563 
This view was shared by participants at a round table on robo-advice hosted by eValue in 
November 2015. Jason Chapman, managing director of Willis Owen, argued that robo-
advice does not pose a threat to face-to-face. Instead, what could pose a threat is advisers' 
lack of skills in using technology, particularly around building consumer friendly websites 
and a creating a better digital experience. He added that advisers could embrace technology 
ďetteƌ thaŶ theǇ do todaǇ: ͚What ǁe Ŷeed to ǁoƌƌǇ aďout is the huge sǁaǇ of iŶdiǀiduals 
who have no access to any advice or any product solution and create the journeys that will 
enable them to use technology and have a choice of the way that they puƌĐhase͛. “aŵaŶtha 
Seaton, CEO of eValue, said: ͚We aƌe alǁaǇs goiŶg to haǀe a teŶsioŶ ǁheƌeďǇ a tƌaditioŶal 
adviser is probably going to feel alienated and threatened by robo-advice and I think that's 
perfectly natural. But I don't think that will stop robo-adǀiĐe fƌoŵ happeŶiŶg͛. Otheƌs 
agreed robo-adǀiĐe ǁas aŶ oppoƌtuŶitǇ to iŶĐƌease the oǀeƌall size of the ŵaƌket: ͚It seeŵs 
to be an opportunity to expand the market rather than cap the market you've already got. 
It's to build a whole new group of consumers, who if they may not pay so much to begin 
ǁith, theǇ use Ǉouƌ pipeliŶe aŶd theǇ aƌe paǇiŶg soŵethiŶg͛.564  
Some, on the other hand, believe robo advice will only have a limited future in the UK. For 
eǆaŵple, Nuŵis douďts ǁhetheƌ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ǁill eǀeƌ tƌulǇ ͚eŶtƌust theiƌ life saǀiŶgs to a 
Đoŵputeƌ͛.565  Sheriar Bradbury, managing director of Bradbury Hamilton, does not believe 
that robo-adǀiĐe ͚ǁill fullǇ ƌeplaĐe skilled, pƌofessioŶal adǀiseƌs. I appreciate that tools 
offering automated solutions are sought by the DIY investor but, in the main, our clients are 
discerning and want to be challenged. They actively seek the value of strategically and 
tactically thought-through advice which only a human ĐaŶ pƌoǀide…Theƌe ǁill ďe aspeĐts of 
advice that an algorithm is unlikely to replace. Holistic advice involving financial planning for 
more complex areas of, for example, inheritance tax, retirement, investment planning and 
the taxation interplay, is unlikely to be replaced by an algorithm any time soon. The 
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question is which wealth management firms will be on the right side of that technology? 
These aƌe the fiƌŵs ǁhiĐh ǁill suƌǀiǀe eǆtiŶĐtioŶ͛.566  
“teǀe Hagues, fouŶdeƌ of ‘etiƌiŶg IFA, ďelieǀes that ͚ŶothiŶg beats comprehensive personal 
seƌǀiĐe…The ĐhalleŶges that high Ŷet ǁoƌth iŶdiǀiduals faĐe iŶ ŵaŶagiŶg theiƌ ǁealth ƌaŶge 
from the complexity of investing to working with multiple providers – banks, asset 
managers, accountants, lawyers, insurance agents and so on – to the complications of 
estate aŶd taǆ plaŶŶiŶg…[Theƌe] is a ďeŶefit foƌ foƌǁaƌd-thinking firms to improve their 
focus and free up resource which can be achieved through tie-ups with other professional 
service companies, such as lawyers and accouŶtaŶts… [As] the adǀiĐe ŵaƌket ďeĐoŵes ŵoƌe 
intricate, raising the value and scope of the service offered to clients is more than likely 
goiŶg to ďe keǇ to pƌofessioŶal seƌǀiĐes fiƌŵs' suĐĐess iŶ the futuƌe͛.567 
Chris Williams, chief executive of Wealth Horizon, argues that robo-advice could well push 
out geŶeƌalist adǀiseƌs: ͚A geŶeƌalist adǀiseƌ ǁho is just ƌeallǇ ŵaŶagiŶg poƌtfolios of fuŶds 
for people has got a problem because fees are going to come down. Investment 
management and portfolio management are easy to automate. There's an abundance of 
information out there. People will question the fees they are paying. But where there is real 
complexity, where an individual doesn't really understand what's happening people are 
happy to pay for it in that space. That is where we will see fees increase because there is a 
ƌeal Ŷeed foƌ adǀiĐe aŶd foƌ gettiŶg it ƌight…‘oďo ĐaŶ go a ǀeƌǇ loŶg ǁaǇ toǁaƌds ŵeetiŶg 
financial advice. What it can't do is replicate the emotional, the empathetic [element] of 
having a human work with you. It's simply a choice whether they want that or whether they 
aƌe happǇ to do it oŶliŶe͛.568  
The Finametrica report The Robo Revolution cited earlier considers 10 ways in which robo-
advisers will affect human advisers:569 
 Robos are big 
o You're going to hear a lot about them and they will impact on your life. We 
believe that the impact will be overwhelmingly positive! Don't believe the 
gloom that says robos will replace human advisers. They won't  Robos will be everywhere 
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o Everyone in the financial services supply chain will have a robo, either as a 
direct-to-consumer offering or as a tool for financial advisers to use  Your client base may be under threat 
o Robos will be everywhere and your clients will be courted by them. Your new 
competitor might be a club or a community based organisation or affiliate – 
any organisation with a large membership could soon be in the market for a 
while-label robo  There will be many different robos for different purposes 
o You will have a choice of robos, which will not all be the same. If you plan on 
working with any one you will need to assess it carefully to ensure it will be 
fit for your purpose  Early-movers don't necessarily win 
o Better to make a considered decision and use proven technology and 
processes   Robos will have to adopt suitability standards 
o To flourish, robos will have to meet the same suitability standards as human 
advisers. It is unimaginable that an advice business would want the same 
client getting a different recommendation depending on whether they used 
robo or human advice. A business built on a multi-factor assessment of risk 
tolerance, risk capacity and risk needed will, of course, expect those same 
standards in a robo  Dealing with non-assigned clients and other relationships 
o Robos are quick and accurate at process work, like collecting data. And they 
make things fast – an investment recommendation can be on the table 
moments after the data is collected. It will, of course, be expected that robos 
must integrate with your business practices  Low-cost, multi-asset portfolios are here 
o Robos deal in very low-cost investment structures and that is going to 
challenge current thinking, current practice and profitability. Like ripples in a 
pond, over time the effect becomes unpredictable even when it started out 
very structured  You will have to prove your value proposition 
o Advisers are professionals who add value to their clients' financial lives. Be 
ready to prove that, because you will have to be able to supply that proof to 
charge higher fees than a robo  Fees may come under pressure 
o Just as low-cost airlines lowered airfare costs, robos are likely to bring down 
the base-cost of advice. But, just as with the airlines, some people will not 
want to fly with the cheapest; some will be happy to pay full economy and 
some will want the silver-service that comes with first-class. The more holistic 
and detailed you are, the more you will win. Robos are not currently good at 
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complex matters, such tax or estate planning or insurance. Possibly, we will 
see traditional advice operating to create the financial plan, with robos 
dealing with ongoing transactional needs 
FiŶallǇ, UB“ pƌediĐts diƌeĐt adǀiĐe aŶd siŵplified adǀiĐe͛s shaƌe of the UK ƌetail saǀiŶgs 
market will rise from 21% to 29% by 2025, although it does not identify how much of this 
will be robo-adǀiĐe. It also pƌediĐts ǁoƌkplaĐe adǀiĐe͛s shaƌe ǁill iŶĐƌease fƌoŵ ϭϵ% to ϯϭ% 
by 2025.570  McKinsey believes the market for virtual wealth management advice has the 
potential to generate annual revenues of $66 billion.571 
 
3.8.3 RetirementSaverService 
The RetirementSaverService is a proposal made by Mark Hoban in January 2015 when he 
was MP for Fareham:572  
The RetirementSaverService (RSS) would facilitate better retirement 
planning by supporting savers to see how their current savings might 
translate into income in retirement and what this means for how much 
they save, how long they plan to work and their appetite for risk. The 
service would do this by bringing together the multiple strands of 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aďout aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s assets aŶd souƌĐes of iŶĐoŵe oŶ a useƌ-
friendly online service. The RetirementSaverService would also provide 
tailored guidance to people approaching retirement. It would bridge the 
gap between the limited guidance currently provided and regulated advice, 
which remains unaffordable for most people. The service would help them 
choose suitable approaches and avoid unsuitable products through a 
narrowing of choices. The service would be independent and provided in 
the first instance by the Money Advice Service, building on its existing 
opeƌatioŶs iŶ this spaĐe…. 
The RetirementSaverService is targeted at meeting [two] needs: guidance 
to support savers and a focal point of drawing together savings 
information. It would be a digital service providing guidance for users. It 
would be a self-directed service; offering tailored guidance driven by 
answers given by users to a series of questions. Although focused on 
retirement planning, it will use data about pensions and other assets 
alongside personal information to produce tailored guidance. It will not 
produce personal recommendations but will present a series of choices to 
users with the user making the final decision. 
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Figure 3.2 shows a network map which illustrates how data could be shared and aggregated 
across the RetirementSaverService, while Figure 3.3 shows how users might interact with 
RSS from joining to retirement.573 
 
Figure 3.2: RetirementSaverService network map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
573 Respectively, Figures 6 and 7 in Mark Hoban (2015) RetirementSaverService, Reform, January. 
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Figure 3.3: Lifecycle of the RetirementSaverService 
 
3.9 Is there an advice gap? 
3.9.1 A number of advice gaps have emerged 
Things do not appear to have gone according to plan. The year between the 2014 Budget 
and Flexiday, 6 April 2015, was devoted to establishing a system of guidance and advice to 
meet the needs of those exercising their pension freedoms. The Government would provide 
the guidance guarantee and, following this, people would be queuing up to seek advice. 
Now it was not clear at first whether they would be looking at simplified advice or fully 
regulated advice and there were different views within the advice community about which 
was more appropriate. It was felt that those with pension pots less than £30,000 would take 
cash and not seek advice at all. It was also felt that those with pension pots above a certain 
size (£100,000 or some amount above this) would be likely to – and certainly should be 
encouraged to – seek full regulated advice. The debate within the advice community was 
about how many of those with pension wealth between £30,000 and £100,000 would look 
for simplified advice and how many would take the full regulated route. A new kid on the 
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block is robo-advice. It is too early to predict what effect this will have on the advice market 
as a whole, except to say that it could be significant, despite not being able to deal with the 
͚eŵotioŶal͛ Ŷeeds of Đustoŵeƌs. 
But this is not the way things have worked out. According to Robert Cochran from Scottish 
Widoǁs: ͚The 'guidance guarantee' offered via Pension Wise will offer savers access to 
information, but early indications suggest this is being sorely under-utilised, with barely 15% 
of the available appointments being used. For those who do reach the door of the Pension 
Wise offices, they will find it only gives a certain level of support, and for those who want a 
recommendation appropriate for their circumstances, they're likely to struggle finding it at a 
͞ƌeasoŶaďle͟ Đost. The ĐliŶĐheƌ is that this Ŷeǁ segŵeŶt ŵaǇ Ŷot eǀeŶ ďe aǁaƌe theǇ Ŷeed 
advice. For those who've been saving for a few years and are now approaching retirement 
with a modest pot, they have a plethora of choice and little understanding of what the 
options are, or what the tax implications could be. Some may even be confused about the 
differences between advice and guidance and believe they've already had advice from their 
pƌoǀideƌs oƌ PeŶsioŶ Wise, oƌ thiŶk the guidaŶĐe theǇ'ǀe had is eŶough͛. 
Arguments such as these have led to the view that an advice gap has developed in the UK. 
Mƌ CoĐhƌaŶ ďelieǀes ͚theƌe's a gƌoǁiŶg Ŷuŵďeƌ of people ǁith ƌelatiǀelǇ ŵodest peŶsioŶ 
savings, and it's becoming apparent that there's a gap in the market for advice aimed at 
people with smaller drawdown pots. This gap stands to widen as the effects of auto-
eŶƌolŵeŶt staƌt to uŶfold, aŶd the full poteŶtial of the Ŷeǁ fƌeedoŵs tƌulǇ hit hoŵe.  … 
Advice may well be perceived as a luxury for richer clients, but what many consumers won't 
realise is how much of that fee could be offset as a result of the advice theǇ ƌeĐeiǀe͛. He 
then provided an example to demonstrate the point. The individual has a £45,000 pot which 
they want to take as cash. Their marginal tax rate is 40%, so will pay £13,500 in tax. But if 
advised to split the amount taken over two years , the individual could save up to £8,870 in 
tax, offsetting the £1,500 cost of advice. 
Mr Cochran also appeals to providers to help: ͚“oŵe pƌoǀideƌs applǇ a Đhaƌge peƌ 
withdrawal when people take encashment, which eats into the capital which could be used 
to pay for an adviser. By making products simpler and limiting or removing charges from 
encashment, it would make it easier to sell into employees with smaller pots, enabling them 
to seek out paid-for advice without eƌodiŶg theiƌ ŵodest saǀiŶgs͛.574 
Stuart Wilson, managing partner at Later Life Academy, goes further than Mr Cochran and 
argues that advisers should offer Pension Wise retirees free regulated advice up to a limit. 
He ďelieǀes that ͚guidaŶĐe ƌepƌeseŶts aŶ untapped opportunity which, if executed correctly, 
could deliver a large number of new clients with varying later life advice needs, plus of 
Đouƌse, the ƌefeƌƌals that ŶatuƌallǇ Đoŵe ǁith aŶǇ satisfied iŶdiǀidual…. [This folloǁs 
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because Pension Wise] is a long way away from tailored advice which delivers a clear route-
ŵap aŶd ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs foƌ ǁhat to do Ŷeǆt….[F]oƌ  adǀiseƌs iŶteƌested iŶ these ĐlieŶts, 
the important part is developing a proposition which takes these individuals on the next 
stage of the ĐlieŶt jouƌŶeǇ…BǇ that I ŵeaŶ adǀiseƌs aƌe pƌoďaďlǇ goiŶg to haǀe to offeƌ up 
soŵe ͞fƌee͟ tiŵe aŶd adǀiĐe iŶ oƌdeƌ to ŵoǀe the ĐlieŶt oŶ – this means taking the 
information provided by Pension Wise and making it much more specific, it means 
highlighting options and areas which guidance will not have covered, it will mean a 
discussion of pension options, but also offering some clear idea of what that may mean for 
taǆ ďuƌdeŶs aŶd ďeŶefit eŶtitleŵeŶt…AŶd this should ďe offeƌed fƌee of Đhaƌge ďeĐause a 
client leaving Pension Wise may well recognise their need for financial advice, but they may 
not yet be in the headspace which means they are willing to pay for it. After this initial 
session however, the adviser will be able to make clear that any next steps come with a 
Đhaƌge͛.575 
Some argue that any controversy over a widening gulf between those who need financial 
advice and those who can actually afford to pay for it is not actually the advisers' problem.  
For example, Geoff Mills, founding director of Rayner SpeŶĐeƌ Mills ‘eseaƌĐh, saǇs ͚The ƌole 
of the [advice] industry is to educate those who can pay for [advice] about the benefits of it. 
Yes there is an advice gap but that's not for advisers to solve. That is for the Government to 
ǁoƌƌǇ aďout, Ŷot ďusiŶesses͛.576  
The Association of Professional Financial Advisers (APFA) has pressed for advisers' 
contributions to funding Pension Wise to be reduced because they are not winning 
sufficient follow-on advice business.577 Nevertheless, APFA reported that by September 
2015, 90% of advisers had received an average of eight new enquiries about getting 
financial advice on accessing pensions. Around half the advisers surveyed said the request 
for advice was on how to transfer out of a DB scheme. Although not all enquiries resulted in 
a transaction, the survey suggests that up to 150,000 people had contacted an IFA. This 
compares with the 400,000 people who reach retirement age each year. It is recognised that 
many people fail to take advice because they say that they cannot afford it, resulting in an 
'advice affordability gap'. APFA agreed that more needed to be done to lower the price of 
advice and for Pension Wise to explain the value of regulated financial advice.578 
It is also becoming clear that a different type of advice gap has emerged – the inability of 
some segments of the market to find advisers even when they want advice. Whatever the 
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merits of using advisers, some believe that customers with small pension pots will struggle 
to find advisers who will take them on. According to Graham Bowser, a certified financial 
plaŶŶeƌ at Q“ FiŶaŶĐial PlaŶŶiŶg: ͚IŶ pƌaĐtiĐe, ŵost IFAs ǁill Ŷot ďe ǁilliŶg to eŶgage ǁith 
these ͞eǆtƌa͟ loǁ ǀalue ƌetiƌees ǁho ŵight ǁaŶt to eǆtƌaĐt fuŶds oƌ use dƌaǁdoǁŶ ďeĐause 
the regulatory/compliance risk will be so much higher than is the case when dealing with 
people in the traditional drawdown market (those with £100,000-plus in pensions and have 
other saǀiŶgs/iŶǀestŵeŶtsͿ͛. 579  Chris Smallwood, chief executive of 2plan, said 2plan 
advisers have been instructed to turn away clients wanting to cash in their pots or move 
into drawdown when the amount is between £30,000 and £100,000. The firm would only 
recommend drawdown for pots above £100,000 if it believed it was a suitable product after 
giving full advice. Foƌ ŵaŶǇ otheƌs, aŶ aŶŶuitǇ is ͚still the ƌight optioŶ͛.580 
A related issue is the shortage of advisers following the implementation of RDR which 
significantly reduced the number of advisers in the market. David Thompson, managing 
director of business development and proposition at AXA Wealth, has looked at the number 
of advisers in different countries in relation to population size. Hong Kong, which had an 
RDR-style reform in 2015, has a one financial adviser for every 156 people. In the US and 
Australia, there is one adviser for every 1,400 people, while in Canada, there is one adviser 
for every 1,900 people. By contrast, in the UK, there is one adviser for every 2,700 people.581 
Mƌ ThoŵpsoŶ ďelieǀes ͚ǁe ƌuŶ the ƌisk that people ǁill go lookiŶg foƌ adǀiseƌs aŶd theƌe's 
goiŶg to ďe Ŷo oŶe theƌe to aŶsǁeƌ the Đall͛.582 
Steve Hagues of Retiring IFA expects more consolidation of the adviser market via mergers 
over the next couple of years as a consequence of increased competition from simplified 
aŶd oŶliŶe adǀiĐe. He said: ͚AdǀiĐe fiƌŵs Ŷeed to ďe oŶ the ďall to ŵake suƌe theǇ doŶ't lose 
ĐlieŶts….Do Ǉou ƌeŵeŵďeƌ ǁheŶ gaƌages sold fuel and not much else? Most are mini-
supeƌŵaƌkets Ŷoǁ….AĐĐouŶtaŶts aƌe iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ iŶteƌested iŶ iŶǀestŵeŶt adǀiĐe, ǁhile 
financial advisers are beginning to understand the power of doing a client's tax return and 
probate. The advantage of servicing clients' needs across the board is slowly starting to gain 
aĐĐeptaŶĐe iŶ the adǀiĐe iŶdustƌǇ…As the deĐade pƌogƌesses, if Ǉou doŶ't ƌiŶg feŶĐe Ǉouƌ 
clients, you will be faced with having to defend them relentlessly from the other 
professions. Those who move across the professions are likely to succeed at the biggest 
client land grab wins due to the principle of first mover advantage. As the industry develops, 
it's clear the lack of a linked up or overarching strategy across different professional service 
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offerings could be a missed opportunity. At the moment, everyone is doing their job, but no 
oŶe aĐtuallǇ oǁŶs the ĐlieŶt͛s oǀeƌall ƌeal outĐoŵe͛.583 
The issues of mass access to advice and people being priced out of advice has been an 
increasing concern of the FCA since RDR. As we mentioned earlier, its solution was 
simplified advice. But a perceived lack of clarity from the regulator around the rules and 
liability for simplified advice has meant the concept has not yet taken off.584 
The FCA is working on a middle-ground category where advice is offered but not a personal 
recommendation.585  
We have therefore been discussing with our stakeholders the options for 
low-cost, simpler ways of recommending retail investment products, 
particularly for customers with relatively modest amounts to invest and 
relatively straightforward investment needs. It is clear that there has been 
some reluctance on the part of firms to develop these models and we are 
keen to understand more about the barriers firms believe they face.  
We are also aware that firms offering retail investments without personal 
recommendations want greater clarity on how they can support customers 
in making informed decisions – increasingly via technology-rich solutions – 
without stepping over the boundary into providing a personal 
recommendation.586  
 
3.9.2 The Financial Advice Market Review 
 In August 2015, the Treasury and FCA launched a major review of the financial advice 
market. The Financial Advice Market Review (FAMR) has been set up to improve consumers' 
access to financial advice. 
Its terms of reference are to examine:587  
 the advice gap for those people who want to work hard, do the right thing and get 
on in life but do not have significant wealth  the regulatory or other barriers firms may face in giving advice and how to overcome 
them  how to give firms the regulatory clarity and create the right environment for them to 
innovate and grow 
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 the opportunities and challenges presented by new and emerging technologies to 
provide cost effective, efficient and user friendly advice services, and  how to encourage a healthy demand side for financial advice, including addressing 
barriers which put consumers off seeking advice. 
The review will consider the current regulatory and legal framework governing the provision 
of financial advice and guidance to consumers and its effectiveness in ensuring that all 
consumers have access to the information, guidance and advice necessary to empower 
them to make effective decisions about their finances. 
The review will also consider the interplay between the regulatory framework for advice 
and the role of the FOS and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) in redress. 
The initial evidence gathering will have a broad scope before narrowing down to consider 
those areas where the so called advice gap may be most acute. The initial evidence 
gathering will request examples of problems in obtaining advice in the following markets: 
 investments, savings, pensions, and retirement income products (including 
annuities)  mortgages (including Help to Buy and equity release) and consumer credit  general insurance. 
The review will also examine evidence from consumers about the barriers they face in 
seeking advice, the value they place on it and how easy it is to understand where advice can 
be found and what it means. 
While focusing on consumer financial services and products, the review will also look at the 
provision and effectiveness of advice across retail markets to assess whether differences in 
regulatory requirements around advice lead to unintended consequences for consumers 
and firms.  
Finally, the review will come forward with:  
 a package of reforms to:  
o empower and equip all UK consumers to make effective decisions about their 
finances 
o facilitate the establishment of a broad-based market for the provision of 
financial advice to all consumers  
o create a regulatory environment which give firms the clarity they need to 
compete and innovate to fill the advice gap   a set of principles to govern the operation of financial advice  measures to ensure standards of behaviour for firms within all types of financial 
advice market are in accordance with those principles  proposals as to whether the regulatory perimeter for financial advice should be 
amended, taking into account European legislation  
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 an examination of the role that might be played by regulatory carve-outs, such as a 
so called safe-harbour  a consideration of the proportionality of rules and their impact on affordability and 
availability of financial advice and products  indications of  
o the resources needed for implementation of these proposals 
o a framework for evaluating how successful reforms have been in closing the 
advice gap, post implementation.  
The FCA said it understood advisers' concerns about their liability for simplified advice that 
focuses only on specific client needs and dealing with this issue would be a core part of the 
review. The regulator said it would need to consider clearer and simpler options from both 
the consumer and adviser point of view. However, it was unlikely the FCA would consider 
removing liability for 'simple' advice solutions altogether. Speaking at a Work and Pensions 
Select Committee hearing on 16 September 2015, Christopher Woolard said: ͚Theƌe is a 
fuƌtheƌ juŵp…to Đƌeate a safe haƌďouƌ ǁheƌe if Ǉou giǀe soŵeoŶe adǀiĐe aŶd Đhaƌge foƌ 
that in some way and yet not take responsibility for that advice given – that feels like a step 
too far. But there is a lot we can do listening to those concerns to come up with something 
to help ĐoŶsuŵeƌs aŶd the adǀiĐe ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛.588 
The Treasury (represented by Charles Roxburgh, director general of financial services at the 
Treasury) and the FCA (represented by Tracey McDermott, acting FCA chief executive) will 
lead the review with an advisory panel of industry and consumer experts, chaired by Nick 
Prettejohn, chairman of Scottish Widows. The Treasury said it wanted to make sure people 
can access high-quality, affordable, tailored guidance and advice to help them make 
iŶfoƌŵed fiŶaŶĐial deĐisioŶs. Haƌƌiett BaldǁiŶ said: ͚MakiŶg suƌe that ouƌ fiŶaŶĐial seƌǀiĐes 
sector supports working people at every stage of their lives is a key part of our long-term 
plan. That's why we've launched a major new review to explore what more can be done to 
make sure consumers can access high quality and affordable advice so they can make 
informed decisions with their hard-eaƌŶed ŵoŶeǇ͛.   
Huw Evans, director general of the ABI, said: ͚This is a ǁelĐoŵe step ǁhiĐh Đoŵes at a good 
time. The new pension freedoms have highlighted how important it is that proper advice is 
aĐĐessiďle to all, Ŷot just those that ĐaŶ affoƌd it͛.  
Chris Hannant, director general of the Association of Professional Financial Advisers (APFA), 
said: ͚We ǁelĐoŵe GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ƌeĐogŶitioŶ of the Ŷeed to eǆaŵiŶe the legislatiǀe ďaƌƌieƌs 
to accessing affordable financial advice. We believe there needs to be a fundamental rethink 
of the current regulatory enviƌoŶŵeŶt, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ aƌouŶd liaďilitǇ͛ aŶd listed, as eǆaŵples, 
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the lack of a long-stop [i.e., an open-ended liability] for advisers, the levy approach of the 
FSCS which penalises regulated advisers for those unregulated investments which go wrong, 
as well as imposing an unpredictable and seemingly ever-increasing fee burden, and 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶs that the FiŶaŶĐial OŵďudsŵaŶ “eƌǀiĐe faĐes ͚sǇsteŵatiĐ pƌoďleŵs͛ iŶ its deĐisioŶ-
ŵakiŶg. He said: ͚CoŶsuŵeƌs Ŷeed to uŶdeƌstaŶd that iŶǀestŵeŶts ĐaŶ Ŷeǀeƌ ďe ϭϬϬ% ƌisk-
free. We look forward to continuing to work with HM Treasury and the FCA as part of this 
review and elsewhere to ensure liability is assigned more fairly and that steps are taken to 
ŵiŶiŵise the Đost of ƌegulatioŶ foƌ pƌofessioŶal fiŶaŶĐial adǀiseƌs͛.589 In evidence to a Work 
and Pensions Select Committee hearing iŶ “epteŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϱ, Mƌ HaŶŶaŶt said: ͚Theƌe had 
been incidents where an adviser had, for example, set up a self-invested personal pension, 
the client had then undertaken their own investments but the adviser had still been held 
responsible. There is no time limit on which a complaint can be brought to the ombudsman. 
There are long tail liabilities. The way the FSCS is funded needed a fundamental hard looking 
at…. [Fuƌtheƌ], ŵaŶǇ adǀiseƌs ĐaŶ foƌesee pƌoďlems further down the line as pensions 
freedom beds in over the coming years. Everyone is saying things have gone reasonably 
ǁell, theǇ haǀeŶ͛t falleŶ oǀeƌ. But the ďiggest ĐoŶĐeƌŶ aŵoŶg ŵǇ ŵeŵďeƌs is that theǇ 
foresee problems further down the track. We woŶ͛t kŶoǁ uŶtil fiǀe oƌ teŶ Ǉeaƌs doǁŶ the 
tƌaĐk [if the ƌefoƌŵs haǀe ďeeŶ a suĐĐess]͛.590  
In October 2015, the FCA announced that it was considering five options for re-introducing a 
complaints long-stop for advisers: 
 Maintaining the current regime –  not putting in place a long-stop  Introducing a single long-stop – for example, a longstop of 15 years (such as that 
applying to certain causes of action under the Limitation Act 1980), or using a 
different time period recognising the long life of financial services products  Introducing varied limitation periods linked to the terms of products – for example, 
differential time limits which reflect the nature of products or advice, so that liability 
extends for a longer period when it relates to longer-term products (for example, 25 
years for a mortgage)  Enhanced professional indemnity insurance (PII) – strengthening PII for firms so that 
it includes cover sufficient to meet claims relating to long-term advice, whether the 
firm is still in business or not  A compensation fund – setting up a compensation fund which would pay out in the 
event of a justified claim older than 15 years against an individual firm, which all 
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firms would contribute to, but which would not require the firm concerned to be 
insolvent before paying.591 
The review was also welcomed by advisers. For example, Keith Churchouse of Chapters 
FiŶaŶĐial aŶd “aidso, said: ͚Theƌe aƌe ŵillioŶs of people ǁho aƌe just Ŷot eŶgaged iŶ the 
financial advice process who should be. There is a mass market, we are talking millions of 
people, who are totally disenfranchised from financial advice but not through either their 
oǁŶ ĐhoiĐe oƌ theiƌ oǁŶ kŶoǁledge….The ƌealitǇ is that uŶless people aƌe guided toǁaƌds 
taking advice they will carry on probably doing not a lot and missing out on great 
oppoƌtuŶities to ŵake theiƌ ŵoŶeǇ ǁoƌk haƌdeƌ….Theƌe aƌe alǁaǇs those ǁho thiŶk that 
everything in life should be free, but I do not think they will get the answers that they want. 
However, I do think there is a middle market who are prepared to pay a nominal fee for 
good ƋualitǇ guidaŶĐe aŶd adǀiĐe. To saǇ ͞this is ǁhat Ǉou should ďe doiŶg, this is ǁho Ǉou 
should ďe doiŶg it ǁith͟. It is those [people] ǁho Ŷeed to ďe dealt ǁith. The ƋuestioŶ is hoǁ 
much is a nominal fee? At Saidso it is £299. I am not saying that is the answer, but it is an 
aŶsǁeƌ. I aŵ suƌe theƌe ǁill ďe Đoŵpetitoƌs aĐƌoss the ŵaƌket͛. Mƌ ChuƌĐhouse also ďelieǀes 
financial advice aggregator sites will come to the fore over the course of the next ten years. 
Such sites would compete for business to guide investors towards individual 
recommendations. This is a different concept from robo-advice which he believed would 
also ďeĐoŵe populaƌ: ͚‘oďo-advice might be another low-cost solution, people might be 
prepared to pay less for that. They are a bit like tracker funds – they are very cheap but run 
by a computer to keep costs low. Some people might want that, [but] some people might 
ǁaŶt a ďit ŵoƌe of a peƌsoŶal appƌoaĐh͛. He does Ŷot ďelieǀe eitheƌ of these iŶitiatiǀes ǁill 
be a thƌeat high ƋualitǇ fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe: ͚The ƌeasoŶ ǁhǇ this ƌeǀieǁ is goiŶg thƌough is that 
these people are not being serviced at all. Even when internet services come into place, they 
still ǁoŶ't ďe a fiŶaŶĐial adǀiseƌ's taƌget ŵaƌket͛.592  
Similarly, Wealth Horizon͛s Chris Williams believes the introduction of safe harbour 
legislation for financial advisers would be a welcome step towards rebalancing liability 
between advisers and clients. Safe harbour legislation exists in both the US and Australia. In 
the US, it means employers cannot be sued if they followed certain steps when arranging 
employees' pension investments that later underperform; in Australia, it sets out the steps 
financial planners need to take to ensure they meet a statutory obligation to act in clients' 
best interests. Mr Williams believes safe harbour legislation could bring about a regulatory 
eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt that ƌeĐogŶises Đaǀeat eŵptoƌ, oƌ ďuǇeƌ ďeǁaƌe: ͚Theƌe has to ďe a ǀieǁ that 
consumers are able to make their own decisions based on relevant information. Trying to 
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instil that level of responsibility and determination for consumers would be really 
iŵpoƌtaŶt͛.593  
In October 2015, the FCA reported that it had identified eight main reasons which 
prevented people from seeking financial advice, and hence created an advice gap. The FCA 
defiŶes aŶ adǀiĐe gap as ͚aŶǇ situatioŶ ǁheƌe ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ĐaŶŶot get the foƌŵ of adǀiĐe that 
theǇ ǁaŶt oŶ a Ŷeed theǇ haǀe, at a pƌiĐe theǇ aƌe pƌepaƌed to paǇ͛. 
The eight reasons are: 
1. Price 
Consumers may view the price for advice, particularly for professional, face-to-face 
advice, to be too high. A survey by unbiased.co.uk found that consumers are paying an 
average hourly rate of £150 for professional, regulated advice (though this represents a 
14% drop compared to 2013). Some consumers may also find it hard to judge the value 
of advice because the benefits are usually deferred over time and more intangible than 
for purchases of non-financial products. 
2. Lack of trust 
Consumers may not trust firms in the financial services market to act in their best 
interests, or be able to identify which firms are trustworthy and could provide valuable 
service. 
3. Lack of knowledge 
Consumers might not recognise the need for advice or be aware of it. They also may not 
understand how to obtain it. As many people engage only infrequently in the market, 
this is not an area where people can easily gain experience to inform future decisions. In 
addition, consumers may lack confidence about the process, feel embarrassed about 
their lack of knowledge or concerned they may be judged for previous decisions – this 
may cause consumers to make non-advised financial decisions with poor outcomes. For 
example, a Mintel report showed that there might be a sizeable group of consumers 
who lack a basic understanding of what professional advice involves and how to obtain 
it. Of the consumers surveyed, 44% believe it is too complicated to understand how 
financial services firms can help them manage their finances, and 34% do not believe 
that professional advice is geared towards them. Moreover, 14% of consumers said they 
would not know where to begin looking for a financial adviser. 
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4. Engagement 
Consumers who are disengaged with financial services generally are unlikely  
to engage with the process of seeking advice. Others may not recognise the complexity 
of their financial needs, e.g., longevity, tax, long-term care, benefits and investment 
returns may be relevant to a decision about retirement planning. Still others may feel 
they need financial advice but never be prompted sufficiently to seek it. 
5. Overconfidence 
Some consumers might believe they are as competent as a professional adviser, even 
though they could benefit from using one. As a result, consumers might not seek 
professional advice or, if they do, not follow the advice. 
6. Access to face-to-face advice 
Depending on their location, some consumers may not have easy access to advisers, and 
others may not wish to make the time to meet with an adviser. 
7. Access to the internet and concerns with sharing data online 
Where advice is available via the internet (for example, in the form of information, 
generic advice or an automated online advice service), lack of ability to use such 
channels and tools may prevent some consumers from getting advice in this way. 
Consumers may also have concerns about sharing sensitive personal data online. 
8. Advice not necessary 
Consumers may make a rational and reasonable decision that they do not need advice 
and are capable of making a decision themselves. This could be the case, for example, 
where the situation and options are simple and the risk is low, or where the effort or 
cost of seeking advice is disproportionate to the benefits.594 
In the same month as FAMR was announced, the results of a survey by comparison website 
Money showed that the majority of the 669 over-55s with a pension pot who were surveyed 
neither wanted advice nor were willing to pay for it. The reasons respondents gave for not 
taking financial advice were: they do not feel they need it (59%), they think advice is a waste 
of money (28%), they could not afford it (27%), and they want their money quickly without 
any hassle (15%); further 10% of women said they felt intimated by advisers. Just one in five 
said they would use Pension Wise and give this as a reason for not going on to pay for 
advice. Only one in five of the over-55s – and just 13% of men – are willing to pay for 
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financial advice. Of those who are planning to pay for advice, 82% said they wanted to get 
such a major financial decision right. In terms of cost, the average amount the respondents 
would be willing to pay for advice was £253, with more than half saying they wanted to pay 
£200 or less; according to Money, the average cost of an initial financial review is double 
this at around £500. Around 25% of respondents were planning to make a withdrawal from 
their pot, but only a third of these said they fully understood the tax implications of doing 
so.595 The results of this survey indicate another aspect of the advice gap, namely the 
unwillingness of people to actually seek advice in the first place. 
David Brooks, technical director at corporate advice firm Broadstone, explained the results 
of this suƌǀeǇ iŶ teƌŵs of the ͚DuŶŶiŶg-Kƌugeƌ effeĐt͛, desĐƌiďed ďǇ Daǀid DuŶŶiŶg as 
folloǁs: ͚...iŶĐoŵpetent people do not recognise – scratch that, cannot recognise – just how 
iŶĐoŵpeteŶt theǇ aƌe…What's Đuƌious is that, iŶ ŵaŶǇ Đases, iŶĐoŵpeteŶĐe does Ŷot leaǀe 
people disorientated, perplexed or cautious. Instead, the incompetent are often blessed 
with an inappropriate ĐoŶfideŶĐe, ďuoǇed ďǇ soŵethiŶg that feels to theŵ like kŶoǁledge͛. 
While competent individuals tend to underestimate their ability, the opposite is true for 
incompetent people.596 
A survey by Aegon, published in November 2015, found that consumers thought they 
needed a pension pot of around £121,000 before advice was needed, and that they were 
reluctant to pay for advice with assets below this amount. While some advisers believe that 
£30,000 is a viable sum to make advice worthwhile, only 6% of potential clients thought 
paying for advice on a pot of £30,000 would be worth it. The survey also found that 
customers with £50,000 would, on average, be prepared to pay £191 for advice, while those 
with £250,000 would pay £314. The benefits perceived by customers from taking advice 
were the potential to grow their investments (42% of respondents), peace of mind that they 
have been advised by an expert (34%), and the feeling that they had made the best decision 
for their circumstances (28%).  
Commenting on the findings, Duncan Jarrett, Aegon UK managing director, retail, said: 
͚Theƌe is a sigŶifiĐaŶt gap ďetǁeeŶ ǁhat ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ďelieǀe theǇ Ŷeed to haǀe saǀed ďefoƌe 
they seek advice, and the amount advisers believe is required to make advice worthwhile. 
The Government's consultation on methods of extending advice needs to look at ways of 
reframing consumer thinking. Take a household example, as a car gets older many people 
opt for an annual service which can spot potential problems early. While it involves a regular 
cost, it could pay you back many times over if it prevents a major expense at a later date. 
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The same is true of advice. When people understand that the cost is potentially securing 
them a much more comfortable retirement or removing a major worry, then the value 
ďeĐoŵes appaƌeŶt͛.597 
In October 2015, Citizens Advice released a report called The Four Advice Gaps.598 The 
report concludes that more than 5 million people would be willing to seek out and pay for 
regulated advice, but are not prepared to pay current prices. The report also argues that 
there is not a single advice gap, affecting those who want advice but cannot afford it. 
Rather, there are four gaps which lead to a range of people missing out on the benefits of 
advice and the security that it affords. The results are based on responses from more than 
Ϯ,ϬϬϬ iŶdiǀiduals aŶd ͚sĐaled up͛ ďased oŶ the ϮϬϭϭ population total of 48.3 million. 
The four advice gaps are: 
1. The affordable advice gap affects consumers who are willing to pay for advice, but 
not at current prices. According to Citizens Advice research, up to 5.4 million 
additional people would consider paying for advice if it cost less. While 20% of the 
population would consider paying for advice when making an investment, just 6% 
would pay £500 or more for simple investment advice. 
2. The free advice gap affects people who want advice, but who are unable to pay for 
it. Citizens Advice said up to 14.5 million people who think they would benefit from 
free advice haven't taken any in the past two years. This includes some 735,000 
people who have apparently tried to access free advice but have been unable to due 
to a lack of supply. 
3. The awareness and referral gap affects people who are not aware that advice exists, 
or where to get that advice. As many as ten million people who think they would 
benefit from free advice are not aware of public financial guidance, according to the 
Citizens Advice report. 
4. The preventative advice gap affects those who need financial guidance at key points 
in their lives, but do not take it because it is not marketed properly, or do not get the 
required breadth of help they need when they do. 
In addressing these advice gaps, the FCA has announced it seeks to explore how access to 
adǀiĐe ĐaŶ ďe ͚ƌadiĐallǇ iŵpƌoǀed͛. It has theƌefoƌe aŶŶouŶĐed, as paƌt of FAM‘, aŶ adǀiĐe 
consultation which will focus on the following questions: 
 What kind of financial advice do consumers want? 
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 Are there gaps between the financial advice that consumers want, and the financial 
advice that they can access and afford?   How can these gaps be closed?   What role could technology, such as robo-advice, play in improving access to 
financial advice? 
There will be a simultaneous guidance consultation which will consider how the 
Government should structure the provision of free, impartial guidance, including that given 
by the Money Advice Service (MAS) and Pension Wise, to give consumers the information 
they need, either to make financial decisions directly or to seek the right additional advice 
to help them do so. The two reviews will provide a complementary and comprehensive 
analysis of the advice landscape.599 
While recognising that the advice gap exists, firms could be opening themselves to risks 
further down the line if they rush to fill it, according to Simon Laird, a partner at law firm 
RPC. Addressing an audience of financial advisers at the Wealth ManageŵeŶt AssoĐiatioŶ͛s 
IŶǀestŵeŶt CoŶfeƌeŶĐe ϮϬϭϱ, he said that ͚oƌdiŶaƌǇ people Ŷeed to ŵake ĐƌuĐial deĐisioŶs 
aďout hoǁ to iŶǀest theiƌ ŵoŶeǇ to last theŵ foƌ ϯϬ Ǉeaƌs oƌ ŵoƌe….The ƌealitǇ is if fiƌŵs 
get tempted into that advice gap [by offering simplified or flat-fee products] without some 
sort of thought-out structure behind it, then they might only be wanting to help, but if it 
goes ǁƌoŶg, theǇ͛ƌe goiŶg to ďe tuƌŶed oŶ aŶd people aƌe goiŶg to laǇ ĐƌitiĐisŵ at theiƌ dooƌ 
lateƌ doǁŶ the liŶe… If people do start taking shortcuts to keep costs down, they could fall 
foul of the ƌegulatoƌ͛.600  
The FAMR consultation drew the following responses: 
 Thomas Miller Investment has called on the Government to extend a tax exemption 
for employers who arrange financial advice for employees. The HMRC exemption 
from an employee benefits tax charge for regulated advice costing an employer up 
to £150 per person per year should be increased to as much as £1,000 per individual. 
This ǁould ĐoŶfƌoŶt the ͚iŶĐoŶǀeŶieŶt tƌuth͛ that ͚the oŶlǇ ǁaǇ to eŶsuƌe people 
make good decisions is to ensure they get good, sound advice from highly-qualified, 
highly-ƌegulated adǀiseƌs͛. Matthew Phillips, managing director, said that the 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ŵust faĐe up to ͚ǁheƌe the ĐouŶtƌǇ fiŶds itself. The reality is that 
retirees' choices are varied, older pension schemes are complex and a 45-minute 
guidance session will offer nowhere near the level of assistance that most people 
need to make an informed decision. Sorting out the regulatory befuddlement 
between advice and guidance is welcome, as is anything that reduces the jargon of 
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the financial services industry, but here is the catch: it rather misses the point. The 
only way to help people is for them to receive advice, and the reality is that with 
advice there are no half measures. If you have a regulated advice community, it is 
binary - it either gives advice, for which it is liable, based on an individual's full 
position, or it does not. It is a tailored solution and tailored solutions come at a 
pƌiĐe…AŶ iŶĐƌease iŶ the HM‘C taǆ eǆeŵptioŶ is the ďest aŶd ŵost pƌaĐtiĐal 
solution, actively encouraging the use of pƌofessioŶal ƌegulated adǀiseƌs͛.601  The Financial Inclusion Centre has called for the establishment of a funded national 
advice network to help bridge the advice gap, with the funding provided either by 
industry or the Government. The Ŷetǁoƌk ǁould ͚provide advice, guidance, and 
information to consumers who are not commercially viable for the for-profit 
financial services industry. This must involve some form of cross-subsidy either from 
the public purse or from the industry. Closing the advice gap means focusing on 
making the financial services industry more efficient, so it can extend its reach to 
more consumers and providing alternative provision for consumers who are not 
commercially viable for the for-pƌofit adǀiĐe seĐtoƌ͛.602  The ILC-UK has called for a new type of advice for older retirees that would sit 
between the non-advised and advised categories and be cheaper to deliver than full 
regulated advice. In a report published in December 2015 and entitled 
Understanding Retirement Journeys: Expectations vs Reality, the ILC-UK said: 
͚BƌiŶgiŶg fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe to the ŵass market – whether face to face, over the phone 
or on the internet – is long overdue and we call on the Financial Advice Market 
Review to faĐilitate ƌeal ĐhaŶge iŶ this aƌea͛. UsiŶg data fƌoŵ the Living Costs and 
Food Survey and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, the report found evidence 
of under-consumption among the older population who hold the majority of their 
savings in low interest current accounts. Further, people typically started reducing 
their consumption around the age of 70, so their saving levels start to rise, thereby 
creating a drag on economic growth. Much of the decline in consumption came from 
reduced spending on non-essential items, such as holidays and eating out, whereas 
spending on essential items such as food remained flat. Some of the reduced 
spending could be explained by consumers becoming more uncertain about their 
income. To circumvent this, consumers should be actively re-engaged in the planning 
process at this point by being offered regular full financial health checks, through 
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both Pension Wise and the proposed new type of advice. That advice would mention 
the importance of buying a lifetime annuity to provide security of income.603  The Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association (PLSA) called on the Government to 
replace the environment where savers are left largely in the dark about the specific 
options open to them to one where they are signposted to quality-assured 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe solutioŶs: ͚While leaǀiŶg saǀeƌs ǁith the ƌight to deĐide hoǁ to 
use their own retirement pot, this would ensure that the path of least resistance is 
much more conducive to good outcomes than today's effective default of taking 
Đash͛. Although ǁideƌ aĐĐess to adǀiĐe ǁould help ;͚ďut oŶlǇ foƌ the feǁ Ŷot the 
ŵaŶǇ͛Ϳ, the ƌealitǇ is that ŵost people aƌe Ŷot iŶĐliŶed to seek adǀiĐe and are 
ƌeluĐtaŶt to paǇ foƌ it. The PL“A͛s oǁŶ ƌeseaƌĐh shoǁed that, aŵoŶg those ǁho haǀe 
already accessed their pension, only 39% sought out financial advice and only 21% 
had used Pension Wise (mostly using the website only).604 
  
3.10 Adviser charging 
It is clear from the previous Section that RDR, which required advisers IFAs to move to a fee-
based and away from a commission-based charging model, has made the cost of regulated 
advice more explicit to the consumer. To illustrate, prior to RDR, a typical annual 
management charge (AMC) of 1% was split 50/50 between the provider (e.g., an insurance 
company) and the adviser. The insurer provided the administration, premium collection and 
the investment funds, while the adviser provided advice to both the employer and the 
scheme members.605 Following RDR, the adviser has to charge the customer directly for 
advice. Furthermore, from April 2016, the FCA also banned trail commission on products 
sold after 31 December 2012, although it still allows trail commission on legacy products 
that were sold before 2013. This could make the advice business unsustainable for between 
20-40% of current advisers, according to some estimates.606  To reduce adviser costs, in 
paƌtiĐulaƌ ƌegulatoƌǇ Đosts, the adǀiseƌs͛ tƌade ďodǇ, the Personal Finance Society (PFS) has 
called for the introduction of a product levy – an explicit fee on investments and policies – 
to be paid for by the client. 607    
                                                     
603 
Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) New category of advice needed to get over 70s spending – report, 
Professional Adviser, 2 December.  
604
 ‘epoƌted iŶ “tephaŶie Baǆteƌ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ IŶdustƌǇ uƌges Ŷeǁ appƌoaĐh to fƌeedoŵs as adǀiĐe is ͚Ŷot eŶough͛, 
Professional Pensions, 22 December. 
605
 Reported Laura Miller (2015) Point, counterpoint: Henry Tapper responds to pension adviser's charge cap 
gripe, Professional Adviser, 20 August. 
606
 Heath Report, February 2015. Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) New adviser body backs commission-
like charges, Professional Adviser, 18 May.  
607
 CaƌŵeŶ ‘eiĐhŵaŶ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ PF“ joiŶs Đalls foƌ poliĐǇ leǀǇ to Đoŵďat ͚uŶsustaiŶaďle͛ adǀiseƌ fees, PƌofessioŶal 
Adviser, 3 June. 
313 
 
In the lead-up to the new pensions regime, there was a debate amongst advisers, conducted 
in Professional Adviser, concerning the most appropriate charging model going forward. The 
main choice is between a fixed fee (based on an hourly rate) and a percentage-of-assets (or 
ad valorem) model.608  The debate was inititated by Alan Smith, who argued that fixed fees 
ǁas the ͚ŵodeƌŶ, pƌofessioŶal ǁaǇ' to Đhaƌge, aŶd Cliǀe Walleƌ, ǁho suppoƌts a tieƌed 
percentage-of-assets model (e.g. 1% to 250,000, 0.75% to £500,000 etc...), with only specific 
pieces of work, such as an inheritance tax report, charged on a fixed-price basis.609  
Keith Robertson, managing director at Armstrong Financial, said that the debate exposed a 
worrying element of conflict: advisers appeared uncertain whether their profits or their 
clients' outcomes should be the main focus. He added: ͚As alǁaǇs, it paǇs to look thƌough 
the ĐlieŶts' eǇes… The oŶlǇ tiŵe ad ǀaloƌeŵ ĐhaƌgiŶg is ƌatioŶal ;aŶd theƌefoƌe likelǇ to ďe 
considered reasonable in principle by clients) is if the practitioner is providing genuine 
investment management advice. If this amounts to no more than passing the client to a 
discretionary investment manager (DIM), a client could, and should, question what 
additioŶal skill Ǉou add foƌ ƌeĐeiǀiŶg a kiĐk ďaĐk oŶ the fees; the DIM does all the ǁoƌk͛. 
Instead, Mr Robertson recommends performance-ƌelated fees: ͚aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ƌeseaƌĐh, it 
turns out that investors would pay reasonably generous performance-related fees - perhaps 
20-25% of all gains above an agreed benchmark. However, this is only the case if the 
investment manager also participated in the bad years by giving something back. So perhaps 
this sort of remuneration would have to be on some sort of rolling basis, with a portion of 
fees held iŶ esĐƌoǁ agaiŶst possiďle futuƌe Ŷegatiǀe ƌetuƌŶs͛. His speĐifiĐ suggestioŶ ǁas as 
follows: ͚“aǇ oŶe set a taƌget aŶŶual ƌetuƌŶ of aŶ iŶflatioŶ ďeŶĐhŵaƌk plus, ŵaǇďe, ϰ%. If 
that return was achieved, an ad valorem fee of, say, a standard 1% would be payable. If the 
return was higher, the adviser/manager would receive 25% of the excess and the investor 
75%. The problem is what happens if the target return is not achieved. Perhaps a sliding 
scale from 1% at the target down to close-to-zero if no return were generated and, if the 
return went negative, the adviser to give back some proportion of previously paid fees. 
Making adviser-managers liable for losses (to a limited extent), as well as gains, would 
change their behaviour and investment strategies; an interesting thought indeed. Non-
investment work is obviously a matter of fixed or time-charged fee, negotiated with the 
ĐlieŶt pƌioƌ to staƌtiŶg the ǁoƌk, eǆaĐtlǇ as pƌesĐƌiďed ďǇ the ‘etail DistƌiďutioŶ ‘eǀieǁ͛.610  
Simplified advice firm Wealth Horizon argues that advisers should set charges according to 
the service their client wants, rather than offeƌiŶg a full seƌǀiĐe that Đhaƌges ͚foƌ eǀeƌǇthiŶg 
ƌatheƌ thaŶ ǁhat is ƌeƋuiƌed͛. The fiƌŵ aƌgues that ͚sigŶifiĐaŶt ĐhaŶges͛ aƌe ƌeƋuiƌed to 
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make the industry more accessible for consumers in the light of the new pension 
flexibilities. Advisers need to avoid expensive packaged bank account-style add-ons that are 
desigŶed foƌ 'paŶdeƌiŶg to the ǁealthǇ͛. CEO Chƌis Williaŵs said that Đustoŵeƌs ǁith less 
thaŶ £ϭϬϬ,ϬϬϬ iŶ the ďaŶk ͚siŵplǇ doŶ't kŶoǁ ǁheƌe to tuƌŶ͛.611  
In May 2015, a new association of directly authorised advisers called Libertatem was 
established with the aim of introducing a type of service for which commission-like 
payments will be payable. Libertatem would also set fixed fees for certain work, which 
would allow people currently unable to access advice to get that advice. The new 
organisation is led by Garry Heath, former IFA Association director general.612 
The May 2015 survey published by Intelliflo discussed earlier also asked respondents how 
they would be prepared to pay for advice: 35% preferred a fixed pre-agreed hourly rate, 
while 12% preferred a fee based on a percentage of assets, with 10% preferring a 
combination of the two. In terms of what was considered to be a reasonable hourly rate for 
a fully qualified IFA, a third said less than £50 per hour, a third said between £50 and £100, 
18% said between £100 and £150, 10% between £150 and £200, and 4% said between £200 
and £300 per hour.613 
A survey by APFA found that around 60% of advisers had turned away clients seeking 
pension advice in 2014 because they were concerned that the advice was too expensive, 
given the clients' needs and circumstances. Chris Hannant called on the FCA to relax 
regulation to allow advisers to come up with simpler, cheaper processes.614  
In December 2015, the Schroders Adviser Survey was published. The survey of 575 financial 
advisers showed that financial advisers' fees had increased during 2015 as advisers have 
increasingly segmented their client bases by asset size. The average fee was 75bps, 
compared with 50bps prior to RDR. Robin Stoakley head of UK intermediary at Schroders, 
said: ͚Theƌe has ďeeŶ aŶ iŶĐƌease iŶ fees ďǇ fiŶaŶĐial adǀiseƌs, ǁith ϳϱďps ďeĐoŵiŶg the Ŷeǁ 
norm. Now, clients are paying different amounts as IFAs are cutting deals with bigger 
clients. Some 87% of respondents offer different levels of service based on a client's asset 
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size or revenue generated, with 61% of those clients being formally asked to leave having 
uŶdeƌ £ϱϬk. Most adǀiseƌs haǀe Ŷo plaĐe foƌ sŵalleƌ ĐlieŶts, usuallǇ uŶdeƌ £ϭϱϬk͛.615  
According to a study by Which? in January 2014, more than half of the advisers surveyed did 
not reveal their charges until they had met with customers to see what they wanted.616 In 
June 2015, only five of the 50 largest financial advice firms published their fees on their 
websites, according to research by low-cost adviser Candid Financial Advice. These are 
Hargreaves Lansdown, ranked second largest with gross sales of £6.6bn 2014, Brewin 
Dolphin, ranked third with sales of £2.5bn, Investec Wealth & Investment, ranked tenth with 
sales of £1.3bn, Saunderson House, ranked 23rd with sales of £620m, and Vestra Wealth, 
ranked 37th with sales of £370m. Most advisers refuse to be transparent about their fees 
because they say it is too difficult to assess how much their advice will cost without fully 
knowing a potential client's circumstances. However, this is making life difficult for 
Đustoŵeƌs, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to JustiŶ ModƌaǇ, fouŶdeƌ of CaŶdid FiŶaŶĐial AdǀiĐe, ǁho said: ͚While 
the commission ban forces advisers to tell clients how much they charge, it seems the vast 
majority will only do so when you agree to speak to or meet with an adviser. This makes 
shopping around for a fair deal very tiresome and in my experience too many clients feel 
compelled to use an adviser afteƌ ŵeetiŶg theŵ, eǀeŶ if theiƌ fees aƌe high… I ǁould ďe ǀeƌǇ 
wary of financial advisers who do not publicly disclose their fees, as in my experience it's 
ofteŶ ďeĐause theǇ aƌe eǆpeŶsiǀe͛.617  
In October 2015, Which? renewed its call for advisers to display their fees and charges 
online. But, it now wants the FCA to act and make displays mandatory. Again, there were 
mixed views amongst advisers about the issue of greater disclosure, but there was little 
support for making this mandatory. 
Supporters of greater disclosure argue that the move would promote transparency, clarity, 
and certainty. For example, Al Rush, founder of Echelon Wealthcare and online adviser 
Fiver-a-Day, said that showing prospective clients how much a service will cost gives clients 
ǁhat theǇ ǁaŶt: gƌeateƌ tƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ.  To illustƌate, the ǁeďsite ͚ǁill tell ĐlieŶts that, if theǇ 
want XYZ, in 85% of cases it will cost you x. This will only increase if the work gets too 
complicated or theƌe is ŵoƌe ǁoƌk iŶǀolǀed͛. He did not accept the argument that it is 
iŵpossiďle to displaǇ geŶeƌiĐ Đhaƌges due to the ͚ďespoke Ŷatuƌe͛ of theiƌ seƌǀiĐe: ͚“oŵe of 
our clients might be bespoke with old pensions and trusts all over the place, but for most 
people, if they want to consolidate a pension, start investing, re-investing, we know straight 
away how much it's going to cost. I know within half an hour. The reality is lots of our clients 
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are not bespoke; they've got pretty similar needs and circumstances. We are not tying 
ouƌselǀes to aŶǇthiŶg. We giǀe aŶ estiŵate, ǁhiĐh is suďjeĐt to ĐhaŶge͛. But ǁhile ͚it ŵakes 
good ďusiŶess seŶse to do it͛, Mƌ ‘ush did Ŷot ǁaŶt to see charges disclosure become 
mandatory.  
Those agaiŶst gƌeateƌ disĐlosuƌe aƌgue that the foĐus oŶ Đost is ͚ŵisleadiŶg͛. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to 
Chris Budd, managing director of Ovation Finance, clients should be focusing on services, 
not fees, and leading them to think otheƌǁise is ŵisguided: ͚I doŶ't thiŶk WhiĐh? ĐalliŶg foƌ 
the FCA to make it mandatory is helping anybody. Clients need to get the right type of 
service for them, not focus on costs. A list of possible fees is not going to tell anybody what 
type of service they will receive. Which? should be telling people to focus on shopping 
around for the service that's right for them. Cost is secondary. People focus on the wrong 
thiŶg ďeĐause theǇ aƌe ďeiŶg ŵisguided ďǇ WhiĐh?͛.618 
The fee charged by advisers also covers the cost of regulation, which includes fees levied by 
the FCA and the FSCS. APFA surveyed its member firms in 2014 and found that regulatory 
costs – which included 'indirect' costs such as case-checking and general compliance – could 
be as high as 12% of turnover. The FCA and FSCS levies comprise around 0.5% and 4% of 
tuƌŶoǀeƌ, ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ. “aŵ CauŶt, diƌeĐtoƌ of Futuƌe Life FP, saǇs: ͚The ƌeal Đost of 
regulation is covering your backside. The fees and levies are just headline noise. The real 
cost is sitting down with the client, finding out their needs and objectives, doing the 
research and, on the back of that, the compliance it demands. We spend three times as 
much on IT and compliance as we do on FSCS. Most of our cost is labour: doing the job, 
documentiŶg it all aŶd doiŶg the IT͛.619 
A study by consultancy Investment Trends of the Australian advisory market showed that 
profit margins have narrowed following the introduction of regulatory reforms in 2013 
similar to the RDR which banned commission on products. The average profit margin has 
fallen to 1.2% for upfront advice (defined as 'the total cost of providing full advice to the 
typical client') and 3.2% for ongoing annual advice (defined as 'maintaining a client file, 
iŶĐludiŶg peƌiodiĐ ƌeǀieǁs͛Ϳ, Đoŵpaƌed with corresponding UK margins of 4% for both 
upfront and ongoing advice.  
The two markets responded in different ways to the reforms. The UK switched mainly to 
percentage-of-assets charging (or 'explicit commission') and focused on high net worth 
clients. This allowed UK advisers to earn higher fees per client, although the client base was 
smaller. In contrast, Australian advisers moved more to fixed fees, because clients told 
advisers 'we don't want to pay asset-based fees'.  
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Investment Trends' research shows the average Australian adviser earned 21% of its income 
from fixed fees in 2011, compared with 22% from asset-based fees and 54% from 
commission. This grew to 33% via fixed fees in 2014 and is projected to grow further, to 42% 
by 2017. In the UK, the average firm earned 14% from fixed fees, 20% from percentage fees 
and 65% from commissions in 2011. This changed to 21% fixed fees and 52% asset-based 
fees in 2014 and is projected to change to 25% fixed fees and 56% asset-based fees in 2017. 
Australian advisers also started to compete more directly with each other – there are 70,000 
advisers in Australia, more than thrice the number in the UK – while product providers also 
started offering low-cost advice and the result was to drive down prices. Investment Trends 
believes the UK could come under similar pricing pressure as cheaper forms of advice – such 
as simplified advice from providers such as Standard Life and robo-advice – enter the 
market  to fill the 'advice gap' created by RDR. 
 
3.11 The implications for a default pathway 
To be feasible, any default pathway using a decision tree would need to be aligned with the 
guidance guarantee process in a way that it is not classified as regulated advice or a 
personal recommendation. To meet this requirement, the decision tree would, according to 
the FCA, Ŷeed to ͚aǀoid ŵakiŶg aŶǇ judgeŵeŶt oƌ assessŵeŶt that ǁould ƌesult iŶ a siŶgle 
pƌoduĐt oƌ a list of pƌoduĐts ďeiŶg ideŶtified as suitaďle͛.620 Under the current regulatory 
framework, this is clearly a challenge, but it suggests we should be looking at the simplified 
advice route. 
 
3.11.1 A default pathway with simplified advice 
If the objective is a well-designed default pathway based on simplified advice, there are six 
important hurdles to cross.  
The first relates to suitability: over what wealth range will simplified advice be suitable? The 
industry consensus seems to be up to £100,000 (the exception being those who believe 
almost everyone needs bespoke regulated advice). According to Rachel Vahey, independent 
peŶsioŶs ĐoŶsultaŶt: ͚At the ŵoŵeŶt, it is Đleaƌ dƌaǁdoǁŶ is oŶlǇ suitaďle foƌ those ǁith 
laƌge fuŶds aŶd ǁho uŶdeƌstaŶd the ƌisks aŶd take theŵ oŶ ĐoŵfoƌtaďlǇ͛. A paƌtiĐulaƌ issue 
was the cost of guarantees in the new range of drawdown products being offered: 
͚GuaƌaŶtees seƌǀe a useful puƌpose, ďut ĐaŶ ďe eǆpeŶsiǀe. It is iŵpoƌtaŶt people uŶdeƌstaŶd 
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what the costs are, what the implications are for their money management, and importantly 
ǁhat the alteƌŶatiǀes aƌe͛.621 
Joel Adams, adviser with LIFT Financial, argues that, while drawdown will become more 
ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ, it ǁill Ŷot ďe ǀiaďle foƌ people ǁith sŵalleƌ pots: ͚Coŵplete fleǆiďilitǇ is a ǀeƌǇ 
dangerous thing, especially for those without an adviser. I anticipate that there will be a cut-
off level where it is not profitable for advisers to be involved and I think it will be at about 
£100,000. You have to look at it realistically as to whether it is worth getting involved with 
small pots. There is a cut-off line where the benefit of advice will be outweighed. That is 
exactly why we need to see innovation from product providers to make sure advisers can 
offeƌ siŵple solutioŶs to ĐlieŶts͛.622  
The second relates to cost. The process needs to be sufficiently commoditised that the cost 
of the advice (or at least a typical rate) is transparent to the customer at the outset. This 
allows customers to shop around to get the best deal. This is particularly important, since 
less than a tenth of the population has complex enough needs to warrant the fees they 
would pay for full advice, and would be better served by guidance, according to a study by 
IFA Prydis in December 2014.623  
The third relates to the quality of and trust in the advice. As mentioned above, research 
commissioned by the FCA suggests that customers are put off seeking financial advice 
because they are unable to trust the advice they receive or judge its quality. The research 
ǁas ĐoŶduĐted ďǇ ĐoŶsultaŶt IgŶitioŶ House as paƌt of the FCA͛s IŶteƌiŵ ‘epoƌt foƌ its 
Retirement Income Market Study.624  The main findings from the research are:625 
 Đost is seeŶ as a ͚ďaƌƌieƌ to adǀiĐe͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ a sigŶ of ƋualitǇ, leadiŶg to a 
͚teŶdeŶĐǇ foƌ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs to ƌeǀeƌt to a DIY appƌoaĐh͛  providers were not communicating with clients effectively about their retirement 
options, and were ignoring the code of practice produced by the Association of 
British Insurers  a ͚stƌoŶg ŵistƌust͛ toǁaƌds IFAs ďǇ those Ǉet to ƌetiƌe aŶd those Ŷot ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ ǁith 
aŶ adǀiseƌ, due to a ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of ͚pooƌ past eǆpeƌieŶĐes͛ aŶd a ďelief that IFAs 
͚ŵight Ŷot alǁaǇs ǁoƌk iŶ theiƌ ďest iŶteƌests͛. ‘espoŶdeŶts ǁeƌe ͚suƌpƌised to heaƌ 
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that pension advice in the post-RDR environment would be paid for through an 
explicit fee, and that this could cost theŵ iŶ eǆĐess of £ϭ,ϬϬϬ͛. This put some 
customers off using an IFA, especially those with small pension pots  pre-retired advised customers were content with how much they paid their adviser 
and would be happy to continue the relationship post retirement.  there were mixed views from those already retired about the value of advice, with 
some respondents reporting that they had sufficient information available for them 
to confidently make decisions on their own, while others saying that they would seek 
advice if they did not understand the options facing them  many retirees using advice reported that they had no way of telling whether the 
service they had received was good. 
The fourth hurdle relates to a potential confusion by customers about the difference 
between information and advice. Providers are concerned that that customers will wrongly 
assume that any information and guidance that they receive is in fact advice.626 According to 
Fiona Karlin, director at Momentum Partners, FCA guidelines suggest that firms should treat 
simplified and focused advice in the same way as full advice and this would include risk 
profilings. Advice firms need to protect themselves and hence should include hurdle 
questions to assess client suitability in online advice.627 
The fifth relates to the ͚ŵodel iŶǀestŵeŶt poƌtfolio͛ which the FCA defiŶes as a ͚seƌǀiĐe 
which provides access to a pre-constructed collection of designated investments that meet 
a specific risk profile sometimes offered with a periodic rebalancing of investments to 
ŵaiŶtaiŶ a ĐoŶsisteŶt asset alloĐatioŶ͛. A ŵodel iŶǀestment portfolio is used by advisers to 
illustrate to clients the outcome of different investment and drawdown strategies.  
However, when a model investment portfolio is re-ďalaŶĐed, aŶ adǀiseƌ ǁill ďe aĐtiŶg ͚ǁith 
discretion', according to the FCA. This means advisers must ensure each re-balancing is 
suitable for the client. 
The final hurdle relates to how the FOS treats complaints. The FO“͛s ǀieǁ is that if suitaďilitǇ 
has ďeeŶ appƌopƌiatelǇ assessed oƌ soŵe effoƌt ŵade to ͚kŶoǁ the Đustoŵeƌ', the Đase 
would ďe assessed as if ƌegulated adǀiĐe had ďeeŶ giǀeŶ. Otheƌǁise FO“ ǁill ͚eǆpeĐt 
customers to be responsible for their own choice'.628 
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 Carmen Reichman (2015), Pension provider fears 'advice' risk in FCA's retiree rules, Professional Adviser, 28 
January. 
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Quoted in Carmen Reichman (2015) Simplified advice should include 'hurdle questions', says IFA, 
Professional Adviser,  25 February. 
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Reported in Carmen Reichman and Scott Sinclair (2015) FCA tweaks guidance on what constitutes 'advice', 
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3.11.2 Can simplified advice work in a default framework? 
There are strongly differing views as to whether a default framework with simplified advice 
can work. Interestingly, opinion splits according to whether those giving a view work for a 
provider or an adviser/wealth manager. 
Barry O'Dwyer, managing director at provider Standard Life, believes that the financial 
serviĐes iŶdustƌǇ ͚ought to take [siŵplified adǀiĐe ŵodels] ǀeƌǇ seƌiouslǇ͛. Similarly, Tom 
McPhail, from Hargreaves Lansdown which has been providing non-advised drawdown for 
eight Ǉeaƌs, is ĐoŶfideŶt that guidaŶĐe aloŶe ĐaŶ ǁoƌk: ͚Ouƌ oǁŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐe of dealing with 
non-advised drawdown – and we know more about it than any other business in the UK – is 
that you have to engage with the customer, walk them through the relevant information 
and ensure that they understand what they are doing. If the pension provider fails to take 
responsibility for these simple steps, then it is not unreasonable for them to be called to 
account for their failings. One of the biggest risk areas will be trust-based schemes offering 
drawdown. It can be done, but doing it safely requires Đaƌe aŶd ƌoďust pƌoĐesses͛.  
Chris Daems, director of Principal Financial Solutions, believes that the guidance guarantee 
can work, but customers need a clear route to more specialist advice. He uses the analogy of 
the NH“: ͚so, ǁheƌe the NH“ has a floǁ like this:  
NHS Direct (or NHS 111) > Paramedic > Doctor > Specialist (with referrals 
goiŶg to the Ŷeǆt stage if the ͚patient͛ needs more help than the current 
level can provide) 
...the guidance guarantee version might look like this: 
Web site > Phone > Unqualified face-to-face support > Qualified face-to-
face support > Specialist qualified face-to-face support (this also needs to 
be within a clear framework so when certain information is disclosed or 
questions asked, it can be passed on to the next level)͛.629 
 
Those working for advisers or wealth managers tend to disagree that simplified advice can 
work in a default framework. The following views are typical. 
Kay Ingram, divisional director of individual savings and iŶǀestŵeŶts at LEBC, said: ͚Theƌe is 
a whole lot to take into account [when planning for retirement]. [It includes] everything 
from drawdown to deferring pensions and looking at clients' other sources of income. The 
point is, to [deliver guidance] that people can follow and take action on, it is going to take 
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more than a decision tree. The only way really to get an idea is to consult an IFA. It is 
soŵethiŶg that has got to last the test of tiŵe aŶd that's ǁhat's diffiĐult͛.630 
Austin Broad, technical director at AFH Wealth Management, goes further:631  
Retirement options remain one of the most complex areas of financial 
planning, driven in part by the fact that, when an individual enters the 
decumulation phase of their life, it is rarely a simple matter of considering 
their pension plans in isolation. Most retirement planning requires the 
retirees' whole financial situation to be considered in formulating the best 
outcome for them. 
Clearly this is most acute where the retiree has sufficient assets to consider 
drawing their future income directly from their retirement funds, avoiding 
the purchase of an annuity. Known as drawdown, the options and 
variations available are significant and careful consideration and 
professional advice is essential. 
This is completely at odds with the guidance guarantee and more 
importantly, non-regulated individuals delivering guidance in a strategic 
area that requires professional understanding of the retiree's tax position, 
their total assets, their income and their expenditure. 
The new rules in many ways further compound matters as there are likely 
to be more complex solutions and greater alternate options for the retiree 
to consider. 
This is not about whether to use a particular insurance product or 
independent option, this is about the strategy adopted, which according to 
Treasury, does not need a regulated individual to deliver. 
The delivery of strategic drawdown solutions in the new world will require 
advisers to consider the holistic financial position of the retiree, together 
with their objectives and needs. It will require an understanding of life 
expectancy and tax in order to promote the concept of retirees taking 
seriously the need for their plan to be sustainable for life and yet meet 
their other income objectives in the most tax efficient way. 
Trying to guide somebody through this maze, with what could amount to 
limited information, is an accident waiting to happen and therefore the 
emphasis of any guidance, where drawdown is a likely outcome, is to refer 
to a professional adviser.  
I am sure that insurance companies will be very interested in the potential 
for retirees to take on drawdown themselves. Again, for many retirees, 
following this course of action is likely to present challenges which would 
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benefit from professional advice input. In some of the cases where a retiree 
goes direct, the problems that are created could take many years to 
surface and could potentially prove very costly. 
In conclusion, retirement options, in all but the smallest of pension funds, 
will benefit from professional advice.  
The provision of guidance on drawdown, outside of delivering an education 
is dangerous and should be referred to a regulated source. 
The decisions made at retirement are by definition long term decisions that 
need to take account of the whole, not just a part, of the story. 
Therefore, a fee-based, preferably independent advice approach should be 
recommended. This would allow the adviser to manage any conflicts they 
may have, within the agreed fee structure they adopt for the work to be 
done. 
 
Jamie Smith-Thompson, managing director at Portal Financial, is concerned about people 
ĐuttiŶg out adǀiĐe to ƌeduĐe Đosts: ͚Who is goiŶg to diƌeĐt the iŶǀestŵeŶts aŶd ǁhǇ aƌe theǇ 
selecting those investments? To be able to do that as an IFA, you need a few years' worth of 
exam taking and knowledge before you can recommend that to the client. Do you think 
these DIY people haǀe got that eǆteŶt of iŶǀestŵeŶt kŶoǁledge? That is a ƌeal ĐoŶĐeƌŶ͛.  
‘aĐhel VaheǇ aƌgues: ͚Theƌe is a ǁoƌƌǇ that those goiŶg iŶto uŶadǀised dƌaǁdoǁŶ ǁill Ŷot 
understand the risks involved or how to manage them. Guidance will have a role in 
explaining this, but professional advice will obviously be the best route to those considering 
dƌaǁdoǁŶ͛.632  She was concerned about people ending up in their existing provideƌ͛s pooƌ 
ǀalue dƌaǁdoǁŶ fuŶd: ͚“o ǁe ŵight haǀe the uŶappealiŶg situatioŶ ǁheƌe iŶstead of failiŶg 
to shop around for an annuity (as is the case now), people fail to shop around for a 
dƌaǁdoǁŶ fuŶd aŶd just go foƌ the oŶe ǁith theiƌ ĐuƌƌeŶt pƌoǀideƌ͛.633 
David Thompson, managing director of business development and proposition at AXA 
Wealth, said: ͚Feǁ ǁould aƌgue that the peŶsioŶs ƌefoƌŵs….aƌe Ŷot to ďe ǁelĐoŵed. HaǀiŶg 
greater choice and greater flexibility over pension arrangements is surely a good thing. 
However, we believe that, with greater choice and flexibility, there is also a greater risk that, 
without professional financial advice, a lot of people will not achieve their financial 
eǆpeĐtatioŶs iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt…. Less sĐƌupulous pƌoǀideƌs ŵaǇ ďe luƌed ďǇ a quick buck and 
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eǆploit the oppoƌtuŶities to get assets uŶdeƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt… We Ŷeed to fiŶd a ǁaǇ foƌǁaƌd 
that allows people to access professional financial advice which is detailed enough to give 
confidence in the expected outcome, yet at the same time affordable for individuals – or 
their employers – ǁith sŵalleƌ peŶsioŶ pots͛.634 
Despite Toŵ MĐPhail͛s ǀieǁs that guidaŶĐe aloŶe ĐaŶ ǁoƌk, Haƌgƌeaǀes LaŶsdoǁŶ lauŶĐhed 
a low-cost retirement planning service in June 2015 aimed at filling the advice gap between 
Pension Wise and regulated financial advice. The HL Retirement Planning Service, which 
Đhaƌges a flat fee of £ϯϵϱ plus VAT, ͚is aŶ adǀisoƌǇ seƌǀiĐe ďut stops shoƌt of pƌoǀidiŶg 
specifiĐ, peƌsoŶal ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs͛. Mƌ MĐPhail said: ͚The PeŶsioŶ Wise seƌǀiĐe provides 
investors with an invaluable introduction to the key issues they need to think about. The HL 
Retirement Planning Service takes investors a stage further than Pension Wise, walking 
them through the issues they need to consider when setting up theiƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe͛. 
The service would help people understand: 
 their retirement income options and the tax position of each  how much secure income they might need  the risks of drawdown and provides guidance on sustainable income  the need for contingencies, protecting dependants and factoring in potential care 
costs  provides a sense check to their current thinking  where to go and how to convert their pension into income. 
If clients who use the service want to progress to full advice the £395 fee will be knocked off 
future bills. Mƌ MĐPhail Ŷoted that HL͛s seƌǀiĐe Đosts ͚oŶlǇ aƌouŶd a Ƌuaƌteƌ of a tǇpiĐal full 
adǀisoƌǇ seƌǀiĐe͛.635 
 
3.12 Consumer vulnerability and regulatory responses 
The purpose of regulation is to protect the consumer. But the nature and effectiveness of 
the regulation will depend on which model of consumer behaviour – econ or human – 
comes closest to describing real world consumers. In the case of econs, the role of the 
regulator is to ensure that the customer has the information needed to make well-informed 
decisions, sure in the knowledge that econs are perfectly capable of assessing value for 
money and protecting themselves against fraud. In the case of humans with their limited 
understanding and interest in pension matters, the question becomes whether any amount 
of information, however well presented, will be sufficient for consumers to make well-
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informed decisions. What does the regulator do in the case of such potentially vulnerable 
consumers?   
Our research reveals a conflict in the regulatory response to the new pension flexibilities.  
This can be illustrated by the statement made by Christopher Woolard in his forward to the 
FCA͛s disĐussioŶ papeƌ Smarter Consumer Communications, published in June 2015:636 
A well-functioning market needs informed and engaged consumers. It 
requires consumers to have access to high quality, appropriate information 
to help them understand the product or service they have or plan to buy. 
This is especially true in the financial services sector, where it is important 
that the information helps empower consumers to make informed 
decisions about their finances. 
 
This statement is much more consistent with the econ model than the human model of 
behaviour and econs are typically not classified as vulnerable consumers. 
 
3.12.1 Governance of pension schemes in the new pension environment 
The Government has introduced new governance requirements for both trust- and contract-
based pension schemes from April 2015 in response to the new pension environment.637 
Governance in trust-based schemes – which are regulated by TPR – require the setting of 
minimum quality standards from April 2015 which ensure: 
 default investŵeŶt stƌategies aƌe desigŶed iŶ ŵeŵďeƌs͛ iŶteƌests aŶd ƌegulaƌlǇ 
reviewed  core scheme financial transactions are processed promptly and accurately  sĐheŵe ƌules do Ŷot ƌestƌiĐt the tƌustees͛ appoiŶtŵeŶt of adǀisoƌs aŶd 
administrators  trustees assess the levels of charges borne by members and the investment costs, 
with a charge cap of 0.75% on default funds  trustees have, or have access to, all of the knowledge and competencies necessary 
to properly run their scheme  the scheme has a chair of trustees with responsibility for preparing an annual 
governance statement setting out how the scheme has complied with these 
governance requirements.  
Deloitte has produced a seven-point checklist for trustees: 
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1. Consult with employers on issues such as the cost to set up and administer new 
pension options, to determine the amount of flexibility to be granted to scheme 
members, and what defined benefit de-risking strategies the employer may wish to 
implement. 
2. Communications to members should cover the latest changes and the degree of 
flexibility their pension scheme will offer. Frequent communications will be required 
throughout the implementation phase. 
3. Scheme administration should be reviewed, particularly around new minimum 
requirements to signpost members to the guidance guarantee during their 
retirement process. Similarly, another requirement seeks to ensure members are 
properly instructed to find independent financial advice at the appropriate time. 
New pension flexibilities may have additional administrative complexities and costs. 
4. “eek legal adǀiĐe oŶ issues aƌisiŶg fƌoŵ the ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ ĐhaŶges. Conduct a 
review of the trust deed and rules which may unearth amendment requirements, 
and consider the implications of the statutory overrides. 
5. Get actuarial advice. Changes will be applicable for DB schemes specifically, and 
centre on cash equivalent transfer values (CETV) calculations. The basis of these 
should be reviewed and its consistency with cash commutation factors within the 
scheme considered. Seek advice on whether CETVs should be reduced, by what level, 
and whether the employer is willing to support payment of full CETVs. Other 
considerations include the Code of Practice on DB-to-DC transfers and conversions, 
as well as the impact on scheme funding. 
6. Benefit options 
a. DC schemes: A final decision should be made as to the flexibilities offered 
within the scheme, including a review of annual benefit illustrations to reflect 
the new freedoms. The process of notifying and recording should also be 
considered when the money purchase annual allowance is triggered.  
b. DB schemes: As a minimum regulatory requirement, receipt of independent 
financial advice must be confirmed and recorded before CETV completion. 
Additional, and optional, considerations include whether CETVs should be 
provided as part of the retirement process, or whether individuals may take a 
non-statutory CETV at normal retirement as part of their standard scheme 
options. 
7. Investment strategy 
a. DC schemes: A review should be taken of the default investment strategy, as 
well as the lifestyle strategy and switching period, to assess their 
appropriateness. The range of investment funds available to members should 
also ďe a ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ ďoth pƌe aŶd post ͚ƌetiƌeŵeŶt' age. 
b. DB schemes: The investment strategy here should take into consideration the 
membership profile of the scheme which could change rapidly, and DB CETV 
requirements in response to possible liquidity and disinvestment issues. 
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Ongoing trends should be monitored in this regard for future investment 
strategy reviews. 638 
Some believe that the new pension regime combined with the terminal decline of DB 
schemes is likely to reinforce the move away from individual trusts as the vehicle for 
operating pension schemes. Instead, employers are likely to switch to contract-based DC 
schemes or enter into master trusts. According to Alan Morahan, head of DC consulting at 
PuŶteƌ “outhall, ͚ǁe aƌe goiŶg to see a ŵoǀe aǁaǇ fƌoŵ iŶdiǀidual tƌusts. MaŶǇ tƌustees aŶd 
sponsoring employers are going to struggle to open up the full range of freedoms that are 
available. So with that flexibility readily available elsewhere, it will mean that those trusts 
will get wound up and there will be further reduction in the number of trustees that are 
opeƌatiŶg iŶ the ŵaƌket͛. PeŶŶǇ Cogheƌ, head of pensions at Charles Russell Speechlys, 
believes: ͚The ŵoǀe to ĐoŶtƌaĐt-based frees [companies] and their employee trustees from 
the heavy burden of running a scheme. Classic trusteeship will fade away as business 
owners follow the example set by large companies in establishing ... a pension committee. 
These will make sure that their pension provider is delivering a scheme that is fit for 
puƌpose͛.639 
From April 2015, governance in contract-based schemes – which are regulated by the FCA –  
will be based around independent governance committees. IGCs must have at least 5 
members, the majority of whom (including the chair) will need to be independent of the 
firm. Their role is as follows: 
 act in the interests of active and deferred members  assess the value for money of the scheme (comparing the cost with the benefits and 
services it provides)  where the IGC finds problems with value for money, to raise concerns (as it sees fit) 
ǁith the fiƌŵ͛s ďoaƌd  raise concerns to the FCA, alert relevant scheme members and employers, and make 
its concerns public, and   produce an annual report of its findings.  
Schemes in small companies can appoint an independent third party (known as ͚a 
goǀeƌŶaŶĐe adǀisoƌǇ aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶt͛ ;GAAͿͿ to take oŶ theiƌ IGC ƌespoŶsiďilities. 
Questions have been raised about the real powers of IGCs. For example, Jacqui Reid, 
peŶsioŶs laǁǇeƌ at LiŶklateƌs, said: ͚The juƌǇ͛s out oŶ the eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh IGCs ǁill ďƌidge 
the gap between contract-based schemes and trust-based schemes. IGCs can make 
recommendations to contract-based providers, but they have little power in practice. They 
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cannot make changes to improve value for money where they find that value for money 
does not exist [e.g., if the member is in an old-style high charge fund]. Even where it is clear 
that a fuŶd is uŶdeƌpeƌfoƌŵiŶg, Ŷeitheƌ IGCs Ŷoƌ pƌoǀideƌs ĐaŶ ǀaƌǇ eǆistiŶg ŵeŵďeƌs͛ 
ĐoŶtƌaĐtual aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶts ďǇ ŵoǀiŶg theiƌ ŵeŵďeƌs fƌoŵ that fuŶd ǁithout the ŵeŵďeƌs͛ 
eǆpƌess ĐoŶseŶt͛. ‘iĐhaƌd WilsoŶ, poliĐǇ lead foƌ DC at the NAPF, said IGCs didŶ͛t ͚haǀe aŶǇ 
aĐtual poǁeƌs͛ aŶd ǁeƌe ͚esseŶtiallǇ adǀiseƌs͛.640  An insider told us: ͚The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt 
considers IGCs and trustee boards to be essentially equivalent. This is not remotely true. 
IGCs were set up as a way defending the failure to impose a fiduciary duty (i.e., trustees) on 
insurance companies. IGCs are neither independent nor governing. Insurance companies 
appoint the members of the IGC, half of whom can be employees and the other half can be 
representatives of companies which supply the insurance company. The IGC can only make 
recommendations. The conflicts of interest are extreme͛.  However, Steve Webb, the then 
Pensions Minister, said that providers that ignore their IGC would face huge reputational 
damage.641 
There is third governance model – the master trust – which has been around since the 
1950s, but has been given a new lease of life with the introduction of auto-enrolment. A 
master trust is a multi-employer occupational pension scheme where each employer has its 
own, effectively ring-fenced, division within the master arrangement.642 They can benefit 
fƌoŵ eĐoŶoŵies of sĐale aŶd heŶĐe haǀe loǁeƌ Đhaƌges. NE“T, The People͛s PeŶsioŶ aŶd 
NOW: Pensions are set up as master trusts. These schemes have also joined the master trust 
assurance framework (MAF).643   
Specific benefits of the master trust model include: 
 the ability for members to benefit from the ongoing management and oversight of 
investments  the ability to drive down operating costs through bulk purchasing  the need to appoint just one group of professional advisers for the whole scheme 
rather than a group for each division  one board of trustees for the whole scheme, rather than a board for each section, 
thereby coming under TPR rather than the more onerous governance rules of the 
FCA 
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 Reported in Stephanie Baxter (ϮϬϭϱͿ IGCs ǁill haǀe ͚little poǁeƌ͛ to iŵpƌoǀe ǀalue foƌ ŵoŶeǇ, PƌofessioŶal 
Pensions, 9 February. 
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 Repoƌted iŶ MiĐhael Kliŵes ;ϮϬϭϱͿ Weďď ƌejeĐts ͚toothless͛ IGCs Đlaiŵ, PƌofessioŶal PeŶsioŶs, ϮϮ JaŶuaƌǇ. 
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 TPR's defiŶitioŶ of a ŵasteƌ tƌust is ͚aŶ oĐĐupational trust-based pension scheme established by declaration 
of trust which is or has been promoted to provide benefits to employers which are not connected and where 
each employer group is not included in a separate section with its own trustees. For this purpose, employers 
are connected if they are part of the same group of companies (including partially owned subsidiaries and joint 
ǀeŶtuƌesͿ͛. 
643
 Introduced in April 2015, MAF was developed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and 
Wales in association with TPR; http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/trustees/master-trust-assurance.aspx 
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 consolidated accounting and governance requirement. 
A potential disadvantage is that the trustees are typically appointed by the provider of the 
master trust, which can lead to employer disengagement with the pension arrangement. On 
the other hand, some, especially small employers, might welcome this.644 
Both tƌustees aŶd IGCs ǁill haǀe to defiŶe aŶd assess ͚ǀalue foƌ ŵoŶeǇ͛ iŶ theiƌ DC sĐheŵes. 
In the case of trustees of  an occupational DC scheme, this means assessing whether scheme 
charges and transactioŶ Đosts ƌepƌeseŶt ͚good ǀalue͛. In the case of IGCs, this means 
assessiŶg the ͚oŶgoiŶg ǀalue foƌ ŵoŶeǇ͛ of a pƌoǀideƌ͛s ĐoŶtƌaĐt-based workplace DC 
pension schemes. 
 
Table 3.6: Factors to be taken into account by trustees and IGCs in the new pensions 
environment 
 
Factor Trustees IGCs 
Objective Calculate the charges and (in so far 
as they can) transaction costs borne 
by members 
 
Consider investment return 
 
Compare to others in the market, 
where possible 
Consider the level of charges borne 
by members and the direct and 
indirect costs (including transaction 
costs) incurred in managing and 
investing 
 
Consider the design of default 
investment strategies and the net 
performance of all investment 
strategies 
 
Compare to others in the market, 
where possible 
 
Subjective Weigh up benefits and services 
received by members against what 
members value in:  Governance  Communications  Administration 
 
(This includes a statutory 
requirement to consider whether 
core financial transactions are 
processed promptly and accurately) 
Weigh up benefits and services 
received by members against what 
members value in:  Governance  Communications  Administration 
 
(This includes a FCA requirement to 
consider whether core financial 
transactions are processed promptly 
and accurately) 
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 This is drawn from Graham English (2011) Master Trusts - Making a comeback, Pensions World, November. 
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There is no statutory definition of value for money, so according to Helen Ball, head of DC, 
Sackers, both trustees and IGCs will need to develop their own assessment process which 
will involve comparing costs against the benefits provided.645 A well-run scheme in terms of, 
say, good administration and clear communication might cost more, but could result in 
ďetteƌ ŵeŵďeƌ outĐoŵes aŶd heŶĐe ďe of ͚good ǀalue͛. Taďle ϯ.ϲ shoǁs the faĐtoƌs that 
need to be taken into account.In assessing value for money, trustees/IGCs will need to 
establish what factors members value most and then decide how to weight the different 
factors.646 
Some information will nevertheless be hard to gather. An important example of this is the 
disclosure of the full costs of fund management, including transactions costs.647 This is a 
needed for assessing value for money and the AMC, total expense ratio (TER) or even the 
ongoing charges figure (OCF) are inadequate and incomplete measures of fund 
management costs. From April 2015, trustees and IGCs will have to report transaction costs 
for the first time.648  
The DWP-FCA Call for Evidence on this issue in March 2015 stated:649  
Work to increase transparency of transaction costs in the workplace 
pensions market should be viewed in the wider context of efforts to ensure 
other consumers are fully informed about all costs and charges associated 
with other retail investments. Efforts at European Union level are already 
moving towards including transaction costs in any pre-contractual cost 
figure disclosed to the end consumer for retail investment products. This is 
being developed through the Packaged Retail and Insurance-based 
Investment Products (PRIIPs) Regulation and the recast Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II). Neither PRIIPs nor MiFID apply to 
workplace pensions, whether occupational pensions or workplace personal 
pensions, but it is important to work towards achieving consistency across 
the information consumers will receive in relation to these other retail 
investments. Negotiations also continue on European Commission 
governance and transparency proposals within a recast directive on 
Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision (IORP II).  
                                                     
645 HeleŶ Ball ;ϮϬϭϱͿ AssessiŶg ͚ǀalue foƌ ŵoŶeǇ͛ iŶ DC arrangements, Pensions Insight, 1 April. 
646  
The Pensions Regulator (2015) Regulatory Guidance for Defined Contribution Schemes, April 
(http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/guidance-dc-schemes.pdf) 
647 
Transactions costs are just the visible costs. There are also the hidden costs of investment management 
which reduce the net returns to savers and these can be larger than the visible costs. See David Blake (2014) 
On the Disclosure of the Costs of Investment Management, Pensions Institute Discussion Paper PI-1407, May 
2014. (http://www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp1407.pdf). See also the response by the 
Investment Association (2015) Meaningful Disclosure of Costs and Charges, February. 
648
 Pensions Act 2014. 
649
 DWP-FCA (2015) Transaction Costs Disclosure: Improving Transparency in Workplace Pensions – Call for 
Evidence, March; https://www.gov.uk/Government/consultations/improving-transparency-in-workplace-
pensions-transaction-costs-disclosure  
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Disclosure of fund management costs will be particularly important in the decumulation 
phase, since retirees may find it difficult to return to work if their pension pot is depleted 
too quickly by excessive withdrawals, poor investment performance or high fund 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt Đhaƌges, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ foƌ offeƌiŶg guaƌaŶtees. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ͚aŶǇ Đost iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
disclosed to members should be understandable and relevant, and presented in a format 
that ĐoŶtaiŶs suffiĐieŶt, Ǉet suĐĐiŶĐt, iŶfoƌŵatioŶ to iŶfoƌŵ the ŵeŵďeƌ͛.650 
3.12.2 Vulnerable consumers 
NotǁithstaŶdiŶg Mƌ Woolaƌd͛s stateŵeŶt at the ďegiŶŶiŶg of this Section, the FCA is 
certainly aware of potential consumer vulnerability and has introduced a number of 
regulatory initiatives in relation to concerns raised by the new pension flexibilities. 
In February 2015, the FCA published an Occasional Paper which identified up to half the UK 
adult population as being 'vulnerable' consumers.651  The papeƌ fouŶd ͚pƌoďleŵs at eǀeƌǇ 
stage͛ iŶ the ǁaǇ fiƌŵs deal ǁith ǀulŶeƌaďle ĐoŶsuŵeƌs fƌoŵ high-level policy, through 
system design, to the products that are available and ways that staff implement policies and 
sell products. Vulnerable consumers are those with poor literacy skills, those who have 
caring responsibilities, people with disabilities, dementia or the elderly. 
The paper gave the following examples: 
 Policy 
o Many firms lack an overarching strategy or policy on consumer vulnerability 
o Policies designed to prevent financial abuse and fraud can inhibit staff 
empowerment to use discretion, particularly regarding legitimate access by 
third parties (e.g., those with power of attorney)  Systems 
o Failure of internal systems, where firms fail to communicate and connect 
information internally. For example, this can lead to customers having to tell 
firms multiple times about bereavement, resulting in numerous duplicate 
letters from different areas of the business being sent 
o Interfaces or channels of communication that are not inclusive 
o Increasing automation and use of call centres may create challenges in 
spotting potential vulnerability and ensuring customers are referred on to 
specialist teams where necessary 
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 Page 48 of DWP-FCA (2015) Transaction Costs Disclosure: Improving Transparency in Workplace Pensions – 
Call for Evidence, March. 
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 Martin Coppack, Yasmin Raza, Simon Sarkar, Kate Scribbins (2015) Consumer Vulnerability, Financial 
Conduct Authority Occasional Paper No.8, February; http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/occasional-
papers/occasional-paper-8.pdf 
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 Products 
o Inflexible products and services that are designed for a standardised perfect 
customer and do not factor real-life events into their design. Some customers 
who face a change in circumstances are therefore not able to receive a 
flexible, tailored response 
o Product and information complexity and confusing communications 
o Lack of suitable affordable products for people in some non-standard 
situations 
o Lack of solutions for temporary delegation (enabling a family member or 
carer to manage your affairs for a short time) which retain privacy and safety  Implementation 
o Policy/practice gap at firms, where frontline staff are not aware of or do not 
implement head office policies. Frontline staff may not refer people on to 
specialist teams 
o Consumer time is not valued highly and many people give up if the process is 
too time consuming, especially if they are in a stressful situation with other 
demands on their time 
o Inconsistent approach around flexible temporary forbearance 
o Arrangements around temporary delegation (enabling a family member or 
carer to manage your affairs for a short time) and accompaniment (sitting in 
or helping with a phone call or interview) not sufficiently developed and 
flexible to enable family and carers to help 
o Inappropriate selling and sales practices which exploit behavioural biases 
o Issues around disclosure of a vulnerability and data protection – inaccurate or 
overzealous application creates unnecessary problems 
The papeƌ theŶ goes oŶ to desĐƌiďe ǁhat ͚good͛ looks like to consumers, based on research 
that the FCA conducted:  
 Having financial products that are clear and easy to understand  A choice of ways of communicating to be available whenever you need to make 
contact and for these to be designed in an inclusive way so that they are clear, easy 
to understand and meet your needs. This could relate to the method of 
communication (e.g., audio/braille/face-to-face) or the service delivery (e.g., 
agreement to talk at a particular time of day depending on carers and medication)  FeeliŶg that fiƌŵs ǁill tƌeat Ǉou as aŶ iŶdiǀidual aŶd Ǉou ǁoŶ͛t faĐe the ͚Đoŵputeƌ 
saǇs Ŷo͛ ƌespoŶse just ďeĐause Ǉouƌ peƌsoŶal ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes do Ŷot fit the staŶdaƌd 
mould  Knowing that, should you experience a sudden change in circumstances, you will be 
offered a flexible and tailored response from your financial services provider 
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 Being able to talk to someone who will take the time to listen, who is flexible enough 
to let the conversation take its natural course, and who is sufficiently trained to spot 
signs of vulnerability and refer on to specialists where necessary  Being referred on to someone who has the authority and discretion to take a tailored 
approach to your situation and offer flexible solutions, including use of specialist 
sources of help and advice if necessary  Feeling confident that your firm encourages disclosure, that they will work with you 
in your best interests  Knowing that if you do disclose information about your needs, that information will 
be recorded properly, so that you do not have to repeat it every time you make 
contact with all departments of a particular firm  Knowing firms will proactively contact you if they suspect you may be having 
financial difficulties  Knowing appropriate action will be taken if a firm spots suspicious activity that may 
signal abuse or fraud  If you are trying to speak to a firm in a caring capacity, finding that the firm listens 
and makes a note of your concerns even though it may not be able to divulge any 
information to you  If you are recently bereaved, have a power of attorney or a third party mandate, 
receiving consistent advice and treatment. 
The paper concludes by describing what can firms do to deliver good customer outcomes: 
 To ensure a consistent approach that is embedded across all operations, it is 
important to have a high-level policy on consumer vulnerability in place  It is important that all relevant staff are aware of the policy  Firms could begin by auditing current practice  Ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of a vulnerability strategy plays a significant 
role  Research demonstrates that it is important for staff on the front line to have 
sufficient training to facilitate a proper conversation and that they know where 
internal expertise lies  Flexibility in the application of terms and conditions of products and services plays a 
significant role in ensuring the needs of consumers in vulnerable circumstances are 
met  An efficient process for referring consumers on to specialist teams who have 
authority to make flexible decisions is important  Good policies and practice in handling disclosure or communication needs of 
consumers and recording of that information effectively play a key role for 
consumers and are helpful to staff. Actively encouraging disclosure, by staff able to 
have proper conversations, has been shown to be helpful here 
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 Clear, simple information and explanation throughout the product life cycle is 
important to all consumers  Policies around data protection in particular, but also safeguarding and affordability, 
need to be implemented based on a correct understanding. If staff are well trained, 
they are less likely to apply such policies in an overzealous manner which can create 
problems for customers. For example, proper affordability is vital to the wider 
protection of consumers, but firms should have systems in place to allow for 
appropriate discretion. 
3.12.2.1  Vulnerable DC consumers 
In November 2014, the FCA announced in a Policy Statement that it would protect 
vulnerable consumers and review requirements where money is taken directly from 
pensions.652 The regulator noted that (p. 23): ͚Dƌaǁdown itself may be used quite differently 
in the new environment. As we assess the impact on the requirements that relate to 
drawdown, we will consider how to ensure consistent protection for consumers and review 
requirements on firms where money is taken directly from the pension. One particular area 
we will explore is non-advised sales of income drawdown and uncrystallised pension fund 
lump sums. A number of respondents raised concerns here as currently most drawdown 
products are sold with regulated advice͛. The FCA also stated it ǁould ŵodifǇ its ƌules oŶ 
projections in drawdown products which currently assume a regular income is being taken 
over time. If retirees access their pension pots more flexibly, the current rules may produce 
͚ĐoŶfusiŶg oƌ iƌƌeleǀaŶt iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͛. 
On 26 January 2015, the FCA announced a new layer of consumer protection called 
͚additioŶal pƌoteĐtioŶ͛ oƌ a 'seĐoŶd liŶe of defeŶĐe'. It did this iŶ a ͚Deaƌ CEO͛ letteƌ.653  Prior 
to allowing a pension pot to be cashed in, providers will be ƌeƋuiƌed to fiŶd out ĐlieŶts͛ 
health and their comprehension of issues such as tax, impact on means-tested state benefits 
and pension scams before giving them personalised risk warnings. In particular, providers 
must do the following: 
 Ask retirees a set of ƋuestioŶs aďout ͚keǇ aspeĐts of theiƌ ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes that ƌelate 
to the choice theǇ aƌe ŵakiŶg͛ suĐh as theiƌ ͚health and lifestyle choices or marital 
status͛ in order to protect them from making the wrong choices654  Issue ͚ƌeleǀaŶt ƌisk ǁaƌŶiŶgs͛ suĐh as the tax consequences of a decision to take cash 
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 Financial Conduct Authority (2014) Retirement Reforms and the Guidance Guarantee, Policy Statement 
PS14/17, November, http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/policy-statements/ps14-17.pdf 
653  
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/dear-ceo-letters/dear-ceo-letter-retirement-reforms-guidance-
guarantee.pdf 
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The people most likely to benefit from transferring out of a DB scheme will be single people, who do not 
Ŷeed the paƌtŶeƌ͛s ďeŶefit iŶ a DB sĐheŵe, aŶd those iŶ pooƌ health ǁho haǀe iŵpaiƌed life eǆpeĐtaŶĐǇ.  
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 Make a recommendation, in customer communications about retirement options, 
that consumers consult Pension Wise or take regulated advice.  
The ͚Deaƌ CEO͛ letteƌ ǁas folloǁed up ďǇ a FCA PoliĐǇ “tateŵeŶt iŶ February 2015 which 
formally set out the new rules to come into force on 6 April 2015.655  They will apply to 
providers operating personal pensions, stakeholder pensions, selling pension decumulation 
products or facilitating the access of pension savings on an execution-only basis. The FCA 
also announced that it plans to consult in summer 2015 on whether to retain, modify or add 
to these ƌules, as paƌt of a ǁideƌ ĐoŶsultatioŶ oŶ the ƌules aƌouŶd ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ iŶteƌaĐtioŶ 
with providers as they approach retirement. It also stated that TPR will be publishing 
complementary guidance for trustees of trust-based schemes.  
The introduction of additional protection or second line of defence  followed criticism of the 
FCA at a hearing of the Work and Pensions Select Committee on 17 December 2014 at 
ǁhiĐh Chƌistopheƌ Woolaƌd stated: ͚What ǁe ĐaŶ Ŷeǀeƌ do, iŶ aŶǇ aƌea ǁe ƌegulate, is stop 
fools ďehaǀiŶg like fools͛. The Đoŵŵittee felt that this attitude ǁas a deƌeliĐtioŶ of the FCA͛s 
responsibilities. Mike Thornton MP, a membeƌ of the Đoŵŵittee said: ͚You aƌe the FiŶaŶĐial 
Conduct Authority. How providers act towards their customers is at the centre of your 
ƌespoŶsiďilities͛.656 The effect of the criticism was to raise the level of concern within the 
FCA about the possibility of not only mis-selling but also theft via scamming.  
Some welcomed the changes on the ground that they challenged the inertia of the existing 
sǇsteŵ. Toŵ MĐPhail said: ͚This seĐoŶd liŶe of defeŶĐe….is eǆaĐtlǇ ǁhat ǁe haǀe ďeeŶ 
calling for. Without this, it would have been far too easy for pension providers to carry on 
rolling their customers over into poor value or inappropriate retirement income products. 
However it will also raise the bar, making it more challenging for pension companies to deal 
with their Đustoŵeƌs; soŵe ŵaǇ deĐide it just isŶ't ǁoƌth the effoƌt͛.657  
Some were concerned that consumers, overwhelmed by the array of new pension options, 
could easily become confused or misinterpet the new questions about their personal 
circumstances as advice. For example, Claire Trott, head of technical support at Talbot and 
Muiƌ, said: ͚I aŵ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed that soŵe ƌetiƌees ǁho haǀe opted to aǀoid the use of PeŶsioŶ 
Wise will also opt not to answer the prescribed questions [put by the provider] fully or 
honestly and theƌefoƌe ǁoŶ't ƌeĐeiǀe the ŵost appƌopƌiate ƌisk ǁaƌŶiŶgs͛.658  Similarly, Paul 
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 Financial Conduct Authority (2015) Retirement Reforms and the Guidance Guarantee: Retirement Risk 
Warnings, Policy Statement PS15/4, February; http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/policy-
statements/ps15-04  
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  House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2014) Oral Evidence: Progress with Automatic 
Enrolment and Pension Reforms, HC 668, Wednesday 17 December. 
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 Reported in Natasha Browne (2015) FCA introduces emergency rules to prevent mis-selling from April, 
Professional Pensions, 26 January.  
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Quoted in Jenna Towler (2015) Providers back FCA's 'second line of defence' for retirees, Professional 
Adviser,  26 January. 
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EǀaŶs, peŶsioŶs teĐhŶiĐal ŵaŶageƌ at “uffolk Life, said: ͚Theƌe ǁill ďe a lot of pƌoǀideƌs ǁho 
aƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed theǇ ǁill ďe seeŶ as giǀiŶg adǀiĐe iŶ askiŶg the ͞ƌeleǀaŶt͟ Ƌuestions. It is 
essential clients understand the questions they are being asked. There's clarification needed 
oŶ ǁhat the ƌegulatoƌ ǁaŶts aŶd ǁhat pƌoǀideƌs ĐaŶ do iŶ oƌdeƌ to ŵake it ǁoƌk͛.659  
Ms Trott believes that if the second line of defence is insufficiently robust, there could be 
future mis-selling scandals: 
The second line of defence is actually an important stage when trying to 
combat pensions liberation, the time it takes to complete the forms and 
sign the disclaimers should hopefully give just enough time for people to 
stop and realise what they are being asked to do, even if they don't read 
the carefully crafted risk warning letter presented to them. The fact they 
have to complete a questionnaire in order to access the benefits might be 
enough for them to reconsider their options. 
I don't believe conducting the second line of defence over the phone is 
sufficient enough to ensure that clients who haven't taken advice are 
suitably warned about the implications of what they are doing, having to 
sign something to say you want to proceed is much more significant to 
people thaŶ listeŶiŶg to soŵeoŶe aŶd agƌeeiŶg… 
Anything we as providers can do to protect clients without infringing their 
right to access their benefits is great, but it still goes back to full personal 
advice from an FCA regulated financial adviser is clearly best. 
The fact that the FCA require providers to give risk warnings to clients who 
have used the Pensions Wise service is a clear indication that they also 
consider this guidance to be inadequate. 
I would like to see all clients taking advice, but it is wholly unacceptable to 
limit their retirement options just because they've chosen not to. For years, 
annuities have received a poor press. Many people view annuity purchase 
as inflexible and representing poor value. If clients' options are curtailed in 
this way, it could be a real disincentive for the next generation of pension 
savers. I don't believe that an annuity is a better non-advised option than 
drawdown and taking the whole fund as cash is a significantly more risky 
course of action for a non-advised client. 
I can see a new mis-selling scandal here by creating new default options 
for clients and this could all be prevented with robust second line of 
defence practices.660 
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Quoted in Carmen Reichman (2015) Pension provider fears 'advice' risk in FCA's retiree rules, Professional 
Adviser, 28 January. 
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 Quoted in Claire Trott (2015) Providers pushing pensions freedom advice demands 'too far', Professional 
Adviser, 21 September. 
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Even where they do take advice, many members might not like the advice they receive and 
disregard it. In this case, they aƌe Đlassified as ͚iŶsisteŶt ĐlieŶts͛, although this is Ŷot a 
recognised regulatory term and, from a regulatory point of view, they fall into the non-
adǀised ĐategoƌǇ. Adǀiseƌs took diffeƌeŶt ǀieǁs oŶ ͚iŶsisteŶt ĐlieŶts͛. “oŵe ďelieǀed that 
they have a 'moral obligation' and a 'duty of care' towards their clients and would not 
implement anything they regarded as unsuitable, irrespective of whether the client insists, 
eǀeŶ if it ŵeaŶs theǇ ǁould lose the ĐlieŶt͛s ďusiŶess. Otheƌs said they have no moral 
oďligatioŶ as loŶg as the ĐlieŶt is suffiĐieŶtlǇ iŶfoƌŵed aŶd ǁould Ŷot ǁaŶt to ͚ďƌoǁďeat 
ĐlieŶts͛, although theǇ ƌeŵaiŶed ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout ƌisks to theiƌ ďusiŶess.661  
 
In September 2015, the ABI͛s Huw Evans told a Work and Pensions Select Committee 
heaƌiŶg: ͚We ŵust ƌesolǀe the teŶsioŶ that Đaŵe to light ǁheŶ the ƌefoƌŵs ǁeƌe 
implemented around safeguards that have been put in place. Some customers deeply resent 
those safeguards and want to find a way round them. A decision has to taken by 
policymakers to find a way forward. A resolution to that has to be sorted. As a part of that 
we absolutely need to clarify what the advice requirements are. Some providers were still 
uŶĐleaƌ ǁheŶ theǇ had to eŶsuƌe Đustoŵeƌs take ƌegulated fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe͛.662 
 
In January 2016, the FCA announced that 42% of customers taking drawdown were doing so 
on a non-advised basis.663 
 
3.12.2.2  Vulnerable DB-to-DC consumers and others with safeguarded benefits 
In February 2015, TPR issued guidance for trustees of DB schemes on dealing with member 
requests for DB-to-DC transfers.664  The guidance aims to: 
 help trustees ensure they have appropriate processes in place to manage transfer 
requests  prompt trustees to consider the impact of transfer values as part of an integrated 
approach to the risk management of their scheme  require trustees to provide clear information for members so that they can get 
independent advice on the best option for them. 
The guidaŶĐe ƌeĐogŶises that ͚it is likelǇ to ďe iŶ the ďest fiŶaŶĐial iŶteƌests of the majority 
of ŵeŵďeƌs to ƌeŵaiŶ iŶ theiƌ DB sĐheŵe͛.665 If a ŵeŵďeƌ͛s CETV is over £30,000, the 
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The Pensions Regulator (2015) DB to DC Transfers and Conversions, Consultation Document, February; 
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member must take independent financial advice from a D60 qualified specialist pension 
adviser before transferring.666 The member must pay for this advice (unless the transfer is 
initiated by the employer). The adviser will send a questionnaire to the scheme to establish 
the benefits in the scheme and then perform a full benefit comparison with the DC pension 
arrangement the member wishes to switch to. The member is required to provide written 
evidence to the trustees that the advice has been given. However, trustees are not 
͚ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ ĐheĐkiŶg ǁhat adǀiĐe ǁas giǀeŶ, ǁhat ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ ǁas ŵade oƌ to 
confirm whether the member is following that recommendatioŶ͛. Fuƌtheƌ, it is Ŷot ͚the 
tƌustee͛s ƌole to seĐoŶd-guess the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s iŶdiǀidual ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes aŶd ĐhoiĐe to tƌaŶsfeƌ 
[DB] benefits. Nor is it their role to prevent a member from making decisions which the 
trustees might consider to be inappropriate to the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes͛. The tƌustees 
are required to ensure that the receiving scheme is a legitimate arrangement and not a 
pension liberation scam.  
In March, 2015, the FCA announced new rules on pension transfer advice. In particular, it 
would change its ‘egulated AĐtiǀities Oƌdeƌ, aŵeŶd the defiŶitioŶ of ͚peŶsioŶ tƌaŶsfeƌ' to 
reflect the new pension environment, and introduce a requirement for firms to appoint a 
pension transfer specialist (PTS):667  
 New Regulated Activities Order 
o Advice on transfers from a DB occupational scheme to a DC occupational 
scheme will require the firm to be FCA-authorised for pension transfer 
permission 
o Advice on conversion of safeguarded benefits within a DC occupational 
scheme to access flexible benefits will require the firm to be FCA-authorised 
for pension transfer permission 
o Advice on transfer of safeguarded benefits within a DC occupational scheme 
to access flexible benefits will require the firm to be FCA-authorised for 
pension transfer permission 
o Pension trustees/managers of occupational schemes must check a scheme 
member has received advice before a transfer of safeguarded benefits to 
flexible benefits is carried out. Pension trustees/managers will not be 
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 The FCA͛s oǁŶ aŶalǇsis pƌediĐted that up to 40 per cent of people transferring out of a DB scheme would be 
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 Reported in Aileen Lynch (2015) Safety first - How to operate in the new pension transfer world, 
Professional Adviser, 1 May.  
338 
 
required to check advice has been received where the fund is less than 
£30,000, or where an annuity is being purchased.  Definition of pension transfers 
o A transfer of deferred benefits (regardless of when these are to be 
crystallised) from:  an occupational pension scheme  an individual arrangement providing fixed or guaranteed benefits that 
replace similar benefits under a DB scheme  an arrangement that contains safeguarded benefits (for example, 
guaranteed annuity rates and guaranteed minimum pensions) 
o To:   an occupational pension scheme  an individual pension plan (personal pension/stakeholder) 
o Or:  to transfer safeguarded benefits to obtain a right to flexible benefits 
o These proposals mean firms not authorised for pension transfers must 
consider pension advice with extra precaution to ensure they do not carry 
out activities beyond their scope of permissions.  Appointment of a pension transfer specialist 
o Firms that wish to continue to advise clients on some/all of the above areas 
will be required to apply for a variation of permission. This process will 
necessitate the appointment of a pension transfer specialist (a person 
holding an appropriate qualification and who can demonstrate knowledge 
and experience in this area). Firms that currently hold pension transfer 
authority need take no action as their permissions will automatically be 
updated to reflect the proposed definition of this activity. 
 In June 2015, the FCA issued an amended Policy Statement (PS15/12) on pension transfer 
ƌules. It Đƌeates a Ŷeǁ ƌegulated aĐtiǀitǇ of ͚adǀisiŶg oŶ ĐoŶǀeƌsioŶ oƌ tƌaŶsfeƌ of peŶsioŶ 
beŶefits͛. It also clarifies the meaning of safeguarded benefits, a term introduced by the 
Pensions Schemes Act 2015 and defined in the negative as all benefits that are not a money 
purchase benefits or cash balance arrangements.  
It was not clear at the time whether benefits offering a guaranteed annuity rate (GAR) 
would be included in the definition. In principle, they are money purchase benefits, but the 
guarantee could imply that they are safeguarded benefits. The FCA has now decided to 
exclude GARs from the new regulated actively to avoid possible confusion. It argues that the 
transfer of a GAR to flexible benefits is less complex than a transfer of a final salary scheme 
and therefore a PTS is not required, although advice will still be required if the benefit being 
given up is valued at more than £30,000.  
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In May 2015, the Daily Mail reported the case of a 65-year old customer with a valuable GAR 
on his £67,000 DC pension pot, but who wanted to cash it and spend it on a holiday and 
home renovations. His provider insisted he had to take professional advice. But due to the 
GAR, he could not find an adviser willing to sign the form authorising the release. The 
Đustoŵeƌ saǇs: ͚I thought this ǁould ďe easǇ. “oŵe of the ĐoŵpaŶies I͛ǀe spokeŶ to haǀe 
said it͛s just Ŷot ǁoƌth the ƌisk of ďeiŶg hit ǁith a futuƌe ĐoŵpeŶsatioŶ Đlaiŵ.͛ The saŵe 
thing has happened to a 60-year old customer who had a pension pot currently worth 
£21,501, but due to the GAR it will be worth more than £30,000 when he reaches 65. His 
provider insisted he get advice before cashing in the pension, but eight adviser firms have 
turned him down. The provider saǇs: ͚Mƌ [Đustoŵeƌ͛s Ŷaŵe]͛s poliĐǇ has aŶ attƌaĐtiǀe 
guaranteed annuity rate, which is available at age 65. This could be worth over double what 
he Đould fiŶd iŶ the opeŶ ŵaƌket ǁith iŵŵediate aŶŶuitǇ ƌates. We doŶ͛t feel ǁe haǀe ďeeŶ 
overzealous. These rules protect the customer and ensure they do not lose very valuable 
guaƌaŶtees ǁithout ďeiŶg fullǇ aǁaƌe of ǁhat theǇ ŵight ďe giǀiŶg up.͛ Hoǁeǀeƌ, the FCA 
says the provider was wrong to interpret the rules like this. It says firms should look at the 
size of soŵeoŶe͛s peŶsioŶ pot todaǇ – not what it may pay out in future.668 
In November 2015, the DWP announced it was looking to establish a simpler method of 
valuing pensions with GARs to help consumers gauge whether they need to take financial 
advice. It accepted that both providers and consumers were struggling to determine when 
the £ϯϬ,ϬϬϬ thƌeshold is ďƌeaĐhed ďeĐause of the ͚ĐoŶsideƌaďle ǀaƌietǇ͛ of ͚safeguaƌded͛ 
peŶsioŶs aŶd the ĐhalleŶges pƌeseŶted ďǇ the poteŶtial ǀalue of a GA‘ ǁheŶ the ͚pƌoŵise͛ 
element is taken into account.669 In January 2016, the FCA announced that 68% of GARs 
were not being utilised by pension freedom clients, although this was concentrated amongst 
those with small pots who had GARs: 79% of those with pots below £30,000 and 90% of 
those with pots below £10,000 did not take up their GARS. However, 59% of those with pots 
over £30,000 did take up their GARs.670 
The FCA requires, as a further protection for consumers, that all other transfers in excess of 
£30,000 from safeguarded benefits to flexible benefits be checked by a PTS where advice is 
given, whether the benefits are deferred or for immediate vesting (crystallisation). A 
transfer value analysis will still be required for these cases where the transfer and 
immediate vesting is not at the fiŶal salaƌǇ sĐheŵe͛s Ŷoƌŵal ƌetiƌeŵeŶt date. A transfer 
from an occupational scheme with safeguarded benefits to another occupational scheme 
with flexible benefits will now need PTS involvement, whereas previously this was not 
required. Even a move from one part of a scheme that has safeguarded benefits to a part 
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that has flexible benefits will require a PTS to be involved in the advice. One the other hand, 
a transfer from an occupational scheme with no safeguarded benefits to a personal scheme 
with flexible benefits will now not need a PTS, whereas previously it would have. The 
Pensions Scheme Act does not require advice for members whose benefits are worth less 
than £30,000. However, if advice is given, the same rules above apply: there is no 
exemption from the FCA rules based in fund size.671 
Despite the new freedom to do so, it is likely to be the case that many if not most DB 
scheme members would not benefit in the long run from moving from a DB scheme to a DC 
scheme, as the FCA has itself acknowledged. Even in a well-funded DB scheme, members 
who transfer might get only 80-90% of the value of their benefits,672 but for a scheme in 
deficit it could be as low as 60%.673 Someone who switches from a DB scheme to a DC 
scheme and uses the transfer value to purchase an index-linked annuity (the same type of 
pension as in their DB scheme) at current rates will get little more than half their initial 
pension.  
DB scheme members appear to be frustrated by the requirement to take regulated advice 
before transferring out if calls to Fidelity Worldwide Investment's pensions hotline are 
anything to go by. Around 10% of calls are from DB clients who just want to take their 
cash.674   
Furthermore, not only will many members be reluctant to seek and pay for this advice, they 
might actually find it hard to find advisers willing to offer it.675 Henry Denne, head of private 
ĐlieŶts at PuŶteƌ “outhall, aƌgues: ͚MuĐh of the adǀiĐe pƌoĐess ǁill staƌt oŶ the pƌesuŵptioŶ 
that remaining in DB is in the best interests of the individual. ..[P]roviding this advice could 
cost a few thousand pounds and this will need to be paid to the adviser regardless of the 
outcome of the discussion. They may advise against the transfer. I think the individual will 
find it difficult to access advice at reasonable cost. Advisers may be reluctant to advise on 
this area once they understand the full impact of the decision. When advisers read through 
the guidance on enhanced transfer value exercises, they will realise how much care needs to 
go iŶto adǀisiŶg iŶ this aƌea͛.676  
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The FCA͛s ƌeǀieǁ of eŶhaŶĐed tƌaŶsfeƌ ǀalues677 published in July 2014 found that 59% of 
members who took an ETV from a DB scheme did so as an insistent client. The FCA wants 
advisers to ensure they have recorded the client's reasons for wanting to transfer out of the 
scheme and have discussed the risks involved as well as alternative options.  
The JuŶe ϮϬϭϱ PoliĐǇ “tateŵeŶt Đited aďoǀe also Đlaƌified the FCA͛s positioŶ oŶ hoǁ adǀiseƌs 
can avoid liability when dealing with insistent clients. They need to satisfy the following 
three regulatory requirements: 
1. You must provide advice that is suitable for the individual client, and this advice 
must be clear to the client. This is the normal advice process 
2. It should be clear to the client that their actions are against your advice 
3. You should be clear with the client what the risks of the alternative course of action 
are. 
Where the advice includes a pension transfer, conversion or opt-out, there will be additional 
requirements, such as ensuring the advice is provided by or checked by a PTS in the case of 
transfers over £30,000, comparing the DB scheme with the DC scheme and starting by 
assuming the transfer is not suitable. 
This was the first time the FCA had issued rules on how advisers should deal with insistent 
clients  – even though it still did not technically recognise the term. Nevertheless, it said: 
͚Theƌe is Ŷo ƌule to pƌeǀeŶt adǀiseƌs fƌoŵ tƌaŶsaĐtiŶg ďusiŶess agaiŶst theiƌ adǀiĐe if the 
client insists. In practice, there may be occasions where the client wishes to take a different 
course of action from the one you recommend and wants you to facilitate the transaction 
agaiŶst Ǉouƌ adǀiĐe͛. In such circumstances, advisers should ensure they have followed the 
͚Ŷoƌŵal adǀiĐe ƌules͛, iŶĐludiŶg doiŶg a thoƌough faĐt fiŶd aŶd suitaďilitǇ ƌepoƌt aŶd adǀisiŶg 
in the client's best interest.678  
In November 2015, Aileen Lynch, head of technical services at Compliance First, expanded 
oŶ the FCA͛s thƌee steps: 679 
 Step 1 
 
Conduct the business as an advised sale, following all the processes and procedures 
carried out for all clients. For confirmation, this will include the following: 
o providing the client agreement (disclosure of costs and services) 
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o completing a fact-find 
o assessing attitude to investment risk 
o preparing research 
o delivering a recommendation based on the client(s) needs, circumstances 
and objectives 
o produce a suitability report to confirm this position. 
  Step 2 
 
On receipt of the recommendation, should the client(s) decline/reject the advice, a 
request should be made for the client(s) to prepare, in their own words, the reason 
for the rejection, awareness of the risks associated in this course of action and then 
confirmation of the action they wish to take. 
 
The risks associated with the action they wish to take could include: 
o penalties on encashment/transfer/switch 
o reduction of future benefits 
o loss of existing/future benefits (death benefits, guarantees, bonuses, etc) 
o depletion of retirement funds/income 
It is also recommended, for the future protection of the firm, that the spouse or 
dependants/beneficiaries countersign this declaration as they can be considered an 
interested party in the transaction.680 
  Step 3 
 
You should prepare a final letter to clarify that you aƌe aĐtiŶg oŶ the ĐlieŶt͛s 
insistence and confirming the product, provider, fund choices, etc., or drawdown of 
funds if in a pension scheme. 
 
This should also confirm the risks associated with the instruction and, if it relates to 
the drawdown of a pension fund, it should make specific reference to: 
o taxation 
o sustainability of income 
o impact on state benefits (welfare and social care support) 
o state benefit means-testing – deprivation of capital. 
 
You should then include a disclaimer to highlight the client͛s potential loss of 
ƌegulatoƌǇ pƌoteĐtioŶ, ǁith ǁoƌdiŶg siŵilaƌ to: ͚You haǀe ĐhoseŶ Ŷot to aĐĐept ouƌ 
original recommendation and you should be aware that, by proceeding on your 
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specific instructions, you may not benefit from the protection of the rules of the 
Financial Conduct Authority on assessing suitability or from the Financial 
OŵďudsŵaŶ “eƌǀiĐe͛. 
The FCA͛s teĐhŶiĐal speĐialist, Rory Percival, has provided examples of bad practice 
discovered by the FCA during its 2014 investigation of ETV pension transfer advice. To 
illustrate, he said the regulator had come across cases of advisers apparently conducting 
business on an 'insistent client' basis in order to bypass its suitability requirements. He said 
that dealiŶg ǁith iŶsisteŶt ĐlieŶts is a ͚high ƌisk' pƌactice that requires firms to implement 
additioŶal ĐoŶtƌols: ͚We fouŶd, of the Đases that adǀised oŶ ETV tƌaŶsfeƌs, ϱϵ% ǁeƌe oŶ aŶ 
insistent client basis and, within those, there were a lot of problems, [one of which was 
advisers] not really providing theiƌ oǁŶ adǀiĐe͛. “oŵe adǀiseƌs ǁeƌe appaƌeŶtlǇ ĐoŶduĐtiŶg 
business based on their clients' wishes rather than determining whether those wishes were 
suitable for them. AŶotheƌ eǆaŵple ǁas 'papeƌiŶg', ǁheƌe ͚it's ŵaŶifestlǇ Ŷot aŶ iŶsisteŶt 
client case, but that's ǁhat the papeƌǁoƌk deŵoŶstƌated it to ďe,… [ǁith suĐh Đases] 
pƌesuŵaďlǇ uŶdeƌtakeŶ to aǀoid soŵe of ouƌ ƌules, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ those aƌouŶd suitaďilitǇ͛.  
There were also specific issues around suitability, such as when an adviser agreed to a 
transfer on an insistent client basis but then gave advice on which product to switch into: 
͚Just ďeĐause oŶe eleŵeŶt of the iŶsisteŶt ĐlieŶt pƌoĐess is iŶsisteŶt doesŶ't ŵeaŶ that the 
bit where you are giving advice, and the client is taking that advice, [doesn't need] to be 
suitaďle͛. Some organisations, such as the Personal Finance Society, have advised members 
not to transact against their advice under any circumstances, but Mr Percival concluded: 
͚That's Ŷot ouƌ positioŶ. You ĐaŶ tƌaŶsaĐt agaiŶst the adǀiĐe if Ǉou take the (above) three 
steps. But we understand the rationale for that point of view and it's up to firms to decide 
ǁhat seƌǀiĐes theǇ pƌoǀide͛.681 
Despite this reassurance, some advisers still feel exposed. For example, Katherine Dandy, 
partner in Sackers, has warned that confusion over the pension reforms combined with poor 
understanding of the potential risks would result in a high level of mis-selling, which, in turn, 
would trigger mis-selling claims worth billions of pounds. Most at risk will be long-serving 
members of final-salary schemes who might be tempted to transfer to a DC scheme. She 
warned of a repeat of the mis-selling scandal in the 1980s and 1990s when members of final 
salaƌǇ sĐheŵes ͚ǁeƌe ofteŶ ŵistakeŶ ďǇ the ďelief that theǇ ĐaŶ do ďetteƌ themselves by 
investing the money elsewhere. This proved not to be the case, and resulted in huge 
Đlaiŵs͛.682 
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Aileen Lynch, writing in the same article cited above, was also concerned that the issues 
surrounding insistent clients will only continue to grow oǀeƌ the ĐoŵiŶg ŵoŶths: ͚Theƌe͛s aŶ 
uŶsettliŶg diĐhotoŵǇ ďetǁeeŶ the ŵessages of the ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ ŵedia ;͞This is Ǉouƌ ŵoŶeǇ 
aŶd Ǉou aƌe eŶtitled to do ǁith it ǁhateǀeƌ Ǉou ǁaŶt, ǁheŶeǀeƌ Ǉou please͟Ϳ aŶd the ŵoƌe 
considered, long-term approach which is generally prevalent in financial services press and 
among advisers and providers. The difference in perspective is understandable but is almost 
certain to lead to continued misunderstandings between clients and advisers. Recent 
decisions from FOS indicate that erring on the side of caution is always the right path for 
advisers and I would urge you to continue to refuse to undertake business that you believe 
ǁould ďe detƌiŵeŶtal to the fiŶaŶĐial ǁellďeiŶg of the ĐlieŶt͛.683  
Richard Nuttall, a compliance officer at support services provider SimplyBiz, believes that 
clients insisting on going against their adviser's commendations should be asked to put their 
instructions in writing to show they are aware of the risks. Merely asking a client to sign a 
typed statement offers inadequate protection as it may not prove the customer 
uŶdeƌstaŶds theiƌ aĐtioŶs: ͚“oŵethiŶg as [iŵpoƌtaŶt] as this ƌeallǇ Ŷeeds to ďe iŶ theiƌ oǁŶ 
handwriting, otheƌǁise it's just aŶotheƌ letteƌ theǇ sigŶ [aŶd doŶ't pƌopeƌlǇ uŶdeƌstaŶd]͛. He 
warned that ͚theƌe Đould ďe a ƌaft of ĐoŵplaiŶts as ĐlieŶts ǁho haǀe tƌaŶsaĐted agaiŶst theiƌ 
adǀiseƌ's ǁishes lateƌ ƌuŶ out of ŵoŶeǇ͛ aŶd added ͚the [FCA] doŶ't kŶoǁ hoǁ to ďuild the 
ƌules aƌouŶd iŶsisteŶt ĐlieŶts. What ǁe haǀe had has ďeeŶ ǀeƌǇ light touĐh͛.684,685 
Sheriar Bradbury believes some companies might start to offer a signing off service on 
ďusiŶess that otheƌ adǀiseƌs tuƌŶ doǁŶ iŶ the eǆpeĐtatioŶ of ŵakiŶg a ͚ƋuiĐk iŶĐoŵe͛.  If 
things go wrong, the cost will will fall on the FSCS which is paid for by advisers. Mr Bradbury 
ĐoŶtiŶued: ͚AŶǇ adǀiseƌ ǁho agƌees to sigŶ off suĐh a tƌaŶsfeƌ eitheƌ agaiŶst theiƌ adǀiĐe oƌ 
without giving proper advice is "really stupid", even if they ask the client to sign caveats 
explaining they did not advise the transfer. A lot of IFAs got into trouble over various things 
in the past because they took risks they shouldn't have taken and they convince themselves 
it's OK aŶd theǇ ǁaŶt the ŵoŶeǇ. People like ŵe ǁill eŶd up paǇiŶg foƌ it thƌough the F“C“͛. 
He refuses to allow his advisers to do DB-to-DC transfers on an insistent client basis and 
aƌgues the FCA should puďlish fuƌtheƌ guidaŶĐe aŶd ͚tell people ͞ǁe doŶ't like this aŶd 
ǁatĐh out͛͟.686 
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In April 2015, Intelligent Pensions (IP) launched a DB transfer advice service for financial 
advisers who want to assist clients planning to transfer their DB pension to a DC scheme. 
The service allows advisers who do not have the necessary pension transfer specialist 
qualification to outsource the transfers. Clients can choose a drawdown plan of their choice 
oƌ staǇ ǁithiŶ IP͛s oǁŶ self-invested personal pension wrapper. Advisers can then choose 
either to remain with the client in their new scheme or transfer responsibility for ongoing 
advice to IP. The company charges the client an initial advice fee and then a set-up charge to 
carry out the transfer if the client decides to go ahead. IP launched a flexi-access drawdown 
plan in March 2015 with ongoing advice at an annual charge of 0.75%. 
A survey sponsored by the APFA found that more than 50% of advisers are refusing to 
implement pension transfers out of DB schemes due to concerns that the regulator could 
later hold them to account; only 25% are prepared to undertake the transfers. Chris 
HaŶŶaŶt said: ͚This highlights the uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ foƌ adǀisers and the need for the FCA and FOS 
to ĐlaƌifǇ the positioŶ oŶ adǀiseƌs' liaďilitǇ ǁheŶ theǇ uŶdeƌtake a peŶsioŶ tƌaŶsfeƌ͛.687 
The Personal Finance Society has also called on the FCA to introduce additional safeguards 
for advisers dealing with insistent DB transfer clients. It wants clear rules stating that such 
clients cannot later claim redress from the FSCS. Additional independent warnings should be 
given by the scheme trustee to those insisting on transferring against the recommendation 
of their adviser. The PF“ has ideŶtified a ͚pƌoďleŵ alƌeadǇ eŵeƌgiŶg͛ of ĐlieŶts ǁho aƌe ͚Ŷot 
ƌeallǇ lookiŶg foƌ adǀiĐe͛, ďut just ǁaŶt the adǀiseƌ to faĐilitate the tƌaŶsfeƌ to satisfǇ the 
new rules. It is concerned that many who transfer out of their DB pensions could later regret 
the deĐisioŶ aŶd ͚look foƌ soŵeoŶe to ďlaŵe͛. Keith ‘iĐhaƌds, Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe of the PF“, 
said: ͚If the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt eǆpeĐts adǀiseƌs to faĐilitate tƌaŶsfeƌs, iƌƌespeĐtiǀe of theiƌ adǀiĐe 
to the contrary, there must be a change of process to further protect the client and 
guarantee that advisers will not be held liable if a poor outcome subsequently 
ŵateƌialises͛.688  
The FCA has found that 70% of providers (and 77% of the 15 largest providers) are willing to 
accept pension transfer requests from insistent clients, except where the ceding scheme has 
safeguarded benefits or where the transfer is not facilitated by a financial adviser. However, 
if a customer is able to find an adviser willing to act on their behalf, it is likely the provider 
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will accept the transfer. It therefore seems that advisers are more concerned about insistent 
clients than providers.689 
There are a range of reasons why DB scheme members might want to transfer. At one 
extreme, some people could feel pressured by other family members to use their pension 
pot to support them rather than provide for their own retirements. A study by the Centre 
for the Modern Family (which is sponsored by Scottish Widows) published in January 2015 
indicated that, of the 2,082 people surveyed, 23% expected to use their pension pot to fund 
care costs for elderly relatives, while 22% reported that they would use it to fund a deposit 
foƌ ĐhildƌeŶ ďuǇiŶg a hoŵe. CaƌolǇŶ FaiƌďaiƌŶ, Đhaiƌ of the ĐeŶtƌe, said: ͚Although, for many, 
the reforms announced in the 2014 Budget will represent greater autonomy over how to 
use their savings in later life, it is important to consider the knock-on effects on families. 
Many may feel pressure to access their pensions to support struggling family members and, 
while it is reassuring that family members are seeing the importance of pulling together in 
this way, it is vital people are aware of all the short- and long-term implications for 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt pots͛.690  
At the other extreme, according to James Baxter, managing partner of Tideway Investment 
Partners LLP: ͚Members value control of the capital and flexible access to funds above 
guaranteed lifetime income. TheǇ ǁill also ďe thiŶkiŶg: ͞I ĐaŶ͛t ďelieǀe hoǁ ďig ŵǇ tƌaŶsfeƌ 
offeƌ is aŶd I ĐaŶ͛t affoƌd Ŷot to take it͛͟. Mƌ Baǆteƌ ďelieǀes that ͚ĐapitalisiŶg oŶ a DB 
benefit and getting flexible access to those funds from age 55 can be transformational for 
ŵaŶǇ ŵeŵďeƌs….The aďilitǇ to split Đash ǁithdƌaǁals fƌoŵ taǆaďle iŶĐoŵe ǁithdƌaǁals, 
limit taxable withdrawals to lower income tax bands, save in a tax-exempt fund and pass on 
funds to children and create higher levels of temporary income when required are all 
optioŶs that doŶ͛t eǆist foƌ DB peŶsioŶeƌs. These Đoŵe oŶ top of aŶ offeƌ ǁhiĐh is likelǇ to 
be well beyond what most members believe their pensions are worth. Members are 
weighing these benefits versus a loss of income security in their eighties, often recognising 
that life beyond 80 is likely to be quite different, with significantly different financial 
demands, than life in their fifties, siǆties aŶd seǀeŶties͛.691 
Some financial advisers believe that the new pension flexibilities could change attitudes to 
transfers out of final salary schemes. For example, Kim Bendall, director at The 
PaƌaplaŶŶeƌs, saǇs: ͚HistoƌǇ tells us adǀiseƌs ǁould be crazy to recommend a transfer out of 
a final-salary pension but that's all in the past... I've had the opportunity recently to review 
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some final-salaƌǇ peŶsioŶs iŶ oƌdeƌ to deteƌŵiŶe ǁhetheƌ a tƌaŶsfeƌ out ŵaǇ ďe suitaďle.…IŶ 
nearly all cases, the critical yield still suggests that the client would be ͞worse off͟ if they 
transfer out; however we believe this is becoming a flawed and unrealistic way of 
deteƌŵiŶiŶg the suitaďilitǇ oƌ a poteŶtial tƌaŶsfeƌ….UltiŵatelǇ, the ĐƌitiĐal Ǉield has to ďe 
balanced with the client's non-financial objectives – such as providing options for their 
spouse when they die, or the ability to pass on some of the pension fund to their 
ĐhildƌeŶ͛. 692  “iŵilaƌlǇ, Jaŵes Baǆteƌ ďelieǀes DB sĐheŵe ŵeŵďeƌs ͚ŵust oǀeƌĐoŵe 
perceived wisdoŵ aŶd histoƌiĐ pƌejudiĐe that it͛s siŵplǇ Ŷeǀeƌ a good idea to tƌaŶsfeƌ out of 
a DB benefit. We have absolutely no doubts that if schemes were to start communicating 
transfer offers to members, with balanced guidance on the pros and cons of the transfer 
option and some help as to how to get through the advice maze, then the level of transfers 
ǁould ďe sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ higheƌ͛.693 
Despite the potential risks, employers and their consultants might well actively encourage 
DB members to move. The Association of Consulting Actuaries (ACA) was very supportive of 
the pension freedoms when they were first announĐed: ͚BaŶŶiŶg pƌiǀate seĐtoƌ DB-to-DC 
transfers... would have put UK plc at a huge commercial disadvantage with Europe as it 
would effectively have locked companies into funding for buy-out͛.694 Employers certainly 
benefit when members leave the DB scheme. This is because the CETV that the member 
takes when they leave a scheme reflects the best estimate cost of providing the benefits in 
the new scheme and does not include the prudence margin that funding on an ongoing 
basis requires. This margin covers future longevity and inflation risk for example. Further, if 
the scheme is in deficit, this is reflected in a reduced transfer value. The ACA anticipated 
that many companies will initiate transfer value exercises after April 2015.   
“teǀe JohŶsoŶ ƌepoƌts that: ͚TƌaŶsfeƌ ǀalue eǆeƌĐises ĐaŶ ďe populaƌ ǁith ĐoŵpaŶies that 
want to de-risk by reducing the size of legacy DB pension schemes. They have often been 
criticised foƌ eŶĐouƌagiŶg people to giǀe up ǀaluaďle ͞gold-plated͟ ďeŶefits iŶ ƌetuƌŶ foƌ 
moving to a riskier personal pension. In 2012, the Financial Services Authority, the financial 
regulator at the time, said it had found instances where advisers had recommended a 
tƌaŶsfeƌ ďut ǁheƌe the F“A Đould fiŶd ͞little oƌ Ŷo justifiĐatioŶ to do so͟, poteŶtiallǇ leaǀiŶg 
people short-ĐhaŶged iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛.695 
Despite this, a number of practitioners support members transferring out of DB: 
 Simon Taylor, a partner at Barnett WaddiŶghaŵ, said: ͚The Ŷeǁ peŶsioŶ fƌeedoŵs 
may lead to an increase in members looking to transfer out of defined benefit 
schemes into defined contribution, which may ultimately help schemes de-ƌisk͛.  
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 Martyn Phillips, head of buyouts at JLT Employee Benefits, believes that paying a 
generous transfer value may be cheaper than buying a member out with an 
iŶsuƌaŶĐe ĐoŵpaŶǇ: ͚That͛s a gaiŶ fƌoŵ a spoŶsoƌ oďjeĐtiǀe aŶd fƌoŵ a tƌustee 
oďjeĐtiǀe, aŶd it͛s oďǀiouslǇ a ŵoƌe geŶeƌous offeƌ thaŶ the tƌustees ǁould Ŷoƌŵally 
ďe offeƌiŶg those ŵeŵďeƌs͛.696  Ian Gutteridge of Premier Pensions Management believes that ETV exercises to 
encourage DB members to switch to a DC scheme might be an attractive way for 
employers to reduce their DB liabilities in the new pensions environment. Another 
option is for the employer to offer a pension increase exchange (PIE): the member 
receives an increase in the pension but then foregoes annual pension increases on 
non-statutory pension benefits. The employer could pay for the member to have 
adǀiĐe so that ͚oŶlǇ appƌopƌiate iŶdiǀiduals aĐĐept a PIE oƌ tƌaŶsfeƌ ǀalue͛. Mƌ 
Gutteƌidge adds: ͚It͛s a daŶgeƌous stƌategǇ fƌoŵ the tƌustees͛ poiŶt of ǀieǁ if theǇ 
saǇ ͚Ŷo; ǁe doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to get iŶǀolǀed iŶ this͛. Pƌoǀideƌs haǀe ďeeŶ ĐƌitiĐised [in the 
past] by regulators for failing to give policyholders the full range of options available. 
Tƌustees aƌe [also] opeŶ to ďe ĐƌitiĐised͛.697   Tom Ground, head of bulk annuities and longevity insurance at Legal & General, 
argues that member option exercises have an important role to play in DB pension 
scheme de-ƌiskiŶg eǆeƌĐises. He saǇs that: ͚TƌaŶsfeƌ ǀalue eǆeƌĐises, peŶsioŶ iŶĐƌease 
exchanges and other member option exercises can provide valued flexibility to 
scheme members, while potentially increasing the affordability of an insurance de-
risking solution, such as a buyout or buy-in. For example, with certain member 
optioŶ eǆeƌĐises, iŶsuƌeƌs ŵaǇ take the ǀieǁ that theƌe is the poteŶtial foƌ ͞seleĐtioŶ 
ƌisk͟ aŶd ǁill Đhaƌge a higheƌ pƌeŵiuŵ to Đoǀeƌ this risk. This may have an impact, 
where a transfer value exercise has been carried out already and the insurer then 
subsequently assesses the average life expectancy of the remaining members as part 
of a buyout, buy-in or longevity insurance quote. If the insurer believes that only 
those members in poor health had taken up the offer, then the average life 
expectancy of the remaining members will be higher. So the insurance premium 
would then be higher to reflect the increased longevity of the members. This could, 
in some circumstances, put the scheme in a position where it may have been better 
for all parties, if the exercise had been conducted on a wider basis initially. By 
engaging with an insurance provider at an early stage, ahead of the point of carrying 
out member option exercises, a scheme can ensure that the initiatives contribute 
toǁaƌds aĐhieǀiŶg the sĐheŵe͛s loŶg teƌŵ de-ƌiskiŶg oďjeĐtiǀes͛.698 
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A survey of 322 DB schemes conducted by KPMG in May 2015 found that 75% of DB 
schemes intended to offer transfer quotes to members as part of their standard retirement 
process, while a third of schemes planned to offer partial transfers.  Around 25% of schemes 
reported that they would offer free or subsidised advice to members, while 30% planned to 
provide online modelling tools. Only 14% of schemes polled said they had no plans to 
change retirement processes in the new pension regime. Two thirds of those polled 
accepted that responsibility for dealing with the impact of the new legislation rested with 
employers (31%) or trustees (34%), rather than with individuals, providers or the 
Government.  
“teǁaƌt Hastie, peŶsioŶs paƌtŶeƌ at KPMG, said: ͚It is eŶĐouƌagiŶg to see that ŵost 
employers and trustees are waking-up to the fact that they need to respond to the recent 
changes to pensions flexibility. The decisions facing pension scheme members at retirement 
are irreversible. This shows that employers and trustees have recognised that doing nothing 
is not a risk-fƌee stƌategǇ…Both eŵploǇeƌs aŶd tƌustees ŵust staǇ oŶ top of the recent 
changes and ensure they are engaging with their members. We see a need for education, 
not just the provision of information. By educating members, employers and trustees can 
help them plan for their retirement based on their individual needs. Members can also 
benefit from the full range of flexibility options open to them, in turn, increasing staff 
ŵoƌale aŶd the fiƌŵ's ƌeputatioŶ͛.699 
The potential size of the DB-to-DC transfer market could be huge. Some sources estimate 
that about 500,000 members of private sector DB pension schemes will give up their index-
linked final-salary pensions and instead take a cash lump sum.700  Others put the numbers at 
Ϯŵ oƌ ϱϬ% of those oǀeƌ ϱϱ. ‘eseaƌĐh ďǇ iŶdustƌǇ aŶalǇsts foƌ ChaŶŶel ϰ͛s DispatĐhes 
programme estimated that withdrawals could be as high as £6bn, which is three times more 
than HM Treasury estimates. Alan Higham, then retirement director of Fidelity Worldwide 
IŶǀestŵeŶt, told the pƌogƌaŵŵe: ͚Aďout ϮϬ peƌ ĐeŶt of the Đalls ǁe͛ǀe had aƌe fƌoŵ people 
who have made very quick plans to spend money on house improvements, buy a new car, 
go oŶ holidaǇ . . . aŶd aƌe lookiŶg to aĐĐess theiƌ peŶsioŶ fuŶds ƋuiĐklǇ foƌ that puƌpose͛.701 
A Close Brothers Asset Management survey in April 2015 asked 400 employers about the 
response by scheme members to the new pension regime. Around 44% of respondents with 
a DB scheme reported they had been contacted by members considering transferring out, 
ǁhile ϭϭ% said theǇ had ďeeŶ appƌoaĐhed ďǇ a ͚sigŶifiĐaŶt Ŷuŵďeƌ͛ of ŵeŵďeƌs. For those 
with DC schemes, 57% of employers were planning to offer employees help to allow them 
to make more informed decisions. Around 23% said they thought employees would turn to 
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the Government's Pension Wise service, 27% expected their staff to ask them for help, while 
28% thought employees would seek specialised advice from a financial adviser.702 
In August 2015, Selectapension released the results of a survey which showed that pension 
transfer requests from DB schemes doubled in the three months following Flexiday 
compared with the three months from April 2014. The top providers chosen to receive the 
transfers were: Royal London, Scottish Widows, Prudential, and LV=. Andy McCabe, 
managing director at Selectapension, said: ͚PeŶsioŶ fƌeedoŵs haǀe staƌted to make a 
considerable impact on consumers and have acted as a catalyst for many to reassess 
whether remaining in a DB scheme is the best option. However, it is important to recognise 
that transferring from a DB scheme is not suitable for everyone and a decision as complex as 
this should Ŷot ďe ŵade hastilǇ ďut ǁith ĐoŵpƌeheŶsiǀe fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe͛.703 
 
TPR is concerned that a large volume of transfers could destabilise the DB scheme by 
crystallising liabilities. It has therefore provided guidance to DB pension scheme trustees on 
ƌeduĐiŶg a ŵeŵďeƌ͛s tƌaŶsfeƌ ǀalue aŶd hoǁ to applǇ foƌ ŵoƌe tiŵe to ĐaƌƌǇ out a 
transfer.704  
 
3.12.2.3  Vulnerable consumers in the annuity market 
We distinguish between the primary and secondary annuity market. The primary market is 
the market where annuities are first sold.  The secondary market is where someone who has 
bought an annuity can subsequently sell it for cash; this market does not currently exist in 
the UK, but the Government is planning to set one up in April 2017.705 
The primary annuity market 
In August 2014, the Daily Telegraph reported that the FCA had begun an investigation into 
the sale of annuities sold since 2008 to check if they were unsuitable for customers. The 
paper said that more than 600,000 pensioners could have been sold annuities that did not 
take account of their health status. People with diabetes or high blood pressure could have 
had their pensions increased by around 20% if they had been sold an enhanced annuity 
instead of a standard one. It is estimated that as many as 60% of retirees have a medical 
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condition or make lifestyle choices (e.g., smoke) which reduce their life expectancy and 
qualify them for an enhanced annuity. They may now be due compensation if they were 
sold a standard annuity. The difference between the worst standard annuity rate and best 
enhanced rate could be as great as 30%. Telephone conversations will be examined, as will 
paperwork sent to customers before they retired. Compensation orders could be issued 
where failures are identified. 
Observers believe the level of compensation could be significant. For example, John Perks, 
ŵaŶagiŶg diƌeĐtoƌ of ƌetiƌeŵeŶt solutioŶs at LV=, said ͚AŶǇ eleŵeŶt of ĐoŵpeŶsatioŶ ǁill ďe 
costly because it means rectifying an annuity income for the long term plus the cost of doing 
that, so theƌe is poteŶtiallǇ Ƌuite a sĐaƌǇ ĐoŵpeŶsatioŶ eleŵeŶt heƌe͛.706 
The secondary annuity market 
The Government's consultation on its plans to create a secondary annuity market in 2017 
closed in June 2015. 
 
Many respondents geŶeƌallǇ ǁelĐoŵed the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s pƌoposals, ďut theƌe ǁere also 
many critics. For example, Mark Polson, founder and principal of the lang cat, said:707 
 
I'm on record as loving the other freedoms that have been opened up, and 
encouraging the industry to trust savers with their own money. So why 
buck and kick against these freedoms being extended to current 
annuitants? 
There are two reasons. 
Firstly, on a micro level, it's going to be terrible value for those who 
participate. If we accept the mighty Ned Cazalet's recent figures that up to 
20% of the purchase price of an annuity is snaffled in charges, then 
annuitants have already borne significant pain. 
Do we really believe those that purchase second-hand annuities will be 
doing so pro bono? Of course not. We don't know how the figures might 
look, but the purchase has to be profitable for those putting up the capital, 
and that's just another way of saying that the annuitant will receive what 
we like to call a ͚secondary screwing'. 
For sure, we won't be multiplying monthly payments left to the actuarial 
cohort's expected age of death and paying that to the individual. And you 
can expect medical underwriting and postcoding to work in reverse. 
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As Cazalet's 129-page blockbuster proves, annuities are anything but 
simple, and unwinding them will be even worse – think Ginger Rogers' 
famous quote that she did everything Fred Astaire did, except backwards 
and in heels. 
Can we expect the industry to behave itself and not give annuitants looking 
to flee a worse-than-usual screwing? No, we can't. And it is for this reason 
– the supply side, not the demand side – that at an individual level this 
proposal shouldn't go ahead. 
Freedom to get re-screwed by an industry hell-bent on loading the decks 
against you is no freedom at all. 
At a macro level it gets even worse. Purchasers of second-hand annuities 
will only make it work by pooling – that is, by buying lots and lots of them 
to spread mortality risk. Once we're in that world, we'll start profiling 
those pools. 
We ŵight haǀe ͚A' pools, ǁith healthǇ folk iŶ good postĐodes, ͚D' pools foƌ 
people who didn't listen to their wives about the bottle of whisky and all 
that. 
Once that's happening, it's only a matter of time before we have second-
hand annuity funds in the life settlement/second-hand endowment fund 
style, and we know how well those went. And am I the only one who can 
see packages of annuities being bundled up, collateralised and sold on on 
what I suppose would be a tertiary market?  
….this omni-screwing proposal should be put down humanely before it has 
a chance to breed. 
 
“iŵilaƌlǇ, ‘iĐhaƌd PaƌkiŶ, head of ƌetiƌeŵeŶt at FidelitǇ IŶteƌŶatioŶal, said: ͚With these 
benefits come significant risks for consumers who are giving up guarantees in return for 
cash. In essence, this market combines the complexity of defined benefit transfers with the 
risks of pension freedom. We would therefore expect to see similar levels of consumer 
protection and requirements for advice that we have for these transactions. We cannot 
affoƌd to skiŵp oŶ pƌoteĐtiŶg Đustoŵeƌs iŶ puƌsuit of ŵakiŶg tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs easǇ͛.708 
EǀeŶ aŵoŶgst those ǁho ǁelĐoŵed the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s pƌoposals, theƌe ǁas ǁidespƌead 
support for the idea that annuitants wanting to sell their annuities for cash should be 
required to take independent financial advice to reduce the risk that they end up getting a 
raw deal, although some warned that it could hinder competition and choice. 
For example, Aegon warned that people cashing in their contracts could be left below the 
means-tested benefits threshold without entitlement to claim a government top-up. It also 
pointed out that fraudsters would look to exploit any weaknesses in the market place and 
that beneficiaries could be hit if their partners decided to sell the policy. Similarly, the NAPF 
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proposed that there should be mandatory advice if the annuity was valued at £10,000 or 
more. It also pointed out that customers could face a significant tax bill estimated to raise 
for the Treasury an estimated £1bn in the first two years. Under the current tax regime, 
someone wanting to sell their annuity would face a 55% tax charge; however, the 
Government has said it would remove this charge, so people will be taxed only at their 
marginal rate. 
By contrast, LV= Retirement Solutions supported the idea of mandatory advice but only for 
those ǁho ͚Ŷeed͛ it. JohŶ Peƌks, ŵaŶagiŶg diƌeĐtoƌ, said: ͚GiǀeŶ the poteŶtial detƌiŵeŶtal 
risks involved for consumers, we fully advocate that consumers are obliged to take advice 
before making a decision as to whether they proceed. However, we think the requirement 
Ŷeeds to ďe assessed to aǀoid the Đost of adǀiĐe daŵagiŶg the ǀalue of sŵalleƌ aŶŶuities͛. 
Similarly, JLT Employee Benefits accepted that consumers must be protected from scams, 
but did not believe that the advice should be mandatory. TISA wanted consumers to have 
access to 'tailored guidance' rather than advice which could be viewed by consumers as an 
͚uŶŶeĐessaƌǇ ďaƌƌieƌ aŶd eǆpeŶse͛. The guidaŶĐe ǁould ďe Đaƌƌied out uŶdeƌ the existing 
guidance guarantee, Pension Wise, together with an extension of the second-line-of-
defence rules – the requirement on providers to highlight warnings about their clients' 
choices – to apply to all secondary annuity transactions. 
APFA has asked foƌ ŵoƌe ĐlaƌitǇ aƌouŶd adǀiseƌ liaďilitǇ ǁheŶ adǀisiŶg oŶ aŶŶuitǇ sales: ͚We 
would strongly recommend the provision of further guidance to financial advisers and other 
intermediaries around what constitutes a suitable reason for assigning annuity income 
rights. The continuing regulatory uncertainty on adviser liability both generally and around 
the new pension freedoms has meant many advisers are unwilling to engage in the DB-to-
DC pension transfers. We hope this will be looked at by the Government and the regulator 
elseǁheƌe͛. Fuƌtheƌ, it said that eǆistiŶg aŶŶuities should oŶlǇ ďe alloǁed to ďe sold to 
ƌegulated fiƌŵs, Ŷot ƌetail iŶǀestoƌs, siŶĐe ͚seĐoŶdaƌǇ ŵaƌket iŶĐoŵe stƌeaŵs ĐaŶ ďe 
complex and consumers must be protected as far as possible from making financial 
deĐisioŶs ǁhiĐh aƌe to theiƌ detƌiŵeŶt͛. 
There was also concern about reliably quantifying the extent of longevity risk. Hymans 
Robertson recommended the creation of standardised health underwriting, an auction-style 
market place, and a robust audit trail to document the seller's reasons for cashing in their 
contract. 
There was also a difference of view about whether the original provider should be allowed 
to buy back a client's annuity (i.e., provider buy-back). The Government had initially said it 
did Ŷot like the idea. Hoǁeǀeƌ, TI“A͛steĐhŶiĐal diƌeĐtoƌ, JeffƌeǇ MusheŶs, said eǆistiŶg 
annuity providers should be allowed to buy back aŶŶuities ͚iŶ oƌdeƌ to eŶĐouƌage 
competition and coŶsuŵeƌ ĐhoiĐe͛. Mƌ Peƌks agƌeed: ͚We ďelieǀe that iŶdiǀiduals should 
have the right to sell their annuity to their existing annuity provider should the provider be 
willing to do so, and where the provider can demonstrate that a fair offer has been made. 
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We do not believe that it is in the spirit of the reforms to restrict individuals' ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd 
ĐhoiĐe͛ as to how they take their retirement income. We support the proposed approach to 
allow a wide range of corporate entities to purchase the annuity as this will lead to greater 
ĐoŵpetitioŶ aŶd ultiŵatelǇ ďetteƌ ǀalue pƌiĐiŶg͛.709 
In December 2015, the Government announced that the secondary annuity market would 
start oŶ ϲ Apƌil ϮϬϭϳ. The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt said it saǁ ͚Ŷo ƌeasoŶ to pƌeǀeŶt ƌetiƌees ǁho haǀe 
already purchased an annuity from selling their right to future income streams for an 
upfƌoŶt Đash suŵ if it is ƌight foƌ theŵ͛. Fiǀe ŵillioŶ people ǁith aŶ aŶŶuitǇ ǁould be able to 
sell it for a cash lump sum and be taxed at their marginal rate. The annuity can be sold back 
to the original provider or to another institutional investor. Those taking advantage will be 
able to spend the money received as they see fit. The Treasury has also said it wants to 
ŵake ͚appƌopƌiate fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe͛ ŵaŶdatoƌǇ foƌ those ĐoŶsideƌiŶg selliŶg theiƌ aŶŶuitǇ 
and said that it will make an amendment to the Bank of England and Financial Services Bill 
to achieve this. It also seems that anyone will be able to sell their annuity. It had previously 
been thought that those on means-tested benefits would be excluded. Now, the 
Government intends to rely on existing deliberate deprivation rules which state that anyone 
on or likely to become eligible for means-tested benefits who gives up income or capital 
with the deliberate intention of gaining additional support or benefits can be treated as still 
possessing it.710 It is also not currently clear whether the proceeds from selling an annuity 
would remain within a pension tax wrapper.  
Harriett Baldwin said the reforms would include: 
 Setting out that pension annuities belonging to an individual and held in their own 
name will be eligible for the new freedoms  Requiring that all UK-based annuity purchasers and intermediaries are regulated by 
the FCA  Allowing annuity providers the choice to buy back an annuity, subject to robust 
safeguards  Introducing a comprehensive consumer protection package to ensure people make 
informed decisions about their savings, including: 
o extending the free and impartial Pension Wise service to cover the secondary 
annuity market 
o requiring individuals to seek independent financial advice for annuities worth 
above a certain threshold 
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 Asking the FCA to put in place a consumer protection framework which could include 
consulting on a range of extra consumer protections, such as risk warnings and ways 
for consumers to understand the fair value of their annuities  The Government has also responded to consultation feedback and will work with the 
industry and the FCA to create a simple online tool to help consumers work out an 
estimated value of their annuity. 
Ms Baldwin continued: ͚Foƌ ŵost people, stiĐkiŶg ǁith aŶ aŶŶuitǇ is the ƌight thing to do. 
But there will be some who would welcome being able to draw on that money as they 
choose – the same freedom we gave people approaching retirement in April [2015]. That͛s 
ǁhǇ I͛ŵ delighted that ǁe͛ƌe eǆteŶdiŶg ouƌ laŶdŵaƌk peŶsioŶ fƌeedoŵs to over five million 
people ǁith aŶŶuities fƌoŵ Apƌil ϮϬϭϳ. People ǁho͛ǀe ǁoƌked haƌd aŶd saǀed haƌd all theiƌ 
lives should be trusted to make the right decision for them and with the help of the 
regulator, we will ensure these people have the right inforŵatioŶ to do that͛. 
‘os AltŵaŶŶ, the PeŶsioŶs MiŶisteƌ, added: ͚The Ŷeǁ peŶsioŶ fƌeedoŵ ƌefoƌŵs aƌe ĐƌuĐial 
in allowing people to make the most of their hard-earned savings. Keeping an annuity will 
still be the right decision for the majority of people. But some were forced to buy annuities 
in the past that may not have been suitable for them – and I am delighted that this reform 
will allow more people greater choice and the opportunity of a more flexible income stream. 
…IŶdiǀiduals ŵaǇ ǁaŶt to sell aŶ aŶŶuity for instance to provide a lump sum for relatives or 
dependants; in response to a change in circumstances; or to purchase a more flexible 
peŶsioŶ iŶĐoŵe pƌoduĐt iŶstead͛.711 
Tom McPhail said the Treasury's latest amendment was consistent with current rules 
around pension transfers, which require regulated advice for pots over £30,000. He believes 
that having a similar safeguard in place should help prevent investors from selling their 
guaranteed incomes for rock-bottom prices, but the size of the threshold is important: 
͚Theƌe is alƌeadǇ soŵe ĐoŶĐeƌŶ that the ĐuƌƌeŶt £ϯϬ,ϬϬϬ thƌeshold is ĐausiŶg pƌoďleŵs, ǁith 
some investors unable to obtain the advisory services they need. Any increase to the 
threshold would have to be accompanied by other suitable protections to ensure investors 
Đould ŵake aŶ iŶfoƌŵed ĐhoiĐe͛.712  
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Otheƌs ǁaƌŶed that the ĐhaŶge ͚opeŶs the dooƌ to ŵillioŶs ŵakiŶg a fiŶaŶĐial ŵistake ďǇ 
flogging a guaranteed income in return for an immediate lump sum that will be much less 
than they would end up ǁith ďǇ stiĐkiŶg ǁith theiƌ aŶŶuitǇ͛:713 
 Steve Webb, former Pensions Minister and now director of policy at Royal London, 
said: ͚Theƌe is a ƌeal ƌisk of pooƌ outĐoŵes if people oŶ loǁ iŶĐoŵes sell theiƌ aŶŶuitǇ 
only to discover that the DWP treats them as if theǇ ǁeƌe still dƌaǁiŶg that iŶĐoŵe͛.  AlaŶ Highaŵ of PeŶsioŶsĐhaŵp.Đoŵ said the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁas pƌioƌitisiŶg ͚politiĐal 
ideologǇ oǀeƌ people͛s ƌeal Ŷeeds iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt. [The ĐhaŶge ǁould] ͚ďeŶefit feǁ 
ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ǁhile eǆposiŶg ŵaŶǇ to sigŶifiĐaŶt ƌisks͛. He has estimated that someone 
aged 75 who bought an annuity 10 years ago with £100,000 would be receiving on 
average £7,000 a year from it. If they were to sell it and were in good health, they 
would get around £56,000. They would be worse off if they lived for another nine 
years, yet official estimates indicate that an average healthy 75-year old will live for 
aŶotheƌ ϭϮ Ǉeaƌs. Mƌ Highaŵ added: ͚“oŵe healthǇ ϳϱ-year olds could easily live to 
100, given increased life expectancy, and giving up 25 years͛ worth of money for 
eight Ǉeaƌs looks a ǀeƌǇ ďad deal ďǇ aŶǇoŶe͛s ŵeasuƌe͛.   Sarah Pennells of SavvyWoman.co.uk warned that the freedom to cash-in an annuity 
ǁill ďe ǁelĐoŵed ďǇ ͚ƌogues aŶd fƌaudsteƌs [ǁho] haǀe alƌeadǇ takeŶ ŵillioŶs fƌoŵ 
people͛ siŶĐe the ǁider pensions freedoms came into force in April. 
The Government announced that advisers in the secondary annuity market could be 
ƌeƋuiƌed to uŶdeƌgo fuƌtheƌ tƌaiŶiŶg aŶd take eǆaŵiŶatioŶs: ͚IŶteƌŵediaƌies aƌe likelǇ to 
have new opportunities in this market, including facilitating the purchase of annuities and 
providing a range of services for the consumer. These new opportunities are likely to 
improve the profitability of firms. However, there may be a requirement for advisers to take 
part in additional training or earn new qualifications to work with customers looking to sell 
theiƌ aŶŶuitǇ͛.714  
 ͵.ͳʹ.͵ The FCAǯs proposed new rules and guidance following the Ǯfreedom and choiceǯ 
reforms 
In October 2015, the FCA issued a consultation paper on the ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ 
reforms.715 This was a follow on from its Retirement Income Market Study, conducted prior 
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to the introduction of the pension reforms, which focused on the risks facing consumers and 
how they could make poor choices at retirement.  
The FCA has reviewed its rules and guidance and made proposals for future rule changes to 
protect the interests of retirees. The proposals include additional rules and guidance for 
firms on how they should communicate with customers, a review of the retirement risk 
warnings, which were introduced in February without consultation, and new rules for 
pension freedoms communications. The key proposals are: 
 Rules and guidance to ensure that consumers receive timely, relevant and adequate 
information to both encourage consumers to explore the full range of options for 
accessing their pension savings and enable informed decision-making  New rules on the methodology for providing illustrations to members wishing to 
access their pensions flexibly, including guidance to set out the type of ongoing 
information that consumers are provided, once they start accessing their pension 
savings and remain invested  To retain the rules on retirement risk warnings, but to remove the requirement for a 
firm to go through the question and answer process of the rules when a consumer 
has a pension pot of £10,000 or less and where there are no safeguarded benefits  To add guidance to make explicit the application of existing rules in the context of 
pension reforms, particularly in relation to debt collection and debt advice  Restrictions on the promotion and distribution of high risk investments and 
amendments to the FCA's definition of certified high net worth investor and 
restricted investor. 
Christopher Woolard said: ͚PeŶsioŶs aƌe of fuŶdaŵeŶtal iŵpoƌtaŶĐe aŶd it is ǀital that the 
market works well for consumers. Our proposals today are designed to ensure that 
consumers have access to products and services that are well governed and deliver value for 
money following the Government's pension reforms. We will continue to monitor the 
market as it evolves following the introduction of the Government's pension reforms to 
eŶsuƌe that fiƌŵs aƌe helpiŶg ĐoŶsuŵeƌs get the ďest outĐoŵe iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛.  
To ensure consumers are able to make informed decisions about an appropriate retirement 
solution, the FCA proposes to change the information in the pre-retirement wake-up pack. 
In addition to information about Pension Wise and regulated financial advice, the FCA 
proposes to: 
 Reduce and simplify the information provided  Ensure information is presented on all retirement options  Make it easier to obtain annuity comparisons, which would mean the need to 
provide more focus on enhanced annuities  Make it easier to shop around after carrying out these comparisons 
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 Ensure all information is balanced, so it does not promote one solution over another. 
This would mean where an illustration is provided, for, say, an annuity, illustrations 
would also have to be provided for all other available options  To reduce consumer inertia, restrict the annuity application form being enclosed 
within the pack. This has the effect of ensuring consumers make a positive election 
from the options available  As flexibility allows consumers to access the fund at different stages throughout 
their retirement, information should be provided at each time, i.e., pre and post 
retirement. 
In cases where the advice is to use income withdrawal, a suitability report needs to be 
prepared. The current rules apply to flexible access drawdown, but not to uncrystallised 
fund pension lump sums, and the rules will be updated to make specific reference to the 
latter. 
Non-advised annuity sales could be subject to a commission cap or an outright ban. This is 
because consumers were at risk of not getting value for money from non-advised annuity 
sales, and that, in some circumstances, commission payments were so high they exceeded 
the cost of regulated financial advice. Currently, most annuities are bought without advice –  
either direct from the annuity provider (typically the accumulation-stage pension provider) 
or via a third-party distributor. Many third-party distributors were paid a commission by the 
pension provider for arranging the sale. Commission rates were 1% - 1.5% for a standard 
annuity and 2.5% - 3% for enhanced annuities. This contrasts with taking regulated advice, 
which involves consumers themselves agreeing to the service they want to receive and the 
fee to be paid to the adviser. 
However, the FCA is aware of the potential ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes of aŶ outƌight ďaŶ: ͚Otheƌ 
options, such as drawdown, would still carry commission. Therefore limiting any ban to 
annuities could distort competition between these potentially substitutable products. Firms 
might, as a consequence, be incentivised to promote drawdown over annuities with 
potential harmful impacts on consumers in the long term. This would mean that, to avoid 
distorting competition, we would need to consider banning commission on a wider range of 
iŶǀestŵeŶt solutioŶs͛. 
The FCA also wants to exclude pension wealth from the definition of a high net worth 
investor (HNWI) in order to prevent retirees losing their pension pot in high-risk 
iŶǀestŵeŶts. It pƌoposes aŶ aŵeŶdŵeŶt to its ͚Đeƌtified high Ŷet ǁoƌth iŶǀestoƌ' aŶd 
͚ƌestƌiĐted investor' (RI) certification criteria, so that lump sum pension withdrawals are 
excluded from the HNWI income criteria. It also wants money released from pensions as 
cash to be excluded from the definition of net investable assets for the purposes of HNWI 
and RI certification, in addition to the current exclusion of money held in pensions. It said: 
͚We aƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed soŵe ĐoŶsuŵeƌs' peƌĐeptioŶ of theiƌ oǀeƌall fiŶaŶĐial ǁealth folloǁiŶg 
withdrawal of up to 100% cash from their pension savings may lead consumers to certify 
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themselves as HNWI. [It could also lead them to] invest more money than is appropriate 
under the RI category, and for firms to distribute potentially inappropriate investments to 
these ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛.  
The criteria for certifying HNWIs are based on either net income (£100,000) or net 
investable assets (£250,000). As a result of the pension reforms, more retirees could find 
themselves falling within these criteria which, in turn, could leave them exposed to pension 
scammers or being targeted for high-risk investments. Anyone certified as a HNWI does not 
receive the regulatory protection of the suitability rules and it also means there are no 
restrictions on the type of promotions they receive. To reduce the potential risks, the FCA 
wants to exclude cash from a pension from the definition of net investable assets, in the 
same way that money held in a pension fund is already excluded.716 
In September 2015, Mark Neale, the chief executive of the FSCS, called for the Government 
to extend the level of financial protection to cover the total value of peoples' retirement 
savings. Currently, the FSCS protects up to £50,000 of people's retirement and investment 
savings. But this is only for those who invest in regulated products or received regulated 
financial advice and where the firm has defaulted. The FSCS already covers 100% of the 
policy value of an annuity. Mr Neale wants the protection increased to 100% of the value of 
pension pots. He highlighted examples of failures in the self-invested personal pension 
market, relating to high pressure sales tactics to invest in unsuitable alternative assets, 
which created a case for improved protection. The FSCS assesses whether a firm is liable for 
its clients' losses by applying a 'civil liability test', i.e., whether, looking at the evidence, the 
case would have been won in a civil court. 
Mƌ Neale said: ͚IŶ ƌeĐeŶt Ǉeaƌs, the ďulk of iŶǀestoƌ ĐoŵpeŶsatioŶ ǁe haǀe paid out ďeĐause 
of negligent advice has concerned investments in risky and exotic assets, such as overseas 
property schemes. The recent spate of claims to FSCS arising from investments in SIPPs have 
fallen into exactly this category. These are exactly the sort of investors who should have 
FSCS protection. Such investors have seen all or the bulk of modest retirement savings put 
at risk because they did the right thing and sought professional advice about how best to 
invest those funds. They received very bad advice which the great majority of responsible 
financial advisers would not have contemplated. This raises the question of whether - 
following the Government's reforms – we should take a fresh look at the scope of FSCS 
pƌoteĐtioŶ foƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt saǀiŶgs͛.717 
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3.13 Media and Government reactions to regulatory and provider concerns about 
consumer vulnerability: The issues of access and exit charges 
Despite the large sums of money that were withdrawn in the first few months following 
Flexiday,  it soon became clear that many customers were actually finding it difficult to 
access their pension pots or were being made to pay significant exit charges by their 
providers.  
 
3.13.1  Access 
While the measures put in place by regulators and providers were there to protect 
vulnerable consumers, some of them at the prompting of MPs on the Work and Pensions 
Select Committee hearing in December 2014 with the FCA, the media – led by the Daily Mail 
and the Daily Telegraph – saw them as unnecessary and costly barriers to people accessing 
their money and this view was immediately taken up by Government ministers.   
Typical of media reaction is this article in the Daily Mail:718 
Geoƌge OsďoƌŶe͛s peŶsioŶs ƌeǀolutioŶ ǁas iŶ Đƌisis last Ŷight ǁith 
thousands of savers unable to spend their nest eggs as they want. 
Just 65 days into the new regime, financial giants are under siege from 
furious customers. 
The Chancellor had promised savers easy access to their cash. But today a 
Money Mail investigation can reveal a string of disastrous failings:  Firms refusing withdrawals for fear of being sued for negligence in 
years to come;  Savers being forced to pay up to £1,000 for financial advice if they 
want their money;  Customers turned away because they have only small pensions;  Delays of up to 90 days in paying out cash;  Sky-high charges for withdrawals or for switching to rival firms;  Insurers knocking thousands off the value of pensions [that] 
customers want to access. 
....Since April 5 this year anyone over 55 should in practice be allowed to 
take all their savings out in cash, or dip in and out of it as they want – just 
like a bank account. 
But in reality savers are finding that they cannot get their hands on their 
money. 
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Some firms such as NEST, Friends Life and Phoenix will not allow savers to 
use their pension like a bank account. 
Others charge hefty fees of up to £240 for each withdrawal, or place 
restrictions on how much someone can take out. 
Money Mail has been bombarded with letters from pensioners who have 
been told they cannot have their savings unless they first see a financial 
adviser. This typically costs about £1,000. And even if they do consult an 
adviser they may still may not be able to get at their cash if the adviser 
does not think taking the pension is a good idea and refuses to help. 
Some savers had found that the specific type of pension they have does not 
qualify. And many have faced lengthy delays because insurers have been 
forced to dig out pension contracts that are three decades old. 
Customers of firms such as Clerical Medical, Phoenix Life and Aegon have 
experienced huge delays in getting hold of their cash. 
…Dƌ YǀoŶŶe BƌauŶ, of the AssoĐiatioŶ of Bƌitish IŶsuƌeƌs, said: ͚Pƌoǀideƌs 
have and are continuing to work round the clock to ensure these reforms 
are implemented as smoothly as possible. 
͚IŶ the fiƌst ŵoŶth aloŶe, the iŶdustƌǇ haŶdled oǀeƌ oŶe ŵillioŶ telephoŶe 
enquiries – up 80 peƌ ĐeŶt oŶ Ŷoƌŵal. ͚While the ǀast ŵajoƌitǇ of 
customers have been able to access their funds in full, some may be 
ƌeƋuiƌed to take adǀiĐe as a ƌesult of the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ƌules ďeĐause theǇ 
haǀe ǀaluaďle guaƌaŶtees.͛ 
In June 2015, the Daily Telegƌaph, lauŶĐhed a ͚Make PeŶsioŶ Fƌeedoŵs Woƌk͛ ĐaŵpaigŶ 
with five demands:719 
1. All peŶsioŶ pƌoǀideƌs ŵust offeƌ saǀeƌs ͚ďaŶk aĐĐouŶt͛ tǇpe aĐĐess to their money.  
Wheƌe pƌoǀideƌs ǁoŶ͛t do this, they must allow their customers to switch to rival 
providers for free 
2. Charges for making use of the new pension freedoms – per cash withdrawal, for 
example – should be reasonable and capped 
3. The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s default ǁoƌk peŶsioŶ pƌoǀideƌ, NE“T, should offeƌ its oǁŶ ƌaŶge 
of bank account features that will be suitable, and affordable, even for modest 
savers 
4. Exit penalties for all pension savers, even where these penalties have been written 
into old-style pension plans should be scrapped for every saver beyond the age of 55 
5. Savers wanting to move their pension cash from one provider to another should be 
offered a safe, standardised process where all the associated risks and costs are 
clear. 
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EǀeŶ the CoŶsuŵeƌs͛ AssoĐiatioŶ stepped iŶto the deďate. ‘iĐhaƌd LloǇd, eǆeĐutiǀe diƌeĐtoƌ 
of WhiĐh?, said: ͚The ƌeĐeŶt peŶsioŶ ƌeforms are a golden opportunity to make the pensions 
market work in the best interest of consumers. So it is disappointing to see one of the 
ďiggest pƌoǀideƌs Ŷot steppiŶg up aŶd iŵpleŵeŶtiŶg the ĐhaŶges͛.720 
In the same issue of the Daily Mail cited above, Ros Altmann, as Pensions Minister, and 
Harriett Baldwin, as EĐoŶoŵiĐ “eĐƌetaƌǇ to the TƌeasuƌǇ, ǁƌote ;uŶdeƌ the headiŶg ͚IŶsuƌeƌs 
shouldŶ't haǀe aŶǇ eǆĐuses͛Ϳ: 
Earlier this year, George Osborne introduced the most significant reforms 
to the pensions system in a century. 
GoŶe is the effeĐtiǀe ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt to ďuǇ aŶ aŶŶuitǇ. If Ǉou͛ƌe oǀeƌ the age 
of 55, you now have the freedom to access your defined contribution 
pension pot in the way you want — in flexible payments, by taking some 
out and leaving the rest for later, as a regular income, or as cash. 
As the Prime Minister said this week, we want to give people more control 
over the money they saved hard for over their working lives. 
It͛s gƌeat that ŵaŶǇ peŶsioŶ pƌoǀideƌs aŶd sĐheŵes haǀe ƌiseŶ to the 
challenge and are offering their customers flexibility. 
However, it is disappointing that some firms are lagging behind, and some 
providers have chosen to focus their efforts on far too narrow a range of 
options. 
No matter which pension provider you saved with, you should be able to 
use your pension how you want to. 
The industry should be embracing this exciting opportunity and developing 
innovative and competitive products that work for you — and we will work 
closely with them to help them achieve this. 
We have to recognise that some companies have met practical difficulties 
aloŶg the ǁaǇ, iŶĐludiŶg ĐƌeakiŶg IT sǇsteŵs that ĐaŶ͛t ͚speak͛ to eaĐh 
other. 
That is ǁhǇ ǁe͛ǀe alloǁed iŶsuƌaŶĐe ĐoŵpaŶies fleǆiďilitǇ oǀeƌ hoǁ aŶd 
when they introduce these reforms. But we are determined that customers 
should in no way be disadvantaged by that. 
“o, ǁe haǀe ŵade suƌe that if Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t aĐĐess Ǉouƌ peŶsioŶ fleǆiďlǇ, oƌ feel 
you are being charged too much, you can transfer your savings to another 
provider. 
We are monitoring these issues closely and will continue to ensure that 
there is a system in place that works for you. We have also legislated to 
                                                     
720
 Quoted in Dan Hyde (2015) Pension companies 'failing to move with times', says minister, Daily Telegraph, 4 
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allow pension schemes to override their previous narrow scheme rules, so 
they can offer the flexibilities if they want to. 
This means that there is no excuse for firms to claim that their rules mean 
Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t aĐĐess Ǉouƌ ŵoŶeǇ. 
There are some circumstances where you will be asked to seek 
independent financial advice from a regulated professional adviser — 
that͛s siŵplǇ ďeĐause Ǉouƌ peŶsioŶ has special, valuable features which 
you need to understand before you make a decision. 
Ask Ǉouƌ peŶsioŶ pƌoǀideƌ to eǆplaiŶ ǁhǇ theǇ͛ƌe askiŶg Ǉou to take 
financial advice. 
The Government will be watching this issue closely and working with the 
industry and regulators to address any problems. 
If Ǉou͛ƌe ĐoŶsideƌiŶg aĐĐessiŶg Ǉouƌ peŶsioŶ, ŵake suƌe Ǉou take the tiŵe 
to find out what the options are, get help and support, and make the 
decision that is right for you and your family. 
After all, this could well be a once-in-a-lifetime decision that will affect 
what you have to live on for the rest of your life. 
To help you make that decision, the Government has set up Pension Wise, 
which offers free, impartial guidance on your options and will help you to 
understand the tax that you might pay, what charges to look out for and 
other important information. 
These have been major changes, underpinned by a very simple philosophy: 
it͛s Ǉouƌ ŵoŶeǇ, Ǉou haǀe eaƌŶed it, Ǉou haǀe saǀed it aŶd ǁe ǁaŶt Ǉou — 
not the Government or pensions companies — to choose what you do with 
it. 
Our focus now will be to make sure that the new system works in practice 
— and that the industry helps you get the most out of these historic 
reforms. 
 
Despite this, there were mixed messages from the Government about when it would 
intervene to oblige providers to offer full pension flexibility. Writing in the Daily Telegraph, 
Iain Duncan Smith, the Work and Pensions Secretary, said  the Government was ready to 
͚Ŷaŵe aŶd shaŵe͛ pƌoǀideƌs ǁho ǁeƌe Ŷot giǀiŶg theiƌ Đustoŵeƌs peŶsioŶs fƌeedoŵ. He 
also said the Government was talking to regulators to ensure that people have the flexibility 
theǇ deseƌǀe aŶd ǁill ͚Ŷot hesitate to take aĐtioŶ͛. IŶ ĐoŶtƌast,  Ros Altmann said the 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁould Ŷot iŶteƌǀeŶe iŵŵediatelǇ to ͚giǀe the ƌefoƌŵs a ĐhaŶĐe͛ fiƌst to ͚see 
how theǇ ǁoƌk͛. A DWP spokesŵaŶ said: ͚It is eaƌlǇ daǇs aŶd Ŷo-one is proposing an 
immediate intervention, but both ministers are clear that the situation needs to be carefully 
ŵoŶitoƌed. We aƌe pƌepaƌed to ͞Ŷaŵe aŶd shaŵe͟ those ĐoŵpaŶies ǁho aƌe puttiŶg 
barriers in the way of people getting access to their money if such action becomes necessary 
to encourage the industry to make changes. If, as the market develops, it becomes apparent 
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that Government action is necessary to ensure consumers get a good deal, then action will 
ďe takeŶ͛.721 
The ABI immediately hit back at proposals that providers – most of which are insurance 
companies – ǁould ďe ͚Ŷaŵed aŶd shaŵed͛ foƌ Ŷot offeƌiŶg the full ƌaŶge of peŶsioŶ 
freedoms. Huw Evans, director general, said: ͚We ǁaƌŶed iŶ February that not enough had 
been done to ensure a completely smooth implementation of these major reforms. The 
priority now is for the Government, regulators and providers to work through these teething 
problems together. The reforms are proving successful so far for the majority of customers 
aŶd ǁe haǀe to ďuild oŶ that ƌatheƌ thaŶ get iŶto a ďlaŵe gaŵe͛. IŶ the ŵeaŶtiŵe, Friends 
Life – one of the life offices criticised – has refused partial withdrawals to its customers, 
although it saǇs it plaŶs to offeƌ this iŶ ͚due Đouƌse͛, ǁhile NE“T aŶd PhoeŶiǆ – two of the 
other providers criticised – have confirmed they will not be providing the full freedoms in-
house.722 
The ABI also went on to propose a seƌies of ŵeasuƌes to help ƌesolǀe the ͚implementation 
challenges͛ that ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ ƌaised for insurance companies. In particular, it 
suggested that mandatory advice on pension freedom cases with guaranteed annuity rates 
ǁoƌth ŵoƌe thaŶ £ϯϬ,ϬϬϬ should ďe sĐƌapped aŶd ƌeplaĐed ǁith a ͚Đustoŵeƌ ĐoŶtƌol͛ 
mechanism, giving people access to their pension pot without having to pay for advice. It 
said the mechanism should be delivered through a specific guidance session by Pension 
Wise, and enshrined in a protocol agreed with the FCA and the FOS.  
The ABI also published an action plan to facilitate pensions freedom implementation: 
 Establish a joint taskforce between the Government, the regulators, providers and 
advisers to deal decisively with the remaining issues  The FCA to conduct a broader review of the balance of responsibility between 
customers and providers in light of pension flexibility  The FCA to set out clearly those products and circumstances where advice should be 
taken  The Treasury to work with the FCA and DWP to clarify the definition and valuation of 
safeguarded benefits, by a change in the law  Providers to work with the FCA and DWP to clarify the definition and valuation of 
safeguarded benefits, by a change in the law  The Government to publish Pension Wise data and restart marketing to ensure 
maximum take up of this valuable service 
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 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Mixed messages from govt on pensions freedom intervention, 
Professional Adviser, 15 June.  
722 ‘epoƌted iŶ Natasha BƌoǁŶe ;ϮϬϭϱͿ ABI ǁaƌŶs agaiŶst ͚ďlaŵe gaŵe͛ oŶ aĐĐess to peŶsioŶ fƌeedoŵs, 
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 The ABI and its members to start work on developing a standardised language on 
products and charges to help customers consider their options  The ABI and its members to ensure clear, consistent communications to customers 
on the products and services available. 
The ABI said: ͚While the ǀast ŵajoƌitǇ of Đustoŵeƌs so faƌ haǀe suĐĐessfullǇ eǆeƌĐised theiƌ 
choices without complaint, it is clear that implementing the law and regulatory 
requirements as they currently stand is not enough to ensure the benefits of the reforms 
can be universally felt. This action plan proposes a solution to the problem of customers 
uŶaďle oƌ uŶǁilliŶg to aĐĐess adǀiĐe iŶ the ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes set out iŶ the laǁ….We also 
request the urgent establishment of a joint taskforce between the Government, regulators, 
providers and advisors to work through the outstanding issues and deal decisively with 
them. The ABI and its members remain completely committed to making the pension 
reforms a success so customers can make the most of the pension freedoms. But it is clear 
this cannot happen fully without a decisive and joined up approach to the implementation 
challenges that have arisen. If the proposals in this action plan are taken forward, we are 
confident customers will be able to enjoy the freedoms in a suitably regulated 
eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt͛.723 
3.13.2 Early exit charges  
Another issue that soon became apparent was that not only were people facing difficulties 
transferring their pension pots, those that were able to do so were being charged significant 
exit charges. A report in the Financial Times showed that exit charges could typically lie 
between 5% and 15% of the value of the pension pot, although in a few cases the charge 
could be as high as 20% or even 50%. The Chancellor, George Osborne, said that deductions 
of this size ǁeƌe ͚uŶjustifiaďle͛.724 In June 2015, the ABI said nearly 90% of customers eligible 
for the pension freedoms will not face early exit charges.725 However, the FCA reported that 
while 84% of customers will not face an early exit charge, 670,000 consumers aged 55 or 
over faced an early exit charge (16% of the total). Of these, 358,000 faced charges between 
0-2%, 165,000 faced charges between 2-5%, 81,000 faced charges between 5-10%, and 
66,000 faced charges above 10%.726 
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Reported in Professional Adviser (2015 ) ABI urges govt to scrap mandatory pensions freedom GAR advice, 
19 June. 
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 Quoted in Dan Hyde (2015) Pension 'exit' penalties cut so over-55s can withdraw cash, Daily Telegraph, 17 
June. 
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Reported in Professional Adviser (2015) Govt to scrutinise early exit charges under pensions freedom, 
Professional Adviser, 17 June. 
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 Reported in Jack Jones  (2015) One in 30 retirees facing exit charges above 5%, Professional Pensions, 16 
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Insurers impose exit charges on policies that are cashed in before their maturity date, which 
typically coincides with the retirement date of the policy holder, e.g., age 65. This mostly 
affects policies sold in the 1980s and 1990s.727 Such policies were sold by sales staff who 
received up-front commission from the insurer. The insurer recoups the commission over 
the remaining life of the policy in its annual charge and imposes an exit charge if the policy 
is cashed in early.  
Claire Trott, from Talbot and Muir, believes the exit charges are really market value 
adjustŵeŶts ;MVAsͿ: ͚To ŵe the ŵajoƌitǇ of "high eǆit fees" aƌe aĐtuallǇ MVAs. People see it 
as an exit fee, because they are penalised for taking [their money] early, [but] you are 
breaking your contract and [the company] is recouping the Đost [of selliŶg the poliĐǇ]͛. “he 
also pointed out that those breaking their contracts early could also miss out on terminal 
ďoŶuses that ǁould sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ eŶhaŶĐe theiƌ peŶsioŶ pot: ͚The peŶsioŶ pot Đould ďe 
reduced by a hefty amount if you take your pension 10 years before the contract ends, for 
example, at ϱϱ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ϲϱ…You Ŷeed to look at the ĐoŶtƌaĐt aŶd take aĐĐouŶt of 
aŶǇthiŶg iŶ it that Đould ƌeduĐe Ǉouƌ fuŶd ǀalue͛. 
Neil Lovatt, from Scottish Friendly, said policyholders should also be aǁaƌe of ͚eŶhaŶĐed 
alloĐatioŶ ƌates͛ ǁhiĐh ǁould ďe lost if policyholders withdraw early. The purpose of the 
enhancements was to provide an incentive to remain with the insurer. However, the 
enhanced rates were linked to the ongoing payment of commissions, so if the policy was 
Đashed iŶ eaƌlǇ, the eŶhaŶĐeŵeŶt ǁould ďe ǁiped out: ͚“oŵe people haǀe eǆtƌa Đhaƌges 
ďuilt iŶ to theiƌ ĐoŶtƌaĐts. People ǁho haǀe a ĐoŶtƌaĐt ϭϱ Ǉeaƌs ago…ǁould haǀe got aŶ 
allocation value of more than 100% and that extra has been in there from day one and 
because you are [breaking the contract early], the [eǆtƌa] is takeŶ ďaĐk….CoŶtƌaĐts ǁeƌe 
ďuilt uŶtil ƌetiƌeŵeŶt age aŶd if Ǉou leaǀe eaƌlǇ theƌe ǁill ďe a ĐlaǁďaĐk͛.728   
 
3.13.3 Official responses 
The official responses to the criticisms raised over the issues of access and exit charges were 
swift in coming – from the FCA, TPR, HM Treasury and the Work and Pensions Select 
Committee. 
 
3.13.3.1 Financial Conduct Authority  
On 1 July 2015, the FCA announced that it had written to all pension providers requesting 
data on how customers were accessing their pension pots following Flexiday. The request 
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for data includes a questionnaire seeking information on exit charges; transfer procedures; 
treatment of insistent clients; financial advice requirements; and the options they offer 
consumers seeking access to their pots. The announcement followed a request from 
Harriett Baldwin to Martin Wheatley, then FCA chief executive, to take action on the 
implementation of ͚freedom and choice͛.729 
The move was widely welcomed in the press. Typical are these views from the Daily Mail: 
The pensions industry has been given one month to clean up its act over 
the treatment of older savers. 
Following a Daily Mail campaign, regulators have written to the chief 
executive of every pension provider to demand they hand over details of 
the fees they are charging customers to withdraw their savings. 
They have also been told to come clean about any other barriers customers 
face when they try to get hold of their money under the new pension 
freedoms. 
The Financial Conduct Authority has given companies until August 7 to 
declare the exit fees charged if people over 55 try to move to a more 
flexible scheme or a rival firm. 
They will also have to present evidence of what options they have been 
offering customers. 
If they fail to disclose the information, regulators could impose sanctions, 
which might include fines in the most serious cases.  
The demand by regulators follows concerns that millions of savers are 
being blocked from using the pension reforms. 
Since April, the over-55s have been able to cash in their pension for the 
first time rather than being forced to buy an annuity, a fixed monthly 
income for life. 
But the Mail discovered that excessive fees and other restrictions meant 
many were unable to use the full freedoms. 
While most were able to withdraw all their money in one go, many could 
Ŷot use theiƌ peŶsioŶ ͚like a ďaŶk aĐĐouŶt͛ ďǇ takiŶg it iŶ ĐhuŶks aŶd 
keeping the rest invested. 
Some insurers refused to offer this flexibility, and then charged huge fees 
to move to a rival firm that did. 
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Last month the Mail launched its Play Fair On Pensions campaign, which 
called for providers and regulators to lift rules preventing people accessing 
their hard-earned savings.730 
 
3.13.3.2 The Pensions Regulator 
On 2 July 2015, TPR announced it had launched an investigation into exit charges and the DC 
sĐheŵe tƌaŶsfeƌ pƌoĐess to ĐoŵpleŵeŶt the FCA͛s iŶǀestigatioŶ aŶŶouŶĐed the pƌeǀious 
day. It said it will survey a sample of schemes and the results will be used in a discussion of 
the ďƌoadeƌ ͚opeƌatioŶal ƌeadiŶess, goǀeƌŶaŶĐe aŶd ŵeŵďeƌ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛ of sĐheŵes 
looking to provide flexible decumulation options. It also said that a similar investigation was 
taking place to understand the impact of pension freedoms on DB schemes, any subsequent 
ƌisks aŶd the appliĐatioŶ of its ƌegulatoƌǇ guidaŶĐe. TP‘ said: ͚We ƌeŵaiŶ Đoŵŵitted to 
making pension flexibilities work in the interests of retirement savers and expect to conduct 
further research on decumulation, to include costs and charges, in the autumn. We will 
consider with Government and the FCA what further action may be required to promote 
good outĐoŵes foƌ ŵeŵďeƌs͛. It said it ǁas ĐoŶsideƌiŶg creating more prescriptive guidance 
for trustees communicating the pension freedoms to members of large schemes.731 
 
3.13.3.3 HM Treasury 
On 30 July 2015, the Treasury released a consultation document called Pension Transfers 
and Early Exit Charges.  
The consultation will: 732 
 consider the issues around early exit charges, to ensure that people are not facing 
unjustifiable charges when moving scheme or accessing their pension savings flexibly 
within their scheme as part of the new freedoms  seek views on how the process for transferring pensions from one scheme to 
another could be made quicker and smoother, and  explore issues and concerns in relation to the provision and need for financial advice 
when making certain transfers.  
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In particular, the Treasury wishes to consult on whether to place a cap on exit charges that 
ŵaǇ ƌepƌeseŶt aŶ ͚uŶƌeasoŶaďle ďaƌƌieƌ͛ to aĐĐessiŶg the peŶsioŶ pot. It has set out thƌee 
proposals: 
1. A cap on all early exit fees – a blanket cap that would allow pension schemes to 
charge a fixed percentage of the value of the funds being transferred or a capped 
fixed amount. However, there is concern that a fixed amount would deter those with 
small pots from exiting 
2. A flexible cap – this would try and address the small pot issue, so pension providers 
ǁould oŶlǇ ďe foƌĐed to use a Đap oǀeƌ a ͚de ŵiŶiŵis͛ aŵouŶt oƌ tailoƌ the fees to 
take into account small pots 
3. A voluntary fee – this would allow the pension industry to set exit fees and even 
waive fees in cases where they see fit.  
The TƌeasuƌǇ͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶ is that ͚[ǁ]heƌe aŶ iŶdiǀidual ǁishes to aĐĐess theiƌ peŶsioŶ uŶdeƌ 
the new freedoms, they should be able to do so quickly and smoothly and the Government 
is concerned that exit charges may represent an unreasonable barrier to their doing so. For 
example, an exit charge might prevent an individual from accessing freedoms where the 
level of the charge represents a significant proportion of the funds being accessed, or where 
it is so high that even those with larger pots regard the level of the charge as prohibitive. In 
these circumstances, the level of the charge might be considered disproportionate and, 
theƌefoƌe, uŶfaiƌ aŶd eǆĐessiǀe͛. 
The ĐoŶsultatioŶ papeƌ said: ͚Although ŵaŶǇ of these iŶdiǀiduals ǁill faĐe Đhaƌges that 
represent fair and reasonable charges to cover costs, the Government believes there is a 
high degree of overlap between transfer fees and exit charges and, in the case of the latter, 
would like to understand, in particular, whether and why some charges may be significantly 
higheƌ thaŶ otheƌs͛, addiŶg that as ŵaŶǇ as oŶe iŶ teŶ saǀeƌs iŶ ǁoƌkplaĐe sĐheŵes Đould ďe 
affected by charges when transferring their pension. 
The TƌeasuƌǇ said theƌe ǁeƌe ͚paƌtiĐulaƌ issues͛ ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg ĐeƌtaiŶ peŶsioŶ pƌoduĐts sold iŶ 
the ϭϵϴϬs aŶd ϭϵϵϬs: ͚IŶ soŵe Đases, policyholders are reported to have been paying high 
annual management charges, with high exit penalties for switching to another provider. 
Although the majority of these schemes are now closed to new members, a significant 
Ŷuŵďeƌ of these plaŶs ĐoŶtiŶue to opeƌate foƌ eǆistiŶg Đustoŵeƌs͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the 
consultation excludes pensions that have a ͚ŵaƌket ǀalue adjustŵeŶt͛ oƌ ͚teƌŵiŶal ďoŶus͛ 
written into the contract. 
Claiƌe Tƌott of Talďot aŶd Muiƌ said: ͚A ĐoŶsultatioŶ oŶ high eaƌlǇ eǆit peŶalties should ďe 
welcomed. There will be many people trapped in poor performing historic pensions that 
ǁoŶ͛t ďe iŶ a positioŶ to aĐĐess theiƌ iŶĐoŵe iŶ a fleǆiďle ǁaǇ ǁithout iŶĐuƌring excessive 
fees to do so. [However], the consultation should not miss the point that many of the 
historic charging structures were low in the early years because of these built-in exit 
370 
 
penalties and some companies will be out of pocket if they are forced to reduce the 
penalties. This doesŶ͛t ŵeaŶ that it shouldŶ͛t ďe looked iŶto though. The ĐoŶstaŶt ĐhaŶgiŶg 
of pensions legislation can be very costly for pension providers with large historic books and 
bringing in the changes expected by the Government in the short timescales given has been 
a challenge for many. The consultation needs to take into account the cost of providing the 
retirement options and how these differ between different retirement products. Running 
drawdown in a self-invested personal pension with a wide range of assets, such as 
commercial property and various other assets, will be significantly more time consuming 
than drawdown run in a basic personal pension with a range of mutual funds also run by the 
same provider. The consultation should look at ǀalue ƌatheƌ thaŶ outƌight Đost͛. 
Neǀeƌtheless, she felt that the eǆĐlusioŶ of MVAs ŵeaŶt that theƌe ǁas ͚little Ŷeed foƌ the 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt to legislate͛.733  
Stephen Scholefield, pensions partner at Pinsent Masons, said, while tackling exit fees 
makes the ChaŶĐelloƌ aŶ ͚uŶlikelǇ ĐoŶsuŵeƌ ĐhaŵpioŶ͛, it ǁill Ŷot ďe eŶough to eŶsuƌe the 
fƌeedoŵs aƌe suĐĐessful: ͚To haǀe ƌeal suĐĐess, he'll Ŷeed to Đƌeate a safe-harbour 
environment in which providers can process transfers efficiently, whilst savers don't live to 
regret their decisions. Otherwise, ambulance chasers will be joining car retailers in looking 
to pƌofit fƌoŵ those ǁho Đash out theiƌ peŶsioŶ saǀiŶgs͛.734  
Some argued that there was a case for some form of exit charge. For example, Jamie Smith-
Thompson of Portal Financial agreed that exit fees up to 20% were punitive and excessive 
and therefore a cap would help to protect consumers. However, he was concerned that this 
Đould tuƌŶ iŶto a ͚ǁitĐh-huŶt oŶ fees iŶ theiƌ eŶtiƌetǇ͛ aŶd aƌgued that eǆit fees could 
aĐtuallǇ help pƌoteĐt saǀeƌs: ͚It is Ŷot a ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt foƌ all ĐoŶsuŵeƌs to seek fiŶaŶĐial 
advice before emptying their fund or transferring away, which means many people will be 
able to make that decision by themselves without necessarily knowing about certain 
implications, such as tax or how it may affect their benefits. A sensible charge can 
encourage people to think twice and be really sure they are doing the right thing, and 
hopefully even prompt them to seek advice so they don't have any surpƌises͛.735 
The Daily Telegraph reported that key pension providers had already held meetings with the 
FCA to lobby against a draconian cap being imposed on charges. The providers also wanted 
a coordinated approach so all firms reduce their fees at the same time to ensure that no 
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provider faced a sudden exodus of customers to rival companies, although it was recognised 
that this might breach competition law, since it could be classed as price fixing.736  
In January 2016, the Treasury announced that it will legislate to cap excessive early exit 
charges.737 The following month, it said that the cap would come into effect in March 2017. 
implementation target. The FCA will be responsible for setting the level of the cap and will 
consult fully on this in due course.738 
3.13.3.4 The Work and Pensions Select Committee  
On 17 July 2015, the Work and Pensions Select Committee announced it would launch an 
inquiry into the new advice and guidance regime. The committee wanted to hear evidence 
on the take-up, suitability, affordability and independence of the advice, guidance and 
information available to those approaching retirement. It also wanted to hear 
recommendations for improvement. Committee chairman, Frank Field MP, said: ͚MaŶǇ 
constituents were ripped off in the process of putting their earnings into pension savings. 
We have a duty to ensure they are not ripped off again if they wish to take their money out 
aŶd speŶd soŵe luŵp suŵs͛.  
Richard Graham MP, a member of the committee as well as chairman of the All-Party 
Parliamentary Group (APPG) on peŶsioŶs, said: ͚TakiŶg aǁaǇ the ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt to ďuǇ aŶ 
annuity and introducing much greater flexibility in how and when individuals can access 
their pension savings should be a positive change for many. However getting the right 
guidance is key, and this inquiry will look at the guidance and advice being given, and how 
effeĐtiǀe the sǇsteŵ is iŶ helpiŶg people ŵake iŶfoƌŵed ĐhoiĐes͛.739 
In September 2015, the ABI͛s Huw Evans told a Work and Pensions Select Committee inquiry 
hearing that likeŶiŶg peŶsioŶs to ďaŶk aĐĐouŶts is the ͚ŵost iƌƌespoŶsiďle͛ thiŶg aŶǇoŶe ĐaŶ 
saǇ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to peŶsioŶs fƌeedoŵ: ͚If I Đould ƌuď a laŵp ͞AladdiŶ-stǇle͟ aŶd haǀe a feǁ 
wishes, ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ oŶe of theŵ ǁould ďe to stop people ƌefeƌƌiŶg to peŶsioŶs as a ͞ďank 
aĐĐouŶt͟. It is the ŵost iƌƌespoŶsiďle thiŶg aŶǇoŶe ĐaŶ saǇ. You ĐaŶŶot attƌaĐt a taǆ liaďilitǇ 
when you withdraw money from a bank account or set up a direct debit. You can if you 
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access pension liabilities. There is a piece [of work to be done] around customer 
eǆpeĐtatioŶs aŶd ǁe haǀe to use the ƌight laŶguage͛.740 
The Work and Pensions Select Committee reported the results of its inquiry in October 
2015.741 It found that the Pension Wise website, which provides information and guidance 
on options at retiƌeŵeŶt, ďut Ŷot adǀiĐe, ǁas ͚Ŷot fit foƌ puƌpose͛. It also fouŶd a laĐk of 
ƌegulatoƌǇ ĐlaƌitǇ oǀeƌ the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ͚adǀiĐe͛ aŶd ͚guidaŶĐe͛ ǁhiĐh is puttiŶg 
saǀeƌs at ƌisk of pooƌ deĐisioŶs, ͚paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ iŶ the affoƌdaďle ŵiddle gƌouŶd ďetǁeeŶ fƌee 
general guidance and eǆpeŶsiǀe iŶdepeŶdeŶt adǀiĐe͛. The ƌepoƌt said that ͚Good ƋualitǇ, Đo-
ordinated and accessible guidance and advice will be the best tools to ensure people make 
the best, informed decisions about their retirement savings, and protect them from 
sĐaŵŵeƌs…We Đall foƌ ĐlaƌifiĐatioŶ of the distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ guidaŶĐe aŶd adǀiĐe; the 
definitions of safeguarded benefits; and protections in providing advice to insistent clients. 
We also expect to see a reduction in the use of jargon and complex pƌiĐiŶg stƌuĐtuƌes͛. 
 
3.14 Pension fraud and investment scams 
 
Red flags for spotting pension fraud 
 Any unsolicited approach: phone, email, text messages or in person  Free pension reviews, particularly from unregulated companies marketing early access 
to cash or guaranteed investments  Pushy advisers that encourage members to speed up signing paperwork, as well as the 
use of couriers to collect/sign paperwork  Any mention of loopholes, overseas or strange/creative/unique investments –  
unregulated investments, such as hotel rooms, car parking spaces, forestry, renewable 
energy, storage pods  Any mention of loans or bonuses provided by Government  An offer to help you access your pension savings before age 55  A recommendation to take a large amount of money, or your whole pension pot, in a 
lump sum and invest it.  Warnings that the deal is limited and you must act now  An encouragement not to get professional financial advice or talk to Pension Wise  Contact by somebody who is not on the FCA register 
Source: Retirement Advantage, reported in Jenna Towler (2015) Pension scam alert, Professional Adviser, 1 July. 
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Even with safeguards in place, many pension scheme members, especially those with large 
DB pension pots, have attracted the attention of scammers and con artists.742 Tom McPhail 
believes that cold-ĐalliŶg sĐaŵŵeƌs aƌe ͚goiŶg to take adǀaŶtage of the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt-
sanctioned freedoms to persuade people that they can do better than investing in 
͞tƌaditioŶal͟ peŶsioŶs. IŶ ƌealitǇ, ŵaŶǇ of these sĐheŵes ǁill ďe Ŷothing but a rip off.  They 
will use seductive offers of generous guaranteed returns. The two risks from this will be 
unexpected tax charges when they take money out of the pensions and then in some cases 
the loss of the rest of their money when the unregulated investments fail to live up to 
eǆpeĐtatioŶs͛.743 Even the Pensions Minister at the time, Steve Webb, received a text 
ŵessage fƌoŵ a ĐoŶ aƌtist oŶ his ŵoďile phoŶe: ͚if Ǉou haǀe a fƌozeŶ peŶsioŶ pƌioƌ to ϱϱ Ǉou 
are entitled to a free review. Please call ďaĐk͛.744 
In October 2015, a survey commissioned by Portus Consulting, found that one in seven 
savers over the age of 55 has been targeted by a pensions scam since Flexiday. It also 
showed that 69% of those targeted said they were offered a free pension review. Over 27% 
said the suspected scam involved an exotic investment scheme, promising attractive levels 
of return. The most common method used by potential scammers to contact over-55s is by 
email (cited by 36% of the people interviewed), followed by the telephone (33%).745  
Con artists can be pushy and charming. Each year, they steal £1.2bn from investors, 
including pension liberation, an average loss of £20,000. They are drawn to the most 
vulnerable: those in debt and desperate for cash, or who are confused about the rules 
surrounding their pension. Margaret Snowdon, head of the Pension Liberation Industry 
Gƌoup ;PLIGͿ, saǇs fƌaudsteƌs aƌe ǀeƌǇ diffiĐult to ideŶtifǇ: ͚TheǇ do teŶd to ŵiŵiĐ legitiŵate 
schemes and providers. They are fairly clever or they would be easily found out. It is 
probably the patterns of behaviour that help identify them – cold calling for example, or 
pushǇ aŶd thƌeateŶiŶg to sue oŶ delaǇs͛. TheǇ haǀe a ďaĐkgƌouŶd iŶ eitheƌ fiŶaŶĐial seƌǀiĐes, 
including ex-IFAs, accountants, solicitors, or in wealth or debt management. They invest in 
expensive marketing material and websites. 746    
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Jack Doyle and Sam Dunn provide this warning:
747
 
How crooks will target you 
Promised pension freedoms herald a bright new dawn for millions of 
savers. Unfortunately, they will also act as a clarion call for crooks to 
target millions of pounds about to be unlocked by the trusting and the 
unwary. 
The danger lies in scammers' ability to contact you by phone, text or email 
– and their persistence to wear you down. 
Their first approach is usually the most enticing. A text might typically offer 
a 'free pension review', 'one-off investment opportunity' or promise of 
'upfront cash'. 
But the minute you respond to the cold-caller, they'll begin to crank up the 
pressure. Their prize is your pension pot – and they need you to agree to 
sign a funds transfer form to get their hands on it. 
So the promises will come thick and fast. They might suggest juicy returns 
of 8 per cent or more, talk authoritatively about locking away cash in 
overseas investments or dangle cashback payments. 
To soothe fears, they may also claim to be a Government adviser or say 
they've been endorsed by officials. And while there will be talk of you, at 
55, having plenty of time to lock your money away, there will be no 
mention of the imminent tax bill you'll need to pay. The fee they'll charge, 
perhaps as high as 30 per cent, will be glossed over. 
It might take a dozen or so emails and phone calls – or even ten times that 
– but once you're hooked, they'll then push you to sign a transfer form as 
soon as possible. 
This may be sent to you by email as a form to fill in online or even 
couriered over to your front door. You'll be convinced it's a simple final 
matter of filling in the details of your existing pension scheme – usually its 
name and number. 
Legally, your original pension provider – usually an insurer – can only agree 
to transfer the money on the condition it will go straight to another 
registered pension plan. However, the scammers – acting as the broker – 
do no such thing. They'll take the money and then release only a chunk of it 
to you as a loan or cash sum. 
And once your funds are released from your insurer and into a new 
account – often overseas and outside UK jurisdiction or the arm of the 
regulator – then your chances of ever seeing the cash again will vanish. 
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You may find the scammer picks up the phone the first time you call to 
check up on your investment – but they won't be there the next time. 
As well as the hefty fee, HMRC will then slap you with a tax charge of up to 
55% because you've taken out an 'unauthorised payment' from your 
pension. 
Always check the credentials of the company and any advisers, who should 
be registered with the Financial Conduct Authority at fca.org.uk.  
If you think a company is trying to get you to liberate your pension, report 
the company to Action Fraud or call it on 0300 123 2040. It can prosecute 
companies found breaking the law. 
 
In April 2015, Citizens Advice warned that sophisticated fraudsters were targeting 'cash rich' 
retirees. It released a report Consumer Experience of Pension and Pensioner Scams before 
April 2015 which analysed 150 case reports from consumers made in the run up to the new 
pensions regime.748  It has identified five key types of pension scam: 
 Moving savings to a new pension  Fake investment opportunities  OffeƌiŶg fƌee ͚adǀiĐe͛ oƌ seƌǀiĐes  ChaƌgiŶg foƌ ͚dodgǇ͛ seƌǀiĐes  Getting personal information from people. 
The report also identified cold calling as the most common means of initial contact (covering 
two-thirds of cases), although text messages, post, visiting in person and internet contact 
were also methods used by scammers. In some cases, multiple approaches were used: for 
example, phoning and then sending someone to their house, texting then phoning, or calling 
and then following up with letters. 
It said sĐaŵŵeƌs used eitheƌ a ͚Đaƌƌot aŶd stiĐk͛ appƌoaĐh oƌ eŵploǇed high-pressure 
taĐtiĐs: ͚We͛ǀe heaƌd fƌoŵ ŵaŶǇ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ǁho haǀe ďeeŶ offeƌed the ĐhaŶĐe to take 
adǀaŶtage of a ͞taǆ loophole͟ oƌ a ͞speĐial iŶǀestŵeŶt ƌate͟, ǁhile otheƌs haǀe ďeeŶ told 
theǇ͛ǀe ǁoŶ lotteƌies despite Ŷeǀeƌ eŶteƌiŶg oŶe. Pƌessuƌe is ofteŶ applied ďǇ saǇiŶg that 
special offers are time limited, or by bombarding people with correspondence to catch them 
at a weak moment. To appear authentic, some scammers claim to be acting on behalf of a 
ĐlieŶt͛s peŶsioŶ pƌoǀideƌ. IŶ otheƌ Đases theǇ use offiĐial souŶdiŶg Ŷaŵes like ͚the PeŶsioŶs 
OffiĐe͛ oƌ saǇ theǇ aƌe a CitizeŶs AdǀiĐe ͞peŶsioŶs offiĐeƌ͛͟. 
In terms of human cost, the report said one person had lost £200,000 as a direct result of 
peŶsioŶ sĐaŵs aŶd added: ͚The ŵoŶeǇ lost iŶ a sĐaŵ ĐaŶ ŵeaŶ the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ a 
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Đoŵfoƌtaďle ƌetiƌeŵeŶt aŶd a life oŶ the ďƌeadliŶe…. OŶe ĐoŶsuŵeƌ spoke foƌ ŵaŶǇ ǁheŶ 
theǇ said: ͞I feel really stupid to have given away my pension money to a crook on the 
phoŶe͟…. As ǁell as diƌeĐt losses, people ĐaŶ also lose thƌough uŶeǆpeĐted taǆ oƌ ďeŶefit 
ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes͛. 
In a follow-up report, Citizens Advice said that there is increasing evidence that fraudsters 
aƌe usiŶg iŶǀestŵeŶt sĐaŵs to taƌget people͛s peŶsioŶ pots. “Đaŵs iŶĐlude: 
 Unspecified financial products which see fraudsters offering to invest pension money 
in other products without explaining what those products are  Fƌee peŶsioŶ ͚ƌeǀieǁs͛. People are texted or cold-called with offers of free pension 
reviews. Citizens Advice has had reports of fake-IFAs – who could not describe 
investments –  visiting homes  Investment schemes where victims are persuaded to invest money in property, or in 
fine wine. 
GilliaŶ GuǇ, Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe of CitizeŶs AdǀiĐe, said: ͚PeŶsioŶ sĐaŵs thƌeateŶ people's 
financial security. People are being targeted again and again with bogus investment offers 
or fraudulent pension opportunities. Opportunistic fraudsters are finding new ways to go 
after people's pension pots including offering free pension reviews and promising to invest 
in funds that don't necessarily exist. Pension and investment scams are particularly 
dangerous, as they can destroy people's entire pension pot, leaving them with little or no 
savings for retirement. We will be monitoring pension scams closely in order to track how 
they are evolving, and warn consumers what to look out for. If you've had an offer or signed 
up to a scheme you're unsure about, contaĐt CitizeŶs AdǀiĐe foƌ suppoƌt͛.749 
IŶ MaƌĐh ϮϬϭϱ, the IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe ;ICOͿ ƌepoƌted that it ǁas 
investigating claims made by the Daily Mail that its reporters, posing as a cold-calling 
company, had bought a database containing information on the pensions, salaries and 
investments of 15,000 people for 5p a record. The ICO said it was making enquiries to 
establish whether there have been any breaches of the Data Protection Act or Privacy and 
Electronic Communications Regulations. It was also in contact with the police. The 
information was sold without consent, leaving these people vulnerable to fraudsters. The 
ICO also reported that it had received more than 1,000 complaints about pension-related 
spam texts, automated calls and cold-calling relating to pensions in the second half of 2014. 
According to the Pensions Regulator, pension scheme members have so far lost £500m via 
͚peŶsioŶ liďeƌatioŶ͛ sĐaŵs, ǁheƌe ĐoŵpaŶies illegallǇ eŶĐouƌage people ďefoƌe the age of ϱϱ 
to transfer money from their pension fund into investments offering implausibly high 
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returns. These people end up not only losing their investment, they also have to repay the 
tax relief they receive.750   
IŶ JulǇ ϮϬϭϰ, TP‘ ƌelauŶĐhed its ͚“ĐoƌpioŶ͛ ĐaŵpaigŶ ǁhiĐh ǁaƌŶs ĐoŶsuŵeƌs Ŷot to ďe 
͚stuŶg͛ ďǇ Đold Đalls, teǆt ŵessage spaŵ oƌ ǁeďsite offeƌs ĐlaiŵiŶg to ďe aďle to help theŵ 
cash in their pension. The regulator is urging pension trustees and providers to include its 
leaflet in the next annual statement sent to members, and anyone who requests a transfer 
in the meantime. The campaign highlights cases where victims have lost thousands of 
pounds by being scammed into moving their retirement savings into unregulated high-risk 
or bogus investments. One woman, whose 40-year-old son took his own life after never 
receiving a promised £17,000 lump sum following the transfer of his £42,000 work pension, 
said: ͚I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt otheƌ ŵotheƌs to suffeƌ ǁhat I͛ǀe ďeeŶ thƌough, aŶd ǁhat ŵǇ faŵilǇ has 
been through. No ŵatteƌ hoǁ despeƌate thiŶgs get, doŶ͛t ďe teŵpted to Đash in your 
peŶsioŶ. DoŶ͛t do it –  the people ďehiŶd these sĐaŵs aƌe ƌogues ǁho eǆploit people͛s 
ǀulŶeƌaďilities͛. AŶotheƌ ϰϵ-year-old scam victim, who is potentially facing an £18,000 tax 
ďill aŶd ƌisks losiŶg heƌ hoŵe afteƌ falliŶg ǀiĐtiŵ to a ͚peŶsioŶ loaŶ͛ sĐaŵ said: ͚These sĐaŵs 
target vulnerable people. I feel very angry that I have been misled. Ignore the sales patter, 
ignore the glossy websites, ignore the cold calls and text messages. Go to an independent 
financial adviser – speak to aŶ eǆpeƌt͛.751,752 
In October 2014, the FCA launched ScamSmart, a campaign to alert people to the dangers of 
͚sĐaŵŵeƌs offeƌiŶg oppoƌtuŶities that aƌe too good to ďe tƌue͛. The TƌeasuƌǇ has ŵade it a 
criminal offence for anyone to pretend to offer Pension Wise guaranteed guidance. In July 
2015, the FCA provided updated figures on ScamSmart. Around 100,000 people had visited 
the ScamSmart website since October last year. Around 20% had checked an investment 
through the warning list.753 
In March 2015, the Pension Liberation Industry Group introduced a code of good practice 
for combating pension scams:754 ͚The Code of Good PƌaĐtiĐe is ǀoluŶtaƌǇ aŶd sets aŶ 
industry standard for dealing with requests by members for transfers from a UK registered 
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pension scheme to another registered pension scheme or Qualifying Recognised Overseas 
Pension Scheme. 
The Code is aimed at trustees, administrators and providers and sets out industry standard 
due diligence to follow when considering a transfer request. The legislation relating to 
transfers is not prescriptive as to due diligence that trustees/providers should carry out on 
tƌaŶsfeƌ appliĐatioŶs͛. 
The Code operates according to the following three principles: 
1. Trustees, providers and administrators should raise awareness of pension scams for 
members and beneficiaries of their scheme. 
2. Trustees, providers and administrators should have robust, but proportionate, 
processes for assessing whether a receiving scheme may be operating as part of a 
pension scam, and for responding to that risk. 
3. Trustees, providers and administrators should generally be aware of the known 
current strategies of the perpetrators of pension scams in order to inform the due 
diligence they need to undertake and refer to the warning flags as indicated in the 
‘egulatoƌ͛s GuidaŶĐe, FCA aleƌts aŶd AĐtioŶ Fƌaud. 
In May 2015, the FCA issued a warning announcing that fraudsters were using the details of 
the firms it authorises, such as their 'firm reference number' (FRN), in an attempt to 
convince customers that they work for a genuine, authorised firm. This followed a similar 
announcement in April about a scam firm which used the details of investment manager 
BlackRock to defraud investors. The regulator pointed out that investors who give money to 
unauthorised firms have no recourse to the FSCS or the FOS if they lose their money.755 
There is even a case of a fraudster, who goes by the name William Howarth, pretending to 
be calling from the FCA.756 There are fraudsters pretending to be from National Savings & 
IŶǀestŵeŶts ǁho aƌe Đold ĐalliŶg peŶsioŶeƌs aŶd tƌǇiŶg to sell theŵ ͚peŶsioŶeƌ ďoŶds'.757  
In July 2015, the BBC reported that fraudsters had built a database of around 200,000 
people –  with an average age of 74  – on so-Đalled ͚suĐkeƌs lists͛. Alŵost ϭϭ,ϬϬϬ of theŵ had 
already lost an average of £1,184 each.758 Also in July 2015, provider Retirement Advantage 
reported the results of a YouGov survey that it commissioned which showed that 17% of 
oǀeƌ ϱϬs aŶd ϮϬ% of oǀeƌ ϱϱs had ďeeŶ appƌoaĐhed ďǇ a ĐoŵpaŶǇ offeƌiŶg to ͚help' theŵ 
access their pension savings early, typically via a legal loopholes or a one-off investment 
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oppoƌtuŶitǇ. AŶdƌeǁ TullǇ, peŶsioŶs teĐhŶiĐal diƌeĐtoƌ at ‘etiƌeŵeŶt AdǀaŶtage, said: ͚It is 
clear that there are already scammers preying on people who might like the idea of using 
the new pension freedoms to take large amounts of cash from their pension schemes. The 
scammers may be offering get-rich-quick schemes or even early access before age 55 to 
trick people out of their hard-earned savings. Retirees need to be on their guard: if an 
opportunity sounds too good to be true, it almost certainly is. It is vital that the Government 
and financial industry work together to ensure all practical measures possible are in place to 
protect people from these scams. We need to make people aware that there are fraudsters 
hoping to trick them out of their money. Hopefully Pension Wise will help educate people 
around the risks, but professional financial advice will be crucial to ensure people 
understand the options available to them and make the right decision for their personal 
circumstances. The Government also needs to make life difficult for the scammers, and 
puŶish those fouŶd guiltǇ of pƌeǇiŶg oŶ iŶŶoĐeŶt ǀiĐtiŵs͛.  The ABI͛s ĐaŵpaigŶ Your 
Retirement, Your Choice also aims to prevent people avoid pension scams by helping them 
understand their options better.759 
There is also evidence of an increased number of frauds using prominent financial addresses 
in the heart of the City of London. The City of London police force said it was struggling to 
cope with the increased number of cases being reported and it now concerned about the 
CitǇ͛s oǁŶ ƌeputatioŶ. It said that it has alƌeadǇ iŶǀestigated dozeŶs of iŶdiǀiduals, aŶd has 
identified at least 14 different criminal groups.
760
 
Even if the investment opportunities being offered are not scams, they can be unregulated 
which can be equally risky. An example of this is the case of Capital Alternatives and the 
schemes it promoted – Capital Carbon Credits (later renamed Reforestation Projects) and 
African Land – which the FCA claimed were deliberately structured to avoid regulation. Most 
investment funds are collective investment schemes (CIS), where investors pool their assets 
and have these managed by an independent fund manager, and most are regulated. The 
promotion and operation of a CIS is a regulated activity and cannot be lawfully carried out 
by anyone who is not authorised by the FCA. Capital Alternatives is not authorised by the 
FCA. In June 2013, the FCA banned the promotion and sale of unregulated collective 
investment schemes (UCIS) to most retail investors in the UK, the exceptions being certified 
high net worth individuals, certified sophisticated investors, and self-certified sophisticated 
investors. Capital Alternatives denied that its schemes were CIS or UCIS and took the FCA to 
court. In March 2015, the Court of Appeal agreed with the FCA that the Capital Alternatives 
schemes met the definition of CIS, namely that investors' monies was pooled and the 
investments were managed centrally. Capital Alternatives appealed to the Supreme Court 
ǁhiĐh iŶ August ϮϬϭϱ ĐoŶfiƌŵed that Capital AlteƌŶatiǀes͛ sĐheŵes ǁeƌe in fact UCIS and 
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hence cannot be sold to unsophisticated UK investors. Tobias Haynes of Regulatory Legal 
said: ͚The deĐisioŶ of the “upƌeŵe Couƌt is a ǁelĐoŵe oŶe, aŶd oŶe ǁhiĐh is a tƌue 
consumer victory. The decision opens up the doorway to many vulnerable investors who 
otherwise would have no recourse. This is particularly the case where SIPP providers have 
allowed retail investors to invest directly into UCIS without having first been satisfied that 
the consumer was properly certified as a high-net-ǁoƌth oƌ sophistiĐated iŶǀestoƌ͛.761  
The Personal Finance Society has warned about the dangers of consumers becoming 
confused about the difference between regulated and non-regulated financial advice as a 
ƌesult of the ͚iŶeǀitaďle ǁaǀe of ŶoŶ-regulated scaŵŵeƌs͛ ĐapitalisiŶg oŶ ͚freedom and 
choice͛. It called for greater oversight of non-regulated advice. Keith Richards, chief 
eǆeĐutiǀe, said: ͚The puďliĐ geŶeƌallǇ do Ŷot uŶdeƌstaŶd the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ƌegulated 
and unregulated activities and, in fairness, should not be expected to. They are, therefore, 
more exposed to scammers, fraudsters and opportunists who often look like regulated firms 
oƌ pƌoĐesses….The iŶĐƌeasiŶg daŶgeƌ of ĐoŶsuŵeƌs fiŶdiŶg theiƌ ǁaǇ iŶto uŶƌegulated 
activity is worrying. It is now time for all activity to come under the same umbrella, to 
provide consistency of standards and consumer protectioŶ͛.762  
In August 2015, Portal Financial published the results of a survey which appear to show that 
consumer education campaigns around spotting financial scams and finding financial advice 
were not working. The results of the survey of 1,000 people over the age of 55 in four 
ƌegioŶs aĐƌoss the UK aƌe shoǁŶ iŶ Taďle ϯ.ϳ. Jaŵie “ŵith ThoŵpsoŶ said: ͚The ƌesult ƌaises 
questions over the effectiveness of the MAS and Pension Wise awareness campaigns, but it 
also highlights the problem that, at the moment, you can't simply use the message ͞go to a 
regulated company and you will be protected͟ for every financial product. MAS and Pension 
Wise's job would be easier if that were the case. Until legislation is changed to bring all 
financial product sales under the regulatory umbrella it is going to be hard for the man in 
the street to tell a sophisticated scam from a genuine service. The current system of 
identifying and shutting down scam companies can take a very long time, which in turn 
means more people can be affected͛.763 
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Table 3.7: Portal Financial survey concerning financial scams and financial advice 
Question  Midlands 
and Wales  
North & 
Scotland  
Northern 
Ireland  
South  
Have you ever been contacted 
by a company that you felt 
could be running a financial 
scam? 
Yes: 50% 
No: 50% 
Yes: 51% 
No: 49% 
Yes: 69% 
No: 31% 
Yes: 55% 
No: 45% 
Are you confident that you 
could tell the difference 
between a scam and a genuine 
offer from a regulated 
company? 
Yes: 59% 
No: 41% 
Yes: 58% 
No: 42% 
Yes: 46% 
No: 54% 
Yes: 63% 
No: 37% 
Have you noticed an increase in 
the volume of pension-related 
sales calls in the last month or 
so? 
Yes: 40% 
No: 60% 
Yes: 43% 
No: 57% 
Yes: 77% 
No: 23% 
Yes: 33% 
No: 67% 
If you wanted accurate financial 
advice on the pension reforms, 
would you know where to go? 
Yes: 73% 
No: 27% 
Yes: 80% 
No: 20% 
Yes: 54% 
No: 46% 
Yes: 77% 
No: 23% 
Source: Portal Financial 
 
As a consequence of investment scams, compensation payouts from the FSCS jumped 156% 
in 2015 compared with the previous year to £183.1m. The average payout rose from £5,136 
to £8,855. Maƌk Neale, Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe at F“C“, said: ͚MaŶǇ saǀeƌs had ďeeŶ pooƌlǇ adǀised 
to move pension savings from safe workplace schemes to risky investŵeŶts͛.764  
The Pensions Ombudsman (PO) deals with member objections to transfer requests that 
have been blocked by providers who suspect members could become a victim of fraud. The 
PO͛s ƌuliŶgs haǀe ďeeŶ ĐoŶsistent in stating that scheme administrators cannot block a 
member's request where there is a statutory right to transfer and that right will only exist 
where it has been established that the receiving scheme is a properly established and 
registered arrangement. Geoff Egerton, associate at Linklaters, said: ͚You do Ǉouƌ due 
diligence. And you do your work to make sure that you've flagged the warnings from The 
Pensions Regulator's guidance, which says you should satisfy yourselves that this isn't a 
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pensions liberation vehicle. But once you've done all that, if the right exists, there has to be 
a tƌaŶsfeƌ͛.765 
There are also concerns about pensioners cashing in their annuities, and the introduction of 
the secondary annuity market was pushed back from 2016 to 2017 as a consequence of 
these concerns. Pƌoǀideƌs haǀe ǁaƌŶed aďout the ͚teƌƌiďle ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes foƌ eldeƌlǇ 
policyholders if the changes are pushed through before the right safeguards are in 
plaĐe….[M]aŶǇ people ǁould ďe offeƌed a ǀeƌǇ loǁ ǀalue foƌ theiƌ aŶŶuitǇ aŶd Đould faĐe 
rip-off charges to Đash it iŶ͛. The ABI ƌeĐogŶised the plaŶ foƌ a seĐoŶdaƌǇ aŶŶuitǇ ŵaƌket 
'poses a risk'. Dr Yvonne Braun, of the ABI, said: 'Naturally there are considerable challenges 
in establishing a functioning market, [with] many unresolved complex legal, regulatory and 
prudential questions. We urge the Government not to rush these proposals through for 
ϮϬϭϲ͛. The ABI said ŵoƌe ĐlaƌitǇ ǁas Ŷeeded aƌouŶd hoǁ a paƌtŶeƌ ǁould ďe pƌoteĐted if 
someone sold a joint life annuity. Also those selling their annuities would include vulnerable 
older people with 'reduced mental capacity'. In addition, the ABI was concerned about how 
the Government would 'protect people from scams and fraud'.766 
 
3.15 Customer engagement, customer communications and customer responsibility 
3.15.1 Customer engagement 
One key problem with auto-enrolment is that it does not require any customer engagement. 
However, the new pension regime will not work well without engagement. This could be a 
serious problem, since as Nigel Aston, head of DC at State Street Global Adviser, says: 
͚͟Freedom and choice͟ legislatioŶ hasŶ͛t suddeŶlǇ Đƌeated a populatioŶ of self-empowered, 
iŶteƌested, fiŶaŶĐiallǇ saǀǀǇ people….[Hoǁeǀeƌ], all the ƌeseaƌĐh poiŶts to the faĐt that theǇ 
ĐaŶ ŵake ƌeallǇ good deĐisioŶs…ďut theǇ ĐaŶ oŶlǇ do it ǁheŶ theǇ͛ǀe ďeeŶ giǀeŶ soŵe soƌt 
of guidaŶĐe aŶd ďetteƌ pƌoduĐts͛.  
A survey of trustees and pension managers at nine trust- and contract-based DC schemes 
was carried out by Spence Johnson on behalf of the Defined Contribution Investment Forum 
(DCIF) in March 2015. This confirmed that their biggest challenge is improving engagement 
with members to ensure people understood what they wanted. The schemes agreed that 
engagement was much more difficult than choosing an investment solution which one 
respoŶdeŶt said ǁas ͚Ƌuite siŵple͛. The schemes had developed straightforward 
                                                     
765
 Reported in Natasha Browne (2015) Liberation fraud - Where do trustees stand after the latest ombudsman 
decisions?, Professional Pensions, 29 April.  
766 
Reported in Louise Eccles (2015) Fears grow that pensioners cashing their annuities will be 'at the mercy of 
fraudsters' if reforms are rushed through next April, Daily Mail, 26 June. 
383 
 
communications on the impact of the pension freedoms, but are looking for tools that can 
help them improve longer term engagement.767   
We know that in other areas of economic activity, particularly those involving immediate 
gratification, people can become engaged and put the necessary effort in. An example put 
to us was holiday planning. The more effort put in, the better the holiday. We need to find a 
comparable way of engaging people in retirement planning, so that more effort gets better 
outcomes. 
There is also an important question about the best time to begin the engagement process. 
According to a survey by Mercer, 52% of employers and trustees believed the guidance 
guarantee should be offered 5-7 years before retirement, 32% when the member chooses, 
15% when they take their first pension and only 1% at retirement. The following are typical 
of the ŵajoƌitǇ ǀieǁ: ͚It͛s too late at ƌetiƌeŵeŶt. It Ŷeeds to ďe ĐoŶsideƌaďlǇ eaƌlieƌ to 
ensure adequate money is going in, and the correct investment strategy is being applied to 
the poteŶtial deĐuŵulatioŶ optioŶ to ďe used͛ ;JohŶ ChilŵaŶ, Fiƌst GƌoupͿ aŶd ͚We ďelieǀe 
that pension guidance should start a lot earlier than a year or two prior to retirement and 
needs to be part of an integrated approach to improve financial awareness and 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg iŶ the ǁoƌkfoƌĐe͛ ;Chaƌteƌed IŶstitute of PeƌsoŶŶel aŶd DeǀelopŵeŶtͿ.768 
For the plan to be effective, there needs to be a set of key decision dates both before and 
after the plan begins: 
 10 years prior to the nominated implementation date to confirm whether a de-
risking glidepath is required and, if so, when it needs to begin  1 year prior to the nominated implementation date to re-confirm commencement 
date  Age 74 to review death benefits  Ages 80 and 85 to confirm implementation of longevity insurance (i.e., switch to 
annuitisation if drawdown was used at the implementation date). 
 
3.15.2 Customer communications 
The FCA believes that customer engagement can be increased by better communications 
with customers. In June 2015, it issued a discussion paper called Smarter Consumer 
Communications.769 The DP begins by arguing that information, while important, is not 
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enough: there needs to be better communications with customers. In the introduction to 
the DP, Christopher Woolard said: 
Like many other regulators, we have relied heavily on information to help 
ensure greater consumer protection and make competition work. In some 
cases, we specify the type of information firms should disclose to 
customers and the format it should take. We will continue to do this where 
we feel it is necessary to improve outcomes for consumers. 
We recognise, however, that information itself does not necessarily 
empower the consumer. Our work on behavioural economics has clearly 
shown it can overwhelm, confuse, distract or even deter people from 
making effective choices if presented in a way people struggle to engage 
with. We can begin to understand why consumers often fail to make good 
decisions about financial products and services, when we take into account 
that:  behavioural biases, low levels of financial literacy and the 
complexity of some financial services and products can limit 
people͛s aďility to take appropriate action  firms tend to use financial and legal jargon, which can make the 
materials they produce lengthy and impenetrable for the consumer  in some firms, marketing material is much more consumer focused 
than other consumer communications. 
Communications play a fundamental role in helping consumers to make 
informed decisions. Effective, engaging information can be a key tool in 
promoting effective competition to supply products and services that 
consumers want. Greater transparency in fiƌŵs͛ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ǁith 
consumers can also lead to greater efficiency for the industry, with less 
time spent handling complaints. 
Effective, engaging information is also already integral to our regulatory 
approach: we require firms to have due regard to the information needs of 
their customers, and to communicate information in a way that is clear, 
fair and not misleading. While some firms may feel they already do this, 
from what we have seen in our research, thematic reviews and market 
studies, it is evident most firms need to do more to communicate with 
consumers in a way that truly empowers them to make effective decisions. 
We expect all firms to embed an organisation-wide culture where the 
importance of communicating effectively with consumers is recognised and 
prioritised. The information needs of potential customers need to be fully 
considered when developing a product or service and throughout the 
lifecycle of that product or service. 
We are committed to driving improvements in the effectiveness of the 
information consumers receive about the financial products and services 
they have or want to buy. This DP is intended to kick start a debate around 
how the FCA, industry, consumer groups and other stakeholders can work 
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together to deliver information to consumers in smarter and more effective 
ways, including adopting innovative techniques as we move away from the 
paper-based mindset. 
 
In the DP, the FCA reiterates its expectation that firms: 
 understand and recognise the importance of communicating effectively with 
consumers  create product and service information for consumers with at least as much 
behaviourally informed creativity as is applied to business development, marketing 
and financial promotions  create communications as an integral part of the product or service design process. 
It acknowledges that many firms are doing this and it signals its support and encouragement 
for firms that are: 
 writing for the consumer first and then ensuring communications are compliant, 
rather than the other way round  moving away from a box-ticking approach to communication design, or the 
perception that communications driven by regulation are the responsibility of 
compliance and legal staff  ďuildiŶg a ǁideƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of theiƌ Đustoŵeƌs͛ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ Ŷeeds aŶd 
objectively considering not only what consumers actively demand to know, but also: 
o what the consumer needs to know 
o how much they need to know 
o when they need to know it  prioritising efforts to ensure that information is effective for the intended audience 
and testing communications among real consumers  adopting innovative techniques to improve how key information about products is 
conveyed and delivered to consumers.  
The FCA said it was pleased with the good practices and innovative approaches to 
communicating effectively with consumers that it saw emerging in some firms. This included 
firms that: 
 desigŶed ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs to ŵeet the Ŷeeds of the pƌoduĐt oƌ seƌǀiĐe͛s taƌget 
market  ensured their communications effectively delivered the key information to 
consumers by, for example, using plain language, a clear and short format, bullet 
points and clear graphics  provided information at a time consumers need it and in an engaging format 
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 developed interactive communications, harnessing technology such as mobile 
devices, tablets, apps, social media, YouTube and online tools to ensure key 
information was more accessible to consumers. 
One problem area that the FCA identified was communication about charges to consumers. 
It noted that the compounding impact which charges have on investment returns over the 
loŶg teƌŵ ͚ĐaŶ ďe a diffiĐult ĐoŶĐept foƌ soŵe ĐoŶsuŵeƌs to uŶdeƌstaŶd͛.  It ideŶtified 
Nutŵeg as aŶ eǆaŵple foƌ otheƌ fiƌŵs to folloǁ iŶ teƌŵs of ͚pƌeseŶtiŶg this [iŵpaĐt] 
gƌaphiĐallǇ, ǁith a Đleaƌ eǆplaŶatioŶ͛.  
 
Figure 3.4: FCA-proposed label for the services offered by firms derived from the US 
EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal PƌoteĐtioŶ AgeŶĐǇ͛s ͚fuel eĐoŶoŵǇ' laďel͛ 
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Figure 3.5: FCA-proposed laďel foƌ  fiƌŵs͛ Đhaƌges sĐhedule deƌiǀed fƌoŵ the U“ 
EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal PƌoteĐtioŶ AgeŶĐǇ͛s ͚fuel eĐoŶoŵǇ' laďel͛ 
 
 
 
The FCA said it also liked the idea of  disĐlosuƌe ͚laďels͛ to outliŶe fiƌŵs͛ Đhaƌges aŶd the 
type of advice they offer to consumers. It pointed to the 'fuel economy label' designed by 
the US Environmental Protection Agency which has been on display on all new cars in the US 
since 2008 and which it adapted in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. 
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3.15.3 How responsible is the consumer? 
The regulatory tension between the econ and human view of the customer was clearly 
demonstrated by Martin Wheatley, then chief executive of the FCA, speaking at the NAPF 
investment conference in Edinburgh on 11 March 2015.770  
He said consumers will be liable for their decisions in retirement as long as the industry 
complies with conduct rules and standards which involve informing customers about the 
Pension Wise guidance service and about regulated advisers, and giving personalised risk 
warnings to people wishing to access their pension pots. He added: 
Certainly, under the system as it will be, there will be no ability to prevent 
all of the people, all of the tiŵe fƌoŵ ŵakiŶg ͞suď-optiŵal͟ deĐisioŶs. 
Some savers, come 55, will invariably head to Las Vegas, buy fast cars or 
otherwise calculate how to run down their pension pots in days and 
months, rather than years. Optimists will be inclined to believe that these 
numbers will be fractional. Pessimists that they may be more significant. 
But the reality is that this is all simply part of the process that flows from 
the benefit of freedom. Some responsibility, by definition, has to bump 
across from industry to customers otherwise you simply return to difficult 
conversations around why policy makers should, in effect, decide how 
savers draw their money. 
Come April 6, what you will have is a structure under which customers will, 
on seeking access to their pensions, immediately be recommended to seek 
guidance – via Pension Wise or financial advice. After which, when a 
decision has been made, the system will effectively have a further check, if 
necessary triggering a personalised risk warning. Allowing a final 
opportunity for people to assess the wisdom of their choice. [With all this 
in place, customers] will be in a position to make what are, clearly, life-
influencing decisions on future income, with some confidence that the 
structure behind their choice is sound. 
Yet Mr Wheatley left open some doubt about where responsibility ultimately lies:  
It is perfectly reasonable for firms to question where accountability 
eventually lies if you end up in a situation where X percentage of 
consumers refuse to listen to any guidance or risk warnings given. Who, 
ultimately, is to blame if – 10 to 15 years on from now – those people 
ƌegƌet ǁhateǀeƌ ĐhoiĐe theǇ͛ǀe ŵade, oƌ ĐoŵplaiŶ theǇ ǁeƌeŶ͛t pƌopeƌlǇ 
guided? And actually at that point, it becomes difficult to sensibly argue 
that iŶdiǀidual ĐoŶsuŵeƌs shouldŶ͛t aĐĐept ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ. Noƌ, I thiŶk, 
would wider society expect otherwise. [Under the new system, there will be 
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a] division of responsibility [between consumers, firms and policy makers 
that is] a loŶg ǁaǇ fƌoŵ todaǇ͛s aŶŶuitǇ-based system. 
 
3.16  Monitoring outcomes 
MoŶitoƌiŶg outĐoŵes uŶdeƌ the ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ peŶsioŶ ƌefoƌŵs ǁill ďe a ĐƌuĐial paƌt 
of assessing the success of the reforms.  
Yet, as pointed out in a briefing note released by Just Retirement in June 2015, the 
Government has put no monitoring mechanism in place.771 The ďƌiefiŶg Ŷote states: ͚Ouƌ 
primary concern is the lack of a co-ordinated and comprehensive forward plan for 
monitoring the impact of the reforms on consumer outcomes, both in the early stages and 
over the longer term. This is iŵpoƌtaŶt ďeĐause of kŶoǁŶ pƌoďleŵs ǁith ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ 
engagement with pensions and retirement planning decisions which have led to negative 
outĐoŵes foƌ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs…The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt aĐĐepts it Đannot predict the outcome of the 
reforms and has made clear that individuals are responsible for their decisions. Nonetheless, 
it will be important to monitor the available data in order to understand developing norms, 
and to help prevent consumer detriment likely to result from poor financial capability, 
diseŶgageŵeŶt aŶd the iŵpaĐt of fiŶaŶĐial sĐaŵs͛. 
The briefing note identifies the following information sources that will be crucial inputs into 
any evaluation of the success of the reforms: 
 Take-up rates for Pension Wise; the characteristics of the consumers using the 
service; details of what people do next after exiting the service; and the outcomes 
for those who do not choose to use Pension Wise  Data collected by the ABI and FCA will be crucial indicators of early trends. The ABI 
collects sales data from its members, though this does not cover the full range of 
providers across the wider financial services industry and so is limited. By contrast 
the FCA (and before that the Financial Services Authority) has been receiving product 
sales data from all regulated firms since 2005, providing a basic but complete data 
set from which to analyse product purchase outcomes. 
However, the data collected by the FCA does not currently capture certain information, such 
as the rate of cash withdrawals from DC pension savings, type of annuity (e.g., joint or single 
life, enhanced or standard, level or escalating/inflation-linked), or details of the risk profile 
or funds invested through income drawdown contracts at the time of purchase. The briefing 
Ŷote states that: ͚These data poiŶts aƌe iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of the peŶsioŶ ƌefoƌŵs due 
to known shortcomings in financial engagement and capability, especially in relation to 
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retirement choices. Consumer analysis, including the FCA͛s oǁŶ theŵatiĐ ǁoƌk oŶ the 
retirement market, has shown that consumers are often ill informed or make decisions 
without being aware of better options, with the outcome often irreversible. Common 
examples include individuals failing to consider theiƌ depeŶdaŶt͛s Ŷeeds aŶd optiŶg foƌ a 
single life annuity instead of a joint-life policy, or buying a standard annuity without realising 
the significantly higher income provided by enhanced annuities. The potential risk of mis-
selling and mis-buying has increased with the new options available since April 6 [2015], and 
new risks, such as the potential for individuals to unknowingly trigger a large tax charge on 
luŵp suŵ ǁithdƌaǁals͛. 
The briefing note identifies the monitoring gaps that need to be closed in order to fully 
assess the success of the pension reforms: 
The concerns outlined above emphasise the need for substantive data on a 
range of key measures without which regulators and the Government will 
be unable to monitor outcomes in the new pensions environment. 
Compared to the depth of information required for non-retirement 
pƌoduĐts suĐh as ŵoƌtgages, the FCA͛s pƌeseŶt ƌetiƌeŵeŶt pƌoduĐt data 
collection is minimal and will not be sufficient to monitor consumer 
outcomes in the new environment. 
Similarly, the Treasury has yet to set out any plans for the collection and 
publication of data on the feedback from Pension Wise users. This will be 
an important measure, providing basic user feedback on the service itself, 
its quality and whether it is succeeding in helping individuals navigate the 
new pension freedoms. 
 In addition to collecting this feedback on Pension Wise, data on the wider 
outcomes for all retirees must be captured to understand the longer-term 
impact of the reforms. This must also include proper assessment of the 
impact of at-retirement processes for consumers including product 
provider behaviour and the adequacy of regulatory protections including 
the seĐoŶd liŶe of defeŶĐe oƌ ͚ƌetiƌeŵeŶt ƌisk ǁaƌŶiŶgs͛.  
 
The briefing note ends by arguing: ͚The Ŷeed to ĐolleĐt aŶd theŶ aggƌegate a ƌaŶge of iŶputs 
iŶĐludiŶg PeŶsioŶ Wise useƌ data, FCA sales data aŶd iŶtelligeŶĐe fƌoŵ ƌegulatoƌs͛ theŵatiĐ 
and supervisory work, points to the wider need to coordinate these various activities. 
Addressing these intelligence gaps will allow policymakers to identify and address potential 
consumer detriment at an early stage, enabling the Treasury, FCA and TPR to refine the 
ƌegulatoƌǇ aŶd poliĐǇ fƌaŵeǁoƌk, aŶd ďǇ so doiŶg eŶsuƌe the ƌefoƌŵs ďeŶefit ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛. 
The Aon DC Survey, published in November 2015, indicated that achieving better member 
outcomes was a top priority for DC schemes (suggested by 57% of respondents). This was 
followed by communications (46%) and increased member engagement (45%). 
Nevertheless, Sophia Singleton, head of DC Consulting at Aon Hewitt, said that schemes 
Ŷeeded to put pƌaĐtiĐal steps iŶ plaĐe if theǇ aƌe to ŵeet these oďjeĐtiǀes: ͚Noǁ is the tiŵe 
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to re-set the DC agenda. If schemes are serious about the ambition to achieve better 
member outcomes, then they need to start setting clear targets and putting plans in place 
to achieve them. They must also set and measure themselves against clear key performance 
iŶdiĐatoƌs to eŶsuƌe theiƌ iŶteŶtioŶs ďeĐoŵe ƌealitǇ͛.772  
In October 2015, the Work and Pensions Select Committee also reported773 that it was 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout the laĐk of GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt data oŶ ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛. It said that the 
aǀailaďle statistiĐs ǁeƌe ͚uŶaĐĐeptaďle͛ aŶd asked the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt to do ŵoƌe to shed light 
on the impact of the reforms. Specifically, the committee wants regulators to collect 
information on: customer characteristics of those using freedoms from pot size to sources 
of retirement income; take-up of each channel of guidance; reasons for not taking up 
guidance and advice; and subsequent decisions made and reasons for those decisions.  
Apparently, the Government is relying on incomplete HMRC data to assess the reforms.  
Toŵ MĐPhail said theƌe is ͚ĐoŶsideƌaďle disƋuiet͛ aďout GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǀigilaŶĐe oǀeƌ the 
policy and a lack of eaƌlǇ ǁaƌŶiŶg sǇsteŵs aďout uŶiŶteŶded ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes: ͚HM‘C has 
published some very superficial data, which was underwhelming. Either they are not getting 
ŵuĐh data oƌ theǇ aƌe Ŷot shaƌiŶg it. Eitheƌ ǁaǇ, it doesŶ͛t look good. The TƌeasuƌǇ appeaƌs 
to have been surprisingly blasé about the consequences of reform, which are approached 
fƌoŵ aŶ ideologiĐal staŶdpoiŶt….Theƌe aƌe loŶgstaŶdiŶg diǀisioŶs iŶ the sǇsteŵ [suĐh as, the 
division of pension policy between DWP and the Treasury] which exacerbate the data 
problem. Why has no one sought to mitigate the divisions and bring all data sources into 
oŶe heliĐopteƌ ǀieǁ foƌ ǁhat is goiŶg iŶ UK ƌetiƌeŵeŶt saǀiŶgs?͛.774  
Frank Field MP, chair of the Select Coŵŵittee, said: ͚‘eluĐtaŶĐe to pƌoǀide iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
about how a reform or service is working is rarely a good sign. It is very difficult for the 
Government to support its claims that all is well, or for us to make any assessment of 
progress, when no data are forthcoming despite repeated requests. The scarcity of 
information regarding Pension Wise, in particular, is not conducive to effective scrutiny. The 
committee repeats its call for Government to address these omissions urgently, and 
paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ to iŶtƌoduĐe a ƌeseaƌĐh pƌogƌaŵŵe tƌaĐkiŶg ĐoŶsuŵeƌ outĐoŵes…. We haǀe 
seen all too clearly, too many times, what happens when financial information is not 
pƌopeƌlǇ pƌoǀided aŶd ƌegulated͛. The Đoŵŵittee also said the PeŶsioŶ Wise ǁeďsite ǁas 
͚Ŷot fit foƌ puƌpose͛ aŶd that the laĐk of ƌegulatoƌǇ ĐlaƌitǇ oǀeƌ ǁhat is ͚adǀiĐe͛ aŶd 
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͚guidaŶĐe͛ is puttiŶg saǀeƌs at ƌisk of pooƌ deĐisioŶs. NiĐk Thoŵas-Symonds, shadow 
Pensions Minister, said the report showed the Government was failing to protect and 
iŶfoƌŵ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs: ͚“iŶĐe peŶsioŶ fƌeedoŵs haǀe ďeeŶ iŶtƌoduĐed, ŵoŶeǇ lost thƌough 
scam activity has increased. Labour is urging the Government to look very closely at this 
report and act now in order to avert the next great mis-selliŶg sĐaŶdal͛.775  
However, Martin Tilley, director of technical services at Dentons Pensions Management, has 
desĐƌiďed the Đlaiŵs ďǇ the “eleĐt Coŵŵittee that peŶsioŶs fƌeedoŵ Đould ďe the Ŷeǆt ͚ŵis-
selling scandal' in financial services as a misplaced attack on providers and advisers. He said: 
͚The iŶdustƌǇ ǁasŶ't ĐoŶsulted aďout the ĐhaŶges ďefoƌe theǇ ǁeƌe announced, didn't ask 
for them and has been criticised at every turn for not adopting the changes more quickly 
and charging too much to implement them: the latter sometimes in campaigns by national 
journals who are happy to print popular opinion without understanding the facts. By using 
the phƌase ͚ŵis-selling', I'd suggest this is a similarly ill-addƌessed attaĐk͛. Mƌ TilleǇ added 
that Đustoŵeƌs aƌe Ŷoǁ aďle to do thiŶgs that ŵight Ŷot ďe iŶ theiƌ ďest iŶteƌest ͚Ŷot 
because the industry is selling it, simplǇ ďeĐause legislatioŶ Ŷoǁ alloǁs it͛.776 
 
3.17 The self-employed and non-eligible job holders for auto-enrolment 
There are two groups not eligible for auto-enrolment: the self-employed and non-eligible 
job holders for the purpose of auto-enrolment. 
There are around 4.5m (i.e., 17% of the 26.3m employed population, up from 8% in 1980) 
who are self-employed777 and around 6.2m (24%) non-eligible job holders.778 This means 
that around 11m people working in the UK will not be auto-enrolled onto any pension 
scheme. There are, however, a number of problems with interpreting these figures which 
should be noted. For example, the definitions used by ONS for employment categories are 
different from those applied by TPR for auto-eŶƌolŵeŶt, ǁhiĐh iŶĐlude ͚eligiďle joďholdeƌs͛, 
͚ŶoŶ-eligiďle joďholdeƌs͛ aŶd ͚eŶtitled ǁoƌkeƌs͛. IŶ additioŶ, peƌŵaŶeŶt eŵploǇŵeŶt, 
contract employment in the workplace and self-employment are not mutually exclusive 
categories. On average, people change jobs 10 or 11 times during their working lives. This 
can include periods of permanent employment (where the individual is eligible for auto-
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enrolment), periods of non-eligible employment (where the employment contract renders 
them ineligible for auto-enrolment), and periods of self-employment.  
The Royal Society of Arts (RSA) recently published two reports on the self-employed.779 
Between the 2008 recession and 2014, more than 500,000 people have become self-
employed, accounting for more than half of all jobs created during this period.780 Five key 
trends are discernible in this boom in self-employment: 
 The rise of one-person businesses – 95% of new micro-businesses (which employ 
between 0 and 9 employees) started since 2000 have no employees; one-person 
businesses now account for 75% of all businesses in the UK  The growth of part-time self-employment – the number of self-employed people 
working less than 30 hours a week has increased by 60% since 2000, compared with 
a 20% increase in full-time self-employment over the same period  The increasing importance of self-employment outside of London – for instance, 92% 
of all new jobs in the North West since 2000 have been in self-employment  The changing demographic of the self-employed – the biggest growth areas in self-
employment have been among women, the under 25s and older people. The 
number of self-employed people over 65 has increased by 140% since 2000.  The uniqueness of the boom to the UK – the UK is an outlier amongst developed 
countries: self-employment has fallen in Germany, Canada and the US since 2008. 
In terms of the self-eŵploǇed͛s peŶsioŶ aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶts, theƌe is soŵe iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ĐoŶtaiŶed 
in these RSA studies, as well as two other reports from the Resolution Foundation781 and 
from Scottish Widows.782  
The RSA studies found that the self-employed are half as likely as employees to contribute 
to a private pension. They also typically have a pension pot that is half the size at the point 
of retirement: according to the Wealth and Assets Survey, 55–64 year-olds in self-
employment have a median private pension pot of £50,000, compared with £98,700 for 
those in a typical job. One key reason for this difference is the self-employed people do not 
benefit from employer contributions: according to Prudential, those who choose to work for 
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themselves forego an average of £91,500 in employer contributions over their lifetime. The 
self-employed also tend to start saving at a relatively late age, with less than 15% of self-
employed 25–34 year-olds contributing to a private pension.  
The latter two reports found that pension membership for the self-employed has fallen 
significantly behind that of employees, but only since 1998. Scottish Widows, for example, 
found that 39% of self-employed people (as well as 30% of employees working in a small 
business) were saving nothing for retirement in 2015, up from 23% the previous year. The 
Resolution Foundation report found that the self-employed who run businesses with 
employees (17% of the total) are much better prepared for retirement than those who work 
for themselves without additional support. The former can either sell their business or keep 
it and draw an income. In many cases, the self-employed were previously employees and 
can therefore expect some occupational or personal pension income when they retire.  
The RSA studies also found that many self-employed people have made an active decision 
not to contribute to a personal pension. Instead, they will use ISAs to provide for their 
retirement. Data from the Wealth and Assets Survey shows that 55% of households with a 
self-employed worker have savings in an ISA (averaging £17,000, compared with £8,000 for 
employee-only households). These studies point out that, although ISAs give people more 
flexibility, large ISA savings may adversely affect their benefit entitlements under Universal 
Credit. 
In September 2015, the PPI published a briefing note on those who were ineligible for auto-
enrolment.783 There are three main reasons why 6.2m people are ineligible for auto-
enrolment: 
 3.5m (57% of the total) earn below the £10,000 Earnings Threshold because they 
work part-time.784  1.8m (29%) are below age 22.  843,000 (14%) are above state pension age. 
Most (2.7m) of the 3.5m people earning below £10,000 are women. Some of the 3.5m will 
have a number of part-time jobs and may have a combined annual income above £10,000. 
However, the qualification for auto-eŶƌolŵeŶt is assessed oŶ a ͚peƌ joď͛ ďasis. Tǁo otheƌ 
groups that that fail the eligibility criteria are the disabled and carers. Around 30% of 
disabled workers (649,000 people) earn less than £10,000. Similarly, around 81% of 
employed carers are ineligible, including 35,000 who earn below £10,000. 
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Both the self-employed and non-eligible job holders will benefit in due course from the 
single-tier state pension. Similarly, members of both groups could join NEST which has a 
public service obligation to take on anyone who applies, but only around 800 self-employed 
people have done so to date. However, it is more likely that, if they do make any pension 
arrangements, this will be through the retail market. But we could find no accurate data on 
the combined number of the self-employed or non-eligible job holders with individual DC 
policies.  Similarly, when it comes to decumulation, it is likely that these groups will fail to 
benefit from institutional value-for-money solutions and instead will have to rely on the 
high-cost retail market. 
The ‘esolutioŶ FouŶdatioŶ ƌepoƌt aƌgues: ͚TakeŶ togetheƌ, the eǀideŶĐe suggests theƌe is a 
case for greater intervention to ensure the self-employed are adequately prepared for their 
lateƌ Ǉeaƌs͛. A siŵilaƌ Đase Đould ďe ŵade foƌ ŶoŶ-eligible job holders. The PPI briefing note 
fiŶds that ͚if the iŶĐoŵe fƌoŵ ďoth fiƌst aŶd seĐoŶd joďs ǁas takeŶ iŶto aĐĐouŶt ǁheŶ 
assessing eligibility for automatic enrolment, then a further 80,000 people (60,000 women 
aŶd ϮϬ,ϬϬϬ ŵeŶͿ ǁould eaƌŶ eŶough to ŵeet the ƋualifǇiŶg Đƌiteƌia͛. 
The RSA reports do not, however, believe that auto-enrolment into NEST or another of the 
larger master trust schemes is a sensible solution due to the administrative challenges of 
dealing with the irregular and volatile incomes the self-employed tend to have, but also 
because of the clear preference amongst many of them to have flexible access to their 
savings. Instead, the RSA proposes the following two options: 
 PƌeseŶt a ͚ĐoŵpulsoƌǇ ƋuestioŶ͛ foƌ eŶƌolŵeŶt oŶto a peŶsioŶ oƌ I“A sĐheŵe 
o The Government should present the self-employed with a compulsory 
question asking them whether they wish to join a workplace pension scheme 
and/or a Government-backed ISA, for example, one provided by National 
Savings & Investments (NS&I). To increase the likelihood of take-up, this 
should be done at a moment of financial reflection, such as when people 
complete their tax return or Universal Credit application.  Establish automated saving schemes for the self-employed on low incomes 
o The Government should provide an option within the Universal Credit system 
that allows claimants to automatically channel a percentage of their benefits 
into a savings account. Banks should consider following suit by creating a 
͚“aǀe WheŶ Paid͛ iŶitiatiǀe foƌ theiƌ self-employed clients, which would take a 
small amount off the value of every invoice and immediately transfer this into 
savings. 
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3.18 Experience from abroad 
In April 2015, the Pensions Policy Institute released a report that compared the new UK 
pension system with those developing in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and the US.785  It 
noted that the UK was moving in the opposite direction to these countries in terms of risk 
pooling. Whereas the new UK pensions regime completely individualises risk bearing, 
countries, such as Australia, have seen the benefits of greater pooling of risks, and, in 
particular, longevity risk. Chris Curry, said: ͚The fiŶdiŶgs fƌoŵ the ƌeseaƌĐh aƌe eŶĐouƌagiŶg 
in that the UK pensions industry as a whole has an understanding of various types of risk 
and a sophisticated market has developed here for, in particular, underwritten annuities. 
The challenge for the industry will be around the identification of effective default glide-
paths where it can no longer be assumed that individuals purchase an annuity. So far, the 
focus of regulation in the UK has been the introduction of a standards regime to ensure the 
quality and consistency of guidance. This contrasts with countries, such as Australia, which 
are now considering the introduction of rules to ensure defaults that manage longevity risk. 
It is possiďle that fuƌtheƌ steps ǁill ďe ĐoŶsideƌed iŶ the UK that ͚Ŷudge͛ iŶdiǀiduals toǁaƌds 
decisions that ensure they have a regular income stream over the course of their 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛. 
We will examine the experience in Australia, Switzerland, Chile and the US. 
 
3.18.1 Australia 
Australia has been put forward as a success story for a ͚freedom and ĐhoiĐe͛ ƌegiŵe ŵight 
look life. Many of those familiar with the Australian experience take a different view.  
Many people in Australia – a country with no requirement to annuitise the pension pot – 
actually pre-spend their pension fund: they spend more than their disposable income in the 
lead up to retirement, knowing that they will use their pension fund to pay off their 
debts.786 Paul LeaŶdƌo, paƌtŶeƌ at BaƌŶett WaddiŶghaŵ, said: ͚We ǁeŶt out theƌe lookiŶg 
foƌ the silǀeƌ ďullet aŶd ǁe just did Ŷot fiŶd it…The AustƌaliaŶ ŵodel is still ƌelatively 
immature and it will be some 40 years before we see people retiring after having 
contributed 9.5% to their pension and there has also been little focus on what happens at 
decumulation. What is also important is that people don't view this money in terms of a 
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retirement income. Around 27% spend the money on a holiday, while only about 4% 
puƌĐhase aŶ aŶŶuitǇ͛.787  
The Australian Financial System Inquiry discussed earlier discovered that a lack of risk 
sharing and over-reliance on drawdown products had left Australians with inadequate 
incomes in old age. The FSI had estimated that moving to a system that managed longevity 
risk reduced the level of assets needed for adequate retirement incomes by around 15%. It 
was for this reason that the FSI recommended that Australian pension schemes introduce a 
default comprehensive income product for retirement, the CIPR. 
Kevin Davis788 in an article for Reform789 entitled Retirement Incomes Policy Reform in 
Australia,790 wrote: 
A number of shortcomings [in the Australian retirement income system] 
were highlighted by the recent Financial System Inquiry. The main focus of 
the FSI in the areas of superannuation and retirement income was on 
improving efficiency in the accumulation phase and increasing risk-pooling 
in the retirement phase. These have the potential to increase retirement 
incomes substantially, and reduce age pension related Government 
budgetary pressures. The recommendations of the FSI, together with other 
recent reforms, should enhance sustainability and adequacy. 
One fundamental problem, identified by the FSI, is a lack of member-driven 
competitive pressure to induce lower fees and costs and improve efficiency 
iŶ iŶstitutioŶal fuŶds, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ foƌ default fuŶds….AďseŶt sigŶifiĐaŶt 
improvements, consideration should be given to introducing a formal 
competitive process (such as a tender or auction) for allocating new 
employees into default funds. (Those recent reforms sought to introduce a 
cost effective, simple default fund product, improve transparency and 
governance and streamline administrative arrangements.) 
Another major concern is that superannuation assets are not being 
efficiently converted into retirement incomes due to a lack of longevity risk 
pooling and overreliance on account-based pensions. Evidence suggests 
that the major worry among retirees and pre-retirees is exhausting their 
assets in retirement. An individual with an account-based pension can 
reduce the risk of outliving their wealth by living more frugally in 
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retirement and drawing down benefits at the minimum allowable rates 
(which a majority of retirees do). 
The Inquiry also noted that many retirees find it challenging to navigate 
the transition to the retirement phase of superannuation. The task of 
managing multiple financial objectives and risks in retirement is complex 
and the quality of financial advice can vary significantly.  
Accordingly, the Inquiry recommended that institutional super funds be 
ƌeƋuiƌed to offeƌ theiƌ ŵeŵďeƌs a ͚pƌe-seleĐted͛ ĐoŵpƌeheŶsiǀe ƌetiƌeŵeŶt 
income product which, where appropriate, includes a regular and stable 
income stream, longevity risk management and some flexibility. A product 
involving some mix of an account-based pension and deferred annuity is 
one such example, and the longevity risk pooling provides an opportunity 
for higher consumption streams for participating retirees. There is, of 
course, no free lunch, as beneficiaries receive lower inheritances from 
ƌesidual supeƌ ďalaŶĐes. This is ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith aŶotheƌ of the IŶƋuiƌǇ͛s 
recommendations to shift the focus of the system from tax-preferred 
wealth accumulation and estate planning to provision of retirement 
income by setting clear objectives for the system. 
OffeƌiŶg a ͚pƌe-seleĐted͛ pƌoduĐt ǁas pƌefeƌƌed to a sǇsteŵ ǁheƌe 
iŶdiǀiduals aƌe ͚defaulted͛ oƌ ŵaŶdated iŶto a speĐified pƌoduĐt. This 
maintains consumer sovereignty, while positively influencing retiree choice 
towards taking up products that include some longevity insurance. A 
default solution also faces practical complications given retiree diversity. 
 
The concerns about Australia were reinforced by a study published by the Social Market 
Foundation published in November 2015.791 The study identifies two types of Australian 
consumer: 
 ͚Cautious AustƌaliaŶs͛ ǁho pƌeseƌǀe theiƌ Đapital ďǇ ƌeduĐiŶg it by less than 1 per 
cent a year. They face a very low risk of running out of savings, even if they live 
longer than average. But this comes at the cost of reduced incomes and lower living 
standards throughout retirement.  ͚QuiĐk-speŶdiŶg AustƌaliaŶs͛ ǁho consume pension funds quickly with four-in-10 
running out by age 75 – long before they reached average life expectancy. Their 
incomes risk sinking towards poverty levels. 
The study argues that lessons should be drawn by the UK Government. In particular, it 
should create a two-tieƌ ͚EaƌlǇ WaƌŶiŶg “Ǉsteŵ͛ to uŶdeƌstaŶd ǁhat ƌetiƌees aƌe doiŶg ǁith 
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their pension savings and to identify emerging long-term risks both to consumers and the 
taxpayer. It recommends: 
 A ͚‘etiƌeŵeŶt ‘isk Dashďoaƌd͛ – to help the Government monitor retirement 
decisions and provide a view on long-term outcomes for consumers and the state. 
This would be based on a range of statistics such as pension balances, pension cash 
withdrawal, insurance take-up, levels of investment risks and take-up of guidance 
and advice.  ͚PeƌsoŶal PeŶsioŶ Aleƌts͛ – to help policymakers intervene where appropriate with 
the sub-groups it has identified as at particularly high risk. Potential interventions 
could include: targeted support and advice; initiatives to make retirees think twice 
before taking one-off decisions such as withdrawing all their pension savings; and, a 
͚Mid-‘etiƌeŵeŶt FiŶaŶĐial Health CheĐk͛ to eŶĐouƌage oldeƌ people to ƌeĐoŶsideƌ 
their financial position for their later years. 
Nicholas Morris is writing a book with the working title WheŶ Maƌkets DoŶ͛t Woƌk: LessoŶs 
fƌoŵ Austƌalia͛s “upeƌaŶŶuatioŶ FiasĐo which focuses on investment issues. He summarised 
the situation as follows: 
Today, Australia has a complex and expensive [investment fund] industry 
which manages these very large [superannuation] funds. Most funds are 
predominately actively managed, with substantial associated costs. On 
average, administrative and investment management costs exceed 3% of 
managed funds, or over $50 billion, per annum. As risk-free investments 
stƌuggle to eaƌŶ ŵuĐh ŵoƌe thaŶ this iŶ todaǇ͛s ŵaƌkets, the ƌesult is that 
returns after expenses are very modest. Compared to funds in Canada, the 
U“ aŶd Euƌope, Austƌalia͛s fuŶds peƌfoƌŵ ďadlǇ…. 
Why did this outcome emerge and what can other countries learn from it? 
The answer is that principal-agent and conflict of interest problems 
combined with lack of effective competition and light-handed regulation 
allowed rent extraction by private sector managers on a massive scale. The 
prevailing regulatory ethos in Australia followed that adopted in many 
other countries in believing that disclosure and competitive pressures 
would prevent excessive rent extraction from occurring. Inattentive 
trustees, and contractual eclipse of trust law arrangements, led to weak 
ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of ŵeŵďeƌs…. 
[I]nefficiency [in the fund management industry] results from the 
development of a complex, multi-layered, industry, with extensive 
delegation of both functions and responsibilities, and from extensive use of 
active funds management with excessive focus on short-term results. 
Additionally, although in principle there should have been economies of 
scale as the funds administered grew, most of this has not been passed on 
to scheme members.  Rent extraction has been facilitated and permitted 
by a laissez-faire and unfocused regulatory system, including a disclosure 
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regime which permits the majority of costs to remain hidden, and limited 
effective competition.  
The evidence from Australia illustrates how a large degree of separation 
between fund managers and members, created by extensive outsourcing 
and delegation of responsibility, creates a poor outcome for scheme 
members. The result is a sorry tale of costly complexity, poor 
ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of ŵeŵďeƌ͛s iŶterests, limited disclosure and extensive 
unresolved conflicts of interest.792  
 
3.18.2 Switzerland, Chile and the US 
Chris Curry in an article for Reform entitled The UK Retirement Market: Lessons from 
Abroad,793 wrote: 
[C]ountries, such as Switzerland and Chile, have high levels of 
annuitisation. Despite Swiss savers being permitted unlimited access to 
their private pension savings (though some schemes restrict access), 
around 80 per cent of DC assets are put into lifetime annuities. This is 
attributed to cultural attitudes; Swiss workers are described as being 
͚fiŶaŶĐiallǇ ĐoŶseƌǀatiǀe͛ aŶd ͚pƌefeƌƌiŶg guaƌaŶteed iŶĐoŵes foƌ life͛ oǀeƌ 
taking lump sums. 
However, Swiss annuities are funded by hosting pension schemes and their 
rates (which are regulated by the Government) are considered to be very 
generous, given the current low interest rates in the Swiss market and low 
mortality rates amongst annuitants. 
Chileans who wish to access their DC pension savings must opt either for a 
lifetime (deferred or immediate), index-linked annuity or for phased 
withdrawals from a pension fund. The number of DC savers purchasing an 
annuity in Chile has risen from 3 per cent of pensioners in 1985 to just 
under 70 per cent of DC savers for whom annuities were an option in 2007. 
This equates to around 70 per cent of DC assets. 
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The high demand for lifetime annuities in Chile is attributed to the 
restrictions on accessing savings and on the lack of a sufficient universal 
state pension to fall back on. In addition, fund providers must guarantee a 
minimum rate of return, which is backed by the Government. 
Both Switzerland and Chile offer higher annuity rates than would have 
been expected given market conditions. 
AŶŶuities aƌe peƌĐeiǀed as a ͚good deal͛ foƌ aŶŶuitaŶts iŶ these ĐouŶtƌies. 
….The puƌĐhase of lifetiŵe aŶŶuities is ŵiŶiŵal iŶ the U“A, estiŵated to 
account for less than 2 per cent of pensioner income in 2009. Savers in the 
USA are permitted to access their DC savings from retirement age without 
restriction and the lack of interest from consumers in annuitisation is 
attƌiďuted to the laĐk of ďeƋuest optioŶs, laƌge fuŶd sizes, ͚adǀeƌse 
seleĐtioŶ͛ aŶd ĐoŶsuŵeƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout deǀelopiŶg health pƌoďleŵs iŶ 
later life. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the UK is not the only country concerned about pension 
advice. In the US, President Barack Obama has introduced a fiduciary standard for financial 
advisers who recommend retirement-account investments which requires them to act solely 
iŶ theiƌ ĐlieŶts͛ iŶteƌests. CuƌƌeŶtlǇ, adǀiseƌs͛ ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs ŵust ďe ͚suitaďle͛ foƌ a 
ĐlieŶt, ďut theǇ do Ŷot haǀe to ďe iŶ the ĐlieŶt͛s ďest iŶteƌest, ǁhiĐh ǁould ďe a fiduĐiaƌǇ 
standard. The absence of a fiduciary standard has allowed advisers to recommend products 
which earn the advisers higher commissions of around 1%. This is particularly the case when 
401(k) accounts (the US equivalent of the accumulation phase of personal pension schemes) 
are rolled over into independent retrement accounts (IRAs) (the US equivalent of a retail 
drawdown product) when someone retires. In 2013, about $353 billion was rolled from 
401(k) accounts into IRAs. However, advisers claim that anyone with less than $50,000 
would no longer be able to find an adviser willing to deal with them.794 
 
3.19 Feedback from our interviews and responses to the consultation paper 
3.19.1 Feedback from our interviews795 
3.19.1.1 Consultants 
What will members with DC schemes do? 
There was considerable uncertainty about what scheme members would actually do, 
although the most common ǀieǁ is that ŵaŶǇ ǁill folloǁ ͚the path of least ƌesistaŶĐe͛ aŶd 
just aĐĐept theiƌ eǆistiŶg pƌoǀideƌ͛s deĐuŵulatioŶ pƌoduĐt.   
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Nobody yet has a clue as to how many people will want to take all their cash immediately or 
over a very short period (to mitigate a high tax bill in a single year). They will need to 
ĐoŶsideƌ a ƌaŶge of Đoŵpleǆ deĐisioŶs depeŶdiŶg oŶ ǁhat theǇ͛ǀe got iŶ DB, DC, state 
pension, and other sources of capital. 
They need advice, but regulated advice will not make financial sense for most people. There 
ǁas ǁidespƌead ĐƌitiĐisŵ of the FCA͛s ƌole ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to the issue of adǀiĐe: 
 ͚The FCA doesŶ͛t ĐoŶsideƌ the pƌofit ŵotiǀes of adǀiseƌs. IŶ effeĐt it has stopped 
employers and trustees from helping members, because they have to tread on 
eggshells aƌouŶd the adǀiĐe/guidaŶĐe ŵess. It͛s a Đase of ͞ǁhateǀeƌ Ǉou do, uŶdeƌ 
Ŷo ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes ŵust Ǉou giǀe ŵeŵďeƌs useful iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͛͟.  ͚The FCA is iŶ deŶial – if the right people to advise members are not permitted to do 
so, we will have another scandal of similar proportions to the personal pension mis-
selling scandal [in the 1980s and 1990s]͛. 
3.19.1.2 Providers and investment managers 
What are your views on defaults?  
In one sense, there is alǁaǇs a default iŶ deĐuŵulatioŶ ǁhiĐh is ͚doiŶg ŶothiŶg͛. “o, the 
default might be to stay in the final stage of accumulation default fund, unless an active 
decision is made. What subsequently happens depends on the scheme rules: 
 In a contract-based scheme, it is not possible to force annuitisation (due to unfair 
contract terms legislation), although it might be possible, depending on the contract, 
to require the member to take a surrender value at some age (e.g., 75)   In a trust-based scheme, trustees have the poǁeƌ to saǇ to a ŵeŵďeƌ ͚if Ǉou doŶ͛t 
tell us otheƌǁise, afteƌ oŶe Ǉeaƌ ǁe ǁill ďuǇ Ǉou aŶ aŶŶuitǇ͛ ;i.e., theǇ ĐaŶ foƌĐe 
annuitisation as a default). Trustees do want a process for moving people from 
accumulation to decumulation, but are concerned about having a specific default, 
since retrospectively, a member could claim they would have been better off with a 
different solution. So trustees still need to give choices (which conflicts with the idea 
of a single default). 
It was also recognised that maŶǇ people ǁill take ͚the path of least ƌesistaŶĐe͛, ǁheƌeďǇ the 
individual accepts the decumulation product of the pension provider. This used to be the 
pƌoǀideƌ͛s aŶŶuitǇ ;ƌatheƌ thaŶ the opeŶ ŵaƌket optioŶͿ. Noǁ, this ǁill ďe Đash oƌ soŵe 
form of drawdown product. 
Some insurance company participants questioned whether there was even a need for a 
separate default decumulation fund. It could simply be a continuation of the accumulation 
fund, but used to deliver a certain percentage of the fund as income each year until, say, 
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age 75. Others pointed out that this could lead to a similar consumer detriment as 
previously existed with rollover/internal annuities. 
There was support for the idea of default pathways using decision trees, with a small 
number of branches in the decision tree, dealing with health, dependants, other assets and 
liabilities, tax, etc. However, others thought that narrowing down to a single universally 
suitably default will be difficult if not impossible, even though they recognised that defaults 
may be useful.  
It was agreed that an appropriate default should recognise and give appropriate weighting 
to the need for a secure retirement income as the basis upon which to build other access 
options, accepting that there is both a demand for a secure income (guaranteed income for 
life) and a demand for flexibility. However, the first aim should be to secure basic lifelong 
iŶĐoŵe to ŵeet the Ŷeeds of ͚heatiŶg aŶd eatiŶg͛. You ĐaŶ theŶ add a platfoƌŵ foƌ 
drawdown. 
Two defaults were proposed (both meet the needs of a good scheme): 
 Drawdown plus a deferred annuity  Layering – first secure essential life-loŶg eǆpeŶdituƌe ;͚heatiŶg aŶd eatiŶg͛Ϳ, theŶ 
allow for luxuries (e.g., a SPEEDOMETER plan). 
However, there are challenges with the first of these proposals. Individuals do not really 
want to manage investment risk. In the US, for the small number those who choose to take 
out longevity insurance, around 10-15% of the fund at retirement is used to buy a deferred 
life annuity.  In the UK, a key problem with a deferred annuity is cost and this will be made 
worse by the introduction of Solvency II in 2016. People might decide to wait until, say, age 
85 and buy an immediate annuity, but these might not appear to be good value due to 
selection factors.  
We were told that there is potentially a problem with having a default that arises from 
MiFID.796 MiFID says you cannot put people into a commercial contract without their 
consent. However, we were informed that it is possible to get around this by getting a Letter 
of Comfort from the EU. This was the mechanism used to get around a similar problem in 
the case of auto-enrolment in the UK.  
What are your views on guidance and advice? 
We first asked about the distinction between guidance and advice in relation to a decision 
tree for a default decumulation strategy. We were told by Huw Evans, CEO of the ABI, that 
theƌe is aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ͚adǀisoƌǇ͛ aŶd ͚adǀiĐe͛ iŶ EŶglish laǁ. A deĐisioŶ 
tree would be advisory, but is not really advice. However, there is no distinction between 
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͚adǀisoƌǇ͛ aŶd ͚adǀiĐe͛ iŶ the ĐuƌƌeŶt ƌegulatoƌǇ fƌaŵeǁoƌk. If a deĐisioŶ tƌee is Đlassified as 
advice, then it means that it is regulated. This is not at all useful and would need to change 
for a decision tree to work in the manner intended.  
We were also told that schemes using a decision tree would need to make sure customers 
haǀe used the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s Ŷeǁ guidaŶĐe seƌǀiĐe, PeŶsioŶ Wise, eǀeŶ though this just 
takes stoĐk of people͛s assets and liabilities and explains the options available.  
If these two hurdles can be crossed, then we were told that it might be possible to follow up 
Pension Wise with a standardised decision tree (possibly with statutory approval) which 
would be suitable for those above the new trivial commutation level (£30,000) and below 
those classified as high net worth, i.e., middle income households with assets below 
£100,000. 
It would be better if the decision tree had a standardised set of questions across all 
providers. These might be aligned with the questions asked under advanced protection (or 
the second line of defence) which gives the FCA comfort that a provider is not selling a 
standard product to someone with a health problem, is not selling a single life product to a 
married man, is not selling a fixed-income product to someone who makes clear that he 
wants an inflation-protected income, etc. However, we were told that this would cause a 
problem if the provider does not offer a product covered by a particular question. 
TuƌŶiŶg to the ƋuestioŶ of adǀiĐe ŵoƌe geŶeƌallǇ, the Ŷatuƌe of ͚adǀiĐe͛ ǁill ǀaƌǇ iŶ teƌŵs of 
how it is regarded under FCA regulations. It could be fully regulated fee-based advice 
(where the firm makes a clear recommendation and therefore is responsible/liable) or some 
otheƌ foƌŵ of ͚ŶoŶ-adǀiĐe͛ ;ǁheƌe the fiƌŵ pƌoǀides deĐisioŶ tƌees, eǆplaiŶs optioŶs etĐ, ďut 
the individual makes the final choice – in which case the individual is responsible and the 
firm has little or no liability).  
All participaŶts ǁeƌe agƌeed that the FCA͛s ǀaƌious defiŶitioŶs of adǀiĐe is a ŵajoƌ pƌoďleŵ 
and out of step with what the DC decumulation market needs. This has to change. One 
paƌtiĐipaŶt told us that the FCA͛s attitude is that oŶlǇ the ďest ǁill do, ǁhich implies that we 
have a zero-failuƌe ƌegiŵe. But the ͚ďest is eŶeŵǇ of the good͛ – it results in advice costs of 
at least £1,500 which no one wants to pay. However, it was believed that the FCA will say its 
hands are tied by EU law.  
The concept of advice has to change to make it more useful to customers. Advice should 
help people uŶdeƌstaŶd the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ͚ǁaŶt͛ aŶd ͚Ŷeed͛ aŶd help people ĐlaƌifǇ 
the decisions they need to make. At present, people are presented with a whole range of 
complex questions and choiĐes aŶd theŶ told ͚Ǉou͛ƌe oŶ Ǉouƌ oǁŶ͛. Even guidance or a steer 
toǁaƌds a siŶgle solutioŶ oƌ eǀeŶ tǁo solutioŶs ĐoŶstitutes ͚adǀiĐe͛ uŶdeƌ ĐuƌƌeŶt ƌules. The 
implication is that most customers are overwhelmed by choice, but have nowhere to turn 
without paying £1,500 for advice.  
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What is the solution to this problem?  We were told that the simplest solution involves only 
three routes: 
 Execution-only – the customer makes all the decisions  ͚Filteƌed ĐhoiĐe͛ – the customer is steered towards tailored options (e.g., low-risk 
funds); but this is still currently classified as advice  Personal recommendation (i.e., full regulated advice) 
It would then be necessary to find a way to nudge the mass population towards a soft 
default or a set of default pathways. Three types of nudging were suggested to us: 
 Guidance  What do ͚people like me͛ do?797  Advice (needs to be simplified, targeted) 
However, participants told us that the industry is still a long way from this ideal. For 
example, one provider told us they had built a simplified advice website but acknowledged 
that it does Ŷot ƌeallǇ seƌǀe Đustoŵeƌs͛ Ŷeeds. The FCA has ƌeǀieǁed eǆistiŶg siŵplified 
advice models, but says that they are not clear enough. No life office has yet brought a 
simplified advice model to the market, which is regarded as very telling. 
All agreed that guidance/advice is where there is a need for real innovation – far more than 
in product design. The use of web-enabled technology is already producing good results. 
Consumer education is another key factor and the industry needs to rise to the challenge.  
It was also agreed that guidance and advice could not be a single event, but had to be a 
process. There needed to be periodic financial health checks, with at a minimum of one 
leading up to retirement, and another before age 75. 
Theƌe ǁas ĐoŵŵoŶ agƌeeŵeŶt aŵoŶgst iŶteƌǀieǁees that the FCA͛s adǀiĐe aŶd guidaŶĐe 
ƌegiŵe is little shoƌt of ĐatastƌophiĐ aŶd does ǀiƌtuallǇ ŶothiŶg to pƌeǀeŶt Đustoŵeƌs ͚self 
haƌŵiŶg͛. There was also common agreement that the two regulators, the FCA and TPR, 
should merge. 
 
3.19.1.3 Trade unions 
What are your views on advice to members? 
A participant opeŶed ǁith the ĐoŵŵeŶt: ͚What Ǉou ĐaŶ haǀe is a default to fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe. 
The scheme or employer can say we will pay for you to have a session with a regulated 
financial adviser who will take responsibility for that advice (and the individual therefore has 
recourse if wrong advice is given). Guidance is great because it takes you through your 
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 See for example, https://www.fidelity.co.uk/investor/getting-started/tools-info/people-like-me.page 
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options. But if the best thing for you is drawdown or an annuity, that is buying a regulated 
financial product. But the way the industry is at the moment, it is difficult to get financial 
adǀiĐe foƌ pots less thaŶ £ϯϬ,ϬϬϬ͛.  
We pointed out that 75% of people currently have pots less than £30,000 and regulated 
advice can cost £1,000 or more, which prompted the discussion: 
 ͚If schemes are paying for this, may be they are able to bring costs down͛  ͚If it is the case of an employer having to pay, I cannot see them leaping at that͛  ͚To my mind, the only way you would get employers to take on the real responsibility 
and cost is if the state said ͞we are going to subsidise advice through tax relief or 
some other mechanism͛͟   ͚There is no incentive for an employer to do it͛  ͚Low and middle-income savers lack the trust and experience of dealing with 
financial advisers. This is why attention should be focused on default options not 
advice͛  ͚Some unions (e.g., Unison with Lighthouse, Unite) and have directories of financial 
advisers͛  ͚Advisers have an interest in (maintaining) complexity. With good defaults you can 
take a lot of the complexity out of it. People do not really want regulated advice. 
They want to be directed͛  ͚Advisers just try to sell you stuff͛. 
 
3.19.2 Responses to the consultation paper 
We summarise the responses to Questions 22-31 in the consultation paper here. 
22. It is now recognised that many people face a number of behavioural barriers which 
prevent them behaving optimally. When it comes to decumulation, what are the key 
barriers? 
A wide range of behavioural barriers were mentioned by the different respondents. The 
barrier to optimal behaviour that was most commonly mentioned was the lack of financial 
literacy. Other behavioural barriers included poor understanding of longevity risk, lack of 
engagement, short termism, framing effects, procrastination and over/under confidence. 
23. We need to recognise that retirees: have different expenditure needs during different 
phases of their retirement; need to pace their spending throughout retirement in order to 
optimise the use of their lifetime assets and income and their ability to make intended 
bequests; and need a choice architecture that reflects the market segment to which they 
belong. (a) What is your understanding of the regulatory consumer market segmentation 
and is this appropriate in relation to the needs of DC retirees? (b) What nudges and choice 
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architecture do people need to deal with these issues and overcome the behavioural barriers 
they face? 
There was general agreement on the characterisation of market segmentation into mass 
market, mass-affluent market and high net worth. A substantial minority of responses were 
enthusiastic about nudges, but more thought that it was more important to provide better 
information. 
24. (a) What lessons from auto-enrolment in the accumulation phase can be brought to 
the decumulation phase?  
Responses to this were very mixed. Respondents agreed that inertia had provided benefits 
in the accumulation phase of pension saving, but not all thought that this could be used in 
the decumulation phase: one reason for this was the greater diversity of needs in the 
decumulation phase, which makes it much harder to provide appropriate defaults. There 
were also differing views on whether defaults were needed to address the issue of inertia or 
whether they discouraged engagement with the process and made matters worse. Several 
responses suggested having a menu with a limited number of default choices. 
24. (b) Given the importance of income security for the elderly and the existence of 
longevity risk, is there a case for  defaulting people into buying longevity insurance via auto-
enrolment (i.e., drawdown with longevity insurance becomes the default retirement 
strategy)? Consider the advantages and disadvantages of such a strategy.  
Responses were equally divided on whether or not there should be defaults into longevity 
iŶsuƌaŶĐe. OppoŶeŶts said that suĐh a poliĐǇ ǁas iŶĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ 
and that it would be hard to select an appropriate range of options for heterogeneous 
pensioners with different needs. The most enthusiastic supporters said that people could 
always opt out. 
24. (c) What would be the likely annualised cost of such products for individuals? 
Responses suggested that the cost of default longevity products depends on too many 
factors to provide a simple answer. 
24. (d) How could the default principle, upon which the success of auto-enrolment is 
predicated, be best reconciled with the individual freedoms for DC decumulation introduced 
in the 2014 Budget? 
Responses were very divided on whether or how defaults into longevity products could be 
reconciled with choice and there was no agreed position. Supporters of defaults thought 
there was no real problem of reconciliation: defaults were useful in eliminating confusion 
and helped those who wanted to be told what to do, while everyone was free to opt out.  
Opponents said individuals needed advice to take full advantage of the individual freedoms. 
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25. What aƌe the iŵpliĐatioŶs of the ChaŶĐelloƌ͛s announcement in September 2014 
effectively ending the 55% tax rate on inherited pension pots? 
A third of respondents thought that ending the 55 per cent tax rate on inherited pension 
pots would encourage more pension savings. Others thought people might feel obliged to 
use their pension pot for inheritance, rather than spend it during their own retirement. 
Most recognised that the issue was irrelevant for people with small pension pots. 
26. What are your views on the guidance guarantee and how effective it will be? 
Many responses thought that it was too soon to tell whether the guidance guarantee would 
be effective and many had concerns that it would be insufficient, especially for those who 
wanted to be told what to do. 
27. (a) Will other forms of guidance and advice be needed?  
There was a very strong view that more support would be needed than the guidance 
guarantee alone. A quarter of responses thought that there needed to be a level of support 
between guidance and advice. 
27. (b) For DC savers who prefer to make their own decisions, what is the best way to 
build on the guidance guarantee to help individuals avoid buying retail products that are 
inappropriate (e.g., in relation to risk) and/or poor value (e.g., in relation to price)? 
Most responses thought that better information needed to be provided to build on the 
guidance guarantee, possibly via online resources. Only a minority referred to advice or 
nudges. 
28. (a) What specific risks should regulatory safeguards aim to address in relation to 
financial decisions made at retirement? 
Respondents identified three main risks of decision-making at retirement that need to be 
addressed by regulation: the risk that individuals purchased inappropriate products (e.g., a 
married person buying a single life annuity); the investment risks faced by individuals; and 
the risk of scams and mis-selling. 
28. (b) At what point does individual choice cease to be a regulatory 
concern/responsibility? 
Responses disagreed on when individual choice ceases to be a regulatory concern. On 
balance, responses suggested that it was when (or if) an individual secured an income for 
life. A significant minority (42 per cent) said that the point of the recent reforms was to 
provide choice and that this would inevitably mean that at some point consumers should be 
free to make mistakes and hence not the concern of the regulator. 
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29. Some DC customers might draw down all their pots in the early years of retirement, a 
decision they might subsequently regret. What is the most effective way of assisting DC 
customers to act in their best long-term interests? 
Respondents were divided on how to assist DC customers to act in their best long-term 
interests and not make decisions that they subsequently regret. Some responses noted that 
the poiŶt of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ is to alloǁ ĐhoiĐe aŶd that the possiďilitǇ of ďad ĐhoiĐes 
must be accepted as part of that. The responses to this question on how to avoid bad 
choices were varied and included defaults, better education and incentives to secure an 
income (at varying points in retirement). 
30. (a) What is the best way of ensuring that any DB-to-DC transferees only undertake 
such a transfer when it is in their best interests? 
The large majority of respondents thought that transfers from DB to DC should only be 
allowed after taking advice (with an exception for small pots). Many accepted that the 
advice could be ignored, although one suggested that transfers should be banned if the 
advice was negative. One response suggested that if individuals wanted to transfer out they 
should take advice at their own expense. 
30. (b) What are your estimates of the number of DB-to-DC transferees (deferred and 
also active) and size of assets involved? 
Very few responses provided estimates of the number of DB-to-DC transferees. Those that 
did thought that about ten per cent would transfer. 
30. (c)  Is the requirement for regulated independent advice for such transferees 
adequate? 
The few responses to this question believed that the requirement for regulated 
independent advice for DB-to-DC transferees was adequate. 
30. (d) Can/will the guidance guarantee process cope with DB active/deferred members 
who seek help in considering their options? 
Respondents thought that the guidance guarantee for DB members was inadequate. 
31. Are there other ways of supporting pension savers to make the right choice at 
retirement for them and their family? 
Respondents suggested that a combination of approaches (including advice, nudges, 
incentives and information) would be needed to support pensioners to make the right 
choice at retirement. Some believed that better education and improved financial literacy 
were required in the longer term. 
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3.20 Analysis and recommendations 
3.20.1 Analysis 
This Chapter is Đalled ͚“uppoƌtiŶg saǀeƌs to ŵake the ƌight ĐhoiĐe at ƌetiƌeŵeŶt foƌ theŵ 
and their family and how to build on the lessons of auto-eŶƌolŵeŶt͛. IŶ oƌdeƌ to ŵeet this 
aim, we need to examine, in turn, each of the players involved in or commenting on pension 
provision: savers, the national media, advisers, the wider financial services industry, and the 
FCA. We also consider pension fraudsters and investment scammers, and the self-employed 
and non-eligible job holders. We begin with savers (i.e., the pension scheme members). 
3.20.1.1 Savers  
The model of economic behaviour underlying the pension flexibilities introduced in the 2014 
Budget is the exact opposite of the model underlying auto-enrolment.   
The model used by the Chancellor George Osborne on 19 MaƌĐh ϮϬϭϰ ǁas that of aŶ ͚eĐoŶ͛, 
a rational lifetime financial planner: 
People who have worked hard and saved hard all their lives, and done the 
right thing, should be trusted with their own finances. 
AŶd that͛s pƌeĐiselǇ ǁhat ǁe ǁill Ŷoǁ do. Tƌust the people.… 
I am announcing today that we will legislate to remove all remaining tax 
restrictions on how pensioners have access to their pension pots. 
Pensioners will have complete freedom to draw down as much or as little 
of their pension pot as they want, anytime they want. 
No caps. No drawdown limits. 
Let me be clear. No one will have to buy an annuity. 
 
However, the model used in auto-enrolment (AE) to get people to save more for their 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt is that of a ͚huŵaŶ͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh iŶeƌtia aŶd other behavioural biases drive 
behaviour. With AE, individuals make no active choice to join a pension scheme, are 
enrolled at a default contribution rate, and do not need to choose the fund into which their 
contributions are invested.  
So the Government has relied on the model of ͚huŵaŶs͛ to get people to do soŵethiŶg 
relatively simple – namely get them to save a bit more – and is now relying on the model of 
͚eĐoŶs͛ to get people to Ŷegotiate the highlǇ Đoŵpleǆ pƌoĐess of deĐuŵulatioŶ.   
As “aƌa BeŶǁell poiŶts out: ͚Auto-enrolment largely exists because we believe that people 
are either incapable or unwilling to save for their future. At the same time, ͞freedom and 
choice͟ makes the assumption that people are capable of making good decisions about 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt. It doesŶ͛t take a ďehaǀiouƌal eĐoŶoŵist to tell Ǉou soŵethiŶg͛s Ŷot ƌight heƌe, 
ďut ǁhat ďehaǀiouƌal sĐieŶĐe ĐaŶ tell Ǉou is the tǁo poliĐies aƌeŶ͛t just ĐoŶtƌadiĐtoƌǇ; theǇ 
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aƌe uŶdeƌpiŶŶed ďǇ diaŵetƌiĐallǇ opposed assuŵptioŶs aďout the ǁaǇ people ǁoƌk͛.798 As 
the FCA itself recognised in its June 2015 discussion paper Smarter Consumer 
Communications: ͚We ĐaŶ ďegiŶ to uŶdeƌstaŶd ǁhǇ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ofteŶ fail to ŵake good 
decisions about financial products and services, when we take into account that behavioural 
biases, low levels of financial literacy and the complexity of some financial services and 
pƌoduĐts ĐaŶ liŵit people͛s aďilitǇ to take appƌopƌiate aĐtioŶ͛. Eitheƌ that oƌ the 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ďelieǀes that ͚huŵaŶs͛ haǀe soŵehoǁ tƌaŶsfoƌŵed iŶto ͚eĐoŶs͛ oǀeƌ the 
course of their working lives.   
Gƌeg Daǀies, head of the BaƌĐlaǇs ďehaǀiouƌal fiŶaŶĐe teaŵ, Đoŵpaƌed AE ǁith ͚fƌeedoŵ 
aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛:799  
It͛s Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌilǇ eŶough to eŶsuƌe that eǀeƌǇoŶe is iŶ the ƌight situatioŶ 
for them. 
Essentially, nudging people to make pensions contributions creates better 
outcomes, but to ensure optimum outcomes, we also need to educate 
people to ensure they save more and in the right way. 
That engagement has long-teƌŵ ďeŶefits as ǁell ďeĐause it͛s oŶlǇ ďǇ 
having engagement over time that we do actually build up the confidence 
and the knowledge for people to start approaching the decisions when 
theǇ͛ƌe deĐuŵulatiŶg ǁith aŶǇ degƌee of ĐoŶfideŶĐe. 
[With the new pensions freedoms], we now have a raft of behavioural 
issues that are going to be there that wereŶ͛t theƌe ďefoƌe. 
This is largely because the assumptions behind auto-enrolment are right. If 
we can learn anything from the past it is that when left to their own 
devices, people make sub-optimal decisions. 
By shifting to an opposing behaviour assumption at the finish line of the 
pensions process, we are assuming people will act in a different way. When 
ǁe look at the pooƌ ĐhoiĐes people ŵade ǁheŶ ĐhoosiŶg aŶ aŶŶuitǇ, it͛s 
Đleaƌ that this isŶ͛t the Đase. 
When left to their own devices, people make sub-optimal decisions. 
The assumption seems to be that in the intervening decades between 
ǁheŶ ǁe Ŷudged people iŶto saǀiŶgs ǁheŶ theǇ ǁouldŶ͛t do it theŵselǀes, 
we now seem to believe that they have magically become able to 
assimilate large quantities of information in a short period of time and 
make optimal decisions for their future. 
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 Sara Benwell (2015) 'Freedom and choice' could be the undoing of the pensions industry, Pensions Insight, 
30 January. 
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 Quoted in Sara Benwell (2015) 'Freedom and choice' could be the undoing of the pensions industry, 
Pensions Insight, 30 January. 
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GiǀiŶg people ĐhoiĐe oŶ its oǁŶ doesŶ͛t seeŵ to ďe that ǁell gƌouŶded iŶ 
our behavioural knowledge, because we know that if you give people 
Đoŵpleǆ ĐhoiĐes, iŶ aŶ aƌea that theǇ͛ƌe not experts in, particularly one 
which involves trade-offs over time between actions now and outcomes in 
the future, these are all features that make people deeply uncomfortable. 
 
Complexity is indeed a key problem. Many of the risks in Table 1.2 are very hard to 
understand – even for pension professionals. Pensions must be made simpler to appeal to 
ordinary savers, according to Lesley Williams, the first chair of the Pensions and Lifetime 
Savings Association (PLSA),800 as well as group pensions director at Whitbread. In her first 
speeĐh as Đhaiƌ, she said that ͚ǁe'ƌe kiddiŶg ouƌselǀes if ǁe thiŶk eduĐatioŶ ǁill fiǆ͛ the 
problem of people not understanding pensions or being engaged in them and that it will 
only treat the symptoms. Savers should not be regarded as the problem – rather the 
industry and policy-makers are collectively to blame for creating complexity in pensions. Ms 
Williaŵs said that, ǁhile she is a ͚ƌeal ďelieǀeƌ͛ iŶ default pathǁaǇs, she ďelieǀed that the 
industry could make pensions simpler and less technical for the end customer.801 Speaking 
at the same event as Ms Williams, Andy Harrison, chief executive of Whitbread, said: 
͚PeŶsioŶs haǀe alǁaǇs ďeeŶ haƌd foƌ people to uŶdeƌstaŶd, ďut the tƌust iŶ peŶsioŶs is 
probably the lowest it has been in my lifetime. Government really has not helped, but we 
Ŷeed to do the ďest ǁith ǁhat ǁe haǀe… The lessoŶ fƌoŵ AE's suĐĐess ǁas siŵpliĐitǇ aŶd 
solid ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ǁoƌked aŶd this Đould ďe applied to otheƌ pƌoďleŵs iŶ peŶsioŶ͛.802 
Of Đouƌse, if the ͚eĐoŶ͛ ŵodel is right, we do not need to worry about any of this – econs are 
Ŷot tƌouďled ďǇ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ. If, iŶstead, the ͚huŵaŶ͛ ŵodel ďetteƌ desĐƌiďes ŵost people͛s 
behaviour – which appears to be the case – then we should be looking for a framework for 
nudging people to behave in what is in their best long-term interests. Running out of money 
before they die and living in poverty in very old age is ĐleaƌlǇ iŶ Ŷo oŶe͛s loŶg-term interests.  
It was to avoid this possibility that pension schemes providing lifetime incomes – rather 
than lump sums – first started in this country. 
Given the complexities of decumulation and the risks in Table 1.2, the challenge is to design 
a simple and effective default decumulation strategy that deals with the key risks in the 
Table, yet allows for the flexibilities made possible by the 2014 Budget. At the very 
minimum, we believe that an effective quasi-default decumulation strategy – initiated by 
the scheme members, but which they can always opt out of – can be designed which allows 
for:  
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 Reported in Stephanie Baxter (2015) NAPF 2015: Incoming chair blames industry and policymakers for 
complexity in pensions, Professional Pensions, 16 October. 
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Reported in Michael Klimes (2015) NAPF 2015: Whitbread chief says trust in peŶsioŶs ͚loǁest iŶ ŵǇ 
lifetiŵe͛, PƌofessioŶal PeŶsioŶs, ϭϰ OĐtoďeƌ. 
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 access  investment performance to beat inflation during retirement and   longevity insurance. 
This could be determined using a standardised decision tree (possibly with statutory 
approval) which will be suitable for those above the new trivial commutation level (£30,000) 
and below those classified as high net worth, i.e., middle income households. 
Those opposiŶg a default eŵploǇ a ͚oŶe size does Ŷot fit all͛ aƌguŵeŶt. While this is a 
reasonable point to make – although much less so if the member can opt out of the default 
– we do not believe that most people͛s ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes aƌe so Đoŵpleǆ that they cannot use a 
decision tree with a small number of pathways that lead them to a set of suitable retirement 
income products that will meet their life-long expenditure needs – especially if the 
alternative is 350,000-400,000 different bespoke solutions per year, one for each retiree 
ǁhateǀeƌ the size of theiƌ peŶsioŶ pot. We should alǁaǇs ďeaƌ iŶ ŵiŶd the stateŵeŶt ͚the 
best is the eneŵǇ of the good͛. If the default is ͚good͛, theŶ that should ďe ͚good eŶough͛ 
for most members with relatively small pension pots – especially if the alternative is a huge 
set of expensive, highly engineered, over-complex solutions designed by providers and 
advisers. 
An important aspect of the success of such a quasi-default will be consumer engagement. 
The value of any product or service depends on the time and effort that goes into planning 
it. Consumers understand this with products and services which give immediate 
gratification, such as holidays. Can we get them to understand that the same applies to 
products and services involving deferred gratification, such as retirement income solutions?  
Related to this is the number of product and solution choices. While competition can be 
good and lead to product innovation, it also leads to a proliferation of essentially identical 
products which are marketed as being different. This leads to customer confusion. 
Consumer engagement will improve if there are only a small number of well-designed 
products and solutions being offered to customers. 
We expect – and certainly hope – that, whether nudged, guided or advised, the majority of 
decumulation strategies after April 2015 will take the form of either (a) layering (e.g., 
SPEEDOMETER plans), or (b) cash and income drawdown, with longevity insurance in the 
form of annuity purchase deferred until later life. Retirees in poor health without 
dependants might well choose to access their funds in full at the date of retirement. 
Nevertheless, we would find it very hard to understand if savers in good health at 
retirement were not advised to purchase longevity insurance as part of their retirement 
expenditure plan. Careful tax planning will also be a feature of such strategies in order to 
avoid people paying too much tax in the early years of the plan. However, this can be quite 
straightforward for most people, if they have access to a simple table that allows them to 
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calculate how much they can withdraw from their fund in one year in relation to their 
current income before they move into a higher tax bracket. 
Another important aspect will be realism. Clearly, consumers value flexibility, but it can be 
expensive to provide. The new flexibilities have placed product providers in a similar 
position to an airline pilot who believes her passengers want to fly from London to Sydney, 
but, as she is about to land, is told that the passengers have changed their mind and want to 
fly to Shanghai instead.  It can, of course, be done, but only at a price. Consumers also value  
guarantees, but they are also expensive. For example, guaranteed drawdown which gives 
complete flexibility of withdrawal can result in the income that can be withdrawn being up 
to 30% less than an equivalent annuity. 
Related to this is consumer vulnerability. Humans can be particularly vulnerable when it 
comes to financial services and the FCA has estimated that up to 50% of UK consumers are 
potentially vulnerable. Humans are also prone to overconfidence, bordering on arrogance. 
There is nothing potentially more toxic in financial services than consumers who are not 
aware of their own vulnerability and are dismissive when this is pointed out to them. This is 
particularly true when it comes to investment and longevity risks, the two key risks in 
retirement. Both risks are likely to be dismissed as unimportant by many humans.  
3.20.1.2 The national media 
The situation has not been helped by national media reports that emphasise the immediate 
problems that people have accessing their pension pots, but which do not mention longer-
term risks, such as investment and longevity risks, or the importance of the additional 
protection/second line of defence that was designed to protect consumers.  
Typical are these extracts from Daily Mail articles:803 
More than 100,000 savers have already discovered they face a fee if they 
take advantage of the new pension freedoms. 
Radical reforms introduced two months ago promised that the over-55s 
could cash in their pots rather than being forced to use the money to buy 
an annuity, or income for life. 
But a Money Mail investigation found some savers are being charged huge 
fees if they withdraw their funds or seek financial advice, while others are 
being allowed no access at all to their cash. 
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Louise Eccles and Ruth Lythe (2015) 100,000 are hit by huge fees to join pension revolution: One in ten 
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Now, industry analysts have revealed one in ten over-55s eligible to take 
advantage of the pension freedoms will have to pay if they want to get 
their hands on their hard-eaƌŶed saǀiŶgs.…. 
Many pensioners have been told they cannot withdraw their money until 
they have seen a financial adviser. 
But if the adviser believes it would be a bad idea to cash in their pot, some 
pension firms have then refused to let people do so. Advisers and pension 
firms are worried they will face fines for mis-selling if customers later blow 
their cash and end up penniless in retirement. 
But critics said savers must be allowed to spend their money as they wish, 
even if it contradicts professional advice. Paul Green, of over-50s specialist 
fiƌŵ “aga, said: ͚People should ďe tƌusted ǁith theiƌ oǁŶ ŵoŶeǇ.͛…. 
We have identified six major failures of the reforms: 
1: Firms refusing to hand over savings 
Before the reforms, most pension providers promised they would take part. 
They admitted there were challenges, but that things would be ready on 
time. In practice, many savers are finding this is not the case. 
Research from actuary firm Barnett Waddingham found that none of the 
major pension firms offer full access to all the freedoms. 
“oŵe haǀe puďliĐlǇ adŵitted theǇ ǁoŶ͛t alloǁ saǀeƌs to use theiƌ peŶsioŶ 
as a bank account. 
2: £1,000 for advice you don't want 
Some big insurers are so scared of being accused of mis-selling that they 
refuse to help customers unless they have had formal financial advice.  
There are specific circumstances where savers have to take guidance for 
their own protection. These include anyone who wants to take all their 
cash at once from a pension of more than £30,000, and those with 
guaranteed payout rates written into their contracts. 
But many firms are telling customers they have to see an adviser 
regardless of circumstances. A session with a financial adviser will typically 
cost £500 to £1,000. 
3: Savers stuck in limbo with no help 
Money Mail has been bombarded with letters from savers stuck in limbo 
after their insurer and financial adviser refused to help them. 
“oŵe haǀe ďeeŶ tuƌŶed aǁaǇ ďǇ dozeŶs of fiƌŵs ǁho just doŶ͛t ǁaŶt theiƌ 
business. In many cases, savers have visited advisers for help withdrawing 
all their cash from a pension. 
The adǀiseƌ has ƌeĐoŵŵeŶded that theǇ doŶ͛t do this, ďut ǁheŶ the 
customer insists they still want to press ahead, the adviser refuses to 
assist. 
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4: Delays of up to 90 days 
Time and time again, Money Mail has come across savers being forced to 
jump through hoops before they can access their own savings. 
It͛s leaǀiŶg ŵaŶǇ facing substantial delays in getting their cash. 
Often, savers are being made to move their money to a different type of 
pension and, though the official industry figures show this should be 
completed within ten days, readers and independent experts say it can 
take as many as 90. 
5: Sky-high fees and crippling red tape 
Even when they are allowed to get their hands on their pension savings, 
many retirees are being confronted with sky-high charges. 
There is also a dazzling array of terms and conditions that stop them using 
their pot as they would wish. Savers can be hit with a set-up fee of £184 
and then charges to manage their pension fund on top of that. They can 
also be asked to pay from £20 to £90 – and in some cases up to £240 – 
every time they make a withdrawal. 
Some firms only allow wealthy savers access to the freedoms. According to 
Barnett Waddingham, you can only have flexible drawdown at Legal & 
General if you have £30,000 saved, £20,000 at Royal London, or £50,000 at 
Zurich. 
At the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s approved low-cost pension provider NEST, you can 
only have access to the freedoms if you are prepared to take all your 
savings in one go –  potentially exposing yourself to a massive tax bill. 
6: Insurers who cut value of your pot 
Money Mail has also heard from savers who have been told they cannot 
enjoy the freedoms unless they move to a new type of pension – at a steep 
cost. 
When they switch the money to the newer scheme they are hit with a 
charge. 
A typical problem occurs when someone wants to take their pension over 
the age of 55, but then discovers their contract prevents them from doing 
so without penalty before the age of 60 or 65. 
 
Articles such as these give the impression that the pension fund is held in cash and people 
are being charged high fees for accessing it. If the pension fund were held in cash, the return 
on the pension fund would be very low. Instead the pension fund is invested in growth 
assets that aim to generate higher average long-term returns, but which are hard to 
liquidate at short notice. If the pension fund had to hold more assets in cash-like 
instruments, just in case someone wants to withdraw money without notice, this will bring 
down the return on the overall pension fund – which would lead to a different complaint 
from the national media. Even more important is that there is no mention of longevity risk. 
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Pension assets have to last a lifetime – complaining that it takes 90 days to access a pension 
pot ƌeallǇ is the ǁƌoŶg issue to ďe disĐussiŶg at the staƌt of soŵeoŶe͛s ƌetiƌeŵeŶt. 
3.20.1.3 Advisers 
The evidence we have gathered in the earlier Sections of this Chapter suggests that advisers 
need to address five key issues. 
First, advisers do Ŷot appeaƌ to ďe suffiĐieŶtlǇ foĐused oŶ the ĐoŶsuŵeƌ͛s ƌeal Ŷeeds. Most 
consumers (as many as 90% according to one study) have very simple needs. They also have 
very modest resources in retirement. Such consumers need something very straightforward, 
namely financial help.   
There is insufficient clarity amongst advisers about the appropriate way to segment the 
market and about the level of assets below which financial help in the form of a purely 
advisory default pathway will be adequate. We believe the market should be segmented by 
behavioural type, by spending type, and by resources and needs – and suitable integrated 
solutions offered to each segment. This would assist in determining the appropriate level of 
guidance, help and advice more effectively. The evidence we have gathered suggests that, 
as a rough rule of thumb, those below £30,000 need only guidance (provided it deals 
effectively with the impact on entitlement to welfare benefits or unless they actively choose 
something different), those with £30,000-£100,000 need help via a default pathway (unless 
they to actively choose something different), and those with more than £100,000 would 
benefit from full advice (unless they also choose something different).  
Anyone who strongly believes that full advice is needed as a default by those with smaller 
amounts should bear in mind that the new single-tier state pension has a capital value of 
around £200,000 and no one is setting up a business to advise people how to spend their 
state pension. Also when drawdown was first introduced, it was deemed to be a suitable 
product for people with a pension fund above £250,000. 
Theƌe has to ďe a ŵiddle ǁaǇ ďetǁeeŶ guidaŶĐe aŶd ƌegulated adǀiĐe. MaŶǇ people͛s pots 
are just not big enough and their financial circumstances are just not complicated enough to 
warrant full regulated advice. If we do not end up with a simple set of default pathways 
which the middle market can use with confidence, then there are two dangers. The first is 
that many people will not take advice at all, in which case, we need to answer the question 
ƌaised ďǇ IaŶ PƌiĐe, diǀisioŶal diƌeĐtoƌ of peŶsioŶs at “t Jaŵes͛s PlaĐe: ͚LiďeƌatiŶg peŶsioŶs 
will be the new windfall and the new boost to consumption, but what happens when that 
money is all spent and people still haǀe ϭϬ to ϭϱ left iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt?͛804 The second is that 
many of the 350,000-400,000 people who retire each year will be persuaded by advisers and 
providers that they need a personally designed bespoke retirement income solution that 
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has been exclusively prepared for them. It would, of course, be nice if we could all afford 
our own interior designer when we redecorated our homes, but most people do not need 
one. Peter Bernstein ĐoiŶed the phƌase ͚iŶteƌioƌ deĐoƌatoƌ fallaĐǇ͛ foƌ the aƌguŵeŶt that 
ŵost people͛s iŶǀestŵeŶt poƌtfolios should ƌefleĐt iŶǀestoƌ ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs suĐh as attitude 
to risk in the same way that interior decorators attempt to reflect the personal taste of their 
clients.805 There is a hint of the interior decorator fallacy about the argument that every 
retiree needs full regulated advice. 
There is, of course, an important role for advice for those prepared to pay for it, but it 
should be highly focused at its cost should reflect this. As John Porteous, head of client 
proposition at Towry, says: ͚As a general observation, there seem to be three primary 
challenges that the industry faces in delivering both effective and valued client outcomes for 
a rapidly growing market: 
 Advice policy around the relative merits of the options available  Investment strategy to support a sustainable standard of living   Ongoing communication and client engagement over time͛.806 
Second, advisers appear to be too focused on their own revenue generation, rather than 
providing the right type of advice for the right type of client. We were told that the advisers 
ǁeƌe ͚pushing for decumulation to be a retail market for obvious reasons: it͛s paǇďaĐk tiŵe, 
as they have lost out when auto-enrolment was introduced – ǁith Ŷo Ŷeed foƌ adǀiĐe͛.  
It is also somewhat surprising that advisers had not sorted out whether they should have a 
fee-based or percent-of-assets charging structure by the time that the pension freedoms 
began. Steve Lewis, head of distribution – retirement solutions at LV=, believes a fixed fee 
ĐaŶ ǁoƌk foƌ sŵalleƌ pots: ͚The ĐhalleŶge is doiŶg that iŶ aŶ effiĐieŶt ǁaǇ ǁhiĐh ĐleaƌlǇ 
eǆplaiŶs the ƌisk aŶd ďalaŶĐes to the ĐlieŶt ǁithout ĐƌeatiŶg aŶ eǆĐessiǀe ďuƌdeŶ of fee….A 
lot of people below £100,000 will come into the drawdown space. I suspect we will see 
adviser firms doing it on a fixed-fee basis; so perhaps fixed initial fees, and pre-determined 
fees foƌ ͞adǀiĐe eǀeŶts͛͟.807 
It is significant to note that very few professional services firms – lawyers, accountants, etc – 
now charge on an ad valorem basis. Instead they charge on the basis of the amount of work 
done, typically expressed as an hourly rate. One of the reasons for this change was the loss 
of professional indemnity cover in cases where clients successfully sued a professional 
services firm and the firm could not justify the size of the fee charged against the amount of 
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work done, typically expressed in terms of hours worked.
808 
 Many in the financial services 
industry, in particular advisers and investment managers, along with estate agents, still 
charge on an ad valorem basis and we wonder why that is the case.   
The new pensions regime is an opportunity for financial advisers – and other financial 
services firms such as investment managers – to put themselves on the same footing as 
most of the rest of the professional services industry. We accept advisers need to be 
adequately rewarded, but there also needs to be much clearer evidence that the charging 
method used provides customer value for money. If advisers want to be compared with 
estate agents, then estate agents have smart high street offices, embrace the latest 
technology and have enthusiastic sales staff selling your property.  
Third, and equally remarkable, is the lack of clear charge disĐlosuƌe oŶ adǀiseƌs͛ ǁeďsites. 
The argument that exact fees can only be established after a conversation to gauge the 
work involved does not prevent fees for typical scenarios being published. With estate 
agents, lawyers, and accountants, for example, it is also easy to find out the sales 
commission or fees that will be charged without feeling committed to using a particular 
agent. We recognise that people want to sell their house, for example, whereas most 
people do Ŷot ͚ǁaŶt͛ iŶǀestŵeŶt adǀiĐe, ďut we should also ask why that is the case, given 
that many people have pension pots and houses of similar value. 
Fourth, the advice industry also has to redesign its business model to deal with new 
technologies such as online advice and the competitive challenges this will bring for both 
the revenue and cost side of the model. Similarly, simplified advice will be suitable for many 
people aŶd that has to ďe deliǀeƌed at loǁ Đost, aŶotheƌ ĐhalleŶge foƌ the adǀiseƌs͛ ďusiŶess 
model.  There is a very clear role for low-cost, fixed-fee robo-advice for people with pension 
pots between £30,000 and £100,000 – with fees of around £100 p.a. per client. 
Finally, there is the issue of the professional standards of advisers. Advisers have certainly 
become more professional in recent years. For example, the Financial Adviser School was 
launched in 2011 and offers vocational and academic training for financial advisers. It was 
established by the Sesame Bankhall Group and sold to Intrinsic in October 2015.809 Similarly, 
the Society of Later Life Advisers (SOLLA) has created an industry standard for retirement 
advisers called the SOLLA Retirement Advice Standard (RAS).810 To satisfy the standard, 
SOLLA accredited advisers need to hold a QCF level 4 financial planning qualification, a 
statement of professional standing (SPS), and the minimum qualifications in equity release 
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and long-term care.
811 
 In November 2015, the Chartered Insurance Institute (CII) announced 
that it would launch a new Life and Pensions Foundations examination unit (LF1) to support 
professional standards in the life and pensions sector. It is targeted at new entrants as well 
as those already working in customer-facing jobs. People who pass will get a CII Level 2 
Award in Life and Pensions Foundations. The exam is designed to enhance public confidence 
in life and pensions.812  
Despite this, advisers are not a recognised profession, unlike accountants, and this is 
affecting recruitment into the industry. The average age of advisers is rising and could be as 
high as 50, according to recent surveys, implying that not enough younger people are 
looking at financial advice as a career choice. A debate on LinkedIn suggested reasons why 
this was happening and put it down to the absence of a recognised career path in financial 
advice. According to Lawrence Gosling: ͚The Đost of tƌaiŶiŶg is too high, Ŷot eŶough people 
are taking up some of the excellent financial services degrees which are available at 
universities, and the generally negative image of the profession outside the industry. One 
participant perceptively made the comparison with accountancy, pointing out trainee 
accountants have a clear career path – pass the two Chartered accountancy exams and you 
can practice. Then, after a couple of years, you can become a fellow of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants. There is no such clear equivalent in the advice sector, which could 
ƌead ͞take the eǆaŵs, theŶ a feǁ ŵoƌe, ďe suďjeĐt to a Đouple of FCA audits, realise the cost 
of professional indemnity insurance is high, network like crazy, and you might get a few 
ĐlieŶts͟. But eǀeŶ afteƌ all of this, Ǉou do Ŷot haǀe a Đaƌeeƌ, uŶless Ǉou ĐaŶ fiŶd a fiƌŵ to 
take you on, or get lucky and find a couple of good ĐlieŶts aŶd set up oŶ Ǉouƌ oǁŶ͛.813  
 
3.20.1.4 The wider financial services industry 
There is always going to be a tension between competition and cooperation, but the 
evidence we have gathered in this and the previous Chapter suggests that there is currently 
too much tension between (a) advisers and providers (who are fighting a turf war over 
access to clients), and between (b) investment managers and insurance companies (who are 
fighting a turf war over control of client pension assets) to the detriment of consumers.  
On the one hand, we have customers, many of whom do not understand the risks they face 
in retirement, are not interested in finding out more about these risks, and even when told 
about them, do not care. Yet, they still need to use their pension pot to provide them with a 
͚good͛ life-long retirement income journey. 
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On the other hand, we have suppliers – advisers, providers, investment managers and 
insurance companies – which should be offering integrated effective value-for-money 
solutions to these customers, but which appear to be more concerned about protecting 
their own patch and their own revenues. This means that instead of an integrated approach 
in which each supplier contributes an appropriately designed component that fits well in an 
overall ͚good͛ solutioŶ, we are seeing a fragmented approach in which each supplier offers 
ǁhat theǇ ĐoŶsideƌ to ďe the ͚ďest͛ solutioŶ, without taking into account the full retirement 
journey that the member needs to make. So, for example, we are seeing investment 
ŵaŶageƌs ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdiŶg eƋuitǇ iŶĐoŵe fuŶds as the ͚ďest͛ solutioŶ foƌ pƌoǀidiŶg 
retirement income, without any acknowledgement of the importance of dealing with 
longevity risk. Or we have advisers who see full regulated advice as the ͚ďest͛ solutioŶ foƌ 
everyone, irrespective of the size of their pension pot. Just as bad, we have advisers more 
concerned with inheritance tax planning than with managing longevity risk. All this is 
aĐtuallǇ ǁoƌse thaŶ the Đustoŵeƌ gettiŶg a ͚flat pack fuƌŶituƌe uŶit͛. At least ǁith a ͚flat pack 
fuƌŶituƌe uŶit͛, you know what you are going to get, once you have put the pieces together 
ĐoƌƌeĐtlǇ. What the Đustoŵeƌ is ďeiŶg offeƌed Ŷoǁ is a ƌaŶge of iŶĐoŵplete ͚flat pack 
furniture units͛, with no clear way of putting them together and no obvious piece of 
furniture that is recognisable at the end of the exercise. 
There are other examples of bad practice. For example, we see providers and insurance 
companies relying on customer inertia to retain accumulation-stage customers, once they 
eŶteƌ the deĐuŵulatioŶ stage. As JaŶette Weiƌ, fouŶdeƌ of IgŶitioŶ House, said: ͚We aƌe iŶ 
danger in the drawdown market [that] we will make the same mistakes as in the annuity 
market. In the annuity market, inertia was key and people just went with their providers. It 
caused all sorts of problems. The FCA got involved and drawdown is compounding that, 
because, if the providers don't offer drawdown solutions and have appropriate funds to go 
with that, then people will find it impossiďle to shop aƌouŶd. It is ƌeallǇ diffiĐult foƌ theŵ͛.814  
Another example is client poaching. Advisers have recently accused providers of 
inappropriate contact with clients that the adǀiseƌs haǀe ͚iŶtƌoduĐed͛ to theŵ, e.g., Aegon 
was accused of poaĐhiŶg dozeŶs of aŶ adǀiseƌ͛s ĐlieŶts foƌ its diƌeĐt-to-consumer (D2C) 
platform, although the FCA said the provider had broken no rules. A Professional Adviser 
survey of 76 advisers found that half had experienced at least one incidence of a provider 
contacting their clients in a way they felt was inappropriate. Some respondents thought that 
some providers were deliberately trying to undermine the relationship between the adviser 
aŶd the ĐlieŶt: ͚OŶe pƌoǀideƌ ǁƌote to a ĐlieŶt ǁithout ĐopǇiŶg to ŵe, statiŶg: ͞As Ǉouƌ 
adviser has not made any changes to your investment in the last three years, we have 
ƌeŵoǀed theŵ as the adǀiseƌ foƌ this plaŶ͟. But ǁe had ďeeŶ ƌeǀieǁiŶg the plaŶ aŶŶuallǇ. 
“o this led to houƌs of ǁoƌk, Ŷeedless ĐoŶtaĐt aŶd aŶŶoǇaŶĐe foƌ the ĐlieŶt͛. Otheƌs said the 
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problem could be resolved if the adviser was always notified of any coŶtaĐt: ͚The 
relationship between client, adviser and provider should be seen as a partnership in its 
loosest form. As such, I am quite comfortable with providers contacting clients direct but 
ǁith the pƌoǀiso that a ĐopǇ is seŶt to the adǀiseƌ͛. Neǀeƌtheless, most respondents wanted 
the FCA to intervene and limit the amount of freedom providers have to contact their 
clients.815  
Providers would certainly like to be able to give advice to their clients, as Paul Bucksey, head 
of DC at BlaĐk‘oĐk, poiŶts out: ͚MǇ sense is that there is a reluctance among members of 
pension schemes to pay for advice. [Providers can, and should, step in to fill the gap.] From 
an advisory point of view, anything we can do as a provider which is more than listing out a 
range of funds is good. From our perspective, we certainly welcome a bit more clarity 
around firstly acknowledging that people need some help, most people want to be told 
ǁhat to do…. Pƌoǀideƌs, like BlackRock, can do more without getting into personal 
recommendations. This concept of simplified advice, rules of thumb, being able to tell 
people they should be aiming to coŶtƌiďute aďout ϭϱ%, foƌ eǆaŵple, is Ŷot ͚adǀiĐe'. It is 
giving people some guidance, some rules of the road. If you go into drawdown, if you take 
an income of no more than 5%, that would be quite sustainable, but at the moment, people 
get theƌe aŶd ask: ͞hoǁ ŵuĐh should I take?͟; ͞hoǁ ŵuĐh is too ŵuĐh?͛͟. Mƌ BuĐkseǇ͛s 
Đolleague ToŶǇ “teŶŶiŶg, head of UK ƌetail at BlaĐk‘oĐk, added: ͚We should aďle to saǇ this 
stuff without thinking it is advice. Or that it would not be construed as advice if it came from 
TPA“ oƌ MA“, ďut it ǁould ďe if it Đaŵe fƌoŵ BlaĐk‘oĐk͛.816 Clearly a number of providers 
feel that they should be able to offer this sort of financial help to their clients without having 
to bother about advisers. 
We believe that there should be a much more focused narrative based on an appropriate 
segmentation of the market and providing good integrated solutions for each market 
segment. There needs to be a much greater spirit of co-operation amongst the four main 
players involved in pension decumulation – at least in the early stages of the development 
of the new market. Even so, there will be winners and losers. The winners are likely to be 
providers benefiting from the inertia of their clients and investment managers offering 
decumulation products with flexibility and guarantees. The losers will be insurance 
companies selling annuities and advisers trying to get people with less than £100,000 to pay 
very much for advice.  Advisers offering simplified or robo-advice might have better luck in 
this market segment, but still might find it hard to get customers to pay much more than 
£100 per year for it. Advisers offering full regulated advice might find their client pool 
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restricted to those will assets above £100,000 – although it is also clear that many will be 
comfortable with only this type of cleint. 
3.20.1.5 The Financial Conduct Authority 
The current regulatory process is not working well either for customers or their advisers. 
The main reason for this is that the key regulator, the FCA, appears to be confused about 
ǁhetheƌ the ͚huŵaŶ͛ ŵodel of the Đustoŵeƌ is ŵoƌe appƌopƌiate thaŶ the ͚eĐoŶ͛ model. On 
the one hand, it talks of vulnerable consumers. On the other hand, its chief executive 
speaking at the NAPF investment conference in Edinburgh on 11 March 2015 says the 
consumers must take responsibility. Something that is really rather straightforward  –  the 
delivery of a pension, something we have been doing for hundreds of years – has become 
fiendishly complicated, not least because of endless regulatory interventions. 
Taking first the customer. In terms of products, there are no safe harbour products that the 
FCA is currently prepared to recognise. In terms of advice, the regulator distinguishes 
between half a dozen definitions of advice, while the average customer is unable to 
differentiate between advice and guidance. There are just too many different types of 
advice.   
Turning to advisers, they have become fearful of offering common sense solutions to clients.  
We are currently in the extraordinary position of having, on the one hand, people being 
given a whole new set of flexibilities, yet, on the other hand, it is apparently not possible for 
the industry to design a sensible default that helps manage the risks in Table 1.2 without 
coming up against the barrier of regulated advice. As Tony Stenning from BlackRock has 
said: ͚It is a ŵiŶefield. People do Ŷeed help aŶd ǁe haǀe ouƌ haŶds tied ďehiŶd ouƌ ďaĐk. 
Clearly, one of the unintended consequences of RDR was the advice gap. Individuals now 
have much more flexibility and choice which is great, but that also increases their anxiety. 
When you ask people, they really want guidance and to be helped. [But] there is a very thin 
liŶe ďetǁeeŶ adǀisiŶg theŵ aŶd guidiŶg theŵ͛.817  
There needs to be greater clarity on suitability and appropriateness. As Rachel Vahey has 
said: ͚OďǀiouslǇ, [the FCA] will need to develop new guidance on suitability. At the moment, 
it is clear drawdown is only suitable for those with large funds and who understand the risks 
and take them on coŵfoƌtaďlǇ͛. 
Does a decision tree constitute advice? If so, is it regulated? If so, this needs to change. As 
mentioned previously, there is aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ͚adǀisoƌǇ͛ aŶd ͚adǀiĐe͛ iŶ 
English law. The decision tree is advisory but not advice. However, there is no distinction 
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ďetǁeeŶ ͚adǀisoƌǇ͛ aŶd ͚adǀiĐe͛ iŶ the ĐuƌƌeŶt legislatiǀe fƌaŵeǁoƌk. This too Ŷeeds to 
change. 
One way out of the impasse is for the FCA to recognise safe harbour retirement income 
plans. These involve the use of key safe harbour products and a decision tree. Any adviser or 
provider who uses the decision tree and assesses the suitability of the safe harbour products 
for their customers would not subsequently face problems with the FOS. It is important that 
the FCA approves both the decision tree and the default options at the end of the decision 
tree, even if these can only be classified as options that aƌe ͚good eŶough͛, ƌatheƌ thaŶ the 
͚ďest͛ possiďle optioŶs foƌ ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes. 
In Chapter 2, we provided a list of potential safe harbour products:  
 In the annuities class:  
o Lifetime annuities (with/without capital protection) – fixed and inflation-
linked 
o Investment-linked annuities (with a minimum income underpin and 
with/without capital protection) 
o Enhanced annuities  In the drawdown class: 
o Capped drawdown (with a minimum income underpin)  In the hybrid class: 
o Variable annuities (with a minimum income underpin) 
o Guaranteed drawdown (with a minimum income underpin).  
It is important that there is full transparency over the product design and over charges for 
each of the above products – and that the charges are demonstrably not excessive. 
Retirement income solutions which do not offer longevity insurance that (together with the 
state and any defined benefit pensions) covers at least essential expenditure should not be 
given a safe harbour status. Products not granted safe harbour status should not be sold 
without regulated advice. Anyone selling them should be open to future claims for mis-
selling. 
As Derek Bradley, CEO of Panacea Adviser, also argues, simplified advice cannot work 
ǁithout siŵplified ƌegulatioŶ: ͚“iŵpliĐitǇ of fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe deliǀeƌǇ, it seems, is difficult to 
define. There is considerable uncertainty and fear of regulatory retro-retribution for getting 
it wrong, a lesson well and truly learned by advisers. Now here's a simple thought. What if 
the regulator were to define and approve what products could be safely placed in this 
simplified space, along with a simple set of tick-box questions and processes to confirm 
client understanding of product, purpose and suitability in any application. We know that 
ǁould ƌeƋuiƌe ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ fƌoŵ the FCA,….[ďut] eǀeŶ if FCA ĐlaƌitǇ ǁas possiďle, the FO“ 
does Ŷot do ͚ĐlaƌitǇ' to the eǆteŶt it ĐaŶ ďe ƌelied upoŶ. It is the simplified advice killer. To 
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pƌoǀe this a Ŷuŵďeƌ of ŵajoƌ fiƌŵs haǀe ĐoŶĐluded that siŵplified adǀiĐe is Ŷot ͞ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ 
ĐoŵŵeƌĐiallǇ ǀiaďle͛͟.818  
Finally, the FCA needs to sort out the question of customer safeguards. As Huw Evans told a 
Work and PensioŶs Coŵŵittee heaƌiŶg iŶ “epteŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϱ: ͚We ŵust ƌesolǀe the teŶsioŶ 
that came to light when the reforms were implemented around safeguards that have been 
put in place. Some customers deeply resent those safeguards and want to find a way round 
them. A decisions has to taken by policymakers to find a way forward. A resolution to that 
has to be sorted. As a part of that, we absolutely need to clarify what the advice 
requirements are. Some providers were still unclear when they had to ensure customers 
take regulated fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe͛.819  
3.20.1.6 Pension fraudsters and investment scammers  
When it introduced pension freedoms, the Government completely underestimated the 
extent to which pension fraudsters and investment scammers would also seek to enjoy 
these pension freedoms. A great deal of belated effort has gone in to trying to rectify this 
problem, but with limited success to date. It is a potentially bigger risk to pension scheme 
investors than, say, investment risk. 
3.20.1.7 The self-employed and non-eligible job holders 
There are around 4.5m who are self employed  and around 6.2m non-eligible job holders. 
This means that around 10.7m people working in the UK will not be auto-enrolled onto any 
pension scheme. Very little is known about their pension arrangements, although it is 
almost certainly the case that their pension arrangements need improving. 
The RSA did not believe that auto-enrolment of these groups into NEST or another of the 
larger master trust schemes was appropriate due to the administrative challenges, and also 
because of the clear preference amongst many of them to have flexible access to their 
savings.  Instead, the RSA proposed a Government-backed ISA to encourage these groups to 
saǀe ŵoƌe, togetheƌ ǁith a Ŷudge iŶ the foƌŵ of a ͚“aǀe WheŶ Paid͛ optioŶ to paǇ iŶto the 
ISA when an invoice is received or a tax form has to be filled. 
3.20.2 Recommendations 
Our analysis in this Chapter leads us to make the following 12 recommendations. 
 
                                                     
818
 Derek Bradley (2014) Simplified advice can't work without simplified regulation, Professional Adviser, 30 
July. 
819
 Reported in Jenna Towler ;ϮϬϭϱͿ CoŵpaƌiŶg peŶsioŶs to ďaŶk aĐĐouŶts ͚iƌƌespoŶsiďle͛, ABI Đhief ǁaƌŶs, 
Professional Adviser, 8 September.  
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Recommendation 3.1: Safe harbour retirement income plans 
We recommend that a quasi-default retirement income plan is designed and used by 
providers and advisers. This will involve a simple decision tree and a limited set of default 
pathways. The plan would be self-started following a guidance or advice surgery, and the 
plan member has the right to opt out until the point at which the longevity insurance kicks 
in.   
The guidance or advice surgery needs to collect information on: 
 pension pot size  other sources of lifelong income (especially any state and defined benefit 
pensions)  other sources of wealth (such as housing equity)  liabilities (e.g., mortgage, credit card debts)  health status  family circumstances, including bequest intentions   given other income sources, health status and family circumstances, decide the 
levels of expenditure that are considered essential, adequate and desired  tax position  risk attitude  risk capacity. 
The plan could be operated by a provider or an adviser. Two forms of the plan would be 
acceptable: 
 drawdown plus a deferred annuity, or  layering – first secure essential life-loŶg eǆpeŶditure ;͚heatiŶg aŶd eatiŶg͛Ϳ, theŶ 
allow for luxuries.  
The plan must allow for:  
 access – the flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis  inflation protection (either directly or via investment performance), and   longevity insurance. 
The customer will choose from a set of safe harbour products approved by the regulator. 
The purpose of the decision tree is to identify the products that are most suitable for 
ŵeetiŶg the custoŵer͛s Ŷeeds. To be feasible, any default pathway using a decision tree 
would need to be aligned with the guidance guarantee process in a way that it is not 
classified as regulated advice or a personal recommendation. This is because a decision 
tree is advisory – not advice – and so would be granted safe harbour status. Any adviser or 
provider making use of such a retirement income plan would be protected against future 
mis-selling claims.  
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A ǁhole ƌaŶge of pƌoďleŵs that eŵeƌged duƌiŶg the eaƌlǇ ŵoŶths of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ 
can be overcome by using such a default, e.g., lack of financial engagement and capability by 
members, ineffective communications, and scammers. 
 
Recommendation 3.2: Simplifying the definitions of information, guidance and advice 
We recommend that the Financial Conduct Authority: 
 reviews its multiple definitions of information, guidance and advice with a view to 
replaciŶg theŵ ǁith just tǁo categories: ͚persoŶal recoŵŵeŶdatioŶ͛ aŶd ͚fiŶaŶcial 
help͛, with the latter replacing everything that is not full regulated fee-based 
advice where the adviser takes responsibility for the personal recommendation  recognises that a quasi-default decuŵulatioŶ strategǇ is ͚advisorǇ͛ rather thaŶ 
͚advice͛ aŶd that advisers aŶd providers should ďe able to explain the quasi-default 
decumulation strategy and assess suitability without this being classified as 
regulated advice. 
The simplest solution involves only three routes: 
 execution-only – the customer makes all the decisions ;͚I ǁaŶt to do it ŵǇself͛Ϳ  ͚financial help͛ – the customer is helped or steered towards tailored options using a 
decision tree; but this is currently classified as advice ;͚Help ŵe do it͛Ϳ  personal recommendation or full regulated advice ;͚Do it foƌ ŵe͛820) 
It is also important to recognise that guidance and advice cannot be a single event, but has 
to be a process. There needs to be periodic financial health checks or just simple reminders: 
 10 years prior to the nominated retirement date to confirm whether a de-risking 
glidepath is required and, if so, when it needs to begin  1 year prior to the nominated retirement date to re-confirm commencement date  at age 74 to review death benefits  at ages 80 and 85 to confirm implementation of longevity insurance (i.e., the switch 
to annuitisation if drawdown was used at the beginning of retirement). 
 
Recommendation 3.3: Appropriate segmentation of the advice market 
We recommend that: 
 an attempt is made to segment the advice market in a way that would be helpful 
to consumers. There are a number of ways of doing this, e.g.: 
                                                     
820
 Terms used by the Universities Superannuation Scheme. 
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o by level of assets – Is there a level of a ssets ďeloǁ ǁhich ͚fiŶaŶcial help͛ 
alone will be adequate (for most people) and above which full regulated 
advice is recommended?   
o by spending type – Are there speŶdiŶg tǇpes for ǁhoŵ ͚fiŶaŶcial help͛ 
alone will be adequate and are there spending types for whom full 
regulated advice is recommended? 
o bǇ ďehavioural tǇpe, e.g., ͚ecoŶ͛ or ͚huŵaŶ͛. EcoŶs oŶlǇ Ŷeed iŶforŵatioŶ in 
order to make informed decisions. Humans face behavioural barriers and 
biases which need to be identified early on (e.g., low levels of financial 
literacy, overconfidence, and self-control and hyperbolic discounting 
problems). Are there simple nudges that would improve effective decision 
making by humans, such as:   help   What do ͚people like ŵe͛ do?  advice (simple and targeted)?  an attempt is made to agree on: 
o the appropriate level of help or advice for each market segment 
o the appropriate role of technology (e.g., robo-advice) for each market 
segment. 
The service in economy class is broadly similar across different commercial airlines and the 
same is true for business class and first class. Millions of people are content with this simple 
ĐlassifiĐatioŶ. WhǇ ĐaŶ͛t the fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe ŵaƌket ďe segŵeŶted iŶ a siŵilaƌ ǁaǇ? 
 
Recommendation 3.4: Turning financial advisers into a recognised profession 
We recommend that financial advisers undertake a review of their industry with a view to 
transforming themselves into a recognised profession. The following issues would be 
covered in the review: 
 formalising and improving the professional (including training) standards of 
advisers  introducing a fiduciary standard for financial advisers who provide full regulated 
advice  the appropriate charging model for the service offered (fixed fee or percentage of 
assets), with the charges demonstrably delivering value for money to the customer 
and with full transparency over charges. 
Financial advisers are not a recognised profession, yet they wish to provide advice on 
billions of pounds of UK retirement savings. Further, research by the FCA shows that 
customers are put off seeking financial advice because they are unable to trust the advice 
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they receive or judge its quality. The obvious solution is to transform themselves into a 
recognised profession. They should continue to improve their professional standards, 
accepting that the advice market might be smaller, although more profitable as a result. In 
particular, the professional training of advisers should be improved, with a much greater 
emphasis on understanding the risks involved in delivering retirement income solutions and 
how those risks can be measured, monitored and managed.821   
Advisers should also consider introducing a fiduciary standard for those who provide full 
regulated advice, as in starting in the US. This requires adǀiseƌs to aĐt solelǇ iŶ theiƌ ĐlieŶts͛ 
best interests.822  
The current disparate views expressed by the industry on both the nature of the service 
offeƌed ;ƌaŶgiŶg fƌoŵ ͚eǀeƌǇoŶe Ŷeeds ďespoke adǀiĐe͛ to ͚adǀiĐe is oŶlǇ ŶeĐessaƌǇ foƌ the 
very well off͛Ϳ aŶd the ĐhaƌgiŶg ŵodel ;fixed hourly rate vs percent-of-assets) is not helpful 
to consumers or in the long-term interests of advisers. We need a common national 
narrative on both these issues, bearing in mind that surveys show that most consumers are 
not currently prepared to pay very much for advice, because they do not place much value 
on it.  
In terms of adviser fees, there needs to be much greater justification of ad valorem fees 
where the fee is unrelated to the amount of work done. Such fees are now very uncommon 
in most other types of professional services organisations. Charges also need to be 
transparent and easy to understand. It is not acceptable in this day and age that a potential 
client needs to have a long face-to-face meeting with an adviser before they are told what 
the charge will be, and then feel under some moral pressure to accept this charge. 
 
Recommendation 3.5: Review of the unresolved implementation challenges of the 
pension reforms  
We recommend that the Financial Conduct Authority: 
                                                     
821
 The actuarial profession was required to do this following the Equitable Life debacle and the resulting 
Morris Review of the Actuarial Profession in 2005. Further, there are only around 5,000 actuaries in the UK, 
less than 25% of the number of financial advisers;  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/morris_final.pdf 
822
 Following the Morris Review, the actuarial profession adopted five core ethical principles which should 
underpin the conduct of all members when related to their professional lives (see The Actuary Magazine, 
August 2009):  Integrity  Competence and care  Impartiality  Compliance  Openness. 
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 reviews the circumstances where mandatory advice is necessary  clarifies the legal consequences for customers, advisers and providers when 
͚iŶsisteŶt clieŶts͛ act against advice. 
We support proposals, made by the ABI and others, to deal with the remaining 
implementation challenges of the pension reforms.  
 
Recommendation 3.6: Review of the powers of independent governance committees  
We recommend that the Government reviews the powers of independent governance 
committees (IGCs) in contract-based schemes with a view to making them equivalent to 
the powers of trustees in trust-based schemes.  
This essentially means giving IGCs a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of scheme 
members. For example, IGCs should be given the power to fire an underperforming fund 
ŵaŶageƌ ǁithout ƌeƋuiƌiŶg the ŵeŵďeƌs͛ eǆpƌess ĐoŶseŶt. 
 
Recommendation 3.7: Dealing with pension fraud and investment scams 
We recommend the following measures are taken to deal with the problems of pension 
fraud and investment scams: 
 all financial product sales (covering both regulated and unregulated products) 
should be brought under a common regulatory umbrella  telemarketing (cold-calling) should be made illegal  penalties for pension fraud and investment scams should be greatly increased.  
There can be no hiding place for pension fraudsters and investment scammers. 
 
Recommendation 3.8: Customer responsibility  
We recommend that the Government initiates a national debate amongst relevant 
stakeholders on the appropriate degree of customer responsibility and what industry and 
regulators need to do before consumers can reasonably become liable for their decisions 
in retirement. 
Associated with this should be attempts to improve customer engagement via better 
customer communications. 
 
431 
 
Recommendation 3.9: Introduction of an ͚earlǇ ǁarŶiŶg sǇsteŵ͛ to help retirees 
We recommend that the Government introduces the following measures to support 
consumers as soon as possible: 
 a ͚peŶsioŶs dashďoard͛  ͚persoŶal peŶsioŶ alerts͛ to help policǇŵakers iŶterveŶe ǁhere appropriate ǁith 
the sub-groups it has identified as at particularly high risk.  
We support the various proposals that have been made to develop a ͚pensions dashboard͛ 
that would enable consumers to view all their lifetime pension savings (including their state 
pension) in one place. In the past, this idea has been dismissed as too much of a 
technological challenge, given the multiple data bases that this information is held on, but 
we understand that the technology is now available to do this.823  
We also suppoƌt the pƌoposal foƌ iŶtƌoduĐiŶg ͚personal pension aleƌts͛, developed by the 
Social Market Foundation, which ǁould eŶaďle poteŶtial iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs, suĐh as ͚taƌgeted 
support and advice; initiatives to make retirees think twice before taking one-off decisions 
suĐh as ǁithdƌaǁiŶg all theiƌ peŶsioŶ saǀiŶgs; aŶd, a ͞ŵid-ƌetiƌeŵeŶt fiŶaŶĐial health ĐheĐk͟ 
to encourage older people to reconsider their financial position for their later yeaƌs͛. 
 
Recommendation 3.10: Monitoring outcomes 
We recommend that the Government puts in place a monitoring mechanism to assess the 
success of the ͚freedoŵ aŶd choice͛ peŶsioŶ reforŵs. This should be benchmarked against 
the criteria for a good pension scheme listed in Recommendation 1.1 and Table 1.1. 
Data should be collected from sources such as Pension Wise, the ABI, the FCA and HMRC.  
Focus groups should be established to discuss their experience. We support the Work and 
Pensions Select Committee͛s ƌeƋuest foƌ ďetteƌ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ oŶ: ͚customer characteristics of 
those using freedoms from pot size to sources of retirement income; take-up of each 
channel of guidance; reasons for not taking up guidance and advice; subsequent decisions 
made and reasons for those decisions͛. 
 
 
                                                     
823 IŶ JaŶuaƌǇ ϮϬϭϲ, it ǁas ƌepoƌted that the FCA aŶd TP‘ ǁeƌe ǁoƌkiŶg oŶ desigŶiŶg a ͚peŶsioŶs dashďoaƌd͛. 
Michael Roe, development manager at Origo, said that the technical architecture was available to support this 
initiative (reported in Sara Benwell (2016) FCA and TPR working together on pensions dashboard, Pensions 
Insight, 22 January). 
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Recommendation 3.11: The annuities market 
We recommend: 
 The  sale of immediate annuities should be via an auction  The Government should facilitate and encourage the development of a market in 
deferred annuities.  
The first point deals ǁith the pƌoďleŵ ideŶtified ďǇ the FCA iŶ ϮϬϭϰ, ŶaŵelǇ ͚ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ 
tendency to buy from their existing pension provider [which] weakens competitive 
discipline. Not only do incumbent providers feel less pressure to offer competitive vesting 
rates, but challengers find it difficult to attract a critical mass of consumers. As a result, 
theƌe has ďeeŶ liŵited Ŷeǁ eŶtƌǇ iŶto the deĐuŵulatioŶ ŵaƌket iŶ ƌeĐeŶt Ǉeaƌs͛. It is also 
likely that these annuities will be medically underwritten, i.e., applicants have to fill in a 
medical questionnaire which asks health and lifestyle questions. 
The second point attempts to address the problem that an open market in deferred 
annuities does not exist in the UK, yet is essential to provide the longevity insurance needed 
for the decumulation default to work (see Recommendation 3.1). The various reasons why 
a deferred annuity market does not exist (e.g., onerous regulatory capital requirements 
under Solvency II) need to be addressed. 
 
Recommendation 3.12: The self-employed and non-eligible job holders for auto-
enrolment  
We recommend that the Government: 
 considers revising the qualification for auto-eŶrolŵeŶt froŵ a ͚per joď͛ ďasis to aŶ 
͚coŵďiŶed joďs͛ ďasis  begins to collect more reliable information on the pension arrangements of the 
self-employed and non-eligible job holders for auto-enrolment  investigates the possibility of establishing a Government-backed arrangement (like 
an ISA) to help these groups save for their retirement  considers how to help these groups draw a retirement income in a cost-effective 
manner. 
The combined size of these two groups is significant: 4.5m self-employed people (17% of the 
employed population) and 6.2m non-eligible job holders (24% of the employed population), 
implying that around 11m people working in the UK will not be auto-enrolled onto any 
pension scheme.  
The qualification for auto-enrolment is assessed oŶ a ͚peƌ joď͛ ďasis, ǁhiĐh iŵplies that 
individuals with a number of low-paid jobs will be excluded from auto-enrolment onto a 
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pension scheme. The PPI estimates that ͚if the iŶĐoŵe fƌoŵ ďoth fiƌst aŶd seĐoŶd joďs ǁas 
taken into account when assessing eligibility for automatic enrolment, then a further 80,000 
people (60,000 ǁoŵeŶ aŶd ϮϬ,ϬϬϬ ŵeŶͿ ǁould eaƌŶ eŶough to ŵeet the ƋualifǇiŶg Đƌiteƌia͛. 
We fully recognise the practical difficulties of implementing this recommendation. Further, 
the recommendation might not actually be desirable if it results in workers falling into a 
benefit trap. Indeed, it might be the case that the only feasible way of dealing with this 
group of workers is through the state pension system. 
We could find no accurate data on the combined number of the self-employed or non-
eligible job holders with individual DC policies. Similarly, when it comes to decumulation, it 
is likely that these groups will fail to benefit from institutional value for money solutions and 
instead will have to rely on the high-cost retail market, unless NEST establishes a 
decumulation scheme which they could join. 
We support the call of the Resolution Foundation ͚for greater intervention to ensure the 
self-employed [and and non-eligible job holders for auto-enrolment] are adequately 
pƌepaƌed foƌ theiƌ lateƌ Ǉeaƌs͛. These groups should be encouraged to save more for their 
retirement, but in a way that allows them flexible access to their savings and has low 
charges. We therefore support the recommendation of the RSA for the introduction of a 
Government-backed ISA (e.g., provided by National Savings & Investments) to facilitate this. 
IŶ additioŶ, the gƌoups Đould ďe eŶĐouƌaged to joiŶ NE“T. We also suppoƌt the ‘“A͛s ͚“ave 
WheŶ Paid͛ proposal which automatically diverts a percentage of every pay cheque to a 
savings account. 
When it comes to drawing an income in retirement, both groups should be allowed access 
to a national decumulation scheme like NEST (once its decumulation blueprint has been 
implemented).  
Appendix: Information services for customers and advisers 
Services for customers 
In September 2015, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (PRA) launched a Financial Services Register of firms and individual and collective 
investment schemes. The register will include the names of unauthorised firms as well as 
firms knowingly running a scam.824 
The Money Advice Service's (MAS) retirement adviser directory was launched in April 2015. 
It contains a list of 5,000 financial advisers – both independent and restricted – specialising 
in retirement planning for those wanting to access regulated paid-for advice following the 
introduction of the new pensions regime. The directory asks people a number of filtering 
                                                     
824
 Reported in Laura Miller (2015) FCA to include scam firms in relaunch of official register, Professional 
Adviser, 4 September.  
434 
 
questions, such as why they want advice and what size of pot they have, to ensure they are 
guided to the most suitable advisers. The MAS is also working on a charges display to its 
directory so people can compare costs before they seek advice. A total of 6,000 people 
accessed the directory in its first month of operation, although MAS is not currently able to 
say how many people went on to receive advice.825 
In April 2015, the Personal Finance Society launched a consumer financial education website 
called Yourmoney to help consumers make better informed decisions about their personal 
finances.826 It contains a fully-searchable directory of more than 22,000 accredited financial 
advisers, all of whom are members of the PFS and must abide by the society's code of 
professional ethics. The directory contains information on the costs of professional advice. It 
also contains links to financial planning tools from the Money Advice Service, Which? and 
Moneyfacts. It can be accessed at: www.thepfs.org/yourmoney.827 
In March 2015, the Association of British Insurers launched Your Retirement, Your Choice, a 
campaign to help customers understand their choices in retirement in the new pensions 
environment. Its aim is to prevent people from rushing into decisions, while pointing them 
to the Government's guidance guarantee. It will also make people aware of pension scams 
and how to avoid becoming a victim.828 
In October 2015, the Money Advice Service launched a 10-year strategy to enhance financial 
capability in the UK.829 The aim is to improve people's ability to manage money well day to 
day, prepare for and manage life events, and deal with financial difficulties. It will also 
educate people about the difference between financial guidance and advice, help them 
understand when they need advice and how to get it. The work will cover consumers of all 
ages – from education in schools to at-retirement. Progress will be monitored through a 
'financial capability survey' and formal reviews will be published in 2020 and 2025, alongside 
updates on the strategy's website. Advisers will be able to contribute to the strategy by 
joining a number of steering groups, which will each have their set of specific targets and 
success measurements. 
                                                     
825 
Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Thousands flock to MAS adviser directory in first month, Professional 
Adviser, 6 May.  
826
 The Personal Finance Society is one of a number of associations in the UK to which financial advisers are 
affiliated. Two others are the Institute of Financial Planning (IFP) and the Chartered Institute of Securities and 
Investment (CISI). In August 2015, it was announced that the IFP would merge with the CISI in November 2015. 
827
 Reported in Laura Miller (2015) PFS launches consumer education website with 22,000 strong adviser 
database, Professional Adviser, 24 April. 
828
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) ABI launches pension freedom awareness campaign, Professional 
Adviser, 17 March. 
829 
Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Consumer education strategy looking at guidance and advice 
launched, Professional Adviser, 28 October. 
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The strategy will be governed by MAS's Financial Capability Board, whose members at the 
time of launch were: 
 Andy Briscoe, chair, the Money Advice Service (chair of the Board)  Jasper Berens, head of UK Funds, JP Morgan  Sherard Cowper-Coles, senior advisor, HSBC and chair of the Financial Inclusion 
Commission  Benny Higgins, chief executive, Tesco Bank  Elaine Kempson, emeritus professor, University of Bristol  Lily Lapenna, founder & co-chief executive, MyBnk  Phil Loney, group chief executive, Royal London   Eleanor Marks, deputy director communities division, Welsh Government  Louise Macdonald, chief executive, Young Scot  Gwyneth Nurse, director of financial services, HM Treasury  Steve Pateman, executive director, head of UK banking, Santander  Caroline Rookes, chief executive, the Money Advice Service  Roger Sanders, managing director, Lighthouse Group  Hector Sants, chair Archbishop of Canterbury's Task Group and StepChange Debt 
Charity  Otto Thoresen, chair, National Employment Savings Trust  Sian Williams, head of national services, Toynbee Hall  Chris Woolard, director of strategy and competition, Financial Conduct Authority  Tom Wright, group chief executive, Age UK  
Services for financial advisers 
Defaqto has launched a pension ratings service for financial advisers in May 2015 which 
measures the quality of the service from pension providers. Pension Service Ratings uses 
advisers' satisfaction scores on 41 aspects of service to set the provider ratings. The data 
was collected using a survey of 500 financial advisers who advise on personal pension 
products. Defaqto then allocates providers to the following classes: gold, silver or bronze, or 
not rated.830 
F&TRC launched a similar service in July 2015.831  Pension providers are awarded a gold, 
silver or bronze rating depending on their proposition in eight sub-categories:  
 Product offering and administration  Investment and fund options  Record keeping and governance 
                                                     
830 
Reported in Professional Adviser (2015) Defaqto launches pension ratings service, 1 May. 
831
 Reported in Retirement Planner (2015) F&TRC launches ratings service for workplace pensions, 14 July. 
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 Scheme setup  Joiners and leavers process  Education  At-retirement options  Auto-enrolment process. 
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4. Helping savers to manage longevity risk  
͚I'ŵ just oŶe huŶdƌed aŶd oŶe, fiǀe ŵoŶths aŶd a daǇ͛. 
͚I ĐaŶ't ďelieǀe that!͛, said AliĐe. 
͚CaŶ't Ǉou?͛, the QueeŶ said iŶ a pitǇiŶg toŶe. ͚TƌǇ agaiŶ: dƌaǁ a loŶg 
ďƌeath, aŶd shut Ǉouƌ eǇes͛. 
AliĐe laughed. ͚Theƌe's Ŷo use tƌǇiŶg͛, she said: ͚oŶe ĐaŶ't ďelieǀe 
iŵpossiďle thiŶgs͛. 
Lewis Carroll (1871) Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There 
 
A particularly important issue in retirement income provision is longevity risk. There are two 
components to longevity risk. The first is the uncertainty over how long any particular 
pension scheme member is going to live after retirement. This is known as idiosyncratic 
longevity risk. Both individuals and schemes face idiosyncratic longevity risk. The second is 
uncertainty over how long members of a particular age cohort are going to live after 
retirement. This is known as systematic longevity risk. Only schemes face systematic 
longevity risk. Individuals have a poor understanding of idiosyncratic longevity risk.832 
Pension schemes can reduce idiosyncratic longevity risk by pooling the risk amongst a large 
number of scheme members, i.e., by taking advantage of the law of large numbers. 
Systematic longevity risk, however, cannot be reduced in this way: it needs to be hedged 
using a suitable hedging instrument.  
4.1 Introduction 
In order to help savers manage longevity risk, we need to understand both life expectancy 
and longevity risk and we begin with some observations on these.  The main concern is that 
people who underestimate how long they are going to live face the possibility of running out 
of money before they die. This, in turn, suggests that idiosyncratic longevity risk is a risk that 
individual savers are not able – and should not be expected – to manage themselves. To 
protect themselves from outliving their resources, most savers will need longevity insurance 
at some stage in retirement.   
Systematic longevity risk is a trend risk facing the providers of longevity insurance which can 
only be hedged with a suitable hedging instrument. The key instrument for hedging 
                                                     
832
 As the American Academy of Actuaries, the UK Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, and the Australian 
Actuaries Institute say on p.1 of their October 2015 joint report The Challenge of Longevity Risk: Making 
Retirement Income Last a Lifetime: ͚LoŶgeǀitǇ ƌisk is Ŷot ǁell uŶdeƌstood by many people and this lack of 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg ĐaŶ haǀe sigŶifiĐaŶt iŵpliĐatioŶs foƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵes, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ as loŶgeǀitǇ iŶĐƌeases͛; 
http://www.actuaries.org.uk/news-and-insights/media-centre/media-releases-and-statements/longevity-risk-
ticking-time-bomb. 
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systematic longevity risk is a longevity bond and we consider the role the Government could 
play in issuing longevity bonds. We end by examining the arguments that have been put 
forward by those who support the case for Governments issuing longevity bonds and those 
who are against the idea. 
4.2 Some observations on life expectancy and longevity risk 
As we mentioned in Chapter 1, the principal purpose of a pension scheme is to provide an 
income in retirement for however long the scheme member lives. But how long someone 
lives cannot be reliably estimated unless they have a terminal condition.   
 
Figure 4.1: Historical increases in life expectancy 
 
Source: Jim Oeppen and James W. Vaupel (2002), Broken Limits to Life Expectancy, Science, 296(5570): 1029-
1031 
Figure 4.1 shows that in advanced countries, life expectancy has been increasing at the rate 
of approximately 2.5 years per decade since 1840.833 Being told their life expectancy is a 
                                                     
833
 In November 2015, the Office for National Statistics released data which shows that life expectancy 
continues to improve. For example, a new-born baby boy in England can expect to live to 79.5 years. This is an 
increase of 5.9 years over two decades. New-born girls in England can expect to live to 83.2 years – an increase 
of 4.1 years over two decades. Meanwhile, 65-year-old men and women in England can expect to live to 84 
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completely useless piece of information for someone who has just retired, since there is an 
approximately 50% chance that a 65-year old man, for example, will live beyond his life 
expectancy of 86.7 years as the left chart in Figure 4.2 shows. It does not get easier at higher 
ages. Telling an 85-year old man that his life expectancy is 91.6 years is also of little use, 
since one-in-three 85-year old men will reach 93 and 5% will reach 100 as the right chart in 
Figure 4.2 shows. This figure also illustrates the nature of idiosyncratic longevity risk, the 
uncertainty about how long any particular individual will live. 
Figure 4.2: The variability of individual lifetimes 
 
Source: 100% PNMA00 medium cohort 2007 
Furthermore, individuals are notoriously bad at estimating their own life expectancy. Figure 
4.3 reveals that all age groups – and men more than women – tend to significantly 
underestimate their own life expectancy. While the extent of the underestimation 
decreases with age, men in their 60s still underestimate their life expectancy by an average 
of five years and women by three.  So if a retiree plans to draw down their pension fund in 
line with their own estimate of their life expectancy, a typical male will outlive their pension 
pot by five years and a typical female by three. A key explanation for the results in Figure 4.3 
is that people tend to over-estimate how many people die between 65 and 70, and under-
estimate how many live beyond 80 as Table 4.1 shows.834 To illustrate, the table shows that 
members of DC schemes aged over 60 believe that 20% of 65-year olds will die before 70, 
whereas the correct figure is 10%. They also believe that 80% will die before 80, whereas 
the true figure is only 60%. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
and 86, respectively. In December 2015, the ONS predicted that life expectancy at birth would reach 97.6 for 
men and 100 for women born in England in 2064. 
834
 Reported in Ian Porter (2015) The longevity issue - Mapping the new retirement landscape, Retirement 
Planner, 14 May. 
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Figure 4.3: Individual underestimates of life expectancy by age 
 
Source: Christopher O͛BƌieŶ, Paul FeŶŶ, aŶd “tepheŶ DiaĐoŶ ;ϮϬϬϱͿ, Hoǁ Long do People Expect to Live? 
Results and Implications, Centre for Risk and Insurance Studies, Nottingham University Business School, CRIS 
Research report 2005-1, April; the figure shows self-estimated life expectancy compared with the Government 
Actuary͛s DepaƌtŵeŶt foƌeĐast life eǆpeĐtaŶĐǇ. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Percentage of 65-year old members of a DC pension scheme with a £10,000 
pension pot who will die before a specified age 
 
Die before age Estimate by members of DC 
pension schemes aged 60+ 
(%) 
Real data (%) 
70 20 10 
80 50 20 
90 80 60 
100 90 90 
Source: Ignition House 
 
Table 4.2: Difference between self-estimated and actual life expectancy at age 65 
Men Women 
Aviva 
survey 
self-
estimate 
UK 
average 
(ONS) 
Insured 
lives 
Healthy 
insured 
lives 
Aviva 
survey 
estimate 
UK 
average 
(ONS) 
Insured 
lives 
Healthy 
insured 
lives 
15 18.3 21.3 23 19 20.8 23.1 23.7 
 (3.3) (6.6) (8)  (1.8) (4.1) (4.7) 
Note: Difference compared with Aviva survey self-estimated life expectancy reported in brackets. Source: 
Aviva (2015, p.6) Making Your Money Last in Retirement, January. 
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A study by Aviva published in 2015 updates the results of Figure 4.3.
835
  Table 4.2 shows that 
65-year old males underestimate their life expectancy by 3.3 years and 65-year old females 
by 1.8 years, compared with the UK average population. However, assured lives – people 
taking out life assurance – and healthy assured lives will live longer than the national 
average. Healthy assured lives underestimate their life expectancy by 8 years for men and 
4.7 years for women. The general pattern is clear and persistent: almost everyone 
underestimates their life expectancy by a number of years, and men underestimate this 
more than women. 
The Aǀiǀa ƌepoƌt Ŷotes ;pϰͿ: ͚The ƌisk of ƌuŶŶiŶg out of ŵoŶeǇ is likelǇ to ƌeŵaiŶ a ĐoŶstaŶt 
threat for many people throughout their retirement, and, through planning, will become 
increasingly important as people take on more personal responsibility. People choosing to 
take soŵe oƌ all of theiƌ peŶsioŶ saǀiŶgs as Đash….ĐaŶ oŶlǇ assess ǁhetheƌ this ǁas a ǁise 
decision if they have an accurate understanding of their life expectancy. To fail to consider 
how much money they will need for their retirement years means they may risk a life in 
poǀeƌtǇ if theǇ outliǀe theiƌ saǀiŶgs͛. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Reasons people say they will live a shorter life than average 
 
Reason Men (%) Women (%) All (%) 
 
A serious health 
condition/illness 
64 63 63 
A serious health 
condition/illness in the 
family (which they 
currently do not have) 
14 10 12 
Family does not live 
long 
27 28 28 
Lifestyle – drinking and 
lack of exercise 
28 27 28 
Smoker 18 22 20 
Does not have the 
money to support 
themselves should 
they fall ill 
8 11 10 
Source: Aviva (2015, p.4) Making Your Money Last in Retirement, January. 
 
                                                     
835
 Aviva (2015) Making Your Money Last in Retirement, January;  
https://www.aviva.com/media/upload/Making_your_money_last_in_retirement-
Aviva__longevity__report.pdf. 
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The report also gives the reasons why people believe they have a lower life expectancy than 
the average – see Table 4.3. The most common reasons – which are similar for men and 
women – are an existing serious health condition/illness, low family life expectancy, and 
lifestyle  – drinking, lack of exercise and smoking. 
 
Table 4.4: Concerns people have about old age 
 
Concern % most concerned 
 
Living longer than expected and having 
insufficient money 
5 
Ill health 56 
Dementia 50 
Being dependent on other people 36 
Going into a care home 30 
Dying or people close to them dying 25 
Source: Aviva (2015, p.6) Making Your Money Last in Retirement, January. 
 
A particularly worrying finding in the report is that many people do not appear to be too 
concerned about outliving their savings relative to other concerns they have about old age – 
see Table 4.4.836 The ŵaiŶ ƌeasoŶ foƌ this is that this possiďilitǇ is ͚too faƌ iŶto the futuƌe to 
ǁoƌƌǇ aďout͛. The taďle does, hoǁeǀeƌ, shoǁ that people aƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout going into a 
care home, but research by Just Retirement indicates that only 10% of people stated that 
they were prepared for the cost of care.837 In addition, the table shows that people are 
concerned about dementia. But we should remember that financial capability declines a 
long time before dementia sets in – at a rate around 2% a year after age 60 and this is from 
a base level of financial literacy that is also very low for most people. This suggests that 
many people will be financially vulnerable well before the onset of full dementia.838 The 
                                                     
836
 Americans by contrast take a very different attitude. According to a 2010 Allianz survey of 3,257 people, 
ϲϭ% said ͚theǇ ǁeƌe ŵoƌe sĐaƌed of outliǀiŶg theiƌ assets thaŶ theǇ ǁeƌe of dǇiŶg͛. This figure increased to 
77% for those between the ages of 44 and 49, and to 82% for those in their late 40s with dependants. A 2014 
survey conducted by Wells Fargo of 1,001 middle-class Americans (aged 25-75) said theǇ ͚ǁould ƌatheƌ ͞die 
eaƌlǇ͟ thaŶ Ŷot haǀe eŶough ŵoŶeǇ to liǀe ĐoŵfoƌtaďlǇ iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛ ;ƌepoƌted iŶ Jessica Rabe (2015) Which 
pƌofile fits a ŵoŶeǇ ŵaŶageƌ͛s ideal Đustoŵeƌ?, CoŶǀeƌgeǆ.Đoŵ, ϭϮ OĐtoďeƌͿ. 
837
 Reported in Ian Porter (2015) The longevity issue - Mapping the new retirement landscape, Retirement 
Planner, 14 May. 
838
 Michael S. Finke, John S. Howe and Sandra J. Huston (2011) Old Age and the Decline in Financial  Literacy; 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1948627. The 2% rate of decline in financial literacy does 
not increase with advanced age, nor is the decline related to cohort effects or differences in gender or 
educational attainment. On the other hand, confidence in financial decision making abilities does not decline 
with age. Clearly, undiminished confidence when combined with reduced capabilities can lead to very poor 
investment decisions by older people. 
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Aǀiǀa ƌepoƌt ĐoŶĐludes ;pϲͿ: ͚Without a foĐused effoƌt ďǇ the Government and the wider 
industry it may therefore be difficult to get people to really understand the importance of 
loŶgeǀitǇ iŶ theiƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt plaŶŶiŶg͛.   
One might assume that the Government would be better at estimating life expectancy than 
individuals. Unfortunately this is not the case. The official agency for estimating life 
expectancy in the UK is the Office for National Statistics. Figure 4.4 indicates that the ONS 
has systematically and significantly underestimated the increase in life expectancy since 
1971. The figure shows one aspect of systematic longevity risk, namely the risk of 
underestimating the trend improvement in life expectancy. The actual increase in life 
expectancy is shown by the solid black line – this follows the same straight line increase 
depicted in Figure 4.1. All the ONS projections assume that there will be a levelling off of life 
expectancy, but there is little evidence that this is happening.839 However, it is fair to say 
that the ON“͛s ŵoƌe ƌeĐeŶt pƌojeĐtioŶs haǀe ďeeŶ ͚ŵoƌe aĐĐuƌate͛ thaŶ its eaƌlieƌ oŶes, 
since they involve a lower degree of levelling off. 
Figure 4.4: Actual and projected period life expectancy at birth, males, UK, 1966-2031 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
                                                     
839
 In September 2015, the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries' Continuous Mortality Investigation (CMI) did 
report a slowdown in increases in life expectancy over the last four years. It found that expected lifespans 
increased by four months between 2011 and 2015, while life expectancy at 75 showed no improvement at all. 
Between 2000 and 2011, life expectancy increased by three months a year in line with long-run historical 
tƌeŶds. Tiŵ GoƌdoŶ, CMI ĐhaiƌŵaŶ, said: ͚IŶsuƌeƌs aŶd peŶsioŶ fuŶds ǁill Ŷeed to ĐoŶsideƌ ǁhetheƌ this ƌeĐeŶt 
experience indicates a fundamental change in mortality improvement trends, or whether it is a short term 
variation due to influences such as influenza and cold winters - the fiŶaŶĐial iŵpliĐatioŶs aƌe ŵateƌial͛. ϮϬϭϱ 
ǁas aŶ ͚eǆĐeptioŶallǇ heaǀǇ Ǉeaƌ foƌ ŵoƌtalitǇ͛ ǁith Ϯϱ,ϬϬϬ ŵoƌe deaths thaŶ the ϯϬϬ,ϬϬϬ eǆpeĐted iŶ EŶglaŶd 
and Wales over the first seven months, in part because winter flu vaccine had been less effective than usual 
(reported in Jack Jones (2015) Life expectancy increases slow dramatically, Professional Pensions, 28 
September). 
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Even if everyone – individuals and governments – could improve their forecasts of the trend 
improvement in life expectancy, there will always be considerable uncertainty around the 
trend. The longevity fanchart840 in Figure 4.5 shows that the best estimate of male life 
expectancy at age 65 in 2060 is 26 years, but it could be anywhere from 22 years to 28 
years, a range of 6 years. This uncertainty around the trend improvement in life expectancy 
is another aspect of systematic longevity risk: how useful is it to tell a 20-year old male that 
his life expectancy could be anywhere between 87 and 93 years (assuming he survives to 
65)? 
 
Figure 4.5:  Longevity fanchart for 65-year old males 
 
Source: Kevin Dowd, David Blake, and Andrew Cairns (2010), Facing up to Uncertain Life Expectancy: The 
Longevity Fan Charts, Demography, 47(1): 67-78 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
840
 This presents projections of male life expectancy at age 65 out to 2060. The dark central line shows the best 
estimate of the increase in life expectancy to 2016, while the outer lighter shaded area shows the 90% 
prediction interval: we can be 90% confident that the true life expectancy will lie in this band. The model used 
to make these projections is the Cairns-Blake-Dowd (CBD) stochastic mortality model (see Andrew Cairns, 
David Blake, and Kevin Dowd (2006), A Two-Factor Model for Stochastic Mortality with Parameter Uncertainty: 
Theory and Calibration, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73, 687-718). 
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4.3 Idiosyncratic longevity risk and its management 
4.3.1 Longevity insurance  
It should be clear that idiosyncratic longevity risk is a risk that individual savers are not able 
– and should not be expected – to manage themselves. To protect them from outliving their 
resources, most savers will need longevity insurance at some stage in retirement – the 
possible exceptions being those with very significant wealth or those with a serious life-
shortening medical condition, but without dependants. 
Given the primary purpose of a pension scheme, longevity insurance will be an essential 
component of a well-designed DC scheme at some point during decumulation, as we have 
said many times previously.  
Longevity insurance can take two principal forms: 
 A longevity-insured income, such as a lifetime annuity  A deferred longevity-insured income, such as a deferred lifetime annuity. 
Longevity insurance can be embedded in a range of retirement income products that also 
invest in growth assets during retirement, such as investment-linked annuities, variable 
annuities, and guaranteed drawdown products. However, these are retail products, and as 
such can have high charges, especially if they are sold on a voluntary basis and hence have 
to be extensively marketed. Furthermore, products with deferral features, such as a 
deferred lifetime annuity, are expensive to provide from a regulatory capital point of view if 
sold by insurance companies. This is because under the Solvency II regulatory regime for 
insurers that came into force in January 2016, the regulator requires significantly higher 
solvency capital for deferred annuities than for immediate annuities.  
To reduce costs, we again need to look for economies of scale within the pensions 
regulatory regime, since this does not impose solvency capital requirements on pension 
schemes. The obvious solution for achieving these economies – as we saw in Chapter 3 – is 
to use ͚sĐheŵe dƌaǁdoǁŶ͛ ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith ͚loŶgeǀitǇ iŶsuƌaŶĐe͛. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, the sĐheŵe 
itself provides income drawdown together with the longevity insurance. This would enable 
flexibility in spending in the early years of retirement, while also allowing for some 
investment growth, as well as ensuring that retirees do not outlive their assets. This is really 
no more than what large defined benefit schemes do already, but instead of the pension 
being pre-determined, it will fluctuate in line with the investment performance of the 
underlying assets and changing mortality assumptions. The pension only becomes pre-
determined once the longevity insurance comes into effect. The pension then becomes 
fixed in nominal terms if a level annuity is purchased or increases in line with inflation if an 
index-linked annuity is purchased.  
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4.3.2 The optimal age to purchase longevity insurance and the optimal age at which the 
longevity insurance comes into effect 
While longevity insurance in the form of a lifetime annuity (LTA) provides a perfect hedge 
for idiosyncratic longevity risk from the date of purchase, the return is unattractive for many 
people in the early years of retirement compared with that available on other investments. 
This is evident in the historically low annuity rates available for those in their late-50s and 
60s who are in good health.841 Low returns also go some way towards explaining why only 
about 5% of annuitants buy inflation-linking, since it reduces the initial income by around 
40%.842 This means that buying annuities at the point of retirement embeds both low yields 
and massive inflation risk for the remainder of retirement. 
For the purpose of DC decumulation, it is helpful to separate the period prior to longevity 
insurance coming into effect and the period after. As a rough guide, we classify those who 
are aged between 55 and 75-80, in good health, with dependants, as being in the pre-
longevity insurance stage of their retirement.843  As we saw in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5), at 
some point between the ages of 75 and 80, it will become optimal for members of this 
group to switch between income drawdown and a LTA, since the implied return on a LTA at 
these ages exceeds any realistic return available on growth assets such as equities.844 This is 
because, as the upward-sloping curved line in Figure 4.6 shows, the mortality premium – 
which is closely related to the corresponding age-specific mortality rate – built into annuity 
rates increases with age.845 This means that it is optimal to annuitise around the time that 
the mortality premium exceeds the equity premium – the horizontal line in the figure.846 
This explains why it might well be sensible for healthy retirees with sufficient resources to 
                                                     
841
 The low annuity rates are due to both the relentless increase in life expectancy and the historically low long 
term interest rates that resulted from the programme of quantitative easing introduced by the Bank of 
England in March 2009 to save the UK banking system from the effects of the Global Financial Crisis which 
started in 2007-08. 
842
 Money Advice Service quotations, 5 January 2015. 
843
 As previously mentioned, we do not address the needs of late retirement, when long-term care may be 
required. This is because, at present, DC pots are too small to accommodate long-term care (LTC) planning. In 
due course, this will become an important problem to solve in association with the pension problem. 
844 
By optimal, we mean that, if people were behaving rationally, they would be better off making this switch 
than leaving it to chance whether they run out of money before they die (assuming no bequest motive). See 
Menahem Yaari (1965). Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance and the Theory of the Consumer, Review of 
Economic Studies, 32, 137–50. 
845
 Figure 4.6 repeats Figure 2.3 (The Milevsky switching rule) from Chapter 2. 
846
 We can think of the return on an annuity as being equal to the return on a risk-free asset such as a 
government bond plus a mortality premium to those who survive. The mortality premium is related to the 
mortality rate during the year: those who die during the year no longer receive their annuity and this is then 
shared out amongst survivors. We can think of the return on growth assets such as equities as equalling the 
risk-free rate plus the equity premium, the additional return that investors require to hold risky assets rather 
than risk-free government bonds. The mortality premium =  qx  / (1 - qx), where qx is the mortality rate at age x. 
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wait until they are in their late 70s or early 80s before annuitising.
847
  People in poor health 
should, of course, purchase an enhanced annuity.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: The optimal age to draw longevity-insured income 
 
However, despite being optimal, this does not mean that people will be keen to buy 
longevity insurance, especially if they are not particularly concerned about living longer than 
expected and having insufficient money to live on as Table 4.4 appears to indicate. It might 
therefore be necessary to draw on the lessons of behavioural economics to find ways of 
nudging pension scheme members into buying longevity insurance when the time is right. 
One possibility is to use auto-enrolment onto a default decumulation strategy, as we 
discussed in Chapter 3. We also need to be innovative in annuity design848 and behavioural 
economics suggests that capital protected or cash-back annuities might be attractive to 
scheme members. Similarly, paying for longevity insurance in instalments might be more 
acceptable than paying for it upfront at the point of retirement. People also need to be 
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 This is strictly true for someone who is risk-neutral and makes investment decisions on the basis of 
expected returns only: the expected return on annuities will exceed the expected return on equities after this 
point.  For someone who is risk averse, the optimal age will be earlier than this. For someone who is extremely 
risk averse and does not like any income volatility in retirement, the optimal age to purchase longevity 
insurance will be at the point of retirement. See David Blake, Andrew Cairns, and Kevin Dowd (2003) 
PensionMetrics 2:  Stochastic Pension Plan Design during the Distribution Phase, Insurance: Mathematics & 
Economics, 33, 29-47. 
848
 We also Ŷeed to ďe iŶŶoǀatiǀe iŶ ďƌaŶdiŶg, giǀeŶ the ĐuƌƌeŶt uŶpopulaƌitǇ of pƌoduĐts Đalled ͚aŶŶuities͛ aŶd 
ƌeďƌaŶd theŵ as ͚guaƌaŶteed iŶĐoŵe foƌ life͛ pƌoduĐts. 
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continually warned about the very real possibility that they will finding themselves in the 
upper part of the longevity fanchart in Figure 4.5. 
4.4 Systematic longevity risk and its management 
Idiosyncratic longevity risk – the uncertainty over how long any particular individual is going 
to live after retirement – can be reduced by pooling and taking advantage of the law of large 
numbers. This is what insurance companies do when they sell annuities to a large group of 
people. Systematic longevity risk – uncertainty over how long members of an entire age 
cohort are going to live after retirement – cannot be reduced in this way. It is a trend risk 
and can only be hedged with a suitable hedging instrument. The key instrument for hedging 
systematic longevity risk is a longevity bond, in precisely the same way that an index-linked 
bond can be used to hedge inflation risk.849  
 
Figure 4.7: Survivor fan chart - Males aged 65 
 
Source: Derived from the Cairns-Blake-Dowd stochastic mortality model, estimated on English and Welsh male 
mortality data for 65-year olds over the period 1991-2006 
 
In order to see how a longevity bond can hedge systematic longevity risk, we need to both 
quantify longevity risk and identify where it is concentrated. Figure 4.7 presents a survivor 
fan chart.850 This shows the uncertainty surrounding projections of the number of survivors 
to each age from the cohort of males from the national population of England and Wales 
who retire aged 65. The grey bars indicate the 90% confidence interval on the projected 
survivor rate for each age out to 115. The line in the middle of each bar indicates the 
expected proportion of the cohort to survive to each age. The figure shows that there is 
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 It can also be hedged with a longevity swap in the same way that inflation can be hedged with an inflation 
swap. In fact, a longevity bond is the combination of an annuity bond and a longevity swap. 
850
 See David Blake, AŶdƌeǁ CaiƌŶs aŶd KeǀiŶ Doǁd ;ϮϬϬϴͿ, LoŶgeǀitǇ ‘isk aŶd the Gƌiŵ ‘eapeƌ͛s ToǆiĐ Tail: 
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little uncertainty out to age 75: we can be fairly confident that approximately 19% will have 
died by 75. The uncertainty peaks at age 93: the prediction interval band is widest at this 
age. The best estimate is that 36% will survive to age 90, but it could be anywhere between 
30% and 41%. This is a very large range. The figure also shows the extent of the so-called 
͚tail ƌisk͛ afteƌ age ϵϬ: theƌe is soŵe pƌoďaďilitǇ – even if small – that some members of this 
cohort will live beyond 110. 
A survivor fan chart is very useful to a pension scheme or annuity provider since it shows the 
likely range in the numbers of pensioners or annuitants from a given birth cohort surviving 
to each age. If more survive to each age than was expected, the pension scheme or annuity 
provider has to make higher total pension or annuity payments than was anticipated. The 
opposite holds if fewer survive to each age than was anticipated.  
We will now show how a longevity bond with the following characteristics can help to hedge 
systematic longevity risk: 
 The bond pays coupons that decline over time in line with the actual mortality 
experience of a cohort of the population, say 65-year-old males from the national 
population: so the coupons payable at age 75, for example, will depend on the 
proportion of 65-year-old males who survive to age 75  Coupon payments are not made for ages for which longevity risk is low: so, for 
example, the first coupon might not be paid until the cohort reaches age 75 (such a 
bond would be a deferred longevity bond)851  The coupon payments continue until the maturity date of the bond which might, for 
example, be 40 years after the issue date when the cohort of males reaches age 105  The final coupon incorporates a terminal payment equal to the discounted value of 
the sum of the post-105 survivor rates to account for those who survive beyond age 
105. The terminal payment is calculated on the maturity date of the bond and will 
depend on the numbers of the cohort still alive at that time and projections of their 
remaining survivorship. It is intended to avoid the payment of trivial sums at very 
high ages  The bond pays coupons only and has no principal repayment (i.e., is an annuity 
bond). 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the possible range of coupon payments on a deferred longevity bond 
based on the national population of English and Welsh males who are aged 65. Such a bond 
would provide a hedge for the systematic longevity risk faced by pension schemes and 
annuity providers. If population survivorship is higher at each age than was expected, the 
bond pays out higher coupons. This is what pension schemes and annuity providers need in 
order to help match the higher than expected pensions and annuity payments they have to 
                                                     
851
 There is no point in paying for insurance when the risk is low. 
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make. If, on the other hand, survivorship is lower at each age than was expected, the bond 
pays out lower coupons. But the pension schemes and annuity providers are not likely to 
mind this, since their pensions and annuity payments are also likely to be lower. 
 
Figure 4.8: Deferred longevity bond for male aged 65 with 10-year deferment 
 
 
Note: Longevity bond is payable from age 75 with terminal payment at age 105 to cover post-105 longevity risk 
 
However, it is important to recognise that the bond will only provide a perfect hedge for the 
systematic longevity risk faced by pension schemes and annuity providers if the scheme 
members and annuitants have exactly the same mortality experience over time as the 
cohort underlying the bond. If the scheme members and annuitants have a mortality 
experience that differs from that of the national population, this will introduce basis risk.852  
In practice, there will always be some basis risk. One reason for this is that pension schemes 
and annuity books have far fewer members than the national population and will therefore 
experience greater random variation risk than the national population and this is likely to 
cause the mortality experience of a sub-population to diverge from that of the national 
population over time, even if they have the same mortality profile at the outset.  
Another reason is that most pension schemes and annuity books will not have the same 
mortality profile as the national population, even to begin with. There can be differences in 
age, gender and socio-economic composition. Different birth cohorts have different survivor 
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 This is the ƌisk that the ͚uŶdeƌlǇiŶg͛ – in this case, the survivor rates of the particular population being 
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rates of the national population.  
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rates to each age. While survivor rates to each age tend to increase over time, in line with 
the trend improvement in longevity, they do not do so uniformly: some birth cohorts 
experience faster improvements than others.853 Females, on average, live longer than males. 
Professionals tend to live longer than white-collar workers who, in turn, tend to live longer 
than blue-collar and manual workers. But it is not simply the differences in life expectancies 
between these various groups that are important, it is unexpected changes in the trends in 
their survivorship experience that causes basis risk.  
Yet aŶotheƌ ƌeasoŶ foƌ ďasis ƌisk iŶǀolǀes the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ͚liǀes͛ aŶd ͚aŵouŶts͛. A 
population longevity index854 will weight each life equally, but members of the higher socio-
economic groups will tend to have higher pensions and annuities than members of the 
lower socio-economic groups. They are also more likely to have multiple pensions and 
annuities. The directors of, say, a small engineering company are likely to represent a large 
shaƌe of the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s peŶsioŶ sĐheŵe liaďilities aŶd aƌe ŵoƌe likelǇ to liǀe loŶgeƌ thaŶ the 
average member. All these factors will increase basis risk and its complexity.  
Although basis risk is important, it is a second-order risk compared with systematic longevity 
risk itself. It can also be hedged by having a small number of suitably designed hedging 
instruments. In theory, there could be a longevity bond for both males and females, for each 
age and for each socio-economic group. Such granularity of the longevity bond market 
would allow a high degree of hedge effectiveness to be achieved. But it would also result in 
negligible liquidity or pricing transparency: the more bonds there are, the less trading there 
will be in each bond and the less frequently the bonds will be priced by the market. As is the 
case in other markets – especially derivatives markets – a small number of suitably designed 
bonds should provide an appropriate balance between hedge effectiveness, liquidity and 
pricing transparency. 855 
Not only are longevity bonds useful for hedging systematic longevity risk once retirees are 
drawing a longevity-insured income, they could be used to hedge systematic longevity risk 
and long-term investment risk in the period leading up to this point. As we discussed in 
Chapter 2, DC schemes traditionally used a lifestyle investment strategy involving target-
date funds. This involves a high weightiŶg iŶ eƋuities aŶd otheƌ gƌoǁth assets iŶ the ͚gƌoǁth 
stage͛ of the aĐĐuŵulatioŶ pƌoĐess iŶ oƌdeƌ to ďeŶefit fƌoŵ the eƋuitǇ pƌeŵiuŵ. Theƌe is 
then a systematic switch to less volatile assets, typically long-dated fixed-income bonds, 
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Richard C. Willetts (2004), The Cohort Effect: Insights and Explanations, British Actuarial Journal, 10, 833–
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This is an index based on the mortality experience of the national population. 
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 This is demonstrated in: David Blake, Andrew J. G. Cairns and Kevin Dowd (2006), Living with Mortality: 
Longevity Bonds and other Mortality-Linked Securities, British Actuarial Journal, 12, 153-228; Guy D. Coughlan, 
Marwa Khalaf-Allah, Yijing Ye, Sumit Kumar, Andrew J. G. Cairns, David Blake, and Kevin Dowd (2011), 
Longevity Hedging 101: A Framework for Longevity Basis Risk Analysis and Hedge Effectiveness, North 
American Actuarial Journal, 15(2), 150-176. 
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duƌiŶg the ͚ĐoŶsolidatioŶ stage͛856 of the accumulation process – the so-called glide path – 
in order to reduce the volatility of the lifetime retirement income secured at retirement. It 
used to be the case that most people drew their longevity-insured income at the same time 
as they retired. The 2014 Budget is likely to lead to some DC scheme members deferring 
drawing a longevity-insured income from their DC scheme until later in their retirement, 
while keeping the fund invested in growth assets and using income drawdown in the 
interim. Nevertheless, it would still be useful to hedge systematic longevity risk during this 
period by holding some of the fund in longevity bonds.857   
4.5 Why should the Government issue longevity bonds ?
858
 
In principle, longevity bonds could be issued by private-sector organisations. It has been 
argued that pharmaceutical companies would be natural issuers, since their revenues are 
positively linked to survivorship: the longer people live, the more they will spend on 
medicines.859 While this is true, the scale of the demand for longevity bonds far exceeds 
conceivable private-sector supply from companies such as pharmaceuticals. Further, there 
would be significant credit risk associated with the private-sector issuance of an instrument 
intended to hedge a systematic risk many years into the future. In practice, we would argue 
that the only realistic issuer of longevity bonds in scale is the Government.860 
We believe that there are three important reasons why the Government should engage in 
sharing longevity risk with the private sector. It: 
 has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient annuity market  has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient capital market for longevity risk 
transfers  is best placed to engage in intergenerational risk sharing, such as by providing tail 
risk protection against systematic trend risk. 
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 If longevity improves at a higher rate than that expected along the glide path, this too will reduce the 
amount of the annuity that can be paid from a given lump sum. It might also be a better way of providing 
income security from a DC pension scheme at retirement than the alternative of purchasing deferred 
annuities, since the annuity provider has to hold significant capital against the deferred annuities it sold (under 
Solvency II), the cost of which would have to be passed onto the member. Longevity bonds also give more 
flexibility over when to take a longevity-insured income than deferred annuities. 
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 This section draws David Blake, Tom Boardman and Andrew Cairns (2014), Sharing Longevity Risk: Why 
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 Kevin Dowd (2003), Survivor Bonds: A Comment on Blake and Burrows, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 70,  
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860
 The first suggestion for governments to do this was made in David Blake and William Burrows (2001), 
Survivor Bonds: Helping to Hedge Mortality Risk, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 68: 339-348. 
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4.5.1  An efficient annuity market for pensioners 
The Government has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient annuity market, given its 
desire to encourage retirement savings in DC pension schemes that need annuities to turn 
pension savings into guaranteed lifetime retirement income. If the private sector is unable 
to hedge systematic longevity risk, it increases the likelihood that insurance companies stop 
selling annuities, especially deferred annuities, or increase annuity prices which would 
reduce pensioner income in retirement.  
A consequence of the above is that Governments might find themselves having to pay 
additional means-tested ďeŶefits to suppleŵeŶt peŶsioŶeƌs͛ iŶĐoŵes, as ǁell as receiving 
lower income tax and expenditure taxes (such as value added tax) from pensioners due to 
their lower incomes.861 This will, ceteris paribus, lead to higher taxes on the working 
population. This outcome will therefore not be popular with workers or pensioners. Further, 
workers are likely to reduce savings into DC pension schemes. Those that do continue to 
save in DC schemes will face even greater uncertainty about their prospective pension 
income, since an efficient private-sector annuity market might no longer be in existence 
when they retire. 
4.5.2 An efficient capital market for longevity risk transfers 
The capital markets have a key role to help ensure there is an efficient annuity market and 
to help to reduce concentration risk. It can therefore also be argued that the Government 
has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient capital market for longevity risk transfers. 
There are two areas where Government support is required. 
First, the Government can help with the construction of national longevity indices. It is for 
reasons of accuracy that longevity indices would most likely have to be based on national 
mortality data. A key component of the success of the new capital market will be the timely 
publication of accurate and independently calculated longevity indices. The longevity indices 
would cover mortality rates, survivor rates and life expectancies for both males and females.  
Only the Government has access to the information necessary to produce these indices on 
account of the legal requirement to report deaths and related information such as dates of 
death and birth and gender to an official agency, which in the UK is the General Register 
Office of Births, Marriages and Deaths.862 Further, only the Government has access to the 
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 Many of the people who traditionally bought annuities in the UK were also on means-tested benefits. Any 
reduction in annuity payments arising from more onerous capital requirements resulting from insurers being 
unable to hedge longevity risk will immediately increase means-tested benefits. 
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 The government will always have more detailed information than the private sector as a result of data 
protection legislation. This legislation prevents the release of information that would allow an individual – 
even one who has died – to be identified. Mortality data will only be published in a sufficiently aggregated 
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information needed to estimate the size of the exposed population. In the UK, this is 
currently derived from decadal censuses with annual updates between censuses based on 
reported deaths and estimated migration flows. However, the resulting estimates are not 
accurate enough at high ages. It is important to be able to track a cohort over time, 
particularly at high ages: the Government is in a unique position to do this, since it makes 
social security pension payments to almost every old person and needs to keep good 
records to do this. While longevity indices based on social class would be useful, the social 
class of a deceased person is not recorded at the time of death and while attempts have 
been made to construct social class indices, based on factors such as post code, these lack 
the accuracy of national indices. A similar argument would hold for longevity indices based 
on amounts rather than lives. 
Second, the Government can make an important contribution by issuing longevity bonds to 
facilitate price discovery, thereby encouraging capital market development. Longevity risk is 
not currently actively traded in the capital markets, so we do not have a good estimate of its 
market price or premium.863 But if the Government issued a small number of longevity 
bonds, this would help to establish and maintain the market-ĐleaƌiŶg ͚pƌiĐe poiŶts͛ foƌ 
longevity risk at key ages and future dates, and hence establish a market price for longevity 
risk. In other words, the bonds would help to establish the riskless term structure for 
survival rates for ages above 65 for future years. There is a clear analogy with the fixed-
income and index-linked bond markets. In these markets, the issuance of government bonds 
helped to establish the riskless term structures for interest rates and inflation rate 
expectations, respectively, for terms out to 50 years or more. The private sector was then 
able to issue corporate fixed-income and index-linked bonds with different credit risks (AAA, 
AA, etc.) and establish credit term structures above the riskless benchmark curves.  
The establishment of a market price for longevity risk would be particularly useful for EU 
insurance companies operating under Solvency II. The maximum longevity risk premium 
that an annuity provider would be willing to pay to buy a longevity bond would be related to 
the level of capital that the regulators agree can be released as a result of holding the 
longevity bond to back annuity liabilities.
864
  
The establishment of price points will also help to facilitate the capital market development 
of longevity swaps and other longevity derivatives similar to the interest-rate and inflation 
swaps that developed in the fixed-income and index-linked bond markets. Market 
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 The longevity risk premium is paid by the longevity boŶd͛s ďuǇeƌ to the ďoŶd͛s issueƌ to ƌeŵoǀe sǇsteŵatiĐ 
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purchasing the bond, thereby lowering the effective yield on the bond.  
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illiquidity premium contained in the price of longevity bonds. If longevity bonds are not actively traded, 
investors will demand an illiquidity premium to hold them and the regulator might be reluctant to accept that 
the ďoŶds͛ pƌiĐes ĐaŶ ďe used foƌ ŵaƌk-to-market pricing for capital release purposes. 
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participants were able to use market interest-rate and inflation expectations rather than 
projections from models. The same would happen in the longevity swaps market. The 
longevity swaps market began to develop in the UK in 2007-09 with eight publicly 
announced swaps involving six annuity providers and two pension funds. A number of global 
investment banks and reinsurers intermediated the deals – J.P. Morgan, Deutsche Bank, 
RBS, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, Société Générale, and SwissRe – and the longevity risk 
was passed through to investors – such as insurance-linked securities (ILS) investors, hedge 
funds, sovereign wealth funds, family offices and endowments – attracted by a new asset 
class that is uncorrelated with traditional asset classes, such as equities, bonds and real 
estate. More than £60bn of longevity swaps have been executed in the UK since 2007.  
4.5.3 Intergenerational risk sharing  
The Government is the only agency in society that can engage in intergenerational risk 
sharing on a large scale and enforce intergenerational contracts.865 This is important, given 
that longevity risk is a risk that crosses a number of generations.  
This is how intergenerational risk sharing operates. The Government would receive a 
longevity risk premium by issuing longevity bonds.  In effect, the current retired population 
pays future generations an insurance premium to hedge its systematic longevity risk. If, in 
equilibrium, the risk premium is sufficient to ensure that the generation bearing the risk is 
adequately compensated, then each generation is treated fairly. The current generation of 
pensioners derives benefit from annuity companies being able to use government-issued 
longevity bonds to provide better value annuities. The premium that this generation pays 
for taking away the longevity risk is effectively the premium required to compensate the 
younger generations to whom the Government is passing on the risk in the form of possible 
higher taxes to enable the Government to continue paying state pensions to members of 
the current generation who live longer than expected. 
A key role for Government in this context is to provide a hedge for systematic longevity risk 
by offering tail risk protection against trend risk. Once the market for longevity bonds has 
matured, in the sense of producing stable and reliable price points in the age range 65-90, 
the capital markets can take over responsibility for providing the necessary hedging capacity 
in this age range using longevity securities and derivatives. All that might then be needed 
would be for the Government to provide a continuous supply of deferred tail longevity 
bonds with payments starting from age 90 in order to allow pension schemes and insurers 
to hedge their tail risk.866 Figure 4.9 illustrates the cash flows on such a bond.  These bonds 
will be necessary on a permanent basis, since the capital that annuity providers would be 
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 In the private sector, long-term contracts can involve significant credit risk as mentioned above and 
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 Pension schemes and annuity providers might still be willing to invest in government-issued longevity bonds 
covering the age range 65-90 if they are competitively priced compared with capital market hedges. 
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required by the regulator to post in order to cover this risk would be very high in the 
absence of a close matching asset. The bonds are also necessary because the investors who 
have recently become interested in taking the other side of the longevity swaps market 
have no appetite for hedging long-duration tail longevity risk. They would also be needed to 
help kick start a deferred annuity market. 
 
Figure 4.9: Deferred tail longevity bond for male aged 65 
 
Note: Longevity bond is payable from age 90 with terminal payment at age 105 to cover post-105 longevity risk 
 
4.6 Who benefits from Government issuing longevity bonds? 
 
Who benefits from Governments assisting in encouraging the optimal sharing of longevity 
risk? The simple answer is everyone. Everyone should benefit from having a market price for 
longevity risk and the ability to hedge systematic longevity risk. But there are also more 
specific benefits. 
The Government: 
 Gains by having both a more secure DC pension savings market and a more efficient 
annuity market, resulting in less means-tested benefits and a higher tax take  Should gain access to a new source of long-term funding which, by widening the 
investor base, lowers the cost of Government issuance  Is able to issue bonds with a deferred payment structure to help its current funding 
programme and improve its cash flow  Earns a market-determined longevity risk premium thereby further reducing the 
expected cost of the long-term national debt. 
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Defined benefit (DB) pension schemes: 
 Have the opportunity to reduce longevity risks  Can hedge longevity risk exposure prior to buy out. 
Insurers: 
 Can potentially establish a mark-to-market mortality rate term structure867 and 
hence hold the optimal level of economic capital or at least hold capital closer to the 
economic level  Longevity bonds will help insurers to play an aggregating role in providing pension 
schemes and individuals with longevity insurance, whilst being able to pass on a 
proportion of their risk to the capital market; this would reduce their longevity 
concentration risk and facilitate the spread of longevity risk around the capital 
markets. 
The capital markets: 
 Get help to kick start market participation through the establishment of reliable 
longevity indices and key price points on the longevity risk term structure  Can build on this longevity risk term structure with liquid longevity derivatives. 
Investors: 
 Get access to a new (longevity-linked) asset class whose returns are uncorrelated 
with traditional asset classes, such as bonds, equities and real estate. 
Regulators: 
 A loŶgeǀitǇ ƌisk teƌŵ stƌuĐtuƌe should help the iŶsuƌeƌs͛ ƌegulatoƌ ;the PƌudeŶtial 
‘egulatioŶ AuthoƌitǇͿ ǀalidate iŶsuƌeƌs͛ eĐoŶoŵiĐ Đapital, theƌeďy making regulation 
more robust  Longevity bonds should help an orderly transfer of longevity risk from DB schemes to 
the capital markets, thereby reducing reliance on an uncertain sponsor covenant and 
reducing concentration risk amongst insurers, and, in turn, giving comfort to the 
peŶsioŶ sĐheŵes͛ ƌegulatoƌ  A longevity risk term structure should help facilitate the calculation of the risk-based 
levy to the Pension Protection Fund.868 
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and attempts to limit the number of DB schemes needing support from the Pension Protection Fund.    
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Pension scheme members: 
 DB pension scheme members potentially get better security  DC pension scheme members get better valued annuities which produce a higher 
lifetime income when they retire  Further, individuals with DC pension schemes would have a means of hedging the 
longevity risk associated with purchasing an annuity at retirement.  
The potential demand for longevity bonds is high: of the £1.3trn in DB private-sector 
pension liabilities, around £600bn relate to pensions in payment; of the approximately 
£600bn in accumulated DC pension assets, £200bn relate to people over age 55; and 
insurance companies are committed to making annuity payments valued in excess of 
£150bn.  
4.7 Support for Government issuance of longevity bonds 
Support for Governments to issue longevity bonds is growing steadily, not only in the UK, 
where the situation is most immediate, but also internationally.  
The Pensions Commission suggested the Government should consider the use of longevity 
bonds to absorb tail risk for those over 90 or 95, provided it exits from other forms of 
longevity risk pre-retirement which it has done by linking state pension age to increases in 
life eǆpeĐtaŶĐǇ aŶd ďǇ ƌaisiŶg the futuƌe state peŶsioŶ age fƌoŵ ϲϱ to ϲϴ ďǇ ϮϬϰϲ. ͚OŶe 
possible limited role for Government may, however, be worth consideration: the absorption 
of the ͚eǆtƌeŵe tail͛ of loŶgeǀitǇ ƌisk post-retirement, i.e., uncertainty about the mortality 
experience of the minority of people who live to very old ages, say, beyond 90 or beyond 
ϵϱ͛.869 
The Confederation of British Industry, which represents employers, has argued: 
͚Government should drive development of a market in longevity bonds, a similar instrument 
to annuities, by which the payments on the bonds depend on the proportion of a reference 
population that is still surviving at the date of payment of each coupon. This should be done 
through limited seed capital and supporting policy work on the topic. Government could 
also consider how best to match government bond issues to pension scheme needs, 
including the provision of more long-dated bonds and whether Government should issue 
ŵoƌtalitǇ ďoŶds itself͛.870 
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AĐĐoƌdiŶg to the OECD: ͚Governments could improve the market for annuities by issuing 
loŶgeǀitǇ iŶdeǆed ďoŶds aŶd ďǇ pƌoduĐiŶg a loŶgeǀitǇ iŶdeǆ͛.871 
The World Economic Forum has argued: ͚GiǀeŶ the oŶgoiŶg shift toǁaƌds defined 
contribution pension arrangements, there will be a growing need for annuities to enhance 
the security of retirement income. Longevity-indexed bonds and markets for hedging 
longevity risk would therefore play a critical role in ensuring an adequate provision of 
aŶŶuities͛.872  
The IMF states: ͚Although the pƌiǀate seĐtoƌ ǁill fuƌtheƌ deǀelop ŵaƌket-based transfer 
mechanisms for longevity risk if it recognises the benefits of doing so, the Government has a 
potential role in supporting this market. Measures could include provision of better 
longevity data, better regulation and supervision, and education to promote awareness of 
longevity risk. Those Governments that are able to limit their own longevity risk could 
ĐoŶsideƌ issuiŶg a liŵited ƋuaŶtitǇ of loŶgeǀitǇ ďoŶds to juŵpstaƌt the ŵaƌket͛. 873 
FiŶallǇ, BeƌŶhaƌd BƌuŶŶeƌ, DiƌeĐtoƌ of ƌisklaď at AlliaŶz, aƌgues: ͚AŶ iŶjeĐtioŶ of liƋuiditǇ is 
therefore imperative. This is where Governments can come in. By issuing standardised 
longevity bonds index-ďased oŶ the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s oǁŶ populatioŶ, Governments can make 
prices publicly available. These would then be used as reference points for other 
transactions and assist the growth of the longevity derivatives market, solving the problem 
of transparency that is also holding the market back in current over-the-counter 
deals….Government-issued longevity bonds could also help remove two other obstacles: 
staŶdaƌdisatioŶ aŶd eduĐatioŶ͛. 874 
4.8 Arguments against Government issuance of longevity bonds 
A number of arguments have been raised against the issuance of longevity bonds by 
Governments. 
The first is that Governments are not natural issuers of longevity bonds because of their 
large existing exposure – in excess of £5trn in the case of the UK Government875 – to 
longevity risk.   
Our response to this is that a Government͛s eǆposuƌe to uŶaŶtiĐipated loŶgeǀitǇ 
improvements through the issuance of longevity bonds is – or at least could be – well 
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hedged. First, the Government receives a longevity risk premium from issuing the bonds. 
Second, in the event that the risk premium proves to be insufficient, the Government can 
reduce its state pension spend and increase its pre-retirement tax take by systematically 
raising the state pension age in line with increases in life expectancy, as recommended by 
the Pensions Commission. The next generation might have to work longer, but will, in any 
case, have ended up being a fitter generation than the previous one and so be able to earn 
more income which, in turn, will produce more tax. Third, since the issuance of longevity 
bonds should result in a more efficient annuity market and hence higher incomes in 
retirement, this should also result in an increase in the tax take and help to reduce the 
amount of means-tested benefits. In addition, it should be noted that the higher tax take 
and lower means-tested benefits arising from a more efficient annuity market applies to the 
lifetimes of all pensioners buying an annuity, whereas the tail risk protection provided by 
deferred tail longevity bonds applies only to those surviving over 90, some 25 years in the 
future.  
Overall, once a Government is only issuing deferred tail longevity bonds, the risk will be very 
manageable and consistent with the Government͛s ƌole of faĐilitatiŶg iŶteƌgeŶeƌatioŶal ƌisk 
sharing. There could be a significant cost-benefit to the Government from the issuance of 
longevity bonds and therefore a strong case for a Government to issue longevity bonds.  
The second argument is that there is no role at all for a Government in issuing longevity 
bonds as argued by Dowd (2003) and Brown and Orszag (2006).876  
Dowd (2003) criticised the original argument used by Blake and Burrows (2001)877 to justify 
government issuance of longevity bonds (or what Blake and Burrows called survivor bonds), 
namely the appeal to the Arrow-Lind Theorem on social risk bearing. This theorem states 
that by dispersing an aggregate risk across the population (of taxpayers) as a whole, the 
associated risk premium on a longevity bond issued by the Government would be lower 
than that charged by a private-sector issuer. Dowd countered that many of the assumptions 
underlying the theorem – such as taxes are costless to collect, each household bears an 
equal share of the tax burden, and an absence of distributional effects – do not hold in 
practice. Instead, he argued that capital markets are better suited than any Government to 
bear and share risks, since they allow risks to be diversified internationally. In short, Dowd 
argued that Government intervention was unnecessary, since private-sector parties were 
perfectly capable of creating and trading longevity-linked instruments and derivatives 
themselves. There was no market failure for the Government to correct, rather the time is 
Ŷot Ǉet ƌipe: ͚The faĐt that a paƌtiĐulaƌ iŶŶoǀatioŶ has Ŷot Ǉet oĐĐuƌƌed does Ŷot iŶ itself 
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constitute an argument for Government intervention to bring it about. Any good new idea, 
including that of survivor derivatives, should eventually take off – but we have to give it 
time.... When the time is ripe, it is therefore entirely possible, and even likely, that markets 
for survivor derivatives – survivor bonds, forwards, futures, options and swaps, and annuity 
securitisation – will take off, and eventually become as familiar as comparable instruments 
suĐh as Đƌedit deƌiǀatiǀes aƌe todaǇ͛ ;pp. 347-8). 
Brown and Orszag (2006) also accept that a longevity risk premium would need to be paid in 
order to hedge aggregate longevity risk, but they argue that it is not sufficiently high to 
cause a market failure and hence justify Government iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ: ͚ǁe suspeĐt that this ƌisk 
does exert some upward pressure on annuity pricing, possibly in the range of a few 
peƌĐeŶtage poiŶts͛ ;p. ϲϮϮͿ.  TheǇ also aĐĐept that the intergenerational sharing of longevity 
risk can potentially improve social welfare.  Suppose a scientific discovery improves the life 
expectancy of all current and future generations. Current 80-year olds would be unable to 
respond to this by re-entering the labour market and hence would experience a lower 
standard of living as their remaining wealth would have to be spread over a longer period. 
Younger generations are more able to adjust to this mortality shock. Hence the financial risk 
from such a shock could be spread over a number of generations and this would improve 
social welfare. Since only the Government is able to enforce intergenerational contracts, 
there is a potential role for the Government in efficiently spreading risk across generations. 
However, Brown and Orszag believe that it is unlikely that the Government will spread risk 
effiĐieŶtlǇ: ͚to ŵaǆiŵise soĐial ǁelfaƌe, it is Ŷot suffiĐieŶt that the Government move any 
amount of risk from the current generation to some other generation. Rather, the 
Government Ŷeeds to ŵoǀe the optiŵal aŵouŶt of ƌisk oŶto the ƌight geŶeƌatioŶs͛ ;p. ϲϮϱͿ.  
Instead, they believe that the Government will favour the current generation of voters, and 
particularly the large number of vocal grey voters, over generations as yet unborn, by 
tƌaŶsfeƌƌiŶg ͚ŵoƌe thaŶ the optiŵal aŵouŶt of ƌisk to futuƌe geŶeƌatioŶs͛ ;p. ϲϮϵͿ.878    
We would argue that there is a role for both Government and the private sector in 
developing a longevity market. The private sector is best at hedging idiosyncratic longevity 
risk, once it has hedged systematic longevity risk. The Government is the only agent in 
society with both the capacity and credibility to provide a long-term hedge for systematic 
longevity risk through the issuance of longevity bonds. While Dowd, Brown and Orszag 
highlight some of the difficulties associated with the Government͛s aďilitǇ to foƌeĐast futuƌe 
mortality improvements, the existence of longevity bonds would provide an incentive for 
the Government to collect better death records and improve its longevity forecasting 
techniques, both of which would have wider social benefits. Even if the private sector is 
better at forecasting than the Government, systematic longevity is a slowly building trend 
risk and the private-sector issuer of a longevity bond risks insolvency if it gets that trend 
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wrong in a way that the Government with its powers of taxation does not. We also need to 
deal ǁith the possiďilitǇ that ͚ŵoƌe thaŶ the optiŵal aŵouŶt of ƌisk͛ is tƌaŶsferred to future 
generations. However, the total likely issuance of longevity bonds is never going to be 
sufficient for this to be a serious problem and we should bear in mind that the current 
generation is getting its longevity risk insurance for free: if longevity bonds were issued, it 
would have to start paying for it. 
The third criticism is that even if longevity bonds are issued by the Government, there is a 
question mark concerning the potential liquidity of the market trading longevity bonds. 
Some have argued that liquidity is likely to be thin, since any new information concerning 
mortality that would be sufficiently significant to motivate trading is likely to arrive very 
infrequently. While this is true, we believe that there are important lessons from the 
inflation-linked financial futures market. Early attempts to introduce such a market were 
initially unsuccessful but they eventually succeeded and inflation indices have similar 
characteristics to longevity indices, especially in their low frequency of publication.  
The first attempt occurred when CPI futures contracts were listed on the US Coffee, Sugar 
and Cocoa Exchange in June 1985. This contract was delisted in April 1987, with only 10,000 
contracts ever having been traded. The key reasons for the failure of this contract were: 
there was no underlying inflation-linked securities market at the time, the underlying was an 
infrequently published (i.e., monthly) index, and there was no stable pricing relationship 
with other instruments to attract the attention of arbitrageurs. The second attempt 
occurred when Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) futures were listed on the 
Chicago Board of Trade in June 1997 and subsequently delisted before the end of the year 
with only 22 contracts ever traded. The key reasons for the failure of this contract were: 
TIPS had only started trading five months before, there was just a single 10-year TIPS 
trading, the futures contract competed with the underlying for liquidity, and there was 
uncertainty over the future of the TIPS program. The final attempt was in February 2004 
when the Chicago Mercantile Exchange launched a CPI futures contract which is still trading. 
The reasons for the success of this contract are: inflation-linked securities have gained 
acceptance amongst investors, TIPs have evolved into recognised asset class, there is a well-
understood pricing relationship allowing for arbitrage opportunities between TIPS, fixed-
interest Treasury bonds and CPI futures, the US Treasury is committed to long-term TIPS 
issuance, CPI futures do not compete directly with but rather complement TIPS and use 
same the inflation index, and liquidity is enhanced by electronic trading on Globex. This 
experience therefore suggests that it is possible to create a liquid market in an instrument 
based on an infrequently published index. 
The fourth criticism is that longevity bonds are unnecessary since the load factor built into 
annuity prices is sufficiently large to (a) absorb the increase in regulatory capital that will be 
required after the introduction of Solvency II in the absence of longevity bonds, and (b) to 
absorb the longevity risk in countries not subject to Solvency II (e.g., the US and Australia). 
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Our response is that there is limited scope for annuity providers to absorb either the costs 
of the additional capital requirements or the aggregate longevity risk without seriously 
ƌeduĐiŶg the ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth of the aŶŶuities theǇ sell.879 
The life annuity market in the UK has scale880 and as a consequence is price competitive 
with a number of life insurers competing for business. It is relatively easy for pensioners to 
compare the different guaranteed incomes on offer in exchange for their pension savings.  
IŶ ƌeĐeŶt Ǉeaƌs, the ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth of the UK aŶŶuitǇ ŵaƌket has ďeen assessed and tracked 
by Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks. They were commissioned by the Department for Work 
aŶd PeŶsioŶs iŶ ϮϬϬϵ to pƌoduĐe a detailed ƌepoƌt oŶ the ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth of aŶŶuities iŶ the 
UK. Their report examines a time series of pension annuity rates in the UK for the period 
ϭϵϵϰ to ϮϬϬϳ. ͚The ƌepoƌt Đoŵputes the ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth of aŶŶuities aŶd fiŶds that, oŶ 
aǀeƌage, the ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth oǀeƌ the saŵple peƌiod foƌ ϲϱ-year old males has been 90 per 
cent, and for 65-year old females has been a similar but slightly larger 91 per cent. Taking 
into account load factors associated with annuity contracts and, in comparison with other 
financial and insurance products, this iŵplies that aŶŶuities aƌe faiƌlǇ pƌiĐed͛.881  
CaŶŶoŶ aŶd ToŶks͛ aŶalǇsis shoǁs that theƌe is soŵe eǀideŶĐe that the ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth has 
fallen since 2002. They discuss a number of reasons for this, including: changes in insurance 
regulation, changes in industrial concentration, an insurance cycle, the pricing in of 
increased mortality uncertainty, and the growth in the impaired lives market. The last of 
these is becoming an increasingly important factor in the UK and it has resulted in the 
ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth foƌ staŶdaƌd aŶŶuities ;i.e., those foƌ healthǇ liǀesͿ falliŶg as iŶsuƌaŶĐe 
companies have made allowance for the selection effects caused by the introduction of 
enhanced rates for pensioners with health impairments that reduce their expected life 
expectancy. Around 30-40% of pensioners qualify for enhanced annuity rates and life 
insurers have adjusted the rates on standard annuities to reflect the longer life expectancy 
of the 60-70% buying standard annuities. The other main reason is that UK insurers have 
increased the loading for the cost of their risk capital to reflect the fact that they expect to 
have to hold more capital in a Solvency II world. This trend has accelerated since 2009 in 
anticipation of the introduction of Solvency II in 2016. In short, the load factor in annuities 
                                                     
879
 The ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth of an annuity will equal 100% when annuity providers have no administrative costs and 
aƌe ŵakiŶg Ŷo pƌofits.  IŶ pƌaĐtiĐe, the ŵoŶeǇ͛s ǁoƌth will be less than 100% due to the presence of 
administrative costs, risk charges (in form of cost of capital) and the need for annuity providers to make a 
͚Ŷoƌŵal pƌofit͛. The suŵ of the Đosts aŶd Ŷoƌŵal pƌofit is Đalled the ͚load faĐtoƌ͛. 
880
 At its peak, the UK annuity market was worth about £12bn a year in new business – around  half of the 
global annuity market – sales have fallen by more than 50% since the 2014 Budget. 
881 EdŵuŶd CaŶŶoŶ aŶd IaŶ ToŶks ;ϮϬϬϵ, ǆiiiͿ MoŶeǇ͛s Woƌth of PeŶsioŶ AŶŶuities, DepaƌtŵeŶt foƌ Woƌk aŶd 
PeŶsioŶs, ‘eseaƌĐh ‘epoƌt No ϱϲϯ.  CaŶŶoŶ aŶd ToŶks͛ fiŶdiŶgs aƌe suppoƌted ďǇ a ŵoƌe ƌeĐeŶt studǇ ďǇ the 
FCA: Matteo Aquilina, Robert Baker and Tommaso Majer (2014), The Value for Money of Annuities and Other 
Retirement Income Strategies in the UK, Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional Paper No. 5, December 
(http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-5.pdf) 
464 
 
cannot take much more strain without adversely impacting the size of the annuity 
payments. 
The fifth and final criticism that we consider is that basis risk is sufficiently large that it 
would negate any gains from holding longevity bonds.  
We recognise that basis risk is an important issue. There will be a requirement under 
Solvency II for annuity companies to hold capital to cover basis risk where they have a 
hedging instrument that is not perfect. However, given that no longevity bonds have yet 
been issued,882 no annuity provider has been in a position to agree the scale of capital 
required with its regulator. The level of capital will clearly depend on the composition and 
size of the iŶsuƌeƌ͛s aŶŶuitǇ populatioŶ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ƌeiŶsuƌeƌs ǁho aƌe also Đaught ďǇ 
Solvency II would be more able to consolidate exposure by pooling portfolios from different 
providers and therefore experience less basis risk. It is possible that reinsurers could end up 
using longevity bonds to manage their longevity risk and reduce their Solvency II capital 
requirement, whilst providing indemnity rather than indexed solutions to insurers with 
small pools of annuities. 
Whilst it is hard to be absolutely sure at this stage in the development of the market, we do 
not believe that basis risk means that longevity bonds will be ineffective. Basis risk arises in 
other markets where imperfect hedging instruments are used, such as interest rate and 
currency futures contracts. Using these contracts leads to both contemporaneous and time 
basis risk,883 but this does not prevent them from providing highly effective – if not perfect – 
hedges.  
 
4.9 Feedback from our interviews and responses to the consultation paper 
4.9.1 Feedback from our interviews 
We asked the providers and investment managers that we interviewed about their views on 
longevity bonds. The question gave rise to opposing views, of which the following are 
typical: 
 ͚TheǇ ǁould ďe helpful due to loŶg tail of ƌisk aŶd duƌatioŶ of assets. Theƌe aƌe Ŷot 
enough long-teƌŵ ďoŶds. But the ƌetuƌŶ oŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ďoŶds is Ŷot attƌaĐtiǀe͛ 
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 ͚[Ouƌ ĐoŵpaŶǇ – an insurance company] does not see a demand, but we accept the 
poiŶt that theƌe is ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ Ŷo ŵaƌket pƌiĐe foƌ loŶgeǀitǇ ƌisk ;aŶd eǀeƌǇoŶe͛s pƌiĐiŶg 
is ďased oŶ aŶ aĐtuaƌial ŵodelͿ͛.  
4.9.2 Responses to the consultation paper 
We summarise the responses to Questions 32-40 in the consultation paper here. 
32. What eǀideŶĐe is theƌe of iŶdiǀiduals͛ aďilitǇ to ƌeliaďlǇ estiŵate hoǁ loŶg theǇ aƌe 
going to live? 
33. How easy is it for individuals to quantify longevity risk? What evidence is available on 
this question? 
Respondents were unanimous that individuals had problems estimating both life expectancy 
– with a tendency to under-estimate it – and longevity risk. A minority thought that these 
problems could be overcome with education or engagement. 
34. Is longevity risk a risk that individual savers are able – and should be expected – to 
manage themselves? 
The majority of respondents thought that individuals could not manage longevity risk 
adequately, and pointed to solutions in the form of longevity insurance, annuities and 
guaranteed drawdown. A minority thought that individuals could manage longevity risk if 
they received some additional help. 
35. Where people receive tax incentives to save into pensions, should people be required 
to secure a minimum lifetime income in retirement? 
Respondents were split on whether people who had received tax incentives should secure 
aŶ iŶĐoŵe iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt oƌ Ŷot. Just oǀeƌ a Ƌuaƌteƌ said ͞Ǉes͟, ǁhile just oǀeƌ a thiƌd said 
͞Ŷo͟. Otheƌs thought that taǆ ƌelief Đould ďe used to eŶĐouƌage people to buy longevity 
insurance after retirement. Some thought that the use of tax relief in pensions should be 
reviewed, especially since it did not benefit those on low or modest incomes. 
36. (a) Do you believe that the DC retirement income market could benefit from the 
introduction of a market in longevity bonds? Explain. (b) Do you believe that a market in 
longevity bonds is viable (in the sense of having sufficient demand to justify its introduction)? 
Explain. 
37. Do you have a preferred design for a longevity bond?  
38. Is there a case for the Government to issue longevity bonds? Explain. 
There were two interpretations of these questions on longevity bonds. Where longevity 
bonds were interpreted as products issued by the Government to allow insurance 
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companies to hedge mortality risk, a majority were in favour of government issuance, 
although a minority did not believe they would work. Where longevity bonds were 
intepreted as retail products (i.e., a form of deferred annuity) purchased by individuals 
(perhaps from the Post Office or National Savings & Investments), many respondents 
thought that this would be a good idea. 
39. Are there alternatives to longevity bonds to hedge systematic longevity risk? Explain. 
There were only two replies to whether there are alternatives to longevity bonds to hedge 
sǇsteŵatiĐ loŶgeǀitǇ ƌisk, oŶe saǇiŶg ͞Ŷo͟ aŶd the otheƌ saǇiŶg ͞Ǉes, ďut it ǁould pƌoďaďlǇ 
ďe eǆpeŶsiǀe.͟ 
40. Are there other ways of helping savers to manage longevity risk? 
Most responses thought that savers could not manage longevity risk without some form of 
annuity or guaranteed drawdown. A significant minority thought that better education and 
engagement would improve the chances of individuals dealing with longevity risk. 
4.10 Analysis and recommendation 
The evidence that we have put forward in this Chapter suggests that longevity risk is a risk 
that individual savers are not able – and should not be expected – to manage themselves. 
They need help to manage this risk in a cost-effective way, while retaining flexibility in 
spending and the investment growth potential of retirement assets in the early years of 
retirement.  
Our analysis provides further support for Recommendation 3.1 in Chapter 3, namely a quasi-
default decumulation plan, involving drawdown plus longevity insurance in the form of a 
deferred annuity (as one option). However, the providers of longevity insurance face 
systematic longevity risk for which there is currently no suitable hedging instrument, namely 
a longevity bond, being traded. 
We make one recommendation as a result of the analysis in this Chapter: 
 
Recommendation 4.1: Longevity bonds working party  
Since longevity bonds have a potentially important role to play in hedging systematic 
longevity risk, we recommend that the Government sets up a working party to undertake 
a cost-benefit analysis of government issuance of longevity bonds to help manage the 
associated longevity risk exposure.  
The terms of reference of the working party would cover the benefits that would accrue to 
all stakeholders, the scale of the longevity risk that Governments would be assuming, the 
actions Governments can take to mitigate this risk, and the issue of inter-generational 
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equity. The working party should also work through the practicalities of issuing longevity 
bonds, including the construction of reference longevity indices, potential demand, pricing, 
liquidity and taxation.884 
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5. The role of the National Employment Savings Trust in helping savers to 
access good quality retirement products 
͚Do Ǉou ŵeaŶ that Ǉou thiŶk Ǉou ĐaŶ fiŶd out the aŶsǁeƌ to it?͛, said the 
March Hare. 
͚EǆaĐtlǇ so͛, said AliĐe. 
Lewis Carroll (1865) Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
 
The National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) has revolutionised the DC pension savings 
market in the UK by providing a high-quality benchmark for private-sector schemes to 
compare themselves against. We consider whether it can and should do something similar 
in DC decumulation, both for its own members and for the members of other schemes that 
do not offer DC decumulation products. 
5.1 Introduction 
The introduction of NEST has been a game changer for the provision of good-valued, well 
designed and governed pension schemes for low- and medium-income savers in small and 
medium-sized companies. It has brought institutional standards – in terms of low charges, 
good governance and a well-designed default investment fund – to the formerly high-cost, 
poor-value world of retail customers.885  It has also encouraged the entry of new multi-
employer trust-ďased sĐheŵes, suĐh as NOW: PeŶsioŶs aŶd The People͛s PeŶsioŶ.886 
However, under current legislation, once members of these and other auto-enrolment 
schemes retire, they have to go to the retail market to buy annuities on an individual basis. 
Even under the new decumulation regime introduced in April 2015, those who do not wish 
to buy an annuity might end up buying a retail income drawdown product, which at present 
can be very expensive and suffer from both poor investment strategy and poor governance.  
Could institutional standards – in terms of design, governance and charges – be brought to 
the retirement income space and what role could NEST play in achieving this?  
Two key topics are covered in this Chapter. The fiƌst deals ǁith NE“T͛s appƌoaĐh to 
developing a retirement income strategy for its own members. The second explores the 
potential for NEST to play a role in the wider market in relation to employers that want to 
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offer a third-party retirement income solution to their scheme members, and also to the 
millions of private sector workers who are self-employed or whose contracts of employment 
do Ŷot eŶtitle theŵ to ŵeŵďeƌship of theiƌ eŵploǇeƌ͛s auto-enrolment scheme. We begin 
with a brief summary of NEST and its current membership. 
5.2 NEST and its membership 
By 2018, all private-sector employers must establish a qualifying workplace auto-enrolment 
scheme in order to fulfil their legal duties. This essentially means that any worker between 
22 and state pension age with earnings above the Earnings Threshold of £10,000 (in 2015-
16) must be auto-enrolled into a DC workplace pension scheme. NEST is one of the largest 
schemes with over 2m members from 14,000 employers.887 These numbers will increase 
significantly between now and 2018, as NEST will be the scheme of choice for many smaller 
companies that reach their staging date over the next two years.  
NEST is a non-departmental public body (NDPB) and is run as a trust by NEST Corporation, 
which is the trustee. The scheme was introduced by the Government to avoid the danger of 
market failure under auto-enrolment, whereby employers considered economically 
unattractive to traditional life officers might not be able to find a suitable provider.  
While NEST resembles other large master trusts, it is unusual in several respects: 
 It is a new scheme, designed specifically for the auto-enrolment market. It opened 
for business in October 2012 to coincide with the first auto-enrolment staging date 
for large employers888  Its legal structure is similar to any other multi-trust scheme, but as a NDPB, NEST 
Corporation is accountable to Parliament through the Department for Work and 
Pensions  Members of the Corporation (the chair and up to 14 trustees) are appointed by the 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions in line with public appointments guidance  NEST does not have shareholders (unusual, but not in itself unique) or a parent 
company that provides new business capital. Instead its establishment and 
administration costs are funded by a Government (DWP) loan facility. The initial loan 
was £171m and this had increased to £387m by 2015. Details about the terms and 
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conditions of the loan are available in a Freedom of Information (FOI) report, 
although certain sections have been redacted889  In order to repay the loan, NEST has a dual charging structure, whereas most 
modern schemes have a single annual management charge (AMC) or total expense 
ratio (TER). NEST has an AMC of 0.3% and a contribution charge of 1.8% - the latter 
being used to repay the loan. The two charges combined are broadly equivalent to a 
TER of 0.5% for members who stay sufficiently long in the scheme  NEST is the only multi-employer scheme with a public service obligation to accept 
any employer that applies  Although NEST will accept any employer, many of its employer members are either 
smaller companies or companies with lower-paid staff and/or high staff turnover  NEST accepts the self-employed as individual members – by 2015, about 800 have 
joined  NEST cannot accept transfers-in until April 2017  There is an annual contribution cap – again until April 2017. This is the maximum 
aŵouŶt that ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŶtƌiďuted to aŶǇ ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ƌetiƌeŵeŶt pot iŶ a taǆ Ǉeaƌ. The 
contribution limit for the 2015-16 tax year is £4,700. It is adjusted annually in line 
with average earnings. 
In October 2015, NEST became the fourth occupational DC master trust to obtain Master 
Trust Assurance Framework (MAF) status.  This is a voluntary framework, developed by the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) in association with The 
Pensions Regulator (TPR), to support auditors to provide independent assurance reports for 
the trustees of master trusts. The other schemes with MAF status at the time were NOW: 
Pensions, SEI Master Trust and The People's Pension. There are currently around 70 master 
trusts operating in the UK.890 
5.3 NEST͛s approaĐh to deǀelopiŶg a retireŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe strategy for its oǁŶ ŵeŵďers  
Many life companies have struggled to meet the April 2015 deadline for introducing 
͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ and making available a suitable choice architecture and product range 
for decumulation. NEST is more fortunate and is well-placed to deal with the new pensions 
tax regime. Until the 2014 Budget announcement, the scheme had assumed that its 
members would either take their fund as cash, where it was small enough to qualify under 
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 One section redacted relates to the applicable interest rate. This is because ͚the description contained 
within it could prejudice Government policy in future lending to other public sector bodies and the 
methodology used by the Debt Management Office in setting interest rates for such loans͛. The second 
redaction has been made ͚because we have concluded the information would otherwise prejudice NEST 
CoƌpoƌatioŶ͛s ĐoŵŵeƌĐial iŶteƌests aŶd has ĐoŵŵeƌĐial iŵpoƌtaŶĐe to otheƌ peŶsioŶ pƌoǀideƌs͛. 
 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-employment-savings-trust-nest-loan-agreement. 
890
 Reported in Jonathan Stapleton (2015) NEST obtains master trust assurance, Professional Pensions, 15 
October. 
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the trivial commutation rules, or in the form of tax-free cash and an annuity. As it was 
evident that pot sizes would be small – particularly in the early years – the scheme 
established a panel of annuity providers that were prepared to offer annuities for pot sizes 
as low as £1,500. 
Following the introduction of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛, NEST has adopted a new short-term 
strategy. Members coming up to retirement over the next few years will have very small 
pots – and until 2017 they will not be able to use NEST to consolidate this pot with their 
other private pensions because NEST is unable to accept transfers-in before this date. 
Therefore, NEST expects most members retiring over the next few years to take their entire 
pot as cash and, for this reason, these members will be in a target date fund891 that will be 
fully invested in cash at the point of retirement.  
Furthermore, NEST does not have to deal with legacy books of workplace DC business. 
GiǀeŶ the ƌeĐeŶt foĐus of the FCA͛s IŶdepeŶdeŶt PƌojeĐt Boaƌd oŶ tƌeatiŶg legaĐǇ Đustoŵeƌs 
fairly, back books – where policies often have charges that are very high relative to modern 
schemes – are likely to cause problems for the new independent governance committees of  
contract-based workplace schemes.892  ͷ.͵.ͳ NESTǯs consultation on the future of retirement and the guiding principles for 
designing retirement income defaults 
NEST has set out its longer-term plans for scheme decumulation in several reports, starting, 
in November 2014, with a consultation paper, The Future of Retirement: A Consultation on 
IŶǀestiŶg foƌ NE“T͛s Meŵďeƌs iŶ a Neǁ ‘egulatoƌǇ LaŶdsĐape.893  In March 2015, it 
published an interim report, The Future of Retirement: Guiding Principles for the Design of 
Retirement Pathways for the Automatically Enrolled Generation, that set out ͚siǆ pƌiŶĐiples 
foƌ ŵeetiŶg the Ŷeeds of Ŷeǁ geŶeƌatioŶ of saǀeƌs͛.894 Launching the report, Mark Fawcett, 
NE“T͛s Đhief iŶǀestŵeŶt offiĐeƌ, said: 
The new ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ reforms provide a great opportunity to 
deliver innovative solutions for millions of savers who will be increasingly 
reliant on DC pots. What we are seeing is a strong consensus emerging on 
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 See Chapter 2. 
892
 FCA (2014) The Independent Project Board Report: Defined Contribution Workplace Pensions: The Audit of 
Charges and Benefits in Legacy Schemes - A Report from the Independent Project Board, December; 
http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/defined-contribution-workplace-pensions.  
893
 NEST (2014) The Futuƌe of ‘etiƌeŵeŶt: A CoŶsultatioŶ oŶ IŶǀestiŶg foƌ NE“T͛s Members in a New Regulatory 
Landscape, November;  https://www.nestpensions.org.uk/schemeweb/NestWeb/includes/public/docs/The-
future-of-retirement.pdf.   
894
 NEST (2015) The Future of Retirement: Guiding Principles for the Design of Retirement Pathways for the 
Automatically Enrolled Generation, March; 
http://www.nestpensions.org.uk/schemeweb/NestWeb/includes/public/docs/guiding-principles.pdf.  
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good quality default retirement income solutions playing a central role in 
helping these savers achieve better retirement outcomes. 
Much of the evidence we are analysing indicates broad agreement that 
helping savers mitigate the risk of outliving their savings will be a key 
feature for default solutions right for the DC-dependent generation. 
 
An important insight that emerged from the consultation is that DC savers are just as likely 
to underdraw as they are to overdraw their DC savings. International experience backs up 
this finding. The experience in the US is that DC retirees underspend, while in Australia they 
overspend with the result that many retirees run down their DC savings by the age of 70 
(see Chapter 3). 
The key findings of the consultation include the following: 
 There is a need for default retirement income solutions  The design needs to be flexible  There is a need to manage the risk that people will run out of money because they 
live longer than expected (i.e., longevity risk)  No amount of education can prevent people from making complex decisions they 
later come to regret  Choice is a double-edged sword. Most DC savers like to have choice in principle, but 
if the choices are complicated, then they get anxious and confused, often resulting in 
sub-optimal decisions  People cannot and should not be expected to know when they will retire. This is 
paƌtlǇ ďeĐause theƌe aƌe siŵplǇ too ŵaŶǇ lifestǇle, health aŶd fiŶaŶĐial ͚uŶkŶoǁŶs͛ 
in the decade before retirement. It is also due to the increasing trend towards 
fleǆiďle ƌetiƌeŵeŶt, i.e., ǁoƌkiŶg past ͚Ŷoƌŵal ƌetiƌeŵeŶt age͛, ofteŶ oŶ a paƌt-time 
basis.  
NE“T Ŷotes that the laŶguage of ͚defaults͛ is soŵeǁhat flaǁed iŶ ƌelatioŶ to deĐuŵulatioŶ 
options because there must be more than one choice – i.e. cash, annuity, drawdown, and a 
combination of all three. Despite this, NE“T Đhooses to use the teƌŵ ͚default͛ to deŶote the 
income drawdown default fund and investment strategy. As retirees come to rely 
increasingly on DC as a primary source of private retirement income, NEST believes that 
drawdown will represent the most sensible option, provided, as it also emphasises, the 
decumulation strategy also includes a longevity risk hedge in the form of a later-life annuity. 
NE“T͛s ĐoŶsultatioŶ ƌespoŶdeŶts ǁeƌe ďƌoadlǇ iŶ agƌeeŵeŶt aďout the keǇ featuƌes of the 
drawdown scheme. It needs to demonstrate: 
 Simplicity from the member perspective  Value for money through economies of scale and expert governance  Fƌeedoŵ to opt out, ǁhiĐh is esseŶtial uŶdeƌ the ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ ƌegiŵe, aŶd 
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 A clear choice architecture.  
Respondents also suggested that instead of complex annual statements based on 
investment performance and fund size, the statement should focus on meeting income 
targets.895 It is much more meaningful for retirees to understand their retirement pot as a 
series of income payments, so the statement should adopt a similar language to that used in 
annuity income statements, but with the important caveat that the drawdown income is not 
guaranteed. 
NE“T͛s siǆ pƌiŶĐiples foƌ desigŶiŶg ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe defaults foƌ auto-enrolment savers are 
as follows: 
1. Living longer than expected and running out of money is the key risk in retirement 
and a critical input into retirement income solutions. 
Many people underestimate how long they will live and therefore what they are 
likely to need to secure an appropriate income in retirement. 
The latest projections for England suggest males born in 2014 could expect to live to 
79.5 and females to 83.2. 
Under the previous pensions fƌaŵeǁoƌk, aŶŶuities ŵet saǀeƌs͛ Ŷeed to ŵaŶage 
long-life risk. However the new freedoms mean schemes may have a part to play in 
helping to manage this type of risk. 
In comparison with buying an annuity, many question how appropriate attempting 
to manage longevity risk by primarily investing in growth-seeking assets is. 
Buying an annuity at a later age can allow individuals to draw a higher income than 
would be considered sustainable if they were trying to achieve this through a 
drawdown portfolio. 
2. Savers should expect to spend most or all of their pension pots during their 
retirement. 
DC-depeŶdeŶt saǀeƌs͛ pots aƌe likelǇ to ďe theiƌ ŵaiŶ souƌĐe of ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe, 
alongside the state pension. 
UsiŶg all oƌ ŵost of saǀeƌs͛ pots to pƌoduĐe aŶ iŶĐoŵe should be the main objective 
of suitable default solutions. 
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 This had previously been recommended in Debbie Harrison, David Blake and Kevin Dowd (2014) VfM: 
Assessing Value for Money in Defined Contribution Default Funds, Pensions 
Institute.tntitute.org/reports/ValueForMoney.pdf 
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Other considerations, such as being able to leave money to dependants, should not 
be a key driver when designing appropriate retirement options for DC-dependent 
savers retiring in the medium term. 
Strategies foƌ ŵaŶagiŶg these saǀeƌs͛ ŵoŶeǇ ǁheŶ theǇ ƌetiƌe ǁill ďe diffeƌeŶt fƌoŵ 
traditional drawdown strategies aimed at those with larger pots. These may be 
managed in ways that allow individuals to both leave what may be left of their 
savings for others, as well as maintain an income through retirement. 
3. Income should be stable and sustainable. 
Those who are dependent on their DC pot for retirement income ought to have 
access to arrangements that protect them from dramatic rises and falls in that 
income. 
Their needs will also be met by strategies designed to mitigate the risk of them 
running out of money, while still aiming to produce a stable income. 
4. Managing investment risk is crucial as volatility can be especially harmful in income 
drawdown-type arrangements. 
For savers who are reliant on income from their DC pots to meet the cost of living, 
taking advantage of potential investment growth opportunities is appealing. 
However, minimising the chance of running out of money is likely to be of greater 
importance for the majority. 
Investment risk will need to be managed to reflect this. Investment strategies should 
also reflect that, unlike when savers are building up their pots, where there are 
losses, there is less time to make up those falls. 
Importantly, the impact of falls is exacerbated by the likelihood the individual will be 
taking money out of their pot. This is particularly an issue when pot sizes are at their 
largest. 
5. Providers should look to offer flexibility and portability wherever possible. 
Savers value choice and are likely to appreciate the freedom to move between 
different vehicles at and during retirement. Arrangements for DC savers ought to 
reflect this. 
However, some factors are likely to constrain elements of flexibility and portability. 
For example, it may be that some savers can access a higher or more stable income if 
they decide to have a proportion of their pots in illiquid assets or a mortality pool 
which would not allow them to cash out without it costing some of their pot by 
moving. 
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It is these sorts of considerations retirement arrangements will have to assess in 
designing solutions that meet the expectations of savers while aiming to provide a 
stable income. 
Schemes may also need to reflect that flexibility may be more important during the 
transitional years from building up your pot to accessing it, than it is in later years. 
We suggest there will be many cases where savers will see the best outcomes when 
they have enough flexibility to respond to changing circumstances. However, they 
are less likely to get a good outcome if they move too frequently. Moving too 
fƌeƋueŶtlǇ ŵeaŶs saǀeƌs͛ pots ǁill iŶĐuƌ tƌaŶsaĐtioŶal Đosts aŶd lose out oŶ otheƌ 
advantages of staying in the same strategy such as benefiting from mortality cross-
subsidies.  
6. Inflation risk should be managed but not necessarily hedged. 
Many savers are likely to be in retirement for decades. Over this time, the cost of 
living is assumed to rise. 
As inflation can have a dramatic impact on income in retirement, this means 
investment strategies ought to be designed to produce a stable income in real terms. 
This will, in turn, mean balancing the need to keep pace with inflation and provide 
income without taking undue investment risk.  
NEST announced that it would be working on a blueprint for designing retirement income 
defaults based on these principles. It also recognised that these principles might be in 
tension with each other and that providers need to prioritise and understand the trade-offs 
in designing default options. However, Mark FaǁĐett gaǀe aŶ eaƌlǇ iŶdiĐatioŶ of NE“T͛s 
pƌefeƌeŶĐes. He aĐĐepted that ͚foƌ ŵaŶǇ ŵeŵďeƌs, fleǆiďilitǇ iŶ the eaƌlǇ stages of 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt is keǇ, as theǇ ǁill siŵplǇ Ŷot kŶoǁ ǁhat theiƌ iŶĐoŵe Ŷeeds ǁill ďe….[But], as 
retirees get older they need less flexibility and longevity risk becomes the most important 
ƌisk͛. The pƌefeƌƌed solutioŶ is likelǇ to ďe a hǇďƌid pƌoduĐt that is a ďleŶd of dƌaǁdoǁŶ iŶ 
the early years and longevity insurance in the later years, but with the ability to opt out of 
this. This would mean fund managers would need to partner with insurance companies to 
provide deferred annuities that begin at age 80 or 85.  Furthermore, costs should be as low 
as possiďle iŶ oƌdeƌ to giǀe good ǀalue to saǀeƌs: ͚OŶe adǀaŶtage of [the pƌefeƌred] solution 
is the drawdown phase is at a similar cost to accumulation but with some additional risk 
management techniques. One of the challenges in keeping costs low is to encourage 
insurance companies to compete on price, [for example, using] a panel of pƌoǀideƌs͛.896 
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 Reported in Amanda White (2015) Best practice de-cumulatisation - a hybrid approach, Top1000funds, 14 
May. 
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ͷ.͵.ʹ NESTǯs proposals for implementing the guiding principles for designing retirement 
income defaults 
NE“T͛s fiŶal ƌepoƌt, The Future of Retirement: A ‘etiƌeŵeŶt IŶĐoŵe BluepƌiŶt foƌ NE“T͛s 
Members, was released in June 2015.897 
The report begins by revealing what members want from their retirement incomes.  This is 
broadly the same as we found in Chapter 2, namely that: 
 a substantial proportion of people want to use their pension pots to generate an 
income in retirement  there is significant demand for using retirement arrangements to provide an 
inflation-protected income. This would be without significant market risk and 
guaranteed to last for life.  people are not only interested in a stable income for life, they also express strong 
preferences for having access to lump sums and the ability to pass on their savings, 
particularly in the event of early death.  
It then identifies three phases of retirement during which people are likely to accept 
͚diffeƌiŶg pƌopoƌtioŶs of fleǆiďilitǇ, iŶflatioŶ pƌoteĐtioŶ aŶd loŶgeǀitǇ pƌoteĐtioŶ͛: 
 Phase 1, typically mid-to-late 60s to mid 70s, where the priorities are  to maximise 
sustainable income in real terms and to preserve flexibility for later periods  Phase 2, mid 70s to mid 80s, where the aim is to provide a steady income that aims 
to keep pace with inflation, whilst keeping the majority of the pot liquid, so that it 
can be passed on to dependants on death  Phase 3, mid 80s onwards, where the aim is to protect the member from all or most 
investment risk and longevity risk, at the cost of a loss of flexibility. 
The issues arising in each phase and the potential solutions are considered in Table 5.1. 
The main part of the report covers the blueprint for a core retirement income strategy. This 
has a number of aims: 
 to provide a regular sustainable income for retirement  to provide members with the ability to access lump sums without disturbing their 
regular income stream  be low cost and feel straightforward for the member. 
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 NEST (2015) The Future of Retirement: A RetiƌeŵeŶt IŶĐoŵe BluepƌiŶt foƌ NE“T͛s Meŵďeƌs, June; 
https://www.nestpensions.org.uk/schemeweb/NestWeb/includes/public/docs/The-future-of-
retirement,pdf.pdf 
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Table 5.1: Meeting the different objectives of a blueprint for a core retirement strategy 
Phase Capital market returns vs. 
mortality credits 
Lifestyle and behavioural 
influences 
Potential solution 
One Expected returns from 
investments much higher 
than benefits of mortality 
pooling. 
Members entering 
retirement have little 
sense of what their 
consumption needs will 
be. They are likely to have 
ad hoc needs until they 
settle into retirement and 
aƌeŶ͛t foĐussed oŶ long-
term needs. 
Remain fully invested in 
an income drawdown 
strategy. 
Use cash lump sum fund 
for ad hoc needs without 
impacting their regular 
income. 
Two Mortality credits become 
increasingly more 
valuable overtaking 
expected investment 
returns. 
Members are more 
settled into their 
retirement, have a better 
sense of their likely future 
spending needs and are 
becoming less active. 
More recognition that 
they are likely to need a 
retirement income for 
longer than previously 
expected. 
Secure a later-life income 
with a portion of their 
remaining pot. 
Remain invested in the 
income drawdown fund 
to provide sustainable 
income in real terms. 
Use cash lump sum fund 
for ad hoc needs without 
impacting their regular 
income. 
Three Variance of both longevity 
and value of remaining 
pots is too high to 
manage or plan for by 
using capital markets. 
Many members at this 
age will be less active and 
less engaged with their 
finances, preferring 
instead for certainty in 
their regular income. 
Draw from later-life 
protected income building 
block. 
Use cash lump sum fund 
for ad hoc needs without 
impacting their regular 
income 
No longer use investment 
supported income 
drawdown fund. 
Source: NEST (2015, p. 31)  The Futuƌe of ‘etiƌeŵeŶt: A ‘etiƌeŵeŶt IŶĐoŵe BluepƌiŶt foƌ NE“T͛s Meŵďeƌs, 
June. 
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Table 5.2: Meeting the guiding principles 
Guiding principle  How the blueprint for the core retirement 
income strategy meets the principle  
1. Living longer than expected and running 
out of money is the key risk in retirement 
and a critical input into retirement income 
solutions.  
This blueprint aims to manage longevity risk 
through the later-life protected income fund.  
2. Savers should expect to spend most or all 
of their pension pots during their retirement.  
Phases 1 and 2 of the blueprint would aim to 
pay out sustainable income. Any excess 
returns should be paid into the cash lump 
sum fund. Later-life protected income 
provides security in Phase 3 so no money 
Ŷeeds to ďe ͚left oŶ the taďle͛.  
3. Income should be stable and sustainable.  By having a clear investment horizon (the 
end of Phase 2), the drawdown investment 
strategy can be managed with clear 
objectives. The investment strategy should 
be balanced and diversified.  
4. Managing investment risk is crucial as 
volatility can be especially harmful in income 
drawdown-type arrangements.  
There should be a clear requirement in the 
income drawdown fund to manage for 
volatility and sequencing risk.  
5. Providers should look to offer flexibility 
and portability wherever possible.  
A core design principle for this blueprint is 
that it doesŶ͛t loĐk ŵeŵďeƌs iŶ eaƌlǇ iŶ theiƌ 
retirement and gives them flexibility with 
theiƌ ŵoŶeǇ ǁheŶ it͛s ŵost needed.  
Full flexibility is a key feature of Phase 1. This 
is the most important time for flexibility as 
work and retirement patterns change and 
income requirements are uncertain.  
By Phase 3, there will generally be less need 
for this level of flexibility. It becomes more 
important to provide reassurance that the 
money will last as long as it needs to.  
6. Inflation risk should be managed but not 
necessarily hedged.  
Inflation hedging is expensive but a well-
managed drawdown fund could provide 
reasonable inflation protection in Phases 1 
and 2. Inflation protection is arguably less 
important in Phase 3.  
Source: NEST (2015, p. 6) The Future of Retirement: A Retirement IŶĐoŵe BluepƌiŶt foƌ NE“T͛s Meŵďeƌs, June. 
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To achieve these aims, the blueprint discusses three building blocks which cover the three 
phases of retirement: 
1. An income drawdown fund – To provide a steady income that aims to protect 
members against inflation, as well as give them full flexibility to change their mind 
and withdraw some or all of their money. 
2. A cash lump sum fund – To be highly liquid so it can be used by members for 
unexpected events without impacting their core income stream. If market conditions 
are good then this pot can be topped up with additional lump sums. This would be a 
fund from which members could move money in ad hoc lump sums into their bank 
account to use as they like. 
3. Later life protected income – To ďe ͚ďought͛ gƌaduallǇ oǀeƌ time through small 
payments from the drawdown fund. This would remain refundable up to a certain 
age, at which point that money is locked in to ensure a secure income is available for 
the ƌeŵaiŶdeƌ of a ŵeŵďeƌ͛s life to pƌoteĐt agaiŶst the ƌisk of ƌuŶŶiŶg out of money 
before they die. 
Table 5.2 shows how the blueprint meets the guiding principles. NEST believes that the 
guiding principles are of particular importance given that its research had shown that a 
͚sigŶifiĐaŶt pƌopoƌtioŶ of ŵeŵďeƌs ŵaǇ ďe uŶǁilliŶg or unable to pay for fiŶaŶĐial adǀiĐe͛. 
The retirement income and investment strategies post-retirement operate as follows:  
1. 10% of the pension pot at retirement will be kept in a cash lump sum fund (which 
will invest in liquid money market instruments) in case the member wants to make 
ad hoc withdrawals for a holiday, say. 
2. The drawdown phase is designed to pay an inflation-linked income of 4% for 20 
years from 65 to 85. With 10% of the pension pot in liquid assets, the remaining 90% 
of the pot has to produce a return of at least 4.4% to give an overall target return of 
4%. 
3. During drawdown between 1.5% and 2% of the pot is drip-fed into the protected 
income (annuity) fund each year. This is a collective fund, not an individual fund.898  
4. The drawdown strategy is designed to haǀe a ͚high pƌoďaďilitǇ͛ of geŶeƌatiŶg a 
sustainable income until age 85. NEST plans to find out from its members what 
pƌoďaďilitǇ leǀels ǁould ďe ͚aĐĐeptaďle͛. The ƌepoƌt shoǁs that a ͚high poƌtfolio ƌisk͛ 
portfolio (which is dominated by equities) has a 5% probability of running out of 
ŵoŶeǇ iŶ ϮϬ Ǉeaƌs, ǁhile a ͚loǁ poƌtfolio ƌisk͛ poƌtfolio (which is dominated by liquid 
assets) has nearly a 25% probability of running out of money over the same period.  
BǇ ĐoŶtƌast, the ͚ŵediaŶ poƌtfolio ƌisk͛ poƌtfolio (which is a highly diversified fund) 
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 This is siŵilaƌ to the ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe iŶdiǀidual DC sĐheŵe͛ disĐussed iŶ the Ŷeǆt Chapteƌ. It also has siŵilaƌities 
ǁith the oŶe of the ͚defiŶed aŵďitioŶ͛ optioŶs ĐoŶsideƌed ďǇ “teǀe Weďď ǁheŶ he ǁas PeŶsioŶs MiŶisteƌ, 
ŶaŵelǇ, the ͚peŶsioŶ iŶĐoŵe ďuildeƌ͛ fund, although that involved making contributions prior to retirement. 
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has just a 2% probability of running out of money in 20 years. Any money remaining 
in the income drawdown fund at age 85 would be moved into the cash lump sum 
fund. 
The later-life protected income would be provided ideally using deferred annuities, although 
that is subject to the willingness of the insurance industry to provide these products at a 
reasonable cost.NEST is aware of the challenges in delivering the blueprint for a core 
retirement income strategy. It accepts that the two key risks that will need to be managed 
in Phases 1 and 2 are sequence-of-returns risk899 and inflation risk. It also recognises that in 
Phase 3, advanced life deferred annuities might not be available, in which case other 
internal solutions, involving elements of risk sharing, might have to be considered. Cost, as 
well as hedge effectiveness, will also be an important consideration.  
Mark Fawcett said: ͚“iŶĐe the peŶsioŶ fƌeedoŵs ǁeƌe aŶŶouŶĐed the ĐhalleŶge to iŶdustƌǇ 
has been to help savers achieve a sustainable retirement income without removing freedom 
and flexibility. We believe this is possible but it requires innovation. Many of NEST's 
members are the first generation of savers who'll rely almost entirely on their DC pots and 
their state pension in retirement. This makes it absolutely critical that we get this right for 
them. We've developed an evidence-based blueprint for how to meet members' needs. We 
hope this will stimulate the innovation necessary for us and others to deliver what members 
ǁill Ŷeed aŶd ǁaŶt͛. 
5.4 A wider role for NEST in the DC decumulation market? 
Is it possible that NEST could have a wider role in the DC decumulation market? There are 
EU rules on competition and state aid in relation to Government intervention in markets. In 
2010, the Government had to present a convincing case that NEST was necessary to ensure 
the successful implementation of automatic enrolment, i.e., without it there could be a 
market failure. The Government also argued that it was fair and reasonable to support the 
scheme through the provision of a Government loan.900 The loan was justified on the 
gƌouŶds of the Đost iŵpliĐatioŶs of NE“T͛s puďliĐ seƌǀiĐe oďligatioŶ: 
NEST will have a public service duty, to accept all employers who want to 
use the scheme to discharge their duty to automatically enrol workers, 
irrespective of costs. This means NEST will be required to bear costs other 
pension providers do not face. In recognition of this, and in order to 
preserve the scheme's low-cost aims, the Government intend to provide 
relief to the scheme to limit the overall interest charges scheme members 
incur on funds borrowed to the Government's cost of borrowing. The 
Government are currently seeking the European Commission's approval 
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 This is examined in Chapter 2. 
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 House of Commons Library (2010) National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) – Background. Standard Note: 
SN 04826, November;  http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN04826/SN04826.pdf  
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that this approach is consistent with European rules on competition and 
state aid. The Government believe that this funding package represents a 
fair balance between delivering good value to NEST's members, ensuring 
affordability for the taxpayer and putting NEST on a level playing field with 
the existing pensions industry. 
 
As far as EU competition law is concerned, NEST can enter the DC decumulation market if it 
wishes. If it needs a subsidy to do so, that is when it could require a state aid clearance. If it 
requires a state subsidy, there is no requirement to show that a market failure has 
already  occurred, only that the Government has a reasonable belief, on the balance of 
probabilities, that a market failure is likely to occur given the information currently 
available. It is also open to the Government to define what it considers market failure to be. 
For example, the Government could argue that a market failure is likely to occur if (a) a 
significant number of DC savers are mis-sold inappropriate retail drawdown products that 
are likely to run out of money early due to a combination of high charges and inappropriate 
investment strategies, or (b) solutions with institutional standards – in terms of low charges, 
good governance and a well-designed decumulation default offering drawdown with 
longevity insurance – do not soon become available to the mass market. 
NEST – or an independently constituted sister organisation set up along the same lines – has 
the potential to provide a national decumulation scheme similar to its accumulation 
offering, since: 
 It offers a low-cost, low-risk approach that is designed for the mass market, including 
lower earners  It demonstrates high standards of governance through its independent trustee board  It is open to the self-employed and employees whose contracts of employment 
make them ineligible for auto-enrolment.  
The self-employed and non-eligible job holders for auto-enrolment could be allowed to 
participate in such a scheme. 
Finally, in terms of the legal framework necessary for NEST to become a national 
deĐuŵulatioŶ aggƌegatoƌ, ǁe ǁeƌe iŶfoƌŵed that: ͚In order for NEST to become a general 
aggregator to the nation, it would have to become a Regulatory Own Fund (like the Pension 
Protection Fund). We think this could happen. It may well be that NEST remains a master 
trust to accumulate but has a separate structure – a Regulatory Own Fund structure – for 
decumulation. This would happen not just because of demands from consumers (fuelled by 
the pension freedoms) but because this is about the only way that a collective approach to 
spending (including longevity poolingͿ is goiŶg to ǁoƌk͛. 
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5.5 Reactions to the NEST proposals 
There was support for the idea of the Government setting up a national drawdown provider 
with lower charges, similar to NEST, even before the NEST blueprint was published. 
For example, in February 2015, the Trades Union Congress came out in support of the idea 
of a good default in decumulation and called for the establishment of a low-cost master 
trust for drawdown, similar to NEST, which would help to establish good practice, good 
standards and good value to which other products can then be compared. Nigel Stanley, 
theŶ head of ĐaŵpaigŶs aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs, said: ͚The histoƌǇ of fiŶaŶĐial seƌǀiĐes tells us 
that fiŶaŶĐial ŵaƌkets doŶ͛t pƌoǀide good pƌoteĐtioŶ foƌ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs. The ǁhole patteƌŶ is 
innovation, rip-off, concern, regulation, and eventually you get more on this product. 
Theƌe͛s a daŶgeƌ that ǁe͛ll go thƌough that foƌ the Ŷeǁ deĐuŵulatioŶ pƌoduĐts as ǁell. … 
NE“T͛s ƌole iŶ the aĐĐuŵulatioŶ stage has ďeeŶ aďsolutelǇ ĐeŶtƌal. MǇ idea is that ǁe bring 
exactly the same insight and lessons into the decumulation process. I think the default 
provider needs to have a public service obligation to accept funds, particularly occupational 
pensions, run by employers who do not want to look after the decumulation phase. 
Furthermore, I think it should play exactly the same role in setting standards and it should 
be based around a model where there is innovation and people have every right to opt out, 
ďut still haǀe that ĐhoiĐe͛. 901  
Similarly, in March 2015, Which?, in a report called Better Pensions,902 said: ͚In the same 
way as it created NEST to enable all consumers to save into a pension, the Government 
should lay foundations for a low-cost, high value government-backed scheme for consumers 
to take money out of their pension. Once appointed, that provider should develop product 
defaults that ŵatĐh ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ Ŷeeds ;e.g., ďǇ ŵaŶagiŶg ƌisk aŶd ǀolatilitǇ, offeƌiŶg loǁ 
charges, and providing some flexibility so that members can adjust to changes in personal 
ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐesͿ͛. 
The ƌepoƌt ƌeĐoŵŵeŶds that aŶǇ ͚diseŶgaged͛ Đustoŵeƌ should ďe defaulted iŶto this 
provider. It also recommends that any default drawdown product sold by any provider (i.e., 
where the customer does not make an active choice) should have a charge cap in the same 
way that default funds used in the accumulation stage of auto-enrolment schemes have a 
charge cap (of 0.75%).  
The report goes on to recommend that the FiŶaŶĐial “eƌǀiĐes CoŵpeŶsatioŶ “Đheŵe͛s cover 
to be increased iŶ the Đase of dƌaǁdoǁŶ:  ͚IŶ the eǀeŶt of a pƌoduĐt pƌoǀideƌ goiŶg out of 
business, some funds invested via SIPPs are subject to protection under the FSCS, but only 
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 ‘epoƌted iŶ “tephaŶie Baǆteƌ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ TUC ǁaƌŶs DC fleǆiďilities ǁill alloǁ ͚peƌfeĐtlǇ legal͛ ƌip offs, 
Professional Pensions, 16 February; and Adam Cadle (2015) Soapbox – The decumulation dilemma, Pensions 
Age, February. 
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 http://www.staticwhich.co.uk/documents/pdf/better-pensions-report---march-2015-397468.pdf 
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to a maximum compensation level of £50,000. This level of protection would prove 
inadeƋuate foƌ ŵaŶǇ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt saǀiŶgs. AŶŶuities, oŶ the otheƌ haŶd, ďeĐause 
theǇ aƌe Đlassed as iŶsuƌaŶĐe pƌoduĐts, aƌe suďjeĐt to ŵoƌe geŶeƌous pƌoteĐtioŶ͛.903 
Similarly, in a report entitled Some Suggestions for the New Pensions Minister,904 published 
by the Centre for Policy Studies in May 2015, author Michael Johnson recommends 
Baroness Altmann to do the following: 
 Encourage NEST (and its competitors) to develop a collective drawdown capability to 
enable retirees to pool their longevity risk  Establish a not-for-profit national annuities auction house to automate the process 
of shopping around, adding to pricing tension and transparency. 
There were three main industry reactions to the NEST blueprint when it was published:905 
 The ͚ĐoŵpleǆitǇ͛ of the proposed solution, which appears more appropriate for 
engaged investors with large pension pots than to typical NEST members who are 
not interested in pensions and in any case have a small pension pot.  Whether the FCA would agree to disengaged investors being defaulted onto a risk-
based retirement income solution.  The potential cost of developing the blueprint to practical implementation and 
whether this a good use of public funds. 
Tom McPhail, head of pensions research at Hargreaves Lansdown, said:906 
NEST's research echoes market experience of the first weeks of the pension 
freedoms, with investors overwhelmingly favouring drawdown ahead of 
annuitisation, for now at least. They have some good ideas here, however, 
their proposals do set a couple of interesting challenges. Insurance 
companies have shown precious little appetite for developing a deferred 
annuity market though perhaps NEST's blueprint will now stimulate more 
interest. They will also bump up against the challenge of communicating 
drawdown risks to their customers, some of whom are likely to be 
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 The report made a number of other recommendations, including:  a cooling off period for at-retirement product purchases   increase enforcement activity against scams and the distribution of unregulated collective investment 
schemes  alloǁ peŶsioŶ pƌoǀideƌs to ďook aŶ appoiŶtŵeŶt ǁith guidaŶĐe seƌǀiĐe PeŶsioŶ Wise oŶ Đustoŵeƌs͛ 
behalf.  
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 http://www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/original/150514105646-
SomeSuggestionsfortheNewPensionsMinister.pdf 
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 Reported in Michael Klimes (2015) NEST reveals plan for in-scheme drawdown and deferred annuities, 
Professional Pensions, 27 June.  
906
 Quoted in Jenna Towler ;ϮϬϭϱͿ NE“T lauŶĐhes ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe stƌategǇ ͚ďluepƌiŶt͛, Professional Adviser, 27 
June. 
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relatively disengaged. The Financial Conduct Authority is unlikely to look 
kindly on a solution which involves putting disengaged investors into a risk-
based retirement income solution. We also know that to date, investors 
have shown no appetite for buying deferred annuities, so packaging this up 
in a way which is attractive to investors could be challenging and 
complicated. 
While they have not yet been able to put a price on the deferred annuities, 
NEST project that this package of measures could deliver an income of 4% 
a year. This income would be inflation linked up to age 85. For comparison, 
a level annuity would typically pay about 6% at current rates and a 
drawdown plan purely distributing the income from the underlying 
investments would pay about 3.5%. 
NEST has the luxury of not needing to rush into a retirement income 
solution for the pension freedom world. Its members typically have only a 
few hundred pounds in their accounts at present and very few of them are 
currently making retirement income withdrawals. This could change after 
2017 when NEST will be able to accept transfers in from other schemes. 
 
Mr McPhail͛s ǀieǁs oŶ the NE“T ďluepƌiŶt appeaƌ to haǀe ŵelloǁed slightlǇ siŶĐe he ŵade 
the following comments on the Which? report Better Pensions in March 2015: ͚DiseŶgaged 
investors should probably either buy an annuity or take financial advice (or possibly both). 
DefaultiŶg theŵ iŶto dƌaǁdoǁŶ plaŶs ǁheŶ theǇ doŶ͛t uŶdeƌstaŶd the ƌisks look like a 
reĐipe foƌ disasteƌ͛.907 
Immediately following the release of the NEST blueprint, Emma Douglas, head of DC 
solutions at Legal & General Investment Management, speaking at Pensions & Benefits UK 
2015, said that income drawdown may need to be delivered collectively to account for 
deŵaŶd fƌoŵ the ŵass ŵaƌket: ͚Theƌe is a lot to ďe said foƌ [a ĐolleĐtiǀe solutioŶ] iŶ that ǁe 
are looking at a mass income drawdown market where many cannot afford an adviser. They 
will want something that is off the shelf, low cost and easy to understand. However, they 
will need some element of guidance so maybe that could be delivered via a collective 
solutioŶ͛. 908 
 
5.6 Feedback from our interviews and responses to the consultation paper 
5.6.1 Feedback from our interviews 
A number of the consultants we interviewed supported the idea of a NEST-style national 
deĐuŵulatioŶ sĐheŵe. OŶe said: ͚Yes. This ǁould appeal to a lot of eŵploǇeƌs ďeĐause theƌe 
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 Reported in William Robins (2015) Which? calls for Nest-style national drawdown scheme, Citywire, 6 
March.  
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 Reported in Helen Morrissey (2015) PBUK 2015 - Collective solutions could deliver mass market income 
drawdown, Professional Pensions, 30 June. 
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is an assumption of safe harbour. Advisers – retail as well as corporate – would like this too, 
because it would give them a home for customers who are not economic to serve 
sepaƌatelǇ. This Đould ďe ďetteƌ thaŶ BT͛s “IPP solutioŶ. I aŵ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed that the “IPP 
charges aƌe still too high, eǀeŶ though BT has tƌied to Ŷegotiate theŵ doǁŶ͛. 
There was also support from the trade union representatives we talked to, although some 
were concerned about whether NEST itself should operate the decumulation scheme: 
 ͚NEST should provide decumulation͛  ͚But the worry is that NEST is new. It is very early days. I would not like to see all that 
good work wither away͛  ͚Perhaps we do need a new organisation that operates on the same lines as NEST 
with a similar public service obligation͛. 
Providers and investment managers tended to have more doubts: 
 ͚NEST was introduced because of market failure in auto-enrolment. But is there 
evidence of market failure in DC decumulation? If not, you are bringing in to the 
market a government/taxpayer-subsidised loss-making provider as a solution͛  ͚Potential for ͞mission creep͟ – NEST did not initially offer scheme drawdown for its 
own members, but it can take transfers in after 2017 and could start to offer 
drawdown services to this group͛  ͚Given that advice is essential, could NEST provide this?͛  ͚There is a huge government liability if NEST gets decumulation wrong. If 
decumulation goes wrong, it goes wrong quickly͛. 
5.6.2 Responses to the consultation paper 
We summarise the responses to Questions 41-46 in the consultation paper here. 
41. Should NEST provide retirement income products to its members? 
Half of the respondents (a majority of those that had a clear view on the matter) thought 
that NE“T should pƌoǀide ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe pƌoduĐts, ĐitiŶg NE“T͛s ability to use its 
economies of scale, the links between accumulation and decumulation, and pensioner 
inertia in seeking out good products. However, a significant minority – 35 per cent – were 
against the idea, mainly on the grounds that there was not yet any evidence of market 
failure in the provision of retirement income products and that this would also involve NEST 
operating beyond its original remit. 
42. (a) Should NEST provide a default decumulation product (e.g., scheme drawdown or 
annuitisation)? (b) If so, what quality standards should apply (e.g., in terms of charge caps, 
governance)? 
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Of the respondents who were happy for NEST to provide retirement income products, 43 
per cent agreed that there should be a default or a menu of default opinions, 28 per cent 
were against, and the rest were unclear.  Most thought existing quality standards would be 
appropriate. 
43. Are there any other ways in which NEST can help savers to access good quality 
retirement products? 
Most respondents suggested that NEST could provide guidance, advice or something in 
between, and also signpost customers to appropriate products. One respondent suggested 
the importance of engaging with pension savers on an on-going basis. There was also a 
suggestion that NEST might provide an annuity shopping service. 
44. In an aggregator model for stranded pots: (a) Would it be desirable for NEST to act as 
one of the aggregators? (b) Which other schemes could act as aggregators? 
The vast majority – 73 per cent – of respondents thought that NEST could be an aggregator 
for stranded pots, but this did not imply that NEST should take on this role. A minority of 
respondents thought that it was inappropriate for NEST to be an aggregator. All 
respondents agreed that NEST should not be the only aggregator, but there were relatively 
few responses to the second part of the question. 
45. Could NEST do more in decumulation for the self-employed and workers excluded 
from auto-enrolment?  
The overwhelming majority of responses expressed no strong view on whether NEST could 
or should do more in decumulation for the self-employed and workers excluded from auto-
enrolment. 
46. (a) Could NEST become a collective pension scheme? Explain. (b) Should NEST 
become a collective pension scheme? Explain. 
Respondents were equally divided on whether or not NEST should become a collective 
pension scheme, with strong views on both sides. 
5.7 Analysis and recommendation 
There were mixed views on whether NEST should offer decumulation services. There was 
support from the unions and some consultants. Providers on the other hand tended to 
eŵphasise issues like ͚ŵissioŶ Đƌeep͛ aŶd distoƌtioŶ to the ŵaƌket ďǇ a 
͚Government/taxpayer-subsidised loss-ŵakiŶg pƌoǀideƌ͛.   
Even if the Government went ahead with the proposal, it would face at least two additional 
hurdles, according to a pension lawyer we interviewed. The first relates to EU rules on state 
aid which prohibit the state from supporting businesses that undercut other private-sector 
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providers – this could be overcome with a letter of comfort from the EU as was used when 
NE“T ǁas set up. The seĐoŶd ĐoŶĐeƌŶs giǀiŶg NE“T͛s deĐuŵulatioŶ pƌoduĐt aŶ iŵpliĐit safe 
harbour status. This ǁould uŶdeƌŵiŶe the FCA͛s ĐuƌƌeŶt ƌules oŶ ƌegulated adǀiĐe ďǇ giǀiŶg 
an exemption to a Government-backed provider that was not available to advisers.  
NotǁithstaŶdiŶg these issues, NE“T͛s blueprint for designing a retirement income strategy 
comes very close to how a rational life cycle financial planner would think about the 
problem.909 It is also very close to what we have recommended in Chapter 3. Of course, a 
rational life cycle financial planner would understand all the risk-return tradeoffs and be 
fully aware of – and be comfortable dealing with – the tensions between different 
principles, in particular, the tensions between having flexible access to the pension pot, the 
degree of investment risk assumed, and the risk of running out of money before dying.  
The pƌoďleŵ is that ŵost NE“T ŵeŵďeƌs ǁill ďe ͚huŵaŶs͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚eĐoŶs͛. As we have 
mentioned previously, pension flexibility is completely inconsistent with the philosophy 
underlying auto-enrolment in which the disengaged member is required to make no active 
decisions between the age of joining and the age of retirement.  It is unlikely that such 
people will suddenly become engaged when the time comes to make a decision about their 
pension pot.  
We therefore face the following conundrum. Flexibility requires drawdown and drawdown 
is risky.910 Lifetime income security requires deferred annuities and these are expensive. 
Further, as Tom MacPhail warns: ͚The Financial Conduct Authority is unlikely to look kindly 
on a solution which involves putting disengaged investors into a risk-based retirement 
iŶĐoŵe solutioŶ͛. 
Can this conundrum be resolved? We do not believe it can be. Both DC savers and 
regulators are going to have to accept that there is a fundamental difference between a 
retirement income that is based on investment (drawdown plus deferred annuities) and a 
guaranteed income that is secured through an insurance policy (annuities). We have 
recommended that the best solution is to use a decision tree with a small set of default 
pathways that guide people towards one of these two key solutions, depending on the 
ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes and risk appetite.  We believe that both defaults are valid. This is 
unavoidable – aŶd the faĐt that theƌe ĐaŶ ďe ŵoƌe thaŶ oŶe ͚ƌight͛ aŶsǁeƌ is just soŵethiŶg 
the Government, regulators, practitioners and customers have got to get used to.  
Given the blueprint, there are clearly issues about which we need to know a lot more: 
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 There is, of course, guaranteed drawdown – which is not being offered by NEST – but that is expensive. 
489 
 
 IŶ oƌdeƌ to aĐhieǀe the ƌepoƌt͛s ambitions, more clarity will be needed in particular 
on the underlying asset mix designed to produce real returns of up to 6.5% 
consistently over a 20-year investment horizon  Very little has been said about charges, except for the general statement:  
Defaults need to provide good quality and value for money. Value for 
money is a likely consequence of solutions being designed to deliver good 
outcomes for the majority, as opposed to being highly bespoke and more 
expensive to deliver. Solutions that work for the majority will also benefit 
fƌoŵ eĐoŶoŵies of sĐale͛. 911  In due course, we would expect NEST to 
produce a good value benchmark for  charges in each of the three 
component parts the decumulation strategy, i.e.: 
o Low withdrawal cost (some providers are charging a lot for withdrawals, 
either as a an annual % or per withdrawal – £240 for each withdrawal has 
been noted in the press) 
o Low AMC/TER for the default drawdown fund, plus  
o Competitively priced late-life annuitisation process/rates 
  NEST is anticipating that the markets will begin to offer deferred annuities. This, we 
believe, would be an excellent idea, but if this does not happen, will NEST self 
annuitise, i.e., offer deferred annuities internally?  This is possible and they could 
also be reinsured as in the Rothesay arrangement with Zurich in May 2015912  The launch date (2017 at the earliest) and whether the product would be available to 
non-NEST savers. NEST does, of course, have the luxury of being able to wait until 
the time is right. As a new scheme, member pots are tiny at present (£200 on 
average). This plan will probably make more sense in 10 to 20 years͛ time  The blueprint does not address how to engage with scheme members such that the 
fundamental conflicts concerning their attitudes to pensions are resolved:  
o members want secure inflation-proof income that is not impacted by stock-
market falls, but, at the same time, they want flexibility, the ability to pass on 
their pensions when they die and the possibility of benefiting from stock-
market gains 
o members value choice, but are often unwilling to engage with their savings 
options and make complex and significant decisions about how to access 
their savings 
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o It is not clear why the first phase begins at 65 – what happens to people who 
want to start drawing from their pension pot at 55?  Nor is it clear why the drawdown surplus at age 85 should be converted to cash – 
could it not be used to provide an enhanced income above and beyond that from the 
deferred annuity? 
In terms of a wider role for NEST in the decumulation market to help improve retirement 
outcomes: 
 From 2017, it can accept transfers in, which means that existing members will be 
able to consolidate previous pension pots through NEST (always taking care to check 
older policies for terms and conditions such as exit penalties and guaranteed annuity 
rates). This is very important if NEST intends to become a national aggregator 
scheme for DC decumulation. The question is: will transfers-in be classed as single 
contributions and attract the 1.8% contribution charge? We assume NEST would 
prefer the answer to be 'no' which further delays the payment of the Government 
loan; the ABI and all major AE providers would want the contribution to attract the 
1.8% charge. The DWP and the Treasury are also likely to be divided on this point, 
with the foƌŵeƌ suppoƌtiŶg the ĐoŶtiŶued gƌoǁth of theiƌ ͚ďaďǇ͛ aŶd the latteƌ 
concerned about repaying the Government loan  Employers and providers that do not wish to offer scheme drawdown directly could 
use NEST as a third-party provider for this function  The self-employed and employees with employment contract that are ineligible for 
auto-enrolment could be encouraged to use NEST for both accumulation and 
decumulation purposes, putting them on a level playing field with employees who 
already have access to a low-cost, well-designed accumulation and decumulation 
scheme via their employer. 
However, it is clear from the wide spectrum of opinions expressed by respondents to our 
consultation, that a move on NEST͛s part into the wider market would be greeted with both 
very positive and very negative responses. Despite this, we make the following 
recommendation: 
Recommendation 5.1:  A role for NEST in decumulation 
We recommend that NEST should be allowed to compete in the decumulation market 
from 2018 to provide a value-for-money decumulation product in the same way that it has 
in the accumulation market. This would enable NEST to set a competitive charge and 
governance standards that would provide a market benchmark. 
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6. The role of collective pension schemes and how these could be introduced 
in the UK  
͚Well! ǁhat aƌe Ǉou?͛, said the PigeoŶ. ͚I ĐaŶ see Ǉou'ƌe tƌǇiŶg to iŶǀeŶt 
soŵethiŶg!͛ 
Lewis Carroll (1865) Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
Supporters of collective defined contribution (CDC) pension schemes claim that they can 
produce higher and more stable incomes than individual defined contribution (IDC) pension 
schemes.  Broadly speaking, there are two types of CDC scheme in existence: one that is a 
form of DB replacement and one that is a form of DC replacement. Because CDC schemes 
claim to have economies of scale that are not available to IDC  schemes, we will examine 
whether this model for collective schemes can also boost incomes in retirement or at least 
make such incomes more stable across different cohorts of members. We will 
investigate how their performance might compare with standard IDC schemes. We will 
examine overseas examples of collective schemes that pool and share risks and hence make 
incomes in retirement more predictable (at least in principle). We will also consider what 
effect the new flexibilities for drawing down the pension pot in retirement have for the 
feasibility of a CDC pension. Finally, we examine an alternative type of collective scheme 
that might be more compatible with the new pension freedoms, namely collective individual 
DC (CIDC) schemes. 
6.1 Introduction 
An analysis of the risks outlined in Table 1.2 suggests that these might be more effectively 
managed if they (or at least those that can be) are pooled and shared.  Risk pooling within 
each generation or cohort of members requires scale and, at present in the UK, all DC 
pension schemes are individual DC (IDC) schemes with each member having their own 
individual account. While the contributions of scheme members can be invested in a 
common diversified investment fund, so that all members in the same fund get the same 
return, there is no pooling or sharing of other risks. Risk sharing between cohorts of 
members, in order to make the retirement incomes of each cohort more predictable, 
requires the agreement of all cohorts.  
Collective DC (CDC) pension schemes that pool and share risks were not permitted in the UK 
until the passage of the 2015 Pension Schemes Act which made provisions for new risk-
sharing strategies for DC schemes that aim to improve the predictability of the retirement 
income.913  Because collective schemes have economies of scale, we will examine whether 
this model for collective schemes can also boost incomes in retirement, as well as 
                                                     
913
 This is enabling legislation only and makes provision for regulations to be made in respect of: setting target 
benefits, valuations, reporting requirements, and governance.   
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potentially make them more predictable compared with IDC schemes. In doing this, we will 
need to identify the sources of cost savings and risk pooling/sharing in CDC schemes. We 
will examine international examples of collective schemes that pool/share risks and hence 
make incomes in retirement more predictable (at least in principle).  We will also consider 
an alternative type of collective scheme that might be more realistic in a UK setting 
following the 2014 Budget pension reforms – the collective individual DC (CIDC) scheme. We 
will investigate how new options might be introduced into the UK, drawing on the lessons 
from other countries, but recognising the potential problems that might arise when a model 
that works in one country, such as the Netherlands, is introduced into another. A previous 
UK Government looked at the possibility of introducing CDC schemes in 2009, but decided 
against it.914  
6.2 Collective defined contribution schemes: Features and criticisms 
The main benefits claimed for CDC are risk sharing and lower operating costs. It is claimed 
that as a result of these benefits, CDC pensions can be 30% or more higher than in pure DC 
schemes.915 
CDC schemes typically have the following features: 
 They involve risk pooling between members both within the same generation of 
members (i.e., intra-generational risk pooling) and risk sharing between different 
generations of members (i.e., inter-generational risk sharing). However, there is no 
risk sharing with the employer who pays fixed contributions (in the region of 10-12% 
of earnings) and provides no guarantees concerning the level of the pension  They manage both the accumulation and decumulation phases, in contrast with IDC 
schemes, which just manage the former. Each member has a target pension 
(typically related to career average revalued earnings916 (CARE)) which increases the 
longer they are a member (a typical accrual rate is 1% of earnings for each year of 
                                                     
914
 Department for Work and Pensions (2009a) Collective Defined Contribution Schemes: An Assessment of 
Whether and How Collective Defined Contribution Schemes Might Operate in the UK, December; 
www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/collective-defined-contribution-schemes-dec09.pdf 
915
 See, for example: Department for Work and Pensions (2009b) Modelling Collective Defined Contribution 
“Đheŵes: A “uŵŵaƌǇ of The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt AĐtuaƌǇ͛s DepaƌtŵeŶt ModelliŶg of ColleĐtiǀe DefiŶed CoŶtƌiďutioŶ 
Schemes, December (www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/modelling-collective-defined-contribution-schemes-dec09.pdf); 
David Pitt-Watson and Hari Mann (2012) Collective Pensions in the UK, RSA, July; David Pitt-Watson (2013) 
Collective Pensions in the UK II, RSA, November; Kevin Wesbroom, David Hardern, Matthew Arends and Andy 
Harding (2013) The Case for Collective DC, Aon Hewitt, November; David Pitt-Watson, Nigel Stanley, and Kevin 
Wesbroom (2014) Collective Pension Plans, RSA, June; and Shamil Popat, Chris Curry, Tim Pike, and Ciaran Ellis 
(2015) Modelling Collective Defined Contribution Schemes, Pensions Policy Institute, November.  
916
 This ŵeaŶs that a ŵeŵďeƌ͛s eaƌŶiŶgs for each year over their career are revalued to retirement date by the 
increase in national average earnings and then averaged. 
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service).
917
 It is possible to have CDC schemes which are not earnings-related. One 
example is a with-profits scheme. Another is a unit-linked scheme with a dynamic 
asset allocation strategy that places a cap and a floor on the returns that are 
credited.918 It is important to understand that a CDC scheme offers a target pension, 
not a promised pension919,920  On a regular basis, the combined value of the target benefits of all members in the 
scheme is compared against the value of the total funds in the scheme (i.e., the 
funding status of the scheme).  The target benefits will be raised or lowered 
depending on realised investment performance and the actual longevity experience 
of retired members. This type of DC asset-liability modelling is not used in the UK at 
present921  There is a common investment fund for all members. This will be a diversified 
growth fund (DGF) that pools investment risk over a wide range of assets, including 
illiquid assets, such as infrastructure. Because of scale, the investment charges in the 
fund can be much lower than for funds sold to retail customers and to members of 
small schemes  CDC schemes, through their management of both the accumulation and 
decumulation phases, and the asset-liability modelling and management strategies 
mentioned above, can invest for longer periods in growth assets, such as equities, 
than IDC schemes, which conventionally only covered the accumulation period.  An 
IDC scheme traditionally invested in a lifecycle or target date fund (TDF),922 which 
holds growth assets when the member is young, but has a de-risking glide path 
which usually begins 5 or 10 years before retirement and ends up on the retirement 
date with a fund that is invested 75% in bonds and 25% in cash (to provide the tax-
free lump sum). Until the 2014 Budget changes, the bonds were most frequently 
used to buy a fixed-income annuity from an insurer, which is a low-risk bond-based 
iŶǀestŵeŶt that lasts foƌ the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ƌeŵaiŶiŶg lifetiŵe. This ŵeaŶt that oǀeƌ the 
                                                     
917
 It should be noted that if CDC schemes are in any way earnings-related, include employer contributions, 
and smooth payments, or involve guaranteed returns, they will qualify as DB schemes according to the new 
European System of Accounts, ESA2010, introduced by the Office for National Statistics in September 2014. 
918
 For an explanation of the latter, see: David Blake, Andrew J.G. Cairns, and Kevin Dowd (2001) 
PensionMetrics: Stochastic Pension Plan Design and Value-At-Risk During the Accumulation Phase, Insurance: 
Mathematics and Economics, 29, 187–215; David Blake (1998) Pension Schemes as Options on Pension Fund 
Assets: Implications for Pension Fund Management, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 23, 263-286. 
919
 The contribution rate into the scheme is set so that the target pension is achieved on a ͚best expectations͛ 
basis. 
920
 CDC schemes do not have to offer earnings-related target pensions. In Denmark, it is more common to offer 
a zero-rate minimum guaranteed minimum rate of return (i.e., member get back at least their contributions) 
or a minimum nominal pay-out. 
921
 There have been some recent initiatives considering this, but these are based on individual ALM exercises 
and therefore are not collective. 
922
 These are discussed in Chapter 2. 
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life-cycle as a whole, scheme members were invested in low-risk, low-return assets 
for significant periods. By investing for longer periods in growth assets, it might be 
possible to generate higher average investment returns and hence higher pensions 
in CDC schemes compared with IDC schemes.  
 
Figure 6.1: CDC follows an explicit lifestyle de-risking glidepath 
 
Source: Kees Bouwman (2014), Collective DC versus Individual DC – Lessons from the Netherlands, 
presentation at a Cardano - Pensions Policy Institute round-table seminar, 17  December. 
  The extra investment risk that arises from an extended growth phase needs to be 
shared in an efficient and equitable manner. One way of doing this is through a 
sŵoothiŶg fuŶd. WheŶ iŶǀestŵeŶt ƌetuƌŶs aƌe ǀeƌǇ good, the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s aĐĐouŶt is 
allocated only a fraction of the outperformance, the rest of which is held in a reserve 
fund. When investment returns are very poor, the scheme draws on the reserve fund 
to mitigate the impact of the negative performance. In other words, peaks and 
troughs are smoothed out.
923
 The smoothing in CDC schemes produces an implicit 
lifecycle exposure to risk assets, as illustrated in Figure 6.1.924  The rules for 
smoothing need to be made fully transparent from the start – this means that good 
communication is very important – and the process subject to considerable expertise 
and robust independent governance  Longevity risk is pooled in CDC schemes. One way of doing this is through scheme 
drawdown. All members keep their accumulated assets (apart from the tax-free 
lump sum) in the scheme and draw a retirement income. This income, however, is 
Ŷot guaƌaŶteed. DepeŶdiŶg oŶ the fuŶd͛s iŶǀestŵeŶt peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe, it ŵight ƌise oƌ it 
                                                     
923
 This, of course, is the same principle as operated in with-profit funds. 
924
 Note that individual de-risking glidepaths are not permitted in CDC schemes. 
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might fall. Nevertheless, the cost of buying retail annuities, and hence paying the 
iŶsuƌeƌs͛ pƌofit ŵaƌgiŶ aŶd solǀeŶĐǇ Đapital costs, is avoided. 
The most important point about CDC schemes is that risks need to be shared fairly between 
different generations in the scheme and they need to be pooled fairly between members of 
the same generation.925 A key feature of CDC schemes is that they can smooth shocks over 
more than one generation of members. Inevitably there will be a mismatch between a CDC 
sĐheŵe͛s assets aŶd liaďilities ;i.e., the ǀalue of the taƌgeted ďeŶefitsͿ as the ƌealised 
investment performance of the assets and the actual longevity experience of retired 
ŵeŵďeƌs diffeƌ fƌoŵ eǆpeĐtatioŶs. As Cui et al. ;ϮϬϭϭ, p. ϰͿ desĐƌiďe: ͚“uƌpluses oƌ defiĐits iŶ 
the funding process are shared among young, old and future generations by adjusting either 
contributions, benefit levels, or both, which leads to intergenerational transfers. Ex ante, 
contributions are set such that in expectation, a new entry generation funds its own 
pension. Ex post, a given generation may be a net payer who leaves a surplus for future 
generations, but may also be a net receiver who leaves a deficit for future generations. In 
this way, unanticipated investment [and longevity] risks are shared among many 
geŶeƌatioŶs oǀeƌ loŶg peƌiods͛. 926   
One way in which the working members of the scheme can contribute to this risk sharing is 
through agreeing to make higher contributions or delaying retirement if investment 
performance has been poor for a sustained period of time. One way in which the older 
retired generation can contribute to this risk sharing is through ͚ĐoŶditioŶal iŶdeǆatioŶ͛: 
pensions in payment are only uprated if investment performance permits. In very poor 
financial market conditions, pensions might have to be reduced.927 One way in which risks 
can be pooled fairly within a generation is through the medical underwriting of the 
retirement income.928 Standard CDC schemes give the same pension to all members (with 
the same average earnings and length of service) until they die. This is unfair to those 
members with shortened life expectancies for health reasons. When a young generation of 
                                                     
925
 It is important to understand the difference between risk sharing and redistribution. Consider the 
relationship between different generations of members of a CDC scheme. Intergenerational risk sharing 
implies that there is no ex ante (i.e., anticipated) transfer between generations, i.e., the expected size of any 
transfers between generations of members at the start of the scheme is zero.  Ex post, depending on realised 
investment performance, there will be transfers (i.e., redistributions of pension entitlements) between 
generations – that is how pensions are smoothed across generations.  This contrasts with intergenerational 
redistribution where ex ante there is a planned transfer of wealth between generations.  
926
 Jiajia Cui, Frank de Jong, and Eduard Ponds (2011), Intergenerational Risk Sharing within Funded Pension 
Schemes,  Journal of Pension Economics and Finance,10(1), 1-29. 
927
 In the Netherlands, where CDC schemes first started, pensions in some schemes have needed to be cut by 
20%. Others have had no inflation uprating for 10 years. However, the average cut in pensions during the 
financial crisis was 2-6%. 
928
 That is, determining the level of pension to each member after all members have filled in a medical 
questionnaire about their health status and lifestyle. Those with with reduced life expectancies will receive a 
higher pension. 
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members first joins the pension scheme, it will not be known which of them will have below 
average life expectancies and which will have above average life expectancies at the point 
they retire. Agreeing to medically underwrite incomes at the point of retirement is 
therefore ex ante fair, since it means that those with below-average life expectancies would 
not unfairly cross-subsidise those with above-average life expectancies.929 
A number of criticisms have been made of CDC, in particular, that the higher and/or less 
volatile potential pension comes at the expense of some severe restrictions on choice 
flexibility and that the schemes are complex to manage: 
 CDC schemes appear to work as intended only if people stay in for life and draw an 
income from the scheme, rather than take the accumulated pension fund out at 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt. The ϮϬϭϰ Budget iŶtƌoduĐed gƌeateƌ ͚peŶsioŶ fƌeedoŵs͛ fƌoŵ Apƌil ϮϬϭϱ 
which would allow DC savers to take their pension fund in cash from age 55 (subject 
to income tax after the tax-free cash is withdrawn). By keeping their assets in the 
sĐheŵe, soŵe ǁould Đlaiŵ that ŵeŵďeƌs ǁould ďe ͚losiŶg͛ theiƌ peŶsioŶ fƌeedoŵs. 
If sufficient savers exercised these new freedoms, it would make CDC schemes 
unfeasible.930  The CDC schemes in the Netherlands, for example, do not permit this 
flexibility  CDC schemes have little flexibility over the age of retirement. The CDC schemes in 
the Netherlands have a fixed retirement age and the investment strategy in the 
accumulation phase is designed with this retirement age in mind  Members of a CDC scheme have no identifiable pension pot, so the valuation of each 
ŵeŵďeƌ͛s Đlaiŵ iŶ a CDC sĐheŵe is as ĐhalleŶgiŶg as it is iŶ a DB sĐheŵe. Meŵďeƌs 
who transfer out of a CDC scheme when they change jobs might experience a 
reduced transfer value via a market value adjustment (MVA) if the scheme has an 
                                                     
929
 The Dutch, however, measure ex ante fairness at the point when someone joins a pension scheme, rather 
than at the point of retirement. All members of the same age get the same annuity rate when they retire, 
irrespective of their health status, on the grounds that when they first joined the pension scheme, it will not be 
known which of them will have below average life expectancies and which will have above average life 
expectancies at the point they retire.  
930
 To illustrate this potential problem, in response to the 2014 Budget changes, NOW: Pensions, the multi-
employer trust-based IDC scheme, has changed its investment strategy in anticipation that most of its 
members will take their pension pot as cash at retirement. Members begin in the diversified growth fund 
;DGFͿ aŶd ǁheŶ theǇ aƌe ϭϬ Ǉeaƌs fƌoŵ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt theǇ ǁill ďe sǁitĐhed iŶto a ͚ƌetiƌeŵeŶt ĐouŶtdoǁŶ fuŶd͛ 
which is most suited for those who are going to take cash. The previous de-risking strategy was to switch 75% 
of the DGF iŶto a ͚ƌetiƌeŵeŶt pƌoteĐtioŶ fuŶd͛ aŶd Ϯϱ% iŶto a ͚Đash pƌoteĐtioŶ fuŶd͛. The fiƌst fuŶd hedges the 
interest risk from buying annuities, while the second fund is invested to maximise the size of the tax-free lump 
suŵ. The ͚ƌetiƌeŵeŶt ĐouŶtdoǁŶ fuŶd͛ has the saŵe iŶǀestŵeŶt stƌategǇ as the ͚Đash pƌoteĐtioŶ fuŶd͛: it 
invests in a mixture of cash deposits, money market funds, short-dated bonds with low credit risk and interest 
rate derivatives. It is also possible to opt for a five- or 15-year de-risking strategy as an alternative to the 10-
year default (reported in Professional Pensions, 24 July 2014). 
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implicit deficit.
931
 The large CDC schemes in the Netherlands are industry-wide 
schemes and most people when they change employers move to different 
employers in the same industry and so stay in the same pension scheme. This 
suggests that CDC schemes should ideally be established on an industry-wide basis932 
or that we move away from workplace pension schemes sponsored by an employer 
to a small number of very large nation-wide multi-employer pension schemes with 
employees choosing to join one of these when they first enter the labour market and 
then stay with it for the remainder of their career933  If the risk sharing in a CDC scheme is not fair between generations, it could turn into 
a Ponzi (or pyramid investment) scheme, with older members taking out more than 
their fair share at the expense of younger members.934 Ponzi schemes come to a 
sudden stop when new investors refuse to join. There is, of course, the opposite 
problem that the first generation in the scheme receive less than their fair share due 
to the trustees being overly cautious. Trustees therefore need to be aware of – and 
put mechanisms in place – to avoid both possibilities. CDC schemes also face the 
demographic risk that the working population is too small to pay the pensions of a 
large and growing retired population.935 Supporters of CDC schemes need to answer 
the question why younger workers would join a scheme that was in deficit (which 
would happen if older workers were regularly drawing a pension based on the 
targeted performance of the investment fund which was higher than the realised 
performance)  ‘elated to this is the ĐƌitiĐisŵ that CDC sĐheŵes ĐaŶŶot ǁoƌk ǁithout aŶ ͚estate͛ oƌ 
initial reserve that can be used for smoothing returns. Supporters of CDC schemes 
might argue that, with good governance, it is not necessary to have an estate. 
Alternatively, it might be possible to start a CDC scheme without an estate, but to 
require an estate to be built up by the first group of members. In other words, this 
group takes out less thaŶ is justified ďǇ the fuŶd͛s iŶǀestŵeŶt peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe iŶ oƌdeƌ 
to ďuild a sŵoothiŶg fuŶd. This ǁould help to estaďlish the sĐheŵe͛s ĐƌediďilitǇ 
                                                     
931
 This is what happens in the case of with-profit schemes. An implicit deficit occurs when the sum of the 
promised benefits across all members exceeds the assets in the fund. 
932
 The People͛s PeŶsioŶ, foƌ eǆaŵple, staƌted as aŶ iŶdustƌǇ-wide scheme in the building and construction 
industry. 
933
 This is typical in Australian superannuation schemes. Debbie Harrison, David Blake and Kevin Dowd (2014), 
VfM: Assessing value for money in defined contribution default funds predict that as a result of consolidation 
amongst providers five or six trust-based multi-employer schemes would dominate the market by 2020;  
http://www.pensions-institute.org/reports/ValueForMoney.pdf.  
934
  John Ralfe (2012), CDC could lead to Ponzi schemes, Financial Times, 15  April; 
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/633891dc-848e-11e1-b6f5-00144feab49a.html?siteedition=uk#ixzz33BLFoJOW. 
935
 The same problem faces the state pension scheme or, indeed, many other financial products, such as bank 
deposits, if the early depositors get high returns taken in part from the deposits of later depositors: for 
example, the Icelandic banking system became a big Ponzi scheme until it collapsed in 2008. 
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 The risk-sharing rules lack transparency. This is especially true in CDC schemes that 
operate on a similar basis to with-profit schemes. While it is claimed that there is 
greater transparency in CDC schemes that operate on a unit-linked basis, 
nevertheless, risk sharing usually involves actuarial discretion. It could be argued 
that discretion is the enemy of transparency. Some, however, have argued that 
some degree of opacity is necessary for such schemes to work at all  While under current Government proposals, CDC schemes fix employer 
contributions, future Governments or EU directives might change this.  This could 
happen if the target pension was turned into a guaranteed pension which resulted in 
a deficit being created in the scheme which the employer was required to fill.  
Supporters of CDC schemes argue that the way to protect against this is to have a 
clause in the scheme rules which automatically triggers a switch in the CDC scheme 
to an IDC scheme should this happen  Some CDC schemes in Denmark have introduced a zero-rate minimum guarantee 
(i.e., the saver gets at least the accumulated value of their savings back) or a 
guaranteed minimum pay-out in nominal terms (equivalent to the purchase of a 
deferred annuity). This begins to introduce a defined benefit element to a defined 
contribution pension scheme (i.e., makes the scheme a hybrid scheme).  From a 
regulatory point of view, hybrid schemes are very complicated to run in the UK, 
especially if such guarantees require levies to be paid to the Pension Protection Fund  Some employers might be attracted to CDC in preference to IDC if they could convert 
their defined benefit (DB) pension schemes into CDC schemes. This would allow DB 
promises to be converted into non-guaranteed targets in the CDC scheme. This 
would require retroactive changes to accrued DB benefit entitlements. While this is 
permissible in Holland, for example, the Government has so far refused to allow this 
in the UK. The overarching Government objective is to make pure DC stronger rather 
than make pure DB weaker  A question mark has been raised over whether the proposed 0.75% charge cap 
would apply to CDC schemes  The difficulty of imposing effective regulation as the following extract from an article 
published in the Financial Times notes:936 
Regulation is especially important because, unlike DC pots, individual CDC 
members have no clearly defined property rights. And unlike DB pensions, 
there is no sponsoring employer standing behind it, so target pensions can 
oŶlǇ ďe paid fƌoŵ a CDC͛s oǁŶ assets. Foƌ ŵeŵďeƌs to judge the likelihood 
of their target pensions actually being paid, it is crucial that they can 
uŶdeƌstaŶd the sĐheŵe͛s oǀeƌall fuŶdiŶg positioŶ easilǇ. 
                                                     
936
 John Ralfe (2014) CDC pensions will work only if strictly regulated, Financial Times, 16 November;  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d34f4288-69b8-11e4-8f4f-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3JEGVI3Nk 
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The current Bill [now the 2015 Pension Schemes Act], however, says 
nothing specific about CDC regulation. In particular, CDC trustees, advised 
by actuaries, are left to decide for themselves how target pensions for all 
members should be valued, so overall funding can be measured against 
the market value of assets. 
This ͞DIY͟ appƌoaĐh ŵeaŶs theƌe is Ŷo oďjeĐtiǀe and consistent benchmark 
for CDC members to judge the likelihood of their target pensions being 
paid. ͞Tƌust ŵe, I͛ŵ aŶ aĐtuaƌǇ͟ is Ŷot good eŶough as the ďasis foƌ a 
wholly new and untested type of pension. 
 
It is worth noting that some of the above criticisms have been highlighted in particular by 
service providers whose underlying fear is that they would be excluded from providing their 
services to these schemes. This is because CDC schemes manage the investment and 
drawdown strategies internally and might decide not to make use of external service 
providers, such as fund managers and annuity providers. 
AŶotheƌ ĐƌitiĐisŵ ƌelates to tiŵiŶg. The QueeŶ͛s “peeĐh oŶ ϰ JuŶe ϮϬϭϰ aŶŶouŶĐed the 
Government͛s iŶteŶtioŶ of iŶtƌoduĐiŶg CDC sĐheŵes. This ǁas ŵet ǁith hostility from some 
ĐoŵŵeŶtatoƌs ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ ďe suŵŵed up iŶ the eǆĐlaŵatioŶ: ͚oh Ŷo, Ŷot aŶotheƌ poliĐǇ 
iŶitiatiǀe!͛. Theƌe haǀe ďeeŶ so ŵaŶǇ poliĐǇ ĐhaŶges aŶd pƌoposals iŶ ƌeĐeŶt Ǉeaƌs – auto-
enrolment, ending compulsory annuitisation, ending contracting out, possible solvency 
Đapital foƌ peŶsioŶ fuŶds, ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛, Đhaƌge ĐappiŶg, eŶdiŶg the ƌestƌiĐtioŶs oŶ 
NE“T, aďolishiŶg the ϱϱ% ͚death taǆ͛, etĐ – that there might be no appetite for yet another 
new type of pension scheme, even if it would otherwise be regarded as sensible. In 
particular, we are only half way through the implementation of auto-enrolment, which is 
almost entirely IDC and which began with the largest employers in the private sector in 
October 2012. The implementation process will not end until the smallest employers have 
reached their staging dates in 2017 and newly established companies have staged in 2018.  
6.3 A comparison between collective defined contribution schemes and individual defined 
contribution schemes 
If the claim that CDC schemes are able to generate outcomes that are 30% or more higher 
than outcomes from IDC schemes were true, it would be quite a remarkable achievement 
that one particular DC structure could outperform another to such an extent. We therefore 
need to carefully analyse this claim. 
The IDC scheme behind the claim typically has the following structure: 
 An initially high weighting in growth (i.e., equity-type) assets: an asset allocation that 
is invested 60% in equities and 40% in bonds is typical   A de-risking glide path in the period (typically 10 years) leading up to retirement 
(typically at age 65) which switches the pension fund into bonds (75%) and cash 
(25%)  
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 The purchase at retirement of an annuity with the 75% of the pension fund that is 
invested in bonds. 
The CDC scheme behind the claim typically has the following structure: 
 It maintains the investment in growth assets for the whole of the accumulation 
phase  There is no de-risking glide-path  An annuity is not purchased at retirement, instead the fund remains invested in 
growth assets and an income is withdrawn from the fund  A variation on the last point is that an annuity is purchased at some point (e.g., 75), 
while an income is withdrawn from the fund between 65 and 75. 
We have done some calculations using the PensionMetrics simulation model937 and have 
generated the following additional returns from the CDC scheme compared with the IDC 
scheme: 
 A 0.5% additional annual return from avoiding the de-risking glide path, totalling 5% 
over 10 years  A 1.5% additional annual return from maintaining an investment in growth assets 
between 65 and 75 and drawing an income rather than buying an annuity which is 
bond investment: this totals 15% over 10 years938  A large CDC scheme could use its market power to negotiate a better-valued annuity 
from age 75 (or set up its own annuity business and pass its profits onto members) 
and this could lead to higher returns of 5-10%. 
So it is fairly straightforward to see how a CDC scheme can generate a pension that is 30% 
higher than that in an IDC scheme. However, this is not at all a fair comparison, since the 
two schemes are following completely different investment strategies.  It is clear that if the 
IDC scheme followed the same investment and withdrawal strategies as the CDC scheme – 
which is now permissible following the 2014 Budget  – and had the same cost structure as 
the CDC scheme – which large multi-employer trust-based IDC schemes like NEST, NOW: 
PeŶsioŶs aŶd The People͛s PeŶsioŶ haǀe – then they would have precisely the same average 
outcomes.   
Another important point is that the two schemes have different risk exposures. The CDC 
scheme is exposed to equity risk for much longer than the IDC scheme. It should therefore 
not be surprising that it generates higheƌ ͚aǀeƌage͛ ƌetuƌŶs. But it also has higheƌ ƌisks aŶd 
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 www.pensionmetrics.net 
938
 Even without any additional return, a large CDC scheme might be able to run a drawdown scheme at an 
aŶŶual Đost of Ϭ.ϱ% p.a. ;i.e., NE“T͛s aŶŶual ĐhaƌgesͿ Đoŵpaƌed ǁith a Ϯ% p.a. aŶŶual Đhaƌge that ŵight ďe 
extracted from a retail drawdown product, again a saving of 15% over 10 years. 
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hence the outcomes will be more volatile. Supporters of CDC
939
 concede that the risks will 
be higher if the more aggressive investment strategies of CDC schemes are followed by IDC 
schemes, but they argue that these higher risks can be more effectively smoothed in CDC 
schemes than IDC schemes. 
We therefore need to identify precisely the sources of both cost savings and risk pooling in 
CDC schemes that might give them an advantage over large multi-employer trust-based IDC 
schemes. 
6.4 Sources of cost savings and risk pooling in CDC schemes 
The principal costs in a pension scheme are: 
 Administration costs, covering items such as record-keeping, communications, 
governance, etc   Investment management costs  Costs of decumulation products such as income withdrawal and annuities. 
The principal risks in a pension scheme are: 
 Investment risk  Interest rate risk   Inflation risk  Longevity risk. 
6.4.1 Accumulation phase issues 
In the simulation exercise that follows, we will make the assumption that administration 
costs are the same in CDC and large IDC schemes.  Similarly, there is no reason to suppose 
that the investment management costs for the default fund of a large IDC scheme will be 
any higher than those in a CDC scheme.  They could actually be lower, especially if the CDC 
scheme is offering guaranteed returns which are expensive to provide over long investment 
horizons.  
One of the largest cost savings claimed for CDC schemes comes from not having to buy 
annuities in the retail market. Instead, the CDC scheme provides the retirement income, 
while keeping the fund invested in growth assets. However, a large IDC scheme using 
scheme drawdown could equally well provide a retirement income, while also keeping the 
fund invested in growth assets, and without having to buy retail annuities.  Overall, we 
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 For example, Kevin Wesbroom, David Hardern, Matthew Arends and Andy Harding (2013) The Case for 
Collective DC, Aon Hewitt, November; David Pitt-Watson and Hari Mann (2012) Collective Pensions in the UK, 
RSA, July. 
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should not expect significant cost differences between a large IDC scheme and a CDC 
scheme. 
Let us turn to an examination of the risks, beginning with investment risk.  Investment risk – 
the risk associated with volatile investment returns – can be reduced through 
diversification. Large schemes, whether CDC or IDC, have the scale to diversify into a larger 
range of assets. This includes assets that are illiquid, such as infrastructure, which might 
have higher and more stable long-run returns. A CDC scheme has a single investment 
strategy, just like a DB scheme. An IDC scheme will offer a number of investment strategies, 
but 90% of members will typically choose the default fund, which, in a large IDC scheme, can 
be as well diversified as that in any CDC scheme. So in terms of investment risk pooling 
within a given cohort of members, those members of the default fund in a large IDC scheme 
can achieve the same degree of risk pooling as members of a large CDC scheme.940  Further, 
increasing the number of members in the same cohort cannot increase the degree of 
diversification in either type of scheme, since every member of the cohort has the same 
investments.  
So any additional benefits in terms of investment diversification that a CDC scheme has over 
an IDC scheme can only come from diversification across generations, i.e., risk sharing 
between different cohorts of members in the CDC scheme.    
How does risk sharing between cohorts work? We will take the simplest possible example of 
a CDC scheme.941 Suppose 100 people join a new CDC scheme at the beginning of the year 
and each member contributes one unit. Suppose they will retire at the end of the year and 
will take their pension pot in full.  Suppose the CDC scheme has a target return of 9.651% on 
the investments in the fund. Suppose further that the investment fund used by the CDC 
scheme generates a return that alternates between 5% one year and 15% the next year and 
this pattern then repeats indefinitely.  
Assume in the first year the investments happen to generate a return of 5% and so the 
pension fund is worth 105 units, which is 4.651 units short of the target. In an equivalent 
IDC scheme, the retirees will take out 105 units, since they have not been offered a target 
pension.  But in a CDC scheme, the retirees will get the target pension of 109.651 units.  The 
4.651 unit shortfall will come from the contributions of the next cohort of 100 members 
who join the scheme on the same day that the previous cohort retires. However, the 
scheme has a deficit of 4.651 units at the beginning of year 2, with assets of 95.349 units 
aŶd ͚liaďilities͛ ;i.e., ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶsͿ of ϭϬϬ uŶits fƌoŵ the seĐoŶd Đohoƌt of members. 
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 This is confirmed by  Jurre de Haan, Zina Lekniute, and Eduard Ponds (2015, p.9)  Pension Contracts and Risk 
Sharing: A Level Playing Field Comparison, APG, NetheƌlaŶds, FeďƌuaƌǇ: ͚the CDC plaŶ ǁith Ŷo [iŶteƌ-
generational] smoothing provides the same median replacement rate as the individual plan with an indexed 
aŶŶuitǇ iŶ the deĐuŵulatioŶ phase͛. 
941
 Namely, a with-profit scheme. 
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Suppose that in the second year, the investments generate a return of 15% and so the 
pension fund is worth 109.651 (= 95.349 x 1.15) units. In the equivalent IDC scheme, the 
pension fund is worth 115 (= 100 x 1.15) units and members will take the full 115 units in 
pension.  But in a CDC scheme, the members will take out the target pension of 109.651 
units.  The CDC pension fund is effectively fully funded at the beginning of year 3 when 100 
Ŷeǁ ŵeŵďeƌs joiŶ, ǁith assets aŶd ͚liaďilities͛ of ϭϬϬ units (i.e., contributions of 100 units 
from the third cohort of members). The IDC scheme has an identical balance sheet on this 
date. 
It should be clear that, given the repeating pattern of returns, the CDC scheme is fully 
sustainable: it can continue to pay the same pensions of 109.651 units to each new cohort 
of 100 members indefinitely.942 This ĐoŶtƌasts ǁith the IDC sĐheŵe ǁhiĐh giǀes the ͚luĐkǇ͛ 
Đohoƌt of ŵeŵďeƌs ϭϭϱ uŶits aŶd the ͚uŶluĐkǇ͛ Đohoƌt of ŵeŵďeƌs ϭϬϱ uŶits.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, the 
average pension in the IDC scheme at 110 units is higher than the stable pension of 109.651 
units in the CDC scheme.  This is an inevitable consequence of smoothing: the smoothed 
return of 9.651% in the CDC scheme is lower than the average return of 10% in the IDC 
scheme. This might well be a price that members would be willing to pay, since in the real 
world, theǇ ǁill Ŷot kŶoǁ ďefoƌe theǇ ƌetiƌe ǁhetheƌ theǇ ǁill ďe a ŵeŵďeƌ of a ͚luĐkǇ͛ oƌ 
aŶ ͚uŶluĐkǇ͛ geŶeƌatioŶ.   
The volatility of the return in the IDC scheme (as measured by the standard deviation of the 
return943) is 5%, precisely the same as the standard deviation of the return on the 
underlying investments. The standard deviation of the return in the CDC scheme is zero, 
since in this stylised example each cohort gets the same pension.  
The regularly repeating pattern of returns in this example is, of course, unrealistic. We can 
make the returns more realistic by making them completely random. Suppose we assume 
that there is a 50% chance of a 5% return each year and a 50% chance of a 15% return. In 
this case, it will no longer be possible to design a CDC scheme in which the return is 
constant over time at 9.651%. Instead the return will have to be set each year to ensure that 
the funding ratio neither systematically increases nor systematically decreases. Suppose we 
establish the rule that the return in the scheme will be set at 9.651% if the funding ratio944 
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 That is why the rather precise target return of 9.651% was chosen. This particular CDC scheme has what is 
called a knife-edge equilibrium. If the target return is just slightly below 9.651% and is always met precisely, 
the surplus with grow without bounds. If the target return is just slightly above 9.651% and is always met 
precisely, the scheme will eventually become insolvent.   
943
 Standard deviation is a measure of the volatility of returns and can be explained using the following rule of 
thumb. We would expect actual returns to lie within one standard deviation of the average return in two years 
out of every three; we would expect actual returns to lie within two standard deviations of the average return 
in 19 years out of every 20. 
944
 Defined as the value of the assets in the scheme at the beginning of the year divided by the liabilities, which 
in this simple example is equal to the 100 units of contributions paid by the new cohort of members. 
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lies between 90% and 110% (these are typical limits in CDC schemes before adjustments to 
the pension are made). Suppose, further, that if the scheme has a funding ratio above 110%, 
then the return is increased by 1 percentage point to 10.651%. If, on the other hand, the 
funding ratio is below 90%, then the return is set to equal the product of the funding ratio 
and the target return (e.g., if the funding ratio is 80%, then the return will be set at 0.8 x 
9.651% = 7.7208%). We again used the PensionMetrics model to generate twenty 50-year 
histories of returns. The average return in the CDC scheme was 9.3977%, while the average 
standard deviation was 0.7619%. This compares with the IDC scheme in which the average 
return is 10% and the standard deviation is 5%.  The coefficient of variation945 in the IDC 
scheme is 0.5 (i.e., 5%/10%), whereas the coefficient of variation in the CDC scheme is just 
0.08 (i.e., 0.7619%/9.3977%): the volatility per unit of return in the CDC scheme is just 16% 
of that in the IDC scheme.  
While the example here is very stylised, it is nevertheless useful for demonstrating that CDC 
schemes can potentially generate more stable incomes across generations than IDC 
schemes can. Further, we have precisely the relationship we would anticipate between the 
two schemes: the CDC scheme with the lower risks has a lower average return, while the 
IDC scheme with the higher risks has the higher average return. Those supporters of CDC 
schemes who claim that a CDC scheme can generate both higher average returns and lower 
risks than an otherwise identical IDC scheme have found a CDC scheme that violates the 
laws of finance! 
Jurre de Haan et al. (2015) 946 report similar results using the following simulation exercise 
involving a smoothing fund. A 25-year old joins either an IDC or a CDC pension scheme, 
makes a contribution rate of 18%, and retires at 67. The asset allocation is fixed at 23% in 
equities and 77% in bonds. Equities have an expected return of 7.7% and bonds have an 
expected return of 3.5%. Wage growth is 2.4% and the average nominal interest rate term 
structure rises to 2.9%.  The target replacement ratio is 70%. Both the IDC scheme and the 
CDC scheme buy investment-linked annuities, but the CDC scheme has a 10-year smoothing 
of returns, so that if the funding ratio is 95% in a given year, the CDC scheme will reduce the 
pension by 0.5% p.a., whereas, in the case the IDC scheme, the pension is reduced by 5%. 
On the basis of 5,000 simulations, the distributions of replacement ratios for the two 
schemes are shown in Table 6.1. 
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 Defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the average return: it measures the volatility per unit of 
return generated. 
946
 Jurre de Haan, Zina Lekniute, and Eduard Ponds (2015) Pension Contracts and Risk Sharing – A Level Playing 
Field Comparison, APG, Netherlands, February. 
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Table 6.1: Distribution of the replacement ratios in an IDC and a CDC scheme 
Quantiles of the distribution 
of replacement ratios: 
Replacement ratios: 
 IDC scheme CDC scheme 
99% 173% 145% 
95% 136% 121% 
Median 79% 82% 
5% 42% 53% 
1% 33% 43% 
Source: Jurre de Haan, Zina Lekniute, and Eduard Ponds (2015) Pension Contracts and Risk Sharing – A Level 
Playing Field Comparison, APG, Netherlands, February 
 
While the median replacement ratios are not statistically different from each other at 
around 80%, the CDC scheme has less volatile (i.e., smoother) replacement ratios, ranging 
between 53-121% in 90% of simulation trials, compared with 42-136% in the case of the IDC 
scheme. The benefits of using a smoothing fund – in this case across 10 years or cohorts – 
are clear. 
6.4.2 Decumulation phase issues 
Investment risk is the dominant risk in the accumulation phase of a DC pension scheme. We 
now turn to the key risks in the decumulation phase: interest rate risk, inflation risk and 
longevity risk. 
Interest rate risk is a risk associated with the purchase of annuities.  When interest rates are 
low – as they are currently – annuity rates will also be low. This is because when an 
insurance company sells an annuity, it uses the premium received to buy bonds and the 
cash flows on these bonds are used to make the annuity payments.  When interest rates are 
low, bond prices are high947 and fewer bonds can be purchased for a given sized pension 
fund, which, in turn, means that the pension that can be paid will be low. It is therefore 
desirable to avoid the purchase of an annuity when interest rates are low if this is at all 
possible. One way of smoothing out interest rate risk is to purchase the annuities in stages 
over time.948 Another is to avoid the purchase of retail annuities altogether and pay the 
pension from the fund using scheme drawdown. This is what CDC schemes would do. 
An inflation rate of 3% p.a. will reduce purchasing power by 50% in 23 years which is the 
average length of retirement in the UK. Inflation risk is the risk faced by income streams that 
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 This negative relationship between interest rates and bond prices can be illustrated using the simple 
example of a perpetual bond paying £5 p.a. indefinitely. When market interest rates are 5%, the bond will be 
pƌiĐed at £ϭϬϬ. But if ŵaƌket iŶteƌest ƌates fall to Ϯ.ϱ%, the ďoŶd͛s pƌiĐe ǁill ƌise to £ϮϬϬ. 
948
 This strategy is sometimes called staggered vesting. 
506 
 
are not indexed to inflation. It is possible to fully hedge against inflation by purchasing an 
index-linked annuity. However, the initial payment on an index-linked annuity is only 60% of 
that on a level annuity.949 With a 3% inflation rate, it would take 18 years for the payments 
on the index-linked annuity to equal those on the level annuity and 34 years before the total 
payments on the index-linked annuity to equal those on the level annuity. Only 5% of the 
annuities sold are index-linked annuities. Those who do not buy an index-linked annuity are 
exposed to the risk that inflation in future will be much higher than 3%. CDC schemes 
typically do not use index-linked annuities to provide inflation protection. Instead, they pay 
pensions with conditional indexation, that is, pensions paid from the fund using scheme 
drawdown with any uprating of the pensions in payment dependent on the funding 
situation of the scheme. Hence CDC schemes offer the conditional hedging of inflation risk. 
Longevity risk is the risk of the pension scheme member running down their pension fund 
before they die. This can happen with drawdown schemes but not with an annuity.950 CDC 
schemes use drawdown to pay the pension and the pension is adjusted – either by 
foregoing inflation uprating or in extreme cases by cutting the pension – to ensure that the 
scheme remains solvent, i.e., does not run out of money before members die.  
However, every member of a CDC scheme who retires will get the same pension as every 
other member who retires with the same average salary, irrespective of their health status 
and life expectancy. But is this fair to members who have poor health or below average life 
expectancy? Low-skilled workers on low final salaries tend to have lower life expectancies 
than high flyers on high final salaries. Final salary DB schemes therefore involve a significant 
cross subsidy from those on low salaries to those on high salaries. Average salary schemes – 
and CDC schemes target an average salary pension – are designed to reduce this cross 
subsidy, but they do not remove it altogether. In contrast, a large IDC scheme, by 
maintaining individual accounts, might be able to get a better deal for members in poor 
health or who have below average life expectancies, either by allowing such members to 
take enhanced withdrawals from the fund, arranging for them to buy enhanced annuities or 
letting them take a lump sum in extreme cases.951    
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 Personal Pension and Annuity Trends, Moneyfacts Treasury Reports, July 2014.pension of 3.14%. 
950
 Most people in Australia take their retirement pot as a lump sum. In July 2014, the interim report of the 
AustƌaliaŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s FiŶaŶĐial “Ǉsteŵ IŶƋuiƌǇ ;F“IͿ found that a quarter of people with a superannuation 
balance at age 55 had depleted their balance by age 70 ;ƌepoƌted iŶ JoŶathaŶ “tapletoŶ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ͚Will Bƌits 
follow the Aussies in blowing retirement cash?, Professional Pensions,  22 July). The FSI is discussed in depth in 
Chapter 3. 
951
 Following the 2014 Budget changes, any member of a funded pension scheme can take a lump sum from 
55, but this is not the intention of a CDC scheme which is to provide a lifetime pension. 
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6.4.3 Academic studies 
Finally in this Section, we should note a number of academic studies which have shown the 
benefits of CDC schemes.952 These studies use an overlapping generations model in which a 
number of generations of workers of different ages are members of a CDC scheme at the 
same time. The benefit (or welfare) from being a member of a CDC scheme is measured 
across all generations. The studies show that CDC schemes are potentially welfare improving 
compared with IDC schemes. This is because they smooth pensions over time and 
individuals do not know ex ante whether they will be a member of a lucky or unlucky 
generation, and so, if they are rational, they will agree to participate in the CDC scheme. 
Nevertheless, the CDC scheme involves substantial transfers between generations. One of 
the studies finds that it is optimal to transfer up to one third of any underfunding to future 
generations.953  
6.5 International examples of collective schemes 
6.5.1 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands is the home of the second-pillar workplace CDC scheme.954 The CDC 
structure being promoted in the UK – targeting a career-average revalued earnings (CARE) 
pension with conditional indexation – is based on the traditional Dutch CDC model.955 One 
key feature of a Dutch CDC scheme is a high fixed contribution rate of around 20%: the 
Dutch work one day a week for their retirement.956 The main policy lever to keep the 
scheme solvent is conditional indexation. The scheme distinguishes between the real 
͚liaďilitǇ͛ aŶd the ŶoŵiŶal ͚liaďilitǇ͛. The ƌeal ͚liaďilitǇ͛ ;LR) is the value of the accrued target 
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 Christian Gollier (2008) Intergenerational Risk Sharing and Risk Taking of a Pension Fund, Journal of Public 
Economics, 92(1), 1463-1485; Jiajia Cui, Frank de Jong, and Eduard Ponds (2011) Intergenerational Risk Sharing 
within Funded Pension Schemes, Journal of Pension Economics and Finance,10(1), 1-29; Dennis Bams, Peter 
Schotman, and Mukul Tyagi (2013) Optimal Risk Sharing in a Collective Defined Contribution Pension System, 
Maastricht University Discussion Paper, January. See also Samuel Sender (2012) Shifting Towards Hybrid 
Pension Systems: A European Perspective, EDHEC-Risk Institute, March. More generally, Ole Peters and 
Alexander Adamou (2015) The Evolutionary Advantage of Co-operation, arXiv:1506.03414v1, show that in a 
large number of biological and economic systems, the pooling and sharing of resources can reduce fluctuations 
and increase the returns for each co-operator (we are grateful to Dr Con Keating for pointing us to this 
reference).  
953
 One has to question how many British workers would accept that? 
954
 They started formally around 10 years ago, although it can be argued that the defined benefit schemes that 
preceded them, were in effect CDC schemes, since the benefits were, unlike their UK equivalents, not 
guaranteed, but instead were conditional on the performance of scheme investments and could be cut if 
necessary. 
955
 Kevin Wesbroom, David Hardern, Matthew Arends and Andy Harding (2013) The Case for Collective DC, Aon 
Hewitt, November; Eduard Ponds and Bart van Riel (2009) Sharing Risk: The Netherlands New Approach to 
Pensions, Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 8(1), 91-105. 
956
 One has to question how many British workers would accept that? 
508 
 
pension payments when full indexation equal to the growth in average earnings is awarded: 
this is found by discounting the pension payments using the real government yield curve net 
of ƌeal ǁage gƌoǁth. The ŶoŵiŶal ͚liaďilitǇ͛ ;LN) is the value of the accrued target pension 
payments with no indexation: this is found by discounting the pension payments using the 
nominal government yield curve.957 The scheme is fully funded when assets equal real 
͚liaďilities͛ ;A = LR). The diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ƌeal aŶd ŶoŵiŶal ͚liaďilities͛ ;LR – LN) is the 
required indexation reserve needed to cover the target indexation. The actual indexation 
reserve is the difference between the value of the assets and the ŶoŵiŶal ͚liaďilities͛ ;A – 
LN). This might be positive or negative. When the actual indexation reserve is negative (A < 
LN), there is no uprating of pensions and, in extreme cases, pensions might be cut. When the 
value of the assets lies between the nominal aŶd ƌeal ͚liaďilities͛ ;LN < A < LR), pensions will 
ďe upƌated oŶ a pƌo ƌata ďasis. WheŶ the ǀalue of the assets eǆĐeeds ƌeal ͚liaďilities͛ ;A > LR), 
pensions will be uprated fully in line with average earnings plus any catch-up arising from 
previous indexation shortfalls. Dutch schemes typically use a 10-year smoothing window, 
whereby any reduction in the pension paid is spread over a 10-year period.958 
This adjustŵeŶt ŵeĐhaŶisŵ has ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed as a ͚solidaƌitǇ ŵeĐhaŶisŵ͛ ďǇ Frank 
Husken, managing partner at AF Advisors in the Netherlands who has written a report for 
the Dutch Government on CDC schemes. He argues that the way the ͚solidaƌitǇ ŵeĐhaŶisŵ͛ 
works – the way peaks and troughs in returns are smoothed out – must be made clear from 
the start. A failure to do this properly in the Netherlands has led young people to complain 
that theǇ aƌe suďsidisiŶg oldeƌ ŵeŵďeƌs of CDC sĐheŵes. HuskeŶ eǆplaiŶs that ͚YouŶg 
people in universities are coming up with the research and the youth wings of political 
parties are using it to criticise CDCs. They are right. The measures taken to reduce payouts 
are too little too late, what is needed is for the solidarity mechanism to be set out in detail, 
iŶ adǀaŶĐe͛. HuskeŶ poiŶts out tǁo fuƌtheƌ pƌoďleŵs ǁith CDC iŶ the Netherlands: 
First of all there is a lack of transparency. In DB, an individual knows what 
pension he can expect, in DC, they know the value of the assets they are 
entitled to.  
In CDC neither of the two is the case. The pension a member will receive is 
directly related to how the investment proceeds are distributed over 
generations. 
Secondly, the financial crisis taught us that the distribution over 
generations is a difficult exercise.  
The investments suffered, which led to a debate in the Netherlands about 
how much loss on investments can be absorbed by intergenerational risk 
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 A real funding ratio of 100% implies a nominal funding ratio of around 140%. 
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 Kees Bouwman of Cardano has shown that it is possible to replicate the outcome from a Dutch CDC scheme 
with 10-year return smoothing using a very specific investment lifecycle strategy in a IDC scheme: see Figure 
6.1. 
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sharing and how much of the loss should be absorbed by the current 
pensioners through lower pensions.  
This debate became political and in some cases the appropriate measures 
were not taken. 
In my opinion, the only way CDC and the corresponding intergenerational 
solidarity could work is by defining in advance how intergenerational 
solidarity works in practice.959 
 
The criticism that CDC schemes are not fair to young workers or indeed low-skilled workers 
has led the Dutch to search for alternatives that while maintaining the collective benefits of 
CDC schemes – in particular the collective sharing of the risks that are too large for 
individuals to bear themselves – nevertheless protect individual rights where possible.  
OŶe suĐh alteƌŶatiǀe is the ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe iŶdiǀidual defiŶed ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ͛ ;CIDCͿ sĐheŵe.960 In a 
CIDC scheme, the collective features that promote economies of scale and lower costs are 
maintained, e.g., automatic enrolment and the pooling of investment and longevity risks.  
However, there are also key features that are specific to each individual member and which 
make the scheme easy to understand: 
 The CIDC scheme maintains individual accounts for all members in the accumulation 
phase, so it is easǇ to ǀalue eaĐh iŶdiǀidual͛s peŶsioŶ pot  The contribution rate is set to be actuarially fair to each member, implying that there 
is a direct relationship between the contributions that an individual pays into the 
scheme and the pension they eventually receive. This contrasts with CDC schemes in 
which contributions are averaged on a collective basis to meet a target average 
salary pension  Each individual has their own de-risking investment strategy in the lead up to 
retirement.961 
Despite criticisms of CDC and increased support for CIDC in Holland, large numbers of Dutch 
people still trust the Dutch system of solidarity and collective risk sharing, according to 
Bernaƌd Walshots, the Đhief iŶǀestŵeŶt offiĐeƌ of ‘aďoďaŶk͛s peŶsioŶ fuŶd. Neǀeƌtheless, 
he predicted that the pension reform debate currently taking place in Holland would lead to 
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 ‘epoƌted iŶ “teǀe TolleǇ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ, GoiŶg DutĐh: Will “teǀe Weďď͛s ĐolleĐtiǀe DC plaŶs lead to ďetteƌ peŶsioŶ 
returns for savers?, Money Marketing, 4 June; http://www.moneymarketing.co.uk/news-and-
analysis/pensions/going-dutch-will-steve-webbs-collective-dc-plans-lead-to-better-pension-returns-for-
savers/2010866.article. 
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a move away from collectivity.
962
 This view is shared by Gijs van Dijk of the FNV union 
fedeƌatioŶ. He aƌgues: ͚FNV ŵeŵďeƌs aƌe stƌoŶglǇ iŶ faǀouƌ of a ĐolleĐtiǀe sǇsteŵ. TheǇ also 
value risk-sharing. [In addition], costs are lower and you get better returns, and thus a 
better pension in the end for members. But there are limits to their sense of collectivity and 
solidarity. We heard from all sides that members want to be able to see how much money 
they have saved up. Pension funds have to plainly show them how much money is reserved 
foƌ theŵ iŶ the peŶsioŶ pot͛. AŶotheƌ topiĐ that keeps coming up is having more say in the 
iŶǀestŵeŶt poliĐǇ: ͚Tiŵe aŶd agaiŶ, ouƌ ŵeŵďeƌs saǇ that theǇ ǁaŶt to kŶoǁ ǁhat͛s 
happeŶiŶg ǁith theiƌ ŵoŶeǇ͛.963  
6.5.2 Denmark 
DeŶŵaƌk͛s ATP (Arbejdmarkedets Tillaegs Pension or Labour Market Supplementary 
Pension) scheme, which was established in 1964, can be interpreted as a CIDC scheme.964 
This is a mandatory funded first-pillar scheme965 for all Danish employees serviced by a 
semi-official financial institution called ATP.966 As a result of mandatory participation, 
operating costs are very low.  
Contributions which are approximately 1% of salary (with one third paid by the employee 
and two-thirds paid by the employer) are divided into two parts: the guaranteed 
contribution (80% of the total contribution) and the bonus contribution (20%).  The member 
receives an individual guaranteed nominal pension based on the guaranteed contribution 
(effectively a deferred nominal annuity).967 The pension guarantees are fully hedged using 
long-dated derivatives such as interest-rate swaps. The bonus contribution goes into a 
collective reserve which is used to provide future indexation of both pensions in payment 
and accrued pension entitlements on a conditional basis if the funding ratio (total assets 
divided by guaranteed benefits) exceeds 120%. The collective reserve is invested in return-
seeking assets. Given the long-term nature of the scheme, ATP can invest in long-term 
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illiquid assets offering higher expected returns, such as infrastructure. The collective reserve 
is invested on behalf of all scheme participants and individual members have no explicit 
property rights in respect of this fund. 
6.5.3 Canada 
The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) is partly funded and partly unfunded (pay-as-you-go, 
PAYG).968 It is therefore a combination of a CDC scheme and a non-financial (or notional) DC 
scheme.969 It is a nation-wide first-pillar scheme which covers all Canadian provinces except 
Quebec (which operates the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) on a similar basis).  
CPP is a first-pillar scheme which was established in 1997 following a Canadian Government 
AĐtuaƌǇ͛s ƌepoƌt iŶ ϭϵϵϱ shoǁiŶg that the ĐuƌƌeŶt PAYG sĐheŵe ǁould ƌeƋuiƌe a gƌadual 
increase in the contribution rate from 5.6% to 14.2% between 1995 and 2075 to keep it 
solvent in the face of rapid population ageing, where solvency is defined as having a ratio of 
total contributions received to total benefits paid of 100%. The Government responded by 
introducing CPP and increasing the contribution rate immediately to 9.9%. At this rate, 
contributions will exceed pension payouts until 2020. The surplus is invested in return-
seeking assets with the aim of building up a partial fund to pay future pensions. The funding 
ratio is anticipated to reach 31% by 2075 at which time the ratio of contributions to benefits 
is projected to be 87%. The CPP is an example of intergenerational risk sharing as 
investment shocks can be smoothed out over a number of generations. 
The CPP is also aŶ eǆaŵple of ǁhat is kŶoǁŶ as eitheƌ a ͚pooled target-benefit (TB) pension 
plaŶ͛970 oƌ a ͚shaƌed-ƌisk peŶsioŶ plaŶ͛ ;“‘PPͿ.971 This has been characterised as follows: 
A TB pension plan has fixed contributions, a target defined benefit formula 
and a benefits/funding policy that prescribes the methods for varying 
benefits based on affordability, with pre-set reserve levels and a pre-
determined order of benefit adjustments. We distinguish TB from other 
sustainable approaches, the key difference being that TB pension plan 
contributions are set first, at a fixed level, and benefits are derived from 
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what can be afforded by that contribution level, with the ability to adjust 
benefits as experience develops.972 
Target benefits are separated into two types: 
 Base benefits – typically based on a career-average formula  Ancillary benefits – such as cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) and early retirement 
benefits. 
A TB plan satisfies five principles:973  
1. Overall economic risk (variance) must be shared in a manner that is appropriate to 
the participant (e.g., a worker should not be expected to be an investment expert or 
to understand life-course investing). 
2. Size matters. Plans must endeavour to take full advantage of the significant 
opportunities and efficiencies that come with large scale. 
3. Consistent with principles 1 and 2, there should be a collective approach to risk 
shaƌiŶg. That is, the ͚laǁ of laƌge Ŷuŵďeƌs͛ should ďe used to statistiĐally minimise 
risk (variance) whenever and wherever possible. 
4. FaiƌŶess is ĐƌitiĐal foƌ ďoth eŵploǇeƌs aŶd eŵploǇees. IŶ the tƌaŶsitioŶ fƌoŵ todaǇ͛s 
DB and DC pension landscape, whenever participants are expected to cede a right or 
privilege, plans should attempt to replace the lost attribute with new entitlements. 
Participants should not see a significant diminution of their future expectations. 
5. Any new plan design should be cognisant of market realities and the costs 
experienced by members and employers. Cost minimisation is critical to extending 
pension coverage. Proposals that cannot accomplish these goals in a cost-efficient 
manner should not be considered. 
A keǇ featuƌe of a TB plaŶ is sustaiŶaďilitǇ ǁhiĐh is defiŶed as ͚oŶe that ĐaŶ ĐoŶsisteŶtlǇ 
deliver, through both favourable and adverse circumstances, an appropriate range of 
benefits within an acceptable range of costs over the long-term. A sustainable approach to 
providing pensions is based on a solid understanding by all stakeholders of the risk factors 
involved. This, in turn, would work toward the key objective to avoid severe corrections to 
ďoth ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs aŶd ďeŶefits͛.974 Some TB plans allow for risk sharing between the 
employer and employees, with an increase in contributions from both parties under some 
extreme circumstances. 
A particularly interesting example of a TB or shared risk plan is that from the province of 
New Brunswick. This plan will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.6 below. 
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6.5.4 USA 
While not the most obvious country for promoting collective schemes, the Centre for 
American Progress based in the USA has designed SAFE (Secure, Accessible, Flexible, and 
Efficient) Retirement Plans.975 These are hybrid schemes which combine features of a DB 
pension—including regular lifetime payments in retirement, professional management, and 
pooled investing—with features of a DC pension—predictable costs for employers and 
portability for workers. By operating on a large scale, the supporters of SAFE plans claim 
they are superior to individual DC schemes since they (a) eliminate inefficiencies in 
individual schemes, such as high charges and the failure of members to diversify their 
investments properly, and (b) share risks among workers and retirees.  
SAFE plans are designed to work around the behavioural and other barriers that prevent 
individuals making optimal decisions about their pension scheme.  The key issues covered 
are: 
 Reluctance to start pension saving – employees have a set portion of their pay 
automatically deducted and contributed to the SAFE Retirement Plan they have 
chosen  Reluctance to increase pension saving – this is overcome through auto-escalation, 
the automatic increase in the contribution rate over a number of years  Changing jobs: the member stays in the same scheme when they change jobs, i.e., 
the scheme follows the member which avoids the issues associated with the pot 
following the member  Costs: costs are lower than in individual schemes because they are spread across a 
large number of plan members  Investment strategy – investments are managed by professional investment 
managers  Risk of market losses – ͚A “AFE ‘etiƌeŵeŶt PlaŶ ǁould ƌeduĐe the ƌisk of ŵaƌket 
losses by smoothing out the investment returns from years when returns are 
paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ high oƌ loǁ. This ǁould ďe doŶe ďǇ ĐƌeatiŶg ǁhat is kŶoǁŶ as a ͚Đollaƌ͛, 
which would function as follows. In most years, participant accounts would be 
credited with market returns, but in particularly good or bad years, the full market 
return would not immediately be credited. Rather, years of higher returns would be 
saved away and returned over time in weaker-peƌfoƌŵiŶg Ǉeaƌs͛.976 A new SAFE 
scheme would need to build up a reserve cushion before bonuses could be awarded 
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 Risk of outliving pension savings or annuitising when interest rates are low – ͚A “AFE 
Retirement Plan would minimise these risks by providing an annuitised stream of 
payments that increases in value over time and cannot be outlived. The SAFE 
Retirement Plan does this by providing payments out of an annuity fund for retirees 
that is conservatively invested—primarily in bonds with some stocks to enable 
payments to keep up with inflation over time—and by spreading out the impact of 
years of very high and very low returns in a similar manner as is done during the 
aĐĐuŵulatioŶ phase͛ 977  Inflation: the annuity fund would provide cost-of-living increases. 
In October 2015, the 300 Club released a report by David Villa, chief investment officer of 
the State of Wisconsin Investment Board, entitled The Third Way: A Hybrid Model for 
Pensions. The report argues that hybrid schemes can lead to much better governance and 
investment outcomes than either pure DC or pure DB. In such schemes, risk is shared 
equally between employer and employees.  
The report's findings are based on the hybrid structure that has existed in Wisconsin for the 
past 30 years. A minimum level of benefit is guaranteed by the sponsor and any extra 
money in the pot at the point of retirement is split between the sponsor and employee, 
effeĐtiǀelǇ aligŶiŶg theiƌ iŶteƌests. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to Mƌ Villa: ͚The ƌisk shaƌiŶg aspeĐts of this 
design have profound implications for the governance of the system. Interests are not 
aligned in DB or DC structures. In the hybrid structure, risk is shared and the alignment of 
iŶteƌest that ƌesults, ĐoŶtƌiďutes to a ǀiƌtuous ĐǇĐle of goǀeƌŶaŶĐe͛.  The hǇďƌid stƌuĐtuƌe 
giǀes ŵoƌe staďle iŶĐoŵes thaŶ DC, ďut is also supeƌioƌ to DB ͚ďeĐause it Đƌeates a ŵoƌe 
balanced governance structure less susceptible to large shocks that can destabilise the [DB] 
peŶsioŶ plaŶ͛.  
The Wisconsin model works as follows. The beneficiary population is divided into two 
groups. The first group consists of the active employees and the second group consists of 
the retired employees.  
The active employees will accumulate two account balances while they are working. One 
account balance is calculated using a formula that grants credit for each year of service – at 
Wisconsin the credit factor is 1.6%. The result is then multiplied by the average of the three 
highest years͛ earnings. This level of benefit is guaranteed by the employer once the 
member reaches retirement. The target return for the guaranteed benefit based on the 
combined employee and employer contribution is approximately equal to wage growth plus 
4%. In order to compensate the employer for taking the risk of the formula benefit 
guarantee, part of any value created in excess of the guaranteed benefit can be retained by 
the employer. The seĐoŶd aĐĐouŶt ďalaŶĐe is the eŵploǇee͛s ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs ĐoŵpouŶded ďǇ 
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the actual performance of the trust. At retirement, the higher of the two account balances is 
annuitised at a discount rate of 5% and is established as the base benefit. 
Each year, performance of the retiree pool is computed for the previous five years. If the 
pool earns more than 5% in the five-year period, the monthly benefits are increased. This 
creates an adjustment reserve that is added to the liability of the system. This reserve 
represents the growth of the liability above the original base benefit computed at 
retirement. If the performance of the retiree pool is less than 5%, the monthly benefits can 
be decreased by reducing the retiree pool adjustment reserve. However, the liability cannot 
be reduced below the base benefit that was calculated at retirement. Thus, the retirees 
receive a guaranteed base benefit determined by the 5% discount rate plus a contingent 
annuity adjustment based on performance above the 5% discount rate. The goal of the 
contingent annuity adjustment is to compensate for the erosion of the real value of the 
benefit caused by inflation. 
Mr Villa claims that the hybrid scheme is attractive to employers because employees are 
willing to trade-off greater retirement income security for lower wages. According to a study 
by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, wages are 9.5% lower for state 
and local workers in the US, after controlling for education, demographic and other 
factors.978 After modifications for pension contributions and additional health benefits, 
public-sector compensation including wages and benefits is about 4% less than that in the 
private sector. This implies that wages are 5.5% lower to adjust for the value of the pension 
benefit. 
6.5.5 Sweden 
The Swedish mandatory first-pillar collective non-financial (or notional) defined contribution 
(NDC) pension scheme was launched in 1999.979 The contribution rate is 16% of earnings. 
There is also a mandatory first-pillar IDC scheme which has a contribution rates of 2.5% of 
earnings. The NDC scheme was introduced explicitly to deal with intergenerational 
inequities that were perceived to be present in the previous defined benefit system. In 
short, the scheme has explicitly removed intergenerational risk sharing. Instead, risks are 
shaƌed ǁithiŶ eaĐh Đohoƌt. The NDC sĐheŵe deliǀeƌs ǁhat is Đalled aŶ ͚iŶĐoŵe peŶsioŶ͛, 
ǁhile the IDC sĐheŵe deliǀeƌs ǁhat is Đalled a ͚pƌeŵiuŵ peŶsioŶ͛. 
During the accumulation phase, each scheme member iŶ the NDC sĐheŵe has a ͚ŶotioŶal͛ 
fund which grows with new contributions at a rate of return which equals the average wage 
growth rate in the economy plus an adjustment arising from an automatic balancing 
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mechanism (ABM). Defining A/L as the ratio of assets to liabilities in the scheme, the 
adjustment will be negative if A/L < 1.00. It will be positive if, following a negative 
adjustment, A/L  > 1.10 and this adjustment will be maintained until the system has 
returned to the same path of indexation that would have been followed had the negative 
adjustment not occurred. There is no positive adjustment in other circumstances, however, 
so, in principle, the system could build up a surplus that is never distributed.  
In the NDC decumulation phase, the life annuity at retirement that each scheme member 
ƌeĐeiǀes ǁill eƋual the iŶdiǀidual͛s aĐĐuŵulated aĐĐouŶt ǀalue diǀided ďǇ aŶ aŶŶuitǇ faĐtoƌ 
that depends on cohort life expectancy at retirement. The initial real growth rate in the 
annuity was set at 1.6% p.a., with this adjusted (upwards or downwards) to maintain system 
financial balance. The annuity can be claimed in part or whole from age 61. The worker does 
not need to leave the labour force to claim it and, as long as he or she continues to work, 
contributions will be paid on earnings. Also, there is no maximum age at which the pension 
must be drawn. The Swedish first-pillaƌ sĐheŵe has a ŵiŶiŵuŵ peŶsioŶ Đalled a ͚guaƌaŶtee 
peŶsioŶ͛, fiŶaŶĐed thƌough geŶeƌal taǆ ƌeǀeŶues, alloǁiŶg aŶ eleŵeŶt of ƌedistƌiďutioŶ iŶ 
favour of poorer retirees. Additional redistribution occurs through non-contributory rights, 
such as child care rights granted during the first four years after a child is born, also paid 
through external contributions from the general budget. 
NDC schemes have a number of advantages:  
 They are compulsory, so the scheme designer can choose and enforce the 
parameters of the system. For example, the designer can choose an appropriately 
high contribution rate, one intended to achieve a desirable replacement ratio in 
retirement. As another example, the designer can specify the minimum guaranteed 
pension level  They involve risk sharing within each generation, thereby avoiding the 
intergenerational inequities of other systems – including the previous Swedish 
system – that pass deficits down to the next generation. Given demographic changes 
– increasing life expectancy and declining fertility – these deficit transfers were seen 
as unaffordable going forward  They overcome the intragenerational inequities of DB pensions which leave 
companies bearing longevity risk and are unfair to early leavers – who experience 
portability losses when they change jobs – and to low flyers – who do not gain from 
the backloading of benefits in DB schemes  In addition, the Swedish IDC scheme, which supplements the NDC scheme, with a 
free choice of investment portfolios from a set of registered funds, has the following 
characteristics. Its cost of operation is low. Economies of scale are maximised since 
the state (via the tax authorities) collects contributions and there is a central clearing 
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house (via the PPM, the Premium Pension Authority).
980
 The long-run target charge 
of around 0.20 % of PPM assets – comprising around 0.04% for PPM overhead costs, 
0.15% for fund management fees of FDC assets and 0.01% for contribution collection 
– is very low compared with typical IDC charges  There is good access to information. The clearing house provides information on 
returns, costs, and risk measures for all funds (in the IDC component).  
NDC schemes have a number of disadvantages:  
 They require the whole country to participate. This, in turn, implies that a high 
degree of social solidarity is required to make these schemes work  The assets are very poorly diversified internationally. In effect, the Swedish NDC 
sĐheŵe iŶǀests iŶ a siŶgle stoĐk Đalled ͚“ǁedeŶ͛. This ŵeaŶs that “ǁedish peŶsioŶs – 
in the NDC component at least – are wholly dependent on Swedish economic growth 
rates and Swedish demographic trends  They cannot deal well with international labour mobility  The pension assets are not portable in a way that the assets in IDC schemes are.   The state is a monopoly supplier of services and products (e.g., annuities) and so the 
scheme is subject to political risk  Because the annuity factor depends on cohort life expectancy at retirement, the 
NDC pension is unfair to people with impaired lives.  
In short, a NDC pension scheme delivers PAYG pensions, but with a greater degree of built-
in intergenerational fairness. The Swedish pension system probably has little to offer the UK 
except for the following three observations. First, it is possible to have high contribution 
rates – and hence adequate pensions in retirement – but probably only if the high 
contribution rates are mandatory. We should bear that in mind when the UK Government 
comes to review the 8% contribution rate for auto-enrolment in 2018.  Second, it is possible 
to build intergenerational equity into national pension systems, but again probably only if 
they are mandatory. Third, the Swedish Government is the monopoly provider of annuities 
in Sweden – and does so without violating EU competition rules. 
6.5.6 Australia 
A number of large superannuation funds in Australia are considering moving to CDC.981  
The A$17.5 billion Telstra Super fund sees this as a way of smoothing investment outcomes 
and, in particular, avoiding sequence-of-returns risk for its members. The catalyst is the 
FiŶaŶĐial “Ǉsteŵ IŶƋuiƌǇ͛s ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ to Đƌeate the CoŵpƌeheŶsiǀe IŶĐoŵe PƌoduĐt 
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for Retirement. Chris Davies, Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe, saǇs: ͚If Ǉou͛ǀe got the Đoƌe ĐoŵpeteŶĐǇ 
around defined benefit and you have a core of members who have been through defined 
benefit, then you have the culture, you have the ingredients to do something like a 
collective defined contriďutioŶ aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶt͛. Daǀis is also Đoŵŵitted to offeƌiŶg a 
sophisticated level of advice, communication and products for its members. Another fund 
looking at CDC is UniSuper. 
An interesting feature of the Australian system is that members tend to join a scheme when 
first employed and stay with it until they retire.  This implies that the scheme follows the 
member when the member changes job, neatly avoiding the issues associated with the pot 
following the member. 
6.6 How new collective schemes might be introduced into the UK 
In this Section, we investigate how new collective schemes might be introduced into the UK 
and the potential issues that arise when a model that works in one country is introduced 
into a market characterised by a very different culture, history of labour relations and legal 
framework.  
6.6.1 Current UK proposals 
CDC is oŶe eǆaŵple of the ƌeĐeŶtlǇ pƌoposed ͚defiŶed aŵďitioŶ͛ ;DAͿ ǁoƌkplaĐe peŶsioŶ 
schemes that combine some of the risk pooling/sharing benefits of DB, but which impose 
zero or limited liabilities on the sponsoring employer.982 The aims are to provide more 
predictability for members than a typical DC scheme, but at the same time to ensure less 
cost volatility for sponsors of DB schemes than is the case with the traditional model.  
The DA pƌoposals foƌ DB sĐheŵes ;͚DB-lite͛Ϳ foƌ future accrual involve replacing the 
statutory indexation of pensions in payment with conditional indexation (which will depend 
oŶ the sĐheŵe͛s fuŶdiŶg positioŶͿ, ĐhaŶge the sĐheŵe͛s Ŷoƌŵal peŶsioŶ age iŶ liŶe ǁith 
changes in longevity assumptions, and automatically convert benefits to a DC pension when 
a member leaves the scheme, with the choice between a cash equivalent transfer value and 
full buy-out. 
The DA pƌoposals foƌ DC sĐheŵes ;͚DC-heaǀǇ͛Ϳ foƌ futuƌe aĐĐƌual iŶĐlude ;ŶoŶe of these 
options involves any risk to the employer): 
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 Money-back guarantee (MBG) which ensures members receive the same amount 
that they paid in (i.e., they get at least their money back)  Capital and investment return guarantees (CIRG) which ensure that members receive 
back their contributions plus a minimum investment return  ‘etiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe iŶsuƌaŶĐe ;‘IIͿ ǁhiĐh uses paƌt of the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s fuŶd to puƌĐhase 
insurance that guarantees a minimum level of income which is expected to grow 
every year as further insurance is purchased. At retirement, the insurance is 
triggered if the member lives long enough to exhaust their fund.  Pension income builder (PIB) which uses part of contributions to purchase a deferred 
annuity which provides a minimum pension in respect of that year. The rest of the 
contribution goes to a common pooled fund that is invested in riskier assets and is 
used to generate growth and pay conditional indexation. The deferred annuity can 
be bought from an insurer or provided from within the fund  Collective defined contribution schemes (CDC). 
The PIB is the strategy used in the Danish ATP pension scheme. Part of each contribution 
into the scheme is used to buy a deferred annuity which is payable from retirement. The 
level of income secured depends on the level of interest rates at the time and so will 
fluctuate from year to year. The rest of the contribution is invested in growth assets which 
allows for the possibility of pension increases and also provides a buffer against increases in 
life expectancy. The fund accrued with these remaining contributions could be used for 
drawdown during the initial phase of retirement, thereby enhancing the income from the 
deferred annuities (once they start paying). Part of the fund could also be used to buy 
advanced life deferred annuities (ALDAs) which would add to the income in late retirement. 
The PIB is an interesting strategy which fully integrates the accumulation and decumulation 
stages. It has the advantage of expressing the benefit in terms of a future income – which 
members are more likely to understand – rather than a pot size – which most members find 
very difficult to convert into an income equivalent. There are, however, some 
disadvantages.  First, deferred annuities typically have a specific date on which they start to 
make payments. This suggests that individuals would need to have a fairly clear idea about 
the date on which they are planning to retire when they start to purchase deferred 
annuities in, say, their early 20s. Standard deferred annuities give little flexibility to change 
this date. A very large fund like ATP might be able to accommodate a certain amount of 
flexibility, but a small scheme might not be able to do this. Second, deferred annuities 
purchased through insurance companies can be expensive on account of regulatory capital 
requirements. This is because of the potentially large changes in life expectancy that might 
occur over the 40 or so years of accumulation.  Again a pension scheme the size of APT 
might be able to offer these annuities internally, but if it does underestimate increases in 
life expectancy, the next generation of members will be cross-subsidising the retired 
generation. 
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6.6.2 Lessons from abroad 
If CDC ;oƌ oŶe of its ͚DC-heaǀǇ͛ alteƌŶatiǀesͿ is iŶtƌoduĐed iŶ the UK, theŶ it is useful to take 
into account lessons from other countries. Of particular relevance are the Netherlands and 
New Brunswick. 
CDC works in the Netherlands because the Dutch are willing to cooperate to make the 
system work. Large-scale industry-wide schemes are built on employer and union 
agƌeeŵeŶts. EŵploǇeƌs aŶd uŶioŶs ŵeet as ͚soĐial paƌtŶeƌs͛ iŶ ǁoƌks ĐouŶĐils iŶ a spiƌit of 
͚soĐial solidaƌitǇ͛. This tǇpe of ĐollaďoƌatioŶ is faƌ less ĐoŵŵoŶ iŶ the UK, giǀeŶ its histoƌǇ of 
labour relations. Nevertheless, supporters of CDC schemes in the UK include the National 
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC).983 So in 
pƌiŶĐiple, theƌe is suppoƌt foƌ soŵe foƌŵ of ĐolleĐtiǀe DC sĐheŵe aŵoŶgst soŵe of the UK͛s 
͚soĐial paƌtŶeƌs͛. Fuƌtheƌ, it is Đlaiŵed984 that there is a group of employers who might be 
interested in setting up CDC schemes and that is those employers planning to close down 
their defined benefits scheme and wish to offer their employees something more reliable 
than individual DC schemes (even if they cannot change accrued benefits).985  
Scale and cost are important issues to deal with. The Dutch CDC schemes were not set up 
from scratch but were converted from DB schemes in which the benefits were not 
guaranteed, but instead were conditional on the performance of scheme investments and 
could be cut if necessary. By contrast, the accrued benefits in UK DB schemes are 
guaranteed and cannot be changed (in solvent companies). This means that UK DB schemes 
cannot be converted into CDC schemes.  Companies with DB schemes would have to set up 
new CDC schemes which would be a costly exercise. Further, the companies would have to 
be large ones with a large number of potential members in order to generate scale. It 
would, however, be possible for large companies with IDC schemes to switch to CDC at 
reasonably low cost should they wish to do so.  However, it would be even cheaper for such 
companies to convert their IDC schemes to CIDC schemes. 
Another important lesson from the Netherlands is that the CDC schemes are run by not-for-
profit organisations that are largely trusted by all generations of scheme members. This 
trust is very important when risks are shared across generations. It is likely that a for-profit 
organisation would rapidly lose trust if it were awarding dividend payments to its 
                                                     
983
 The Association of British Insurers (ABI) has come out against CDC. It argues that the benefits are 
eǆaggeƌated aŶd theƌe aƌe ͚issues aďout iŶteƌgeŶeƌatioŶal suďsidǇ aŶd tƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ ǁhiĐh Đould pƌoǀe 
ĐhalleŶgiŶg iŶ todaǇ͛s soĐietǇ͛ ;ƌepoƌted iŶ PauliŶe “kǇpala ;ϮϬϭϰͿ DutĐh-style pensions for UK face tough 
credibility test, Financial Times, 10 June). 
984
 See David Pitt-Watson and Hari Mann (2012) Collective Pensions in the UK, RSA, July 
985
 The HM Treasury report Freedom and Choice in Pensions: Government Response to the Consultation (Cm 
8901, July 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/freedom-and-choice-in-pensions) would 
appear to offer a way around this.  Companies could use an enhanced transfer value process to move workers 
out of a DB scheme into a CDC scheme and in the process reduce if not eliminate any scheme deficit. 
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shareholders at the same time as cutting pensions in payment which will inevitably happen 
at some stage in a CDC scheme – even if, as supporters of CDC schemes claim, this will 
happen rarely. This, in turn, would seem to suggest that a CDC scheme should operate in a 
trust-based framework where the trustees are professionally qualified and independent of 
the sponsor. 
The New Brunswick SRPPs provide an interesting case study on how a collective scheme 
might be introduced.986 The New Brunswick SRPPs began in January 2014. The enabling 
legislation for the SRPPs was introduced in 2012 and the provincial Government worked 
with both the employers and the unions from 2010 to recognise the need for reform of the 
existing DB framework which was believed no longer to be sustainable or affordable. A 
taskforce was established to work with the provincial Government, employers and unions to 
establish the principles underlying a new pension model. Table 6.2 lists 10 principles around 
which a consensus might be built, with the three key principles being sustainability, stability 
and affordability. All existing DB plans in New Brunswick were assessed against the key 
principles and failed the test of long-term sustainability. The taskforce then worked with the 
uŶioŶs of those plaŶs iŶ gƌeatest defiĐit aŶd deǀeloped the ͚shaƌed ƌisk peŶsioŶ ŵodel͛. This 
combined the pension design features of the Dutch CDC schemes with the rigorous risk 
management procedures developed for Canadian banks and insurance companies.   
Different SRPPs were proposed with different benefit features. The performance of each 
plan was simulated using stochastic modelling under 1,000 different economic scenarios 
over a 20-year time horizon. The aim was to select the investment strategy and contribution 
rate needed to satisfy the stress tests set out in Table 6.3 aŶd ǁhiĐh ŵet the taskfoƌĐe͛s 
three key principles. Once a particular SRPP passes the stress test, it becomes a candidate 
for adoption by employers and employees in New Brunswick. The Public Service SRPP has 
total contributions of 19.5% of pensionable earnings, with employees paying 8.25% and 
employers 11.25%. It also has a relatively cautious investment strategy: 41% equities, 39% 
bonds, 5% hedge funds, and 10% real estate and infrastructure. 
Once adopted, the SRPP is subject to annual reviews, the aim of which is to identify any 
potential adjustments to benefits or investment strategy well in advance, and, hence, 
minimise the size of any adjustment that needs to occur.  If a cost of living adjustment is to 
be paid in a given year, the primary risk management requirement (concerning base 
benefits not being reduced – see Table 6.3) must first be met. A permanent benefit change 
can only be met if both the primary and secondary risk management requirements (the 
latter concerning ancillary benefits being paid – see Table 6.3) are met. An adopted SRPP is 
subject to an annual actuarial funding valuation. In case the SRPP is underfunded in any 
year, there needs to be a recovery plan that specifies how contributions, investment 
                                                     
986
 Pensions Policy Institute (2014) Risk Sharing Pension Plans: The Canadian Experience, Briefing Note 69, 
October. 
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strategy, and base and ancillary benefits are adjusted, with the reduction in base benefits 
being the last measure taken. In the case of overfunding, a funding excess utilisation plan 
will specify how contributions, investment strategy, and base and ancillary benefits are 
adjusted, with the restoration of previously reduced base benefits being the first priority.  
 
Table 6.2:  Principles for the reformed New Brunswick Pension Plans 
1. Pension plans must be subject to robust risk management, and be checked annually, 
including stress tests, to ensure that the plan complies with that task. 
2. A pension plan must provide benefit security. This means: 
  Risk management targets are focused on delivering a high degree of pension 
security for members and retirees; and  The Plan must be governed by an independent trustee(s) who can force 
employers and employees to increase (or decrease) contributions when 
appropriate, subject to realistic and manageable limits. 
3. A pension plan should be able to demonstrate that it will be sustainable over the 
long term. 
4. A pension plan must be affordable, which means that contributions must be stable 
and affordable for both employer and employees. 
5. The Plan must be equitably designed – no single age cohort should unduly subsidise 
aŶotheƌ, aŶd Ŷo oŶe should ďe aďle to ͚gaŵe͛ the sǇsteŵ. 
6. The Plan must be transparent.  The pension goals and risks must be clearly stated up-
front; who shares the risks and rewards and by how much must be clear and pre-
established. 
7. Benefit changes as a result of conversion will apply only in the future; everyone 
keeps the amount that has already been credited. 
8. Theƌe should ďe Ŷo suddeŶ shoĐks to ŵeŵďeƌs aŶd ƌetiƌees͛ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt plaŶs. 
9. All groups of employees should be treated consistently, including part-time 
employees. 
10. At inception, the actuarial assumptions must be closely related to market 
benchmarks, such as International Accounting Standards 19. 
Source: Chart 3 in ͚‘isk “haƌiŶg PeŶsioŶ PlaŶs: The CaŶadiaŶ EǆpeƌieŶĐe͛, BƌiefiŶg Note ϲϵ, PeŶsioŶs PoliĐǇ 
Institute, October 2014. 
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Table 6.3:  Risk Management Requirements in the New Brunswick Shared Risk Pension Plan 
New Brunswick SRPPs are required to undergo annual stress testing using asset-liability 
modelling.  At the outset of the plan, the contribution levels are set such that the plan can 
satisfy the legislated risk management requirements. 
The specific requirements that must be met when the plan is first set up are that: 
 there is a 97.5% certainty that base benefits will not be reduced over a 20-year 
period (the primary risk management goal); and  there is a 75% certainty that certain ancillary benefits will be paid over a 20-year 
period (the secondary risk management goal). 
Source: Chart 4 in ͚‘isk “haƌiŶg PeŶsioŶ PlaŶs: The CaŶadiaŶ EǆpeƌieŶĐe͛, BƌiefiŶg Note ϲϵ, PeŶsioŶs PoliĐǇ 
Institute, October 2014. 
 
A particular aspect of the New Brunswick legislation is that it allows for existing DB plans to 
ďe ĐoŶǀeƌted to “‘PPs aŶd eǆistiŶg DB ďeŶefits ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŶǀeƌted to ͚ďase ďeŶefits͛ aŶd it is 
eǀeŶ possiďle foƌ aĐĐƌued oƌ ǀested ͚ďase ďeŶefits͛ to ďe ƌeduĐed. These possibilities have 
not been legislated for in the SRPPs of other Canadian provinces and are not currently 
permitted in the UK.  It is also interesting to note that smaller employers have joined multi-
employer SRPPs. Members can leave a SSRP by taking a ͚teƌŵiŶatioŶ ǀalue͛. This is 
calculated as the larger of (aͿ the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s oǁŶ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs plus the sĐheŵe͛s 
investment return on these contributions and (ďͿ the ǀalue of the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s aĐĐƌued 
benefits multiplied by the funding level of the plan (similar to a cash equivalent transfer 
value from a DB scheme in the UK).  
The New Brunswick SRPPs must have independent governance through a trustee board or a 
not-for-profit organisation. Typically, the trustee boards have equal numbers of employer 
and union representatives. They are responsible for establishing the investment and funding 
policies, the annual actuarial valuations and stochastic modelling, and administering the 
plan.  
Given this international experience, how could collective schemes be introduced in the UK? 
David Pitt-Watson (2013, pp.13-14)987 has recommended that the following areas are 
addressed if collective pensions are to be safely introduced: 
The first concerns governance. Pension provision is notoriously open to 
conflicts of interest. And these are exacerbated by the fact that individuals 
have little knowledge of what their pension provider is doing and little 
leverage over their actions. We would therefore strongly recommend that: 
                                                     
987
 David Pitt-Watson (2013, pp.13-14) Collective Pensions in the UK II, RSA, November.  
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1. CDC pensions, like DB pensions should only be introduced under trustee 
management; that is where the governance of the fund owes loyalty only 
to its beneficiaries. 
2. That the primary duty of the trustees is to represent the interest of the 
members. The trustee body should have amongst its members adequate 
expertise to manage the investment and benefit issues they will confront. 
3. The trustees should make public their investment and benefit policy, and 
their proposed response to known risks. These should be made available to 
all beneficiaries. 
4. There should be clear rules as to the decisions which can be made by the 
trustees and those which need the authorisation of the regulator. 
 
The second area concerns the management of the eŶteƌpƌise. …[T]heƌe 
need to be guidelines as to: 
5. The appropriate investment policy and the charges a pension fund can 
make. These should not be onerous, but they should stop abuse. 
6. The actuarial assumptions upon which payments are to be made; that 
these are not unduly optimistic or pessimistic. 
7. Proper custody arrangements being in place. 
8. Members being fully informed over time of the likely level of their 
benefits, and of the nature of the promise being made. This latter point is 
of particular importance. 
9. Meŵďeƌs͛ ƌights ďeiŶg ĐleaƌlǇ defiŶed. “o theƌe Ŷeeds to ďe 
transparency on how decisions will be reached. Members should also 
understand their rights with respect to withdrawing from one pension plan 
and placing their savings in another. 
10. It may also be sensible to suggest that any CDC pension plan has an 
adequate number of members to make it worthwhile. The fundamental 
question here is whether the pension fund is able to generate scale and 
thus exploit economies of scale, as well as to share risk effectively. 
 
The third area is how this can be made attractive to sponsors. First and 
foremost must be an absolute assurance that there will be no attempt to 
ask the sponsor to underwrite promises which they had not signed up to. 
One reason that employers are unwilling to sponsor pension schemes is 
that they feel in the past to haǀe ďeeŶ ǀiĐtiŵs of ͞legislatioŶ-Đƌeep͟, ǁith 
the law forcing them into ever greater responsibilities. Therefore the 
legislation should: 
11. Clarify that this is a defined contribution framework and that the 
sponsor will not be responsible for any liability beyond their annual 
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contribution to the plan and therefore no liability under Section 75 of the 
Pensions Act 1995. 
12. A ͚HeŶƌǇ VIII͛ pƌoteĐtioŶ ǁould aĐt as a safetǇ ǀalǀe. That ǁould ďe a 
protection which ensured that should any liabilities be imposed through 
changing legislation to the employer, they would have the ability to revert 
out of the scheme. 
 
The further consideration is to try and trigger the development of a 
pension system which has other positive characteristics, such as low costs, 
easy pension transfers and so on. To achieve this, we might suggest that: 
13. All CDC plans should be licensed on the basis of their having an 
appropriate cost structure and adequate flexibility. 
14. NEST be allowed to offer collective pensions. 
15. Various social partners (NAPF, CBI, TUC, perhaps even the RSA or 
others) be asked to establish one or more fiduciary bodies which can be 
entrepreneurs for the establishment of multiemployer collective pensions. 
 
Finally, a regulatory body, possibly part of the Pension Regulator, should 
be charged with overseeing the new CDC regime, and licensing those 
undertakings which provide collective pensions. 
 
So with appropriate governance and management, it might be possible to introduce some 
form of collective scheme in the UK. A large single employer might find it attractive to do 
this.  However, it is more likely that a multi-employer trust-based scheme (like NEST) would 
find it easier to do this if there were sufficient appetite amongst scheme members.  
6.7 Feedback from our interviews and responses to the consultation paper 
6.7.1 Feedback from our interviews 
While a number of the risks listed in Table 1.2 can be most effectively hedged by pooling 
and sharing them, suggesting that there are potential benefits from looking at collective 
solutions, there appears to be very little appetite amongst employers for exploring this 
option at the present time. This is likely to be due to a combination of reform exhaustion 
and the previously made point about employers losing interest in occupational pension 
pƌoǀisioŶ peƌ se. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to ouƌ iŶteƌǀieǁs ǁith eŵploǇeƌs͛ ƌepƌesentatives, employers 
aƌe ͚aďsolutelǇ Ŷot iŶteƌested͛ iŶ CDC. TheǇ also said that eǀeƌǇthiŶg the Government has 
done recently – in particular the 2014 Budget – works against the collective principles of 
CDC. 
By contrast, there was general support for some form of collective scheme from trade 
unions: 
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 ͚CDC ĐaŶ ďe ŵoƌe effiĐieŶt thaŶ iŶdiǀidual DC͛  ͚MaŶǇ aƌguŵeŶts agaiŶst CDC aƌe aďout the ƌole of the tƌades uŶioŶs. CDC is 
essentially saying there needs to be trust-based schemes with good governance. The 
advaŶtage of CDC is aďout ƌisk shaƌiŶg aŶd loŶgeǀitǇ pooliŶg͛.  ͚You Ŷeed Đapital to set it up͛.  ͚NE“T ƌeƋuiƌed Đapital to get goiŶg͛. 
6.7.2 Responses to the consultation paper 
We summarise the responses to Questions 47-75 in the consultation paper here. 
47. What should ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe͛ ŵeaŶ iŶ the UK ĐoŶteǆt ;e.g., ĐolleĐtiǀe iŶ teƌŵs of sĐale aŶd 
governance, and collective in terms of risk-sharing)? 
The vast majority of responses suggested that risk sharing of some form or another was the 
defining feature of a collective DC scheme. However, there was disagreement about which 
groups should be pooling risk. 
48. What are the main benefits of CDC schemes over individual DC schemes? 
There were a variety of responses and there was no dominant view on the main benefits of 
collective versus individual DC schemes. Twenty-one per cent of responses either did not 
think that collective DC schemes were better than individual DC schemes or did not think 
that they could work.  Among those responses that were more positive, economies of scale 
were mentioned by 26 per cent of responses and risk sharing by another 26 per cent.  On 
the investment side, it was mentioned that CDC – in contrast to an individual DC scheme – 
had the ability to invest in a wider range of illiquid long-term investments to obtain a 
liquidity premium as well as the ability to avoid the separation between the accumulation 
and decumulation phases. 
49. What are the main disadvantages of CDC schemes over individual DC schemes? 
Sixty-four per cent of respondents thought that the main disadvantage of CDC over 
individual DC schemes was how to share risks between individual savers, particularly in a 
contracting CDC scheme. Some thought that this made the long-term sustainability of CDC 
doubtful. Many raised the issue of explaining risk sharing to members who might struggle to 
understand it, especially the notion that the actual pension might be lower than the target 
pension. Twenty-nine per cent pointed to the reduced flexibility for members compared to 
individual DC. 
50. CDC schemes may be able to generate incomes that are higher than individual DC 
schemes as the latter are currently operated.  (a) Are there reasons why an individual DC 
scheme could not follow the same investment or decumulation strategy as a CDC scheme? 
(b) Would trustees of an individual CDC scheme be willing to accommodate the greater 
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investment risk, given the need to enable members to transfer out and to take their pension 
pot with them? 
Half of the respondents thought that CDC could out-perform individual DC, due to 
economies of scale, risk sharing (within or between) generations – enabling investment in 
higher-risk, higher-return assets – and the avoidance of a de-risking glidepath which moves 
towards less risky products as a member approaches retirement.  However, 30 per cent of 
respondents thought that CDC could not generate higher returns than individual DC and 
that the claims that they could were misleading. In terms of trustee attitudes, most 
respondents thought that trustees would be unwilling to take on greater investment risk 
due to the issues of transfers out of the scheme (such transfers were seen as problematic). 
51. (a) Would a CDC scheme have any additional risk-sharing advantages over a large 
master trust DC scheme which followed the same investment and decumulation strategies 
where possible?  (b) Can the benefits from any additional sources of risk sharing available to 
CDC schemes be quantified? 
Forty per cent of responses thought that CDC would not have any additional risk sharing 
advantages over a large master trust DC scheme, although other responses noted that the 
two types of scheme would follow different investment strategies. The small number of 
respondents who answered the second part of the question about quantifying the 
additional benefits thought that it was possible to do so through appropriate modelling. 
52. (a) What is your preferred design for a CDC scheme, in terms of targeted benefits? 
(e.g., a CDC scheme that is intended to replace a DB scheme and hence would be earnings-
related (specify accrual rate, earnings measure, pre-retirement indexation rule, post-
retirement indexation rule); or a CDC scheme that is intended to replace an individual DC 
scheme and hence would be with-profit and a target return, unit-linked and a target return, 
etc.). (b) Explain why. 
There was considerable variety in the responses about the appropriate design of a CDC 
scheme and many respondents were agnostic or unsure themselves, suggesting that there is 
no consensus view on the target benefits. The most common response (by forty-four per 
cent of respondents) was that there should be some form of a target pension (essentially a 
DB-minus view of pensions). The main differences between the proposals were the 
differences in the acceptable degree of risk sharing across generations. Some said there 
should be little inter-generational risk sharing, with one suggesting that it would be easier to 
have inter-generational risk sharing if some of the contributions were explicitly from the 
employer. One response suggested that the DB-minus view of pensions was closer to what 
DB pensions used to look like before protections were added. Nevertheless, two 
respondents preferred DC-plus on the grounds that it was cheaper than DB-minus and 
hence likely to be more widely provided. 
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53. (a) What is the best estimate contribution rate to achieve the target benefit? (b) How 
should the contribution rate be shared between employer and member? 
Respondents did not provide numerical figures on the best estimate of the contribution rate 
because of the variety of factors needed to be taken into account. A number of respondents 
noted that the higher the share of the contribution from the employer the greater the scope 
for inter-generational risk sharing. 
54. (a) Can a CDC scheme work with a planned contribution rate that is fixed 
iŶdepeŶdeŶt of a ŵeŵďeƌ͛s age oƌ is aŶ age-dependent member contribution rate required? 
(b) If the latter, is a change to equality legislation required? 
Most respondents suggested that either the contribution rate or the target benefit had to 
be fixed but not both. However, it was recognised that, while it was possible to fix both, this 
would involve cross-generational subsidies, which really required (possibly variable) 
contributions from employers to be feasible.  In the case where a scheme wishes to operate 
with age-related contributions, one respondent said that there should be an express 
exemption from equality legislation. 
55. What investment strategy would be appropriate for CDC schemes: (a) in 
accumulation and (b) near retirement and (c) in decumulation? 
Respondents suggested that the investment strategy would not be constrained by its 
liabilities, but would probably look like a DB scheme without costly asset-liability 
management – consistent with the target pension view of what CDC was trying to achieve – 
although the optimal strategy would depend on the composition of scheme membership. 
56. What are the main benefits of a CDC scheme in terms of intra-generational risk 
pooling? 
Respondents suggested that the main intra-generational benefit of a CDC scheme would be 
sharing of longevity risk within the pool.  One response made the caveat that transfers in or 
out should be medically underwritten to preserve the risk sharing. 
57. What are the main benefits of a CDC scheme in terms of inter-generational risk 
sharing? 
Most respondents suggested that the main inter-generational benefit of a CDC scheme 
would be smoothing of investment returns.  One respondent also suggested that this risk 
pooling increased the ability to invest in higher-risk assets and obtain a higher expected 
return. Only one respondent referred explicitly to inflation risk and longevity risk. 
58. (a) Over how many generations should risk be shared?  (b) Explain why this is 
optimal. 
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There were relatively few responses to the issue of how many generations should share the 
risk in a CDC scheme, but, of those who did respond, there were widely divergent answers, 
ranging from risk-sharing between all generations (including those not even in the 
workforce) to risk sharing over a 10-year period (as in the Netherlands). 
59. How should the risk-sharing rules in a CDC scheme be defined? 
All respondents suggested that the most important issue was that the risk-sharing rules be 
clear and transparent. 
60. Hoǁ ŵuĐh disĐƌetioŶ should a CDC sĐheŵe͛s ŵaŶageƌs haǀe ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to 
smoothing or adjusting benefits to target benefits, or should the rules be fully transparent? 
With a relatively small number of responses to this question, there was an almost equal split 
between respondents arguing for CDC scheme managers having no discretion to them 
having very wide discretion. One respondent thought that there would always be need for 
discretion, while another respondent suggested that the rules should be set by the 
regulator. 
61. (a) If the actual pension is above the target pension, when should adjustments be 
made? (b) How and in what order should the adjustments be made (consider adjustments to 
pension indexation, pension amount in payment, investment strategy, active member 
contribution rate, active member retirement age)? 
62. (a) If the actual pension is below the target pension, when should adjustments be 
made? (b) How and in what order should the adjustments be made (consider adjustments to 
pension indexation, pension amount in payment, investment strategy, active member 
contribution rate, active member retirement age)?   
Among the relatively small number of responses to Questions 61 and 62, most thought that 
adjustments should be made annually and they agreed that adjustments should be made 
first to indexation and second to the level of the pension. One respondent was explicit in 
saying that contributions and investment strategies should not be altered. 
63. What mechanisms are needed to ensure that no CDC scheme becomes insolvent? For 
example, a CDC scheme might try to use a high target return to attract more customers. 
Forty-three per cent of respondents noted that CDC schemes could not technically be 
insolvent, but that they could over-promise (and hence under-deliver) to their members. 
Mechanisms needed to be put in place to deal with this and suggestions included actuarial 
reviews, regulation, transparent rules and good trusteeship. 
64. Is it necessary for a CDC scheme to start with or build up a reserve fund to give it 
credibility? 
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Seventy-eight per cent of respondents thought that there was no need for a reserve fund, 
while the rest said that there was such a need. However, many responses thought that a 
reserve fund might be helpful, especially initially, to cover set-up costs and provide scale 
and credibility. 
65. CDC schemes in other countries (e.g., Holland) have virtually no flexibility with 
respect to member choice (e.g. contribution rate, investment strategy, retirement date, form 
of decumulation (i.e., pension). Do the freedoms and flexibilities introduced by the 2014 
Budget render CDC schemes unfeasible or more risky in the UK? Explain why not or, 
alternatively, how freedom and flexibility would need to be tailored in the context of CDC 
schemes?      
Responses were fairly equally divided on whether member choice was compatible with CDC 
schemes, some believing it was possible if not desirable, while most thought that too much 
flexibility would make it hard to run a CDC scheme, or that such flexibility was inappropriate 
and not really wanted anyway (since pensioners who wanted more flexibility had other 
options). 
66. One of the biggest growth areas prior to the 2014 Budget was the medical 
underwriting of annuities and the growth of enhanced annuities. But in a standard CDC 
scheme, everyone gets the same pension irrespective of health status. (a) Would it be 
feasible in a CDC scheme to medically underwrite the pension in retirement? (b) Would it be 
desirable to do this? 
Sixty-three per cent of responses suggested that medical underwriting of the pension in 
retirement was feasible for a CDC scheme, although some noted that such underwriting was 
not really feasible before the age of 50. 
67. How should a CDC scheme best be organised: (a) on a company-wide basis, (b) an 
industry-wide basis, or (c) a nation-wide basis? 
Seventy-one per cent of responses thought that a CDC scheme could be operated on any of 
the three bases suggested, while a minority thought that it should be done on the largest 
scale possible. 
68. What is the minimum number of members in a CDC scheme to make it viable? 
Explain this figure. 
There was no consensus answer to this question. The small number of responses gave 
widely differing views on the minimum number of members in a CDC scheme, ranging from 
forty (one per generation) to 10,000. 
69. Effective regulation, governance and quality standards will be crucial, given the 
absence of member property rights (which apply in standard DC schemes) and also the 
absence of a sponsoring employer that guarantees benefits (which applies in DB).  (a) What 
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ƌegulatioŶ is ƌeƋuiƌed to pƌoteĐt ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ďeŶefits? ;ďͿ What goǀeƌŶaŶĐe ŵeĐhaŶisŵs aŶd 
quality standards are needed in CDC schemes, especially to ensure inter-generational equity? 
No clear conclusion emerged from the varied responses to the first part of the question 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg ǁhat ƌegulatioŶ is Ŷeeded to pƌoteĐt ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ďeŶefits: ϯϴ peƌ ĐeŶt Ŷoted that 
CDCs did create property rights (which might be based on contributions or with actuarially 
set surrender values), some stressed that all member types (pensioners, actives, deferreds) 
should be treated equally, while some said that regulation should be under trust law 
resulting in strong trustees. The vast majority of responses to part (b) agreed that valuation 
should be on a best-valuation basis for CDC schemes to ensure inter-generational equity. 
70. Could CDC schemes operate both on a trust basis and a contract basis? Explain. 
Eighty-six per cent of responses preferred a trust-based scheme, although many thought 
that either a trust or contract basis would be possible. 
71. Could a ͚foƌ pƌofit͛ oƌgaŶisatioŶ ƌuŶ a CDC sĐheŵe? EǆplaiŶ. 
Responses were divided as to whether or not a CDC scheme Đould ďe ƌuŶ ͚foƌ pƌofit͛: ϰϯ peƌ 
ĐeŶt said ͞Ǉes͟ so loŶg as it ǁas appƌopƌiatelǇ Đapitalised, Ϯϴ peƌ ĐeŶt thought a tƌust-based 
sĐheŵe ǁould ďe ďetteƌ thaŶ a ͚foƌ pƌofit͛ sĐheŵe, aŶd oŶe ƌespoŶse ǁas uŶaŵďiguous 
that ͚foƌ pƌofit͛ CDC sĐheŵes ǁould ďe iŶappropriate. 
72. What communication strategy would be appropriate for CDC schemes (a) in 
accumulation and (b) near retirement and (c) in decumulation? 
Eighty per cent of responses thought the appropriate communication strategy for a CDC 
scheme would be an annual report. 
73. What measures should the Government take to make CDC attractive to: (a) potential 
sponsors, and (b) potential members? 
The small number of responses emphasised that sponsors need appropriate regulation. 
Government involvement via NEST might also help things get started. 
74. How should transfer values be treated in CDC schemes, both in and out? 
Most respondents suggested that transfers in or out of CDC schemes had to be for bona fide 
reasons to avoid gaming. 
75. Is it possible for a CDC scheme to work within a charge cap of 0.75%? 
All respondents thought that a 0.75 per cent charge cap was feasible, although not all 
thought that it was necessarily desirable. 
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6.8 Analysis and recommendation 
6.8.1 Analysis 
The evidence that we have examined indicates that CDC schemes could generate smoother 
pensions across different cohorts of members than IDC schemes. This evidence comes from 
both theoretical models of intergenerational risk sharing using an overlapping generations 
framework and stochastic simulation models using CDC designs that are typical of those in 
use in the Netherlands, such as career average revalued pensions with conditional 
indexation.  
The theoretical models also suggest that CDC schemes are only likely to be sustainable in 
the long run if (a) everyone joins (i.e., participation is mandatory) and (b) everyone remains 
in the scheme for life. These two conditions potentially break down in the UK context.  
Participation in second-pillar workplace pension schemes in the UK is based on the principle 
of auto-enrolment, namely that employees are automatically enrolled onto a workplace 
pension scheme when they start a job, but can opt out. Auto-enrolment began in the UK in 
October 2012 and will not be completed until 2018.  The early evidence shows that around 
90% of auto-enrolled employees have remained in their pension scheme. However, these 
were employees in very large companies where the company was very supportive of the 
pension scheme. We have yet to see what the participation rates are like with small and 
micro employers, where the support from the employer might not be so strong. 
Nevertheless, if participation rates remain high, it might be possible to argue that the first 
condition is more or less satisfied. Notwithstanding this, CDC schemes need to be credible 
to survive and they will not be if they are perceived to be unfair to future generations of 
members. To avoid such a misperception, it might be desirable for CDC schemes to build an 
estate or reserve fund immediately after starting. This would help to establish long-term 
credibility. 
CDC schemes are designed so that the member joins and stays in for life, for both the 
accumulation and decumulation phases. This means that they are designed to provide an 
income during retirement, rather than a lump sum at the point of retirement. This is, of 
course, precisely what pension schemes are supposed to do, since their primary purpose is 
to provide an income in retirement for however long the scheme member lives. The 
problem is that the 2014 Budget reforms allow members to exercise their new pension 
freedoms and take their accumulated fund from age 55 from April 2015. However much 
they try to put a brave face on this, supporters of CDC cannot get around the fact that the 
Budget changes, which emphasise the rights of the individual over the shared benefits of 
the collective, greatly weaken the case for CDC schemes in the UK, however desirable that 
case is in principle.   
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The case for CDC schemes is further weakened in the UK context by the problem of 
transfers. As mentioned above, the theoretical evidence suggests that for CDC schemes to 
work best, everyone should stay in the same scheme for life. Transfers between schemes 
are, of course, possible, but this is in theory much easier with IDC schemes – where every 
member has their own account – than with CDC schemes – where members will simply 
know their target pension and could be subject to a market value adjustment if they 
transfer.  Transfers are much more complicated in practice than in theory, at least in the UK.   
IŶ a CDC ĐoŶteǆt, it ǁould ďe ŵuĐh ŵoƌe effiĐieŶt if the ͚sĐheŵe folloǁed the ŵeŵďeƌ͛ 
when the member changed jobs and hence transfers could be avoided. This, in turn, 
requires that there are only a few large CDC schemes in existence, all fully exploiting scale 
economies. A worker joins one when they first start work and stays with that scheme for 
life.  This is only likely to be feasible if the CDC schemes are organised, not on a company 
basis, but on an industry-wide or national basis.  
The claim that CDC schemes could generate outcomes that are 30% or more higher than 
standard DC schemes is based on an unfair comparison.  A large CIDC scheme with the same 
cost structure as a CDC scheme and following the same accumulation and decumulation 
strategies would generate broadly the same outcome. The biggest cost saving in a CDC 
scheme comes from not having to buy individual annuities in the retail market, while one of 
CDC͛s ďiggest adǀaŶtages is the pooliŶg of loŶgeǀitǇ ƌisk.988  
However, a large CIDC scheme using scheme drawdown could also avoid the costs of retail 
annuities, yet still pool longevity risk. It could also allow the individual underwriting of 
longevity risk in a way that CDC schemes cannot. In other words, CIDC could be used as an 
institutional alternative to the purchase of deferred annuities.  
It is true that a CIDC scheme is, unlike a CDC scheme, unable to engage in intergenerational 
risk sharing and hence smooth pension incomes across a number of generations. But the 
question needs to be asked in a country like the UK – where both intragenerational and 
intergenerational solidarity are typically less strong than in, say, the Netherlands – is 
whether a CDC scheme is more likely to be perceived as a vehicle for intergenerational 
redistribution than a vehicle for intergenerational risk sharing. By contrast, a CIDC scheme 
avoids the intergenerational and other cross subsidies that CDC schemes involve, while 
maximising the benefits of economies of scale. It is also consistent with the new flexibilities 
following the 2014 Budget and personal de-risking investment strategies could be designed 
to enable members to take their pension as a lump sum from age 55.989 Such flexibility is not 
consistent with a CDC scheme. There could also be a default decumulation strategy using 
scheme drawdown which could be designed to give higher pensions to those with reduced 
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life expectancies and maintain the benefits of economies of scale in the decumulation 
phase.  
We also need to make a realistic assessment about the likelihood that CDC will be 
introduced in the near future. 
Steve Webb was one of the strongest supporters of CDC when he was Pensions Minister and 
his support remains undiminished since he lost his seat in the May 2015 general election. He 
believes CDC is a ͚sloǁ ďuƌŶeƌ͛ aŶd that ǁoƌk oŶ pƌepaƌiŶg foƌ it Đould ĐoŶtiŶue iŶ his 
aďseŶĐe: ͚It ŵaǇ Ŷot ďe the fiƌst pƌioƌitǇ – there are more pressing ones, but departments 
can do things in parallel. It was always for the long term, and that work will continue. The 
detailed work on producing regulations and consulting on them was always going to take a 
couple of years. It was not just an academic exercise or Government putting out rules and 
regulations and then no one doing anything with it. There are professional people in the 
industry, trade unions and others, who want to see something less volatile than individual 
DC, particularly in sectors DB-doŵiŶated͛.990  
Lord David Willetts, another pensions expert who also left Parliament in May 2015, also 
supports CDC: ͚I do think that pure DC ends up with too much risk being borne by the 
iŶdiǀidual. IŶ faĐt … oŶe of ŵǇ ƌegƌets is that Loƌd Adaiƌ [TuƌŶeƌ], ďetǁeeŶ his fiƌst aŶd his 
second report, pretty much gave up on any form of DB. I accept that conventional old-style 
final salary is on the way out. But Career Average Revalue Earnings, collective DC in various 
foƌŵs, hǇďƌid sĐheŵes… I peƌsoŶallǇ thiŶk that that͛s the ďest ǁaǇ of haǀiŶg soŵe pooliŶg 
of risk. So I do think we need to be imaginative in promotiŶg these tǇpes of iŶstƌuŵeŶts͛.991 
Tim Sharp, pensions policy officer at the Trades Union Congress is another strong supporter 
of CDC – as is the Labour Party. He dƌaǁs eŶĐouƌageŵeŶt fƌoŵ NE“T͛s ‘etiƌeŵeŶt IŶĐoŵe 
Blueprint, published in June 2015:992 
It was easy to assume in the aftermath of the General Election that CDC 
pensions had been packed off to the West Country with outgoing Pensions 
Minister Steve Webb, never to return. 
But the publication by Government-backed pension scheme NEST of its 
blueprint for retirement income in the era of pensions freedom not only 
brings desperately-needed rigour and analysis to the subject. It also places 
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CDC in the mainstream as at least part of the potential solution to the 
ŶatioŶ͛s ƌetiƌeŵeŶt ƋuaŶdaƌies. 
...In this model, incomes are supported by a collective pool of assets. 
Because capital requirements are less, this could operate with lower costs. 
Longevity risk is pooled. Incomes, however, are not fully guaranteed and 
underwritten – but the collective aspect means they should be more 
predictable than in the earlier phase of drawdown. 
…NE“T͛s iŶteƌest is sigŶifiĐaŶt ďeĐause the pƌiŶĐipal ĐƌitiĐisŵs of 
introducing CDC to the UK rarely concern its feasibility. They focus on 
demand for such a product and whether anyone will risk setting up the first 
scheme. 
…[T]heƌe is a stƌoŶg aƌguŵeŶt that peŶsioŶs poliĐǇ is ďest ǁheŶ it doesŶ͛t 
excite passions. And CDC really is merely a common sense solution to the 
dramatic shift in the pensions landscape that could leave the individual 
bearing unacceptable risks in both the accumulation and decumulation 
phases. 
A number of barriers remain to the introduction of CDC in the UK. 
NEST will need to persuade policymakers at home and in Brussels to give it 
permission to offer retirement income products. 
There may also have to be an acceleration in the Department of Work and 
PeŶsioŶs͛ ǁoƌk oŶ deǀelopiŶg CDC ƌegulatioŶs, ǁhiĐh haǀe slipped doǁŶ 
the depaƌtŵeŶt͛s leŶgthǇ to-do list. 
But ǁhat the NE“T ďluepƌiŶt tells us is that CDC…. is a pƌaĐtiĐal answer to a 
pressing issue of public policy that is rightfully attracting serious 
consideration.993 
It is clear that the loss of strong parliamentary supporters like Steve Webb and David 
Willetts will slow progress on the introduction of CDC. Even before the election, in March 
2015, the DWP Select Committee called for a halt on the diversion of Government resources 
to the introduction of CDC until auto-enrolment is complete and the DC market operating 
effectively.994 Further, Baroness Ros Altmann, who replaced Steve Webb as Pensions 
Minister, has been publicly advised against pursuing CDC. For example, Fidelity Worldwide 
Investment has advised the new miŶisteƌ to ͚Prioritise resources which would mean that we 
stop the defiŶed aŵďitioŶ legislatioŶ͛.995 Similarly, Nigel Waterson, the former Tory shadow 
Pensions Minister, hoped the new minister will resist the temptation of trying to do too 
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ŵuĐh: ͚That ŵeaŶs leaǀiŶg oŶ the ďaĐk ďuƌŶeƌ ideas like ĐolleĐtiǀe defiŶed ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ aŶd 
defiŶed aŵďitioŶ͛.996  
The Pensions Minister has clearly heeded this advice. In October 2015, she announced that 
plans to move forward with both collective defined contribution and defined ambition had 
ďeeŶ put oŶ hold. “he said: ͚The ŵaƌket Ŷeeds tiŵe aŶd spaĐe to adjust to the otheƌ 
reforms underway and these areas will be revisited once there has been an opportunity for 
that to happeŶ͛. “he added: ͚We have to protect DB and develop DC and I am of course 
interested in a middle way between the two but this is a future reform as I think we are 
either a bit too early or too late. If this shift had happened ten years ago then we might 
have seen interest but even if we were to work full pelt on CDC then we wouldn't even have 
ƌegulatioŶ iŶ plaĐe ďǇ ϮϬϭϴ͛. While she ďelieǀed theƌe is still a plaĐe foƌ ƌisk shaƌiŶg, it is Ŷot 
a ĐuƌƌeŶt pƌioƌitǇ, ͚ďut ǁe ǁill Đoŵe ďaĐk to this at a lateƌ poiŶt͛.997  
6.8.2 Recommendation 
The best time to have introduced CDC was in 2009 when the Government of the day first 
looked at the possibility of introducing it, but turned it down. This might have helped stem 
the flow of private-sector DB schemes switching straight to IDC. That flow has since become 
a flood and the end of private-sector DB is now unstoppable in the UK.  So CDC had a past. It 
might also have a future if employees use their new freedoms unwisely and deplete their 
pension pots to an extent that they cannot afford to retire: recall that pension schemes in 
the private sector were initially set up by enlightened employers to manage the exit of their 
employees from the workforce when they were no longer capable of productive work. But 
we do not believe that CDC has a present: the new pension freedoms are completely 
iŶĐoŵpatiďle ǁith CDC͛s ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt that ŵeŵďeƌs staǇ foƌ life aŶd dƌaǁ a peŶsioŶ iŶ 
retirement, rather than use the pension pot as a bank account. 
However, since we recognise the benefits of risk pooling, we believe that collective 
individual defined contribution (CIDC) schemes might be the only form of collective scheme 
that is feasible in the short term following the introduction of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛. Because 
they maintain individual accounts, they are better able to deal with sudden cash 
withdrawals than CDC schemes, yet are still able to exploit economies of scale to the full. 
For this reason, we make the following recommendation. 
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Recommendation 6.1:  Collective individual defined contribution schemes 
We recommend that the Government looks at the feasibility of establishing collective 
individual defined contribution (CIDC) schemes – for both the accumulation and 
decumulation phases. Such schemes would be compatible not only with the defined 
ambition agenda, they would also be compatible with the new pension flexibilities 
following the 2014 Budget, while, at the same time, exploiting economies of scale to the 
full and allowing a high degree of risk pooling. 
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7. Conclusion: Developing a National Narrative 
 
Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall, 
Humpty Dumpty had a great fall. 
All the king's horses and all the king's men 
Couldn't put Humpty together again. 
Lewis Carroll (1871) Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There 
 
'Oh, I've had such a curious dream!', said Alice 
Lewis Carroll (1865) Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
 
The key lesson from our research and discussions is that we need a national narrative on 
pensions if we are going to build a consensus around retirement income provision. The 
alternative is to live in a Tower of Babel with any sensible messages drowned out by a 
cacophony of mixed and often contradictory signals that will just confuse the majority of 
pension scheme members in the retirement phase of their lives. The dream of a 
comfortable retirement could easily turn into a nightmare. We identify five key factors that 
need to make an appropriate contribution if the objective of a national consensus is to be 
achieved: the pensions industry itself, national media, the regulatory system, the political 
system, and the pension tax system (and the implications this has for the level of pension 
savings built up prior to retirement). We make a number of recommendations that will help 
support the objective. 
7.1 Introduction 
Everything used to be clear cut when it came to the generation of retirement income from 
funded occupational pension schemes. There was an accumulation phase, a de-risking phase 
leading up to a known retirement date, at which point the member took a 25% tax-free 
lump sum and the rest as a pension or an annuity that provided a retirement income for as 
long as the member (and possibly spouse or partner) lived. If there were weaknesses and 
inefficiencies in that system, there was a case for fixing them. 
The simplest fix would have been to reduce the minimum income requirement (MIR) from 
£20,000 to a lower figure, such as £14,000.998 This would have allowed many more people 
                                                     
998
 As a comparison, the full single tier state pension coming into effect from April 2016 will be around £8,000 
(£155.65 per week). In a written statement to the House of Lords on 22 July 2015, the Pensions Minister, Ros 
Altmann, disclosed that only 37% of people would receive the full amount of new state pension in 2016. 
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to have greater flexibility over their retirement spending, while still ensuring they did not 
run out of money before they die. In two reports written in 2010, the Pensions Institute 
recommended a MIR of £14,000 (£280 per week) as being the level needed to keep people 
from claiming any means-tested benefits.999 These reports were said to have influenced 
Treasury policy, although the Treasury decided to set a much higher MIR. 
However, instead of fixing it, the Government decided to completely abandon this system 
and, in particular, the requirement to annuitise any pension assets at all. Pension schemes 
no longer need to fulfil their primary role of providing a life-long retirement income. There is 
no doubt that the new pension freedoms are very popular with pension savers. Indeed, free 
ŵaƌket suppoƌteƌs desĐƌiďe theŵ as ͚iŶspiƌed͛.1000 It is clear the changes cannot be 
reversed.   
Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that the decumulation decision – the optimal 
running down of assets in retirement – is extremely complex. It involves not only pension 
assets, but also non-pension assets and decisions have to be made about inheritance, 
taxation and long term care, etc. If mistakes are made and the assets are invested unwisely 
or spent too quickly, retired people do not generally have the option to re-enter the labour 
market to earn some more money in the way that younger people do. Further, these 
decisions might have to be made in the presence of reduced mental capacity, as is the case 
with someone with dementia, for example. 
Nor does it change the fact that there are now two completely different and mutually 
inconsistent models of individual behaviour underlying the two different stages of DC 
pension schemes in the UK. In the accumulation stage, we have a model that assumes 
people are ͚huŵaŶs͛ and which exploits inertia and other behavioural barriers to get people 
to start saving a bit (certainly not enough) for their pensions.  In decumulation, we have the 
ŵodel of ͚eĐoŶs͛, ƌatioŶal lifeĐǇĐle fiŶaŶĐial plaŶŶeƌs, fully capable of managing the 
complexities of decumulation decision making, following 45 minutes of guidance and, 
ideally, some good-valued and highly focused advice. 
Further, there is a real danger that people forget they face a lifetime budget constraint on 
what they can do. There seems to be a whole range of people who have not saved enough 
for their retirement, but still expect that their pension pot can be used to pay off pre-
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retirement debts, dip into whenever they like, deliver a life-long income, and also make 
ďeƋuests to theiƌ desĐeŶdaŶts. It just doesŶ͛t add up, as ŵaŶǇ ǁill fiŶd out iŶ due Đouƌse. 
This brings us to the issue of consumer vulnerability. This has two key dimensions. The first 
is that many consumers, through ignorance, overconfidence, arrogance or reduced mental 
capacity, do not recognise their own vulnerability. The second is that many consumers are 
open to exploitation by being sold inappropriate, over-engineered high-cost products. They 
also face overpaying for advice. Even worse, they are open to fraud and investment 
scammers. 
Making decisions about retirement income are the hardest financial decisions people ever 
have to make, because the risks in Table 1.2 are so significant and so poorly understood – 
and these risks are in addition to the importance of recognising that the pension pot cannot 
be spent twice. Getting it right requires a national narrative about what pensions are for.  
Everyone in Parliament – whatever their political affiliation – and industry has to sign up to 
this narrative, just as they did with auto-enrolment. If not, we will end up living in a Tower 
of Babel, with no signal and just a lot of noise, with a different narrative for each retiree.  
This cannot possibly be in the best interests of most retirees, especially the most vulnerable, 
since it will almost inevitably lead to poor outcomes and high charges. Anyone who seriously 
objects to this either believes in an unrealistic model of human behaviour or is pursuing a 
vested interest. We know that a national narrative works in other countries, e.g., Holland, 
where there is an accepted national narrative based on social solidarity between social 
partners. We also know that it can also happen in the UK, if only temporarily, as in the case 
of the ĐoŶseŶsus ďuilt aƌouŶd the PeŶsioŶs CoŵŵissioŶ͛s ƌepoƌts iŶ ϮϬϬϰ-05.  
So what can be done to help establish a national narrative and build a consensus around 
retirement income provision? Each of the following need to make an appropriate 
contribution: 
 The pensions industry  The national media  The regulatory system  The political system   The pension tax system and the level of pension savings. 
7.2 Contributing to a national narrative 1: The pensions industry 
The first contribution needs to come from the pensions industry itself. This broadly 
comprises four key groups of agents: providers, advisers, investment managers and insurers. 
All are important for delivering the best products and services for pension savers in the new 
ǁoƌld of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, it is Đleaƌ fƌoŵ ouƌ aŶalǇsis iŶ Chapteƌs Ϯ aŶd ϯ 
that there are serious fissures in the relationships between these four groups, in particular, 
between investment managers and insurers – who are fighting a turf war over the control of 
542 
 
pension assets in decumulation – and between providers and advisers – who are fighting a 
turf war over access to clients. Yet all these parties are needed to provide appropriate, 
effective and good-valued retirement income solutions.   
Well-designed retirement income solutions have both an investment component – to 
provide stable inflation-adjusted returns and flexibility over withdrawals – and an insurance 
component – to provide a longevity hedge. But the products sold by investment managers 
do not have a longevity hedge and the products sold by insurers, while offering the 
necessary longevity protection, have low returns and little flexibility. But at present, there is 
no clear agreement on what an optimal retirement income solution might look like. There is 
no effective collaboration between investment managers and insurers in designing products 
that can be combined to provide solutions that offer both spending flexibility and protection 
against inflation and longevity risk. 1001  Similarly, there is no agreement on what a 
reasonable charge for this solution should be. We are just told that market forces will sort 
this out. 
Further, parts of the industry, especially the insurance industry, have not in the past treated 
their customers fairly, as they are supposed to do. We were told by an industry insider that 
͚the iŶsuƌaŶĐe iŶdustƌǇ has a lot to aŶsǁeƌ foƌ͛ aŶd Đited a ϮϬϬϴ FiŶaŶĐial Services Authority 
study which reported an example of a company that said that the ABI code was a threat to 
its business model since it wanted to maximise internal annuity sales – rather than have its 
customers use the open market option – and gave bonuses to sales staff for doing so. The 
iŶsideƌ also ǁeŶt oŶ to saǇ ͚if people ŵake ŵistakes, this aĐtuallǇ pƌofits the iŶdustƌǇ, so 
ǁhat iŶĐeŶtiǀe does the iŶdustƌǇ haǀe to stop this?͛ CleaƌlǇ, this tǇpe of attitude ďǇ keǇ 
players in an industry with many vulnerable consumers is not acceptable. Customers are 
told that they will be treated fairly and industry business practices must be consistent with 
this. 
There is also a lot of thinly disguised hostility between providers and advisers concerning 
the appropriate level of advice for different market segments, how it should be delivered, 
the appropriate pricing model for advice in the different segments, and even about who 
should give that advice. Providers want to be able to give advice to scheme members. While 
this is allowed under US regulations and welcomed by US employers, it is frowned upon in 
the UK ďǇ adǀiseƌs aŶd ƌegulatoƌs as Ŷot ďeiŶg ͚iŶdepeŶdeŶt͛. IŶ tuƌŶ, adǀiseƌs ǁho aƌe iŶ 
the process of rebranding themselves as wealth managers believe that they can advise on 
and put in place retirement income and inheritance solutions for their clients without 
involving providers.  
These divisions have been long standing and are, in part, the result of normal competitive 
pressures, compounded by the fact that most pension savers are disengaged from the 
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pension saving process, do not understand the risks that they face, and are generally not 
skilled enough to exercise their sovereign rights as consumers to demand that producers 
and advisers provide them with the best designed and the best valued products and 
services. 
On top of this, we need to recognise that professional services firms are prone to over-
service their clients to build up fee and those operating in financial services are no different. 
There are some in the financial services industry who believe that there should be a tailor-
made plan for every retiree. But, as we discussed in Chapter 3, this is an example of the 
͚iŶteƌioƌ deĐoƌatoƌ fallaĐǇ͛, ŶaŵelǇ the idea that ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe stƌategies should ďe 
designed to reflect attitudes to, say, risk in the same way that interior decorators attempt to 
reflect the personal taste of their clients. 1002 For all but the most affluent, such a tailor-
made plan would be far too expensive. We accept that oŶe size doesŶ͛t fit all, but then 
neither does a bespoke plan with annual reviews for someone with a £50,000 pension pot 
when the charge is 0.75% p.a. Something much more simple and focused is required. If 
anyone is thinking of questioning this, they should remind themselves that the new single-
tier pension has a capitalised value of around £200,000 and no one appears to be setting up 
shop to advise pensioners how to spend their state pension. 
Looking forward, the pensions industry is just not going to be able to get away with how it 
has traditionally operated. Instead, the industry is going to have to work together to offer 
the best designed and the best valued products and services and show clearly how these fit 
in to the retirement journey of their clients. Commercial airlines have to do this for their 
customers, so ǁhǇ shouldŶ͛t those iŶǀolǀed iŶ the pƌoǀisioŶ of ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵes? IŶ 
addition, there needs to be much greater clarity over charges and fees. The full set of 
charges incurred in delivering a product should be made clear to customers. In terms of 
adviser fees, there needs to be much greater justification of ad valorem fees where the fee 
is unrelated to the amount of work done. Such fees are now very uncommon in most other 
types of professional services organisations. 
͚Fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ Đould ďe a disasteƌ if these ŵatteƌs aƌe Ŷot addƌessed. The paƌtiĐulaƌ 
segment of the market most at risk is mass market DC customers with pension assets 
between £30,000 and £100,000. Such consumers are unlikely to pay for full regulated advice 
and are therefore at risk of buying expensive, poorly designed products on a non-advised 
basis. Those with pension assets below £30,000 are likely to have most of their retirement 
expenditure needs met by the state pension and by welfare benefits – they will welcome 
the extra flexibilities that the new pension regime offers in terms of how they spend their 
pension pot. Those with pension assets above £100,000 are more likely to see the value of 
seeking advice. 
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The simplest solution to the problem facing the market segment most at risk is a safe 
harbour retirement income plan which combines: 
 A simple decision tree and a limited set of default pathways  Safe harbour products that deliver income flexibility as well as inflation and longevity 
protection, meet minimum design standards in terms of efficacy, and deliver clear 
value for money  Financial help, most probably delivered over the internet. 
If between them, providers, advisers, investment managers and insurers, are unable to 
deliver this solution, then we would regard this as considerably more serious than the 
market failure – the absence of voluntary pension savings by up 9 million employees in 
companies without a pension scheme – that the Pensions Commission was set up to 
investigate and resolve – via the introduction of auto-enrolment.  
The resolution to this new potential market failure would be a national master trust 
drawdown scheme that has a public service obligation to accept any DC retiree, irrespective 
of their pot size. This might be a simple continuation of NEST's public service obligation to 
accept any employer for accumulation (if EU regulations permit). 
Some industry practitioners are aware of the consequences of the industry getting it wrong. 
For example, Phil Loney, chief exeĐutiǀe of ‘oǇal LoŶdoŶ, has said: ͚George Osborne's 
pension reforms have the potential to become famous for helping people to improve their 
retirement incomes, but without plentiful and affordable financial advice they risk becoming 
an infamous example of political bungling. The reforms have been introduced too quickly 
and the population had so far failed to understand what it means for them. I fear that many 
will make the wrong, often irrecoverable decisions about their retirement and this will result 
in some very poor outcomes. The simple fact is that many people, perhaps most, have not 
engaged with pension freedom and lack the basic financial knowledge to take the next 
steps͛.1003  
7.3 Contributing to a national narrative 2: The national media 
The second contribution needs to come from the national media. As Aileen Lynch, head of 
technical services at Compliance First, has written ͚Theƌe͛s aŶ uŶsettliŶg diĐhotoŵǇ 
ďetǁeeŶ the ŵessages of the ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ ŵedia ;͞This is Ǉouƌ ŵoŶeǇ aŶd Ǉou aƌe eŶtitled 
to do ǁith it ǁhateǀeƌ Ǉou ǁaŶt, ǁheŶeǀeƌ Ǉou please͟Ϳ aŶd the ŵoƌe ĐoŶsideƌed, loŶg-
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term approach which is generally prevalent in financial services press and among advisers 
aŶd pƌoǀideƌs͛.1004  
The national media has a very important role to play in getting the right message across 
about the real purpose of a pension scheme and the genuine risks that retirees face – much 
more now than in the days of final salary pensions when people received a life-long indexed 
pension and did not have to worry about the risks in Table 1.2.  
However, there are two potentially significant long-teƌŵ ĐoŶseƋeŶĐes of the ͚this is Ǉouƌ 
ŵoŶeǇ͛ ǀieǁ of a peŶsioŶ pot ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ pƌeǀailiŶg iŶ the ŶatioŶal ŵedia. The fiƌst is a 
potential moral hazard. If a sufficiently large number of people behave in a reckless way and 
withdraw all their money and spend it too quickly, then they could claim compensation for 
mis-selling. Further, they will also demand an increase in welfare benefits and that, in turn, 
could lead to inter-generational conflict, with the next generation of taxpayers refusing to 
bail out their profligate and reckless predecessors. The second is the focus on reducing 
inheritance tax for those already sufficiently well off that, when they die, they will leave 
significant assets in their pension pot. Ordinary tax payers will soon start asking why they 
should subsidise the transfer of tax-priviledged assets across generations of already wealthy 
families. The whole rationale for having tax incentives to encourage pension savings would 
soon come into question. 
7.4 Contributing to a national narrative 3: The regulatory system 
Our research has highlighted a number of problems with the current dual regulatory system, 
whereby The Pensions Regulator (TPR) regulates trust-based schemes and the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) regulates contract-based schemes. Not only does this lead to 
inconsistencies in regulation, the two organisations have two different narratives. As a 
pension lawyer told us: ͚The FCA looks at pƌoduĐts aŶd pƌoǀideƌs. It has individual customer 
protection as its focus. TPR is concerned more about giving guidance to trustees and 
eŵploǇeƌs at the leǀel of the sĐheŵe͛.  “ee Taďle ϳ.ϭ  foƌ ŵoƌe details of the differences.  
 
Table 7.1:  Respective Strengths of the contract and trust-based regimes 
Activity Contract-based regime (FCA) Trust-based regime (TPR) 
Rigour of regulatory 
regime 
Requirement to meet threshold 
conditions to conduct regulated 
activities.  Ongoing monitoring 
including:  Supervision  Thematic reviews 
It relies on trustees and other 
professionals to report any 
breaches and to comply with 
their statutory whistleblowing 
duties. 
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18 November. 
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Communication with 
members 
Requirement for 
communications that reflect 
where individuals are on the 
retirement journey. 
 
Prescriptive around the 
information provided to 
members – in some cases, this 
may make it more difficult for 
organisations to present 
information in the most useful 
way (e.g., if they are required to 
provide information that will not 
be used by the member). 
Schemes able to tailor their 
communications to their 
members. 
 
Communications may be 
designed at the level of the 
scheme membership and may 
Ŷot ƌefleĐt aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s 
position on their retirement 
journey. 
Compatibility with 
workplace pensions 
Employees do not typically have a choice of pension scheme, this is 
down to the employer 
FCA͛s ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt to pƌoŵote 
consumer choice of their 
pension provider is not as 
relevant under automatic 
enrolment where it is the 
employer who chooses the 
pension scheme. 
 
This suggests that some of the 
information, such as the 
provision of information to help 
members make choices) 
provided, may not be used and 
that this may distract members 
from other important 
information. 
Schemes have the leeway to 
provide information relevant to 
the ŵeŵďeƌs͛ situatioŶ – that 
can reflect the fact that the 
employer chooses pension 
schemes under automatic 
enrolment. 
Activity Contract-based regime (FCA) Trust based regime (TPR) 
Cost (including 
monetary costs and 
time) of managing 
pension schemes 
Compliance entails a higher 
volume of work and cost than 
required by the trust-based 
regime. 
 
Pension providers must receive 
authorisation for certain 
activities. 
Compliance requires lower 
volume of work – for example, 
lower levels of contact with the 
regulator. 
 
Trustees have the freedom to 
make decisions if they judge 
these to be beneficial to 
members. 
Source: Melissa Echalier and Sarah Luheshi (2015, Table A) Comparison of the Regulatory Frameworks for DC 
Pensions, Pensions Policy Institute, October. 
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Problems that have been identified with the current system include the following:
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 TPR and the FCA constantly need to consult one another on a range of activities. 
According to Malcolm McLean, senior consultant at Barnett Waddingham: ͚This is 
Ŷot oŶlǇ iŶeffiĐieŶt it is positiǀelǇ daŶgeƌous…With ďoth auto-enrolment and the 
pensions freedom at critical stages of development, it makes no sense to proceed as 
ǁe aƌe. …A siŶgle ƌegulatoƌ ǁould ďe less ĐoŶfusiŶg foƌ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs, ǁould help to 
plug gaps in the current arrangements and provide greater consistency of treatment 
between trust-based and contract-ďased sĐheŵes…[It ǁould also] pƌoǀide a Đleaƌ 
foĐus foƌ diƌeĐt aĐtioŶ aŶd eaƌlǇ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ ǁheƌe ŶeĐessaƌǇ͛1006   The two regulators are regulating very similar products for very similar consumers, 
but there are different protections for both. One example is the different 
approaches to retirement risk warnings.1007 In January 2015, the FCA said that 
providers of contract-based DC schemes should issue tailored risk warnings that 
depeŶded oŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes assessed ǀia a list of ϭϭ ƋuestioŶs to 
ensure consumers make well-informed decisions. By contrast, TPR encourages 
trustees to provide only generic risk warnings to scheme members and to direct 
them to Pension Wise  Another example relates to a confusion in the proposed rules on transferring from 
DB to DC schemes when there are benefits with guaranteed annuity rates (GARs). 
The FCA states that a GAR turns a money purchase scheme into a safeguarded 
benefit, which means members with a GAR will need to take advice if they want to 
transfer. However, TPR defines a GAR as a money purchase benefit until it is taken, 
which means there should be no requirement for trustees to ensure advice is taken.  There is also potential confusion when it comes to compensation. On the surface, 
everything appears to be clear-cut. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
covers 100% of the value of an annuity in the event that the insurance company 
providing the annuity defaults, £75,000 of the value of bank deposits, and £50,000 of 
the value of retirement and investment savings. But this compensation applies to 
individuals not to schemes and also depends on whether the FSCS treats the pension 
pot as an investment or a long-term insurance arrangement: 
                                                     
1005
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 ͚While ďoth ƌegulatoƌs haǀe ideŶtified siŵilaƌ tǇpes of ƌisk, theiƌ appƌoaĐhes aƌe different with TPR 
focusing on enablement and education. It is also less prescriptive than the FCA in terms of its guidance, 
particularly around communication to pension savers. In contrast, the FCA is more pro-active in monitoring 
peŶsioŶ sĐheŵes͛ aĐtiǀities. This diffeƌeŶĐe ƌefleĐts the fact that it is the trustees who are responsible for 
playing a supervisory role in the trust-based ƌegiŵe͛ (Melissa Echalier and Sarah Luheshi (2015) Comparison of 
the Regulatory Frameworks for DC Pensions, Pensions Policy Institute, October). 
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o For example, if a trust-based scheme invests via an insurance company, there 
are cases where it will not be covered by the FSCS. To illustrate from 
“taŶdaƌd Life͛s Trust-based Pension Plan Key Features document: ͚Youƌ plaŶ 
is classed as a long-term contract of insurance. The trustees will be eligible 
for compensation under the FSCS if Standard Life Assurance Ltd (SLAL) 
becomes unable to meet its claims and the cover is 100% of the value of their 
claim. If your plan is invested in one of our funds that invests in a mutual fund 
run by another firm (including Standard Life Investments Ltd), the trustees 
are not eligible for any compensation under the FSCS if that firm is unable to 
meet its claims. SLAL is not able to make a claim on the trustees behalf, so 
the price of a unit in our fund will depend on the amount we recover from 
the firm. If your plan is invested in one of our funds that invests in a fund run 
by another insurer, the trustees are not eligible for any compensation under 
the FSCS if that insurer is unable to meet its claims. SLAL is not able to make a 
Đlaiŵ oŶ the tƌustees ďehalf͛.1008 
o Similarly, with a self-invested personal pension scheme. A SIPP comes under 
the FCA because it is contract-based, but if it is not set up as a life office 
wrapped product, the FSCS treats it as a pure investment which has a lower 
level of compensation.  While it is very unlikely that a UK life office will become insolvent, the same cannot 
be said of the plethora of small master trusts that have emerged following the 
introduction of auto-enrolment. The entry and capital adequacy requirements for 
ŵasteƌ tƌusts haǀe ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed to us as ͚deƌisoƌǇ͛.1009 While compensation for 
trust-based schemes comes under The Pensions Regulator and its compensation 
scheme, the Pension Protection Fund (which also runs another compensation 
scheme for cases of fraud, the Fraud Compensation Fund),1010 this has not yet been 
seriously tested in the new world of auto-enrolment. NEST has its own separate 
ƌegulatioŶs ǁhiĐh agaiŶ do Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌilǇ giǀe full pƌoteĐtioŶ to ŵeŵďeƌs: ͚Because 
NEST has been set up as a trust, our members are the owners of all the assets we 
hold on their behalf. If anything goes wrong their retirement pots remain their 
property. Member funds are not fully covered by the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁe iŶǀest soŵe of ouƌ ŵeŵďeƌ͛s assets iŶ 
contracts of insurance which are covered bǇ the F“C“ iŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes͛.1011 
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 Rajiv Jaitly states: 1012  
 
͚..[I]t can be argued that multiple regulators weaken their regulatory 
reach. They are weakened because differences in objectives, functions and 
powers of  enforcement between them create loopholes. The need for 
liaison between them creates bureaucracy and delay. These weaknesses 
create the potential for regulatory arbitrage. For example, three regulators 
police DC pension schemes and the financial services firms that provide 
investment funds for them: the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), and the Pensions Regulator (TPR). Each 
regulator has different powers in terms of intervention and fines. In 
particular, while the FCA and TPR share the role of regulating DC pensions, 
the former appears to have much wider powers than the latter. Despite the 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the FCA and TPR in 
relation to DC pensions, this asymmetry in power might tempt providers of 
automatic enrolment pension sĐheŵes to ͚Đhoose͛ ǁhat theǇ peƌĐeiǀe as a 
͚ƌegulatioŶ light͛ ͚tƌust͛ stƌuĐtuƌe ƌegulated ďǇ TP‘ ƌatheƌ thaŶ the FCA. 
Furthermore, the level of fines the regulators can impose – even by the FCA 
– might not be considered punitive by firms. With regulators having to 
abide by principles of proportionality, fines may be treated as no more 
thaŶ ͚the Đost of doiŶg ďusiŶess. 
 
‘etail iŶǀestoƌs ǁho ǁish to ĐhalleŶge a fiƌŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ faĐe a ĐoŶfusiŶg 
process because the three regulators do not normally deal with consumer 
complaints. Complaints about firms regulated by the FCA are directed to 
the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), while those about pension 
schemes regulated by TPR go to the Pensions Ombudsman. There is also a 
grey area of overlap between them, for example in the case of transfers of 
ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ŵoŶeǇ fƌoŵ defiŶed ďeŶefit ;DBͿ sĐheŵes to DC aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶts. 
The jurisdiction of compensation schemes such as the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme (FSCS) and the Fraud Compensation Scheme (FCS) is 
also confusing. 
 
It may of course be possible to challenge an investment management 
contract through the courts, but the options are limited due to the way 
contracts are structured and shortcomings in the legislation on unfair 
contract terms. 
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The following is a sample of the comments of those we interviewed: 
 ͚The contract based-regime prioritises shareholder interests over savers͛ interests, 
whereas the trust-based regime gives absolute priority to savers. The FCA͛s 
regulatory duties are structured so that any attempt to move away from relying on 
information and competition only to remedy market failures would be crippled by 
judicial review, so it repeatedly fails to do anything useful in the pension space. The 
FCA is captured by the industry in a way TPR is not. The FCA does not want to do 
anything, whereas TPR culturally would like to in intervene if it was given more 
poǁeƌs͛.  ͚The failings at the FCA were exposed on 17 December 2014 at the Work and 
Pensions Select Committee where they unwisely said ͞you cannot stop fools acting 
like fools͟. The committee said this was an abdication of responsibility. The FCA are 
supposed to enforce TCF [treating customers fairly], but their own analysis showed 
that they were not doing this, e.g., they were aware that bonuses in insurance 
companies were linked to increases in internal annuity sales. The FCA finally listened 
on 17 December and rushed in the ͞second line of defence͟ [now called ͞additional 
protection͟]. This move followed calls by a range of consumer organisations and 
providers including [our company], as noted in the Work and Pension Select 
Committee report͛.  ͚The FCA is sometimes too prescriptive and sometimes not bold enough, e.g., it was 
forced by industry to bring in the emergency ͞second line of defence͛͟.  ͚The FCA needs to give providers more leeway͛.  ͚TPR is all at sea and well behind the curve͛.  ͚There is inconsistent and conflicting decision making at the EU level, e.g., between 
the European Parliament, the European Commission and EIOPA͛. 
According to Darren Philp, head of poliĐǇ aŶd ŵaƌket eŶgageŵeŶt at The People͛s PeŶsioŶ: 
͚We Ŷeed to haǀe ŵoƌe joiŶed up poliĐǇŵakiŶg to eŶsuƌe Ŷo ŵatteƌ ǁhat peŶsioŶ sĐheŵe 
Ǉou͛ƌe saǀiŶg iŶ, Ǉou get the appƌopƌiate leǀel of pƌoteĐtioŶs aŶd aǀoid ĐoŶfusiŶg ŵessages 
and a confusiŶg ƌegulatoƌǇ laŶdsĐape͛.1013 A similar view is held by Stephen Lowe, director 
at Just ‘etiƌeŵeŶt: ͚MaŶǇ ƌetiƌees haǀe a ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of tƌust-based occupational and 
personal pension plans, so the rules needed to straddle both regimes in order to ensure 
clarity and consistency. It's in the interests of the consumers, the regulators and the 
industry that we avoid the problems caused by trying to operate a two-tieƌ sǇsteŵ͛.1014 
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MaƌtiŶ WheatleǇ, theŶ Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe of the FCA, said he Đould ͚sǇŵpathise͛ ǁith the 
iŶdustƌǇ͛s fƌustƌatioŶ oǀeƌ the tǁiŶ ƌegulatoƌǇ ƌegiŵe. He aĐĐepted that ͚Theƌe aƌe tǁo sets 
of decision-makers putting out slightly different views. We are clear it must be tailored 
ǁithout ďeiŶg adǀiĐe. TP‘ hasŶ't giǀeŶ that kiŶd of pƌeĐisioŶ͛. He agƌeed that it was 
iŵpoƌtaŶt to haǀe ͚ƌeasoŶaďlǇ ĐoŵŵoŶ staŶdaƌd deliǀeƌǇ͛ aŶd aƌgued foƌ the saŵe 
definition of guidance to protect people from receiving mixed messages. He also said that 
moving to a single regulator was a decision for policy makers.1015 
According to those we interviewed, the current fragmented regulatory system fails to 
encourage the design of effective, value-for-money products and solutions with a safe-
harbour status or to adequately protect consumers from mis-selling and fraud. The solution 
would be to have a single pensions regulator, specifically tasked with these responsibilities.  
It would also have a responsibility for trying to change regulations which contribute to bad 
outcomes. As an example, we were told that prudential regulations in the UK increase the 
cost of prudential capital and reduce the value of annuities by 20% compared with the US. 
Another example is EU regulations, particularly MiFID II. If drawdown is reclassified as 
complex under MiFID II, it is likely that only those with large pots (above £100,000) who can 
afford regulated advice will be able to buy the product. What will mass market consumers 
who want to use drawdown do in these circumstances? 
The idea of a single regulator is supported by the Work and Pensions Select Committee in its 
report Progress with Automatic Enrolment and Pension Reforms published in March 
2015.1016  The report said that the potential increased risk to pension savers from mis-selling 
and fraud following the introduction of the new pension flexibilities from April 2015 
strengthens the case for combining the regulators. 
Dame Anne Begg MP, Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee at the time, said: 
The new pension flexibilities give savers the freedom to use their money in 
the way they choose and have the potential to make retirement saving 
really attractive. But savers need to be properly protected from being 
ripped off in frauds or scams, or suffering financial loss from making the 
wrong decision about how to use their pension pots. The pensions industry 
has not always done enough in the past to help savers make the right 
decisions.  
What savers really need is a strong, single regulator to act in their 
interests. We are not convinced that the FCA is sufficiently focused on 
pensions. The comment made in evideŶĐe to us that it ĐaŶ͛t ͚stop fools 
                                                     
1015 ‘epoƌted iŶ Natasha BƌoǁŶe ;ϮϬϭϱͿ FCA ͚sǇŵpathises͛ ǁith fƌustƌatioŶ oǀeƌ tǁiŶ peŶsioŶs ƌegulatioŶ, 
Professional Pensions, 12 March.  
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 Fourth Report from the Work and Pensions Committee: Progress with Automatic Enrolment and Pension 
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aĐtiŶg like fools͛ does Ŷot iŶspiƌe ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ the FCA͛s ǁilliŶgŶess to ďe 
proactive in protecting savers. The Government is coming round to our 
way of thinking about the need for a single regulator. We believe that the 
big shift to the new pension flexibilities in April means that it is now time to 
make this change, which we originally recommended back in 2013. 
 
The report said a single regulator would have a clear focus on the entire retirement saving 
pƌoĐess: ͚“aǀeƌs ǁould haǀe ĐlaƌitǇ oŶ ǁho ǁas ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ pƌoǀidiŶg guidaŶĐe aŶd 
redress, and employers and the pensions industry would have a single body to advise and 
supeƌǀise theŵ͛.  
Nevertheless, combining the regulators would not be straightforward as pointed out by 
Melissa Echalier and Sarah Luheshi (2015), due to, e.g., the volume of contract, tax, trust 
and pension law needing to be changed to accommodate a move to a single regulator; and 
it is not clear where a single regulator should sit – whether this would be in the Department 
foƌ Woƌk aŶd PeŶsioŶs oƌ Heƌ MajestǇ͛s TƌeasuƌǇ.1017 
7.5 Contributing to a national narrative 4: The political system 
The fourth contribution needs to come from the political system. It is increasingly clear that 
the five-year political business cycle is not suited to dealing with long-term issues like 
pensions, long-term care and long-term savings. Political parties, whether in power or in 
opposition, are totally focused on winning the next election and appear unable to think 
beyond that. It is therefore very hard to get any political party to adopt sensible long-term 
solutions to the problems of pensions, long-term care and long-term savings, especially if 
this involves sacrifices today, because it fears this would benefit its political opponents who 
could well be in power when the benefits begin to show.  
This has fundamental consequences for intergenerational equity, since every generation 
passes the consequences of its own failures down to the next generation. While this can be 
a small problem when a population is growing, it becomes very severe when a population is 
rapidly ageing. To illustrate, a key reason why we would want each generation to hedge its 
own exposure to longevity risk is that, if it fails to do so, it is expecting the next generation 
to provide that hedge for free. The main objection to buying annuities – the classic longevity 
hedge –  by the baby boom generation currently retiring is that they aƌe ͚too eǆpeŶsiǀe͛. But 
they will be even more expensive for the next generation to provide if significant numbers 
of baby boomers run out of money and demand that the next generation provides them 
with an income foƌ life ;aka aŶ aŶŶuitǇͿ to keep theŵ out of ͚poǀeƌtǇ͛. Foƌ hoǁ ŵuĐh loŶgeƌ 
can the baby boom generation keep asking for a free lunch from the next? 
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 Melissa Echalier and Sarah Luheshi (2015) Comparison of the Regulatory Frameworks for DC Pensions, 
Pensions Policy Institute, October. 
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One way of achieving a national narrative as well as dealing with the myopia of the political 
business cycle is to have a permanent Pensions, Care and Savings Commission (PCSC). This 
would be an independent body that would have cross-party support and would make 
recommendations on issues relating to pensions, long-term care and long-term savings. The 
PCSC would require an evidence basis for any policy recommendations, together with an 
impact and risk assessment. A particularly important role for the PCSC would be to ensure 
inter-generational equity.1018 Since no generation can, during its working life, store for its 
retirement the goods and services it will consume in retirement, each generation depends 
on the next generation to provide those goods and services in a way that is not widely 
recognised.  Models for how the PCSC might operate are the Low Pay Commission (LPC), the 
Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), and the 
Committee on Climate Change (CCC).1019 The PCSC would report directly to Parliament. 
There is widespread support for such a commission and we consider some examples. 
The Work and Pensions Select Committee report Progress with Automatic Enrolment and 
Pension Reforms cited earlier also called for an independent pension commission to build 
public confidence and long-term stability in the system.1020  The commission would look at 
the following issues:  
 To assess the impact of the Budget flexibilities on default investment strategies  To consider whether a default decumulation option is required for savers making 
poor decisions  To assess the impact of the reforms on the suitability and accessibility of retirement 
products  To ƌeĐoŵŵeŶd ŵaƌket iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs ǁheƌe the ŵaƌket ǁas Ŷot ǁoƌkiŶg iŶ saǀeƌs͛ 
best interest  To tackle high charges and poor governance in legacy schemes  To review auto-enrolment, including making recommendations on minimum 
contributions and defining adequacy of retirement income and how the policy 
should be assessed as a success. The report said using opt-out rates to measure 
success would not be meaningful in the long term  To oversee any further changes in savings and tax policy 
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 In January 2016, the Work and Pensions Select Committee launched an iŶƋuiƌǇ iŶto ͚iŶteƌ-generational 
faiƌŶess͛ oǀeƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs that the state peŶsioŶ aŶd ǁelfaƌe sǇsteŵ is uŶfaiƌlǇ faǀouƌiŶg peŶsioŶeƌs at the 
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select/work-and-pensions-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/intergenerational-fairness-15-16/). 
1019 
https://www.theccc.org.uk/about/. For a risk assessment report which includes a chapter on Ethics by 
Lord Rees (pp 134-136), see http://www.csap.cam.ac.uk/projects/climate-change-risk-assessment/ 
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 To assess the minimum age at which people can exercise their pension flexibilities. 
The current age is 55 and this will rise to 57 in 2028 when the state pension age 
increases to 67. But allowing people to draw on the private pension ten years before 
state pension age could create unrealistic expectations about the age at which they 
can afford to stop working. The commission  would consider whether this should be 
reduced to five years, except for those in ill health  To look at issues relating to auto-enrolment: the challenges of extending AE to 
smaller employers, the level of minimum contributions for employers and 
employees, and how currently excluded groups, such as the self-employed and those 
in multiple low-paid jobs, can be brought into pension saving more effectively. 
Dame Anne Begg MP said: 
The scale and pace of recent changes in pensions policy have completely 
changed the retirement saving landscape. It is necessary to draw breath 
and review the extent of the changes and their implications.  
A new independent pension commission would be able to identify any 
emerging risks, and explore with stakeholders how these can best be 
addressed. The Turner Commission brought political consensus, full 
involvement of stakeholders, and detailed consideration of the wider 
impacts of major pensions policy changes. The successful introduction of 
auto-enrolment is a product of this. The current reforms have not always 
benefited from the same careful approach. A new commission is now 
needed to provide coherence in pensions policy and to build public 
confidence and long-term stability in the system. 
 
Also in March 2015, the Association of Consulting Actuaries (ACA) released a seven-point 
Retirement Income Manifesto.1021 The ACA wants the Government to establish a long-term 
consensus by setting up and taking regular advice from a new standing Independent 
Retirement Income Commission. This ǁould ďe Đhaƌged ǁith ͚pƌoŵotiŶg the aĐtiǀe 
extension and betterment of private retirement income provision and making 
recommendations on the future of state aŶd puďliĐ seĐtoƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt pƌoǀisioŶ͛. 
The ACA proposed the following remit for the Independent Retirement Income Commission: 
 To review the structure of state peŶsioŶs aŶd the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s tiŵetaďle foƌ ƌaisiŶg 
the state retirement age to reflect both improvements in life-spans and overall 
financial costs to the taxpayer (given the current commitŵeŶt to the ͚tƌiple loĐk͛ 
indexation of the basic state pension)  
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 To advise every three years on the need or not for a general increase in retirement 
age to reflect increases in longevity so as to keep pension funding costs broadly 
stable over the long-term where scheme specific information is unavailable   To recommend policies designed to encourage more employers and employees to 
invest in retirement income plans, including auto-escalation and other measures to 
maximise design flexibilities and choices, advising on financial and tax incentives to 
encourage wider coverage, whilst taking account of the UK economic, demographic 
and financial backcloth and life-style changes   To review and make recommendations on tax incentives for long-term care products   To promote legislative and regulatory simplification to encourage quality provision, 
aĐĐeptiŶg that legislatioŶ ŵust ĐoŶtiŶue to pƌoteĐt ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵes 
from the impact of employer or provider insolvency or default   At the request of Government, to review on a periodic basis the structure and rules 
of the NEST scheme to ensure employees are offered an appropriate fall-back 
retirement income plan where no better scheme is offered by a sponsoring 
employer   To ensure that over the long-term, the cost of public sector pensions, and those that 
are largely funded by the taxpayer, are transparent in cost to the taxpayer, are 
sustainable and are fair set against the scale of private provision available to the 
majority of taxpayers   To report (within 6 months) on matters referred by Government to the Commission 
on an ad hoc basis and also on European directives that could have an impact on any 
of the above.  
IŶ JuŶe ϮϬϭϱ, Daǀid Faiƌs, ChaiƌŵaŶ of the ACA, ƌeŶeǁed the assoĐiatioŶ͛s Đall foƌ aŶ 
Independent CoŵŵissioŶ ǁhiĐh ͚ǁould help suppoƌt joiŶed-up decision making and we 
hope the new Pensions Minister, Baroness Altmann, and the new Economic Secretary, 
Harriett Baldwin MP, might persuade their colleagues that such a step would improve the 
long-term success of these fuŶdaŵeŶtal peŶsioŶ ƌefoƌŵs͛.1022   
In a report published in April 2015 called The Case for an Independent Retirement Savings 
Commission, the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), the Association of British 
Insurers (ABI) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) call for an independent retirement 
savings commission.1023 The NAPF sponsored a national survey1024 ǁhiĐh shoǁed that ͚aŶ 
                                                     
1022 ACA says pressures on pension system underscores need for an independent commission and tax 
pause, press release, 11 June 2015. 
1023 NAPF, ABI, and TUC jointly call for an Independent Retirement Savings Commission, NAPF press release, 
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overwhelming majority of people (84%) agreed that an independent commission should be 
set up by a future Government and a similar proportion said it should be politically neutral 
(85%), impartial in its recommendations to Government (85%), and should focus not just on 
pensions, but include the wider range of issues that affect both when people retire and the 
kind of retirement they have (87%). Eight in ten (83%) were in favour of a permanent 
commission – one that would last more than one parliamentary term, would endure 
through future political cycles and provide independent, expert advice to all future UK 
Governments, regardless of their political make-up͛.  
JoaŶŶe “egaƌs, Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe of the NAPF, said: ͚TodaǇ͛s ƌepoƌt shoǁs the ďƌeadth aŶd 
depth of support that exists for creating an independent retirement savings commission. A 
new standing commission will help make sure the long-term interests of savers, not the 
short-term interests of politicians, are at the heart of pensions policy. That matters because 
someone starting work today will see eight or nine General Elections before they start to 
draw their pension – eight or nine potential swings of the pensions policy pendulum which 
will do little to build saver confidence. This support for a standing commission stretches well 
beyond the people who work in pensions to the everyday savers who will rely on their 
pensions for a decent income in retirement. The idea of such a commission is not a new one 
but it has yet to become a reality – our report shows there is growing chorus for that to 
ĐhaŶge, aŶd sooŶ͛.  
“he ĐoŶtiŶued: ͚We need to go back to first principles and agree a collective vision for what 
a good retirement savings system looks like for the long-teƌŵ͛. “he also aƌgued that the 
success of the original Pensions Commission, chaired by Lord Turner, built on:  
 A shared understanding of the problem, namely that voluntarism meant too few 
people saving enough for old age  A shared building of the policy solution – and a collective vision of what needed to 
change.  A shared responsibility for the delivery and success of that solution – not just that 
the delivery of automatic enrolment should be shared between private sector and 
Government, but more importantly the shared acknowledgement that automatic 
enrolment could not fail. 
“he eŶded ďǇ saǇiŶg that: ͚The CoŵŵissioŶ͛s pƌoĐess of deĐisioŶ ŵakiŶg – thoughtful, 
evidence-based and inclusive – laid the foundations for a consensus which has delivered one 
of the most far-reaching public policy interventions in recent decades across any part of 
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557 
 
Government. It is now unthinkable that any Government of any colour (or colours) would 
undo automatic enrolment, or that the social partners or industry would peel away from its 
Đoƌe teŶets. It is a paƌt of the peŶsioŶs laŶdsĐape that is heƌe to staǇ͛.  
Further support comes from: 
 The International Longevity Centre – UK which published a report in February 2015 
called Consensus Revisited iŶ ǁhiĐh it Đalled foƌ a peŶsioŶ ĐoŵŵissioŶ ͚diǀoƌĐed fƌoŵ 
the trappings of Government͛ to ƌeďuild ĐoŶseŶsus-based policy making in pensions 
and, in particular, deal with the challenge of inadequate incomes in retirement.  The 
commission would concentrate on three issues:  
o Defining target outcomes for retirement savings and extending working lives 
o Monitor progress against these targets 
o Consult on its findings and decide if there needs to be a policy update.  The Savings and Investments Policy Project, managed by the Tax Incentivised Savings 
Association (TISA), published a report called Our Financial Future in March 2015, 
which recommended that the Government create a 'savings minister' with the 
responsibility for promoting savings initiatives, consumer guidance and financial 
education.   Age UK has also called for an independent retirement savings commission was 
Ŷeeded. JaŶe Vass, head of puďliĐ poliĐǇ, said: ͚Theƌe is deďate oǀeƌ the eǆaĐt foƌŵ it 
should take, but it needs to be independent and it needs to look at pensions in the 
round – iŶĐludiŶg state peŶsioŶs, pƌiǀate saǀiŶg aŶd ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe͛.1025   Pensions Age͛s Unchaining Pensions from Politics (UPP) campaign. Supporters of the 
ĐaŵpaigŶ ͚wanted the commission to recommend long-term policies as a ͞road-
map͟ to futuƌe peŶsioŶ deǀelopŵeŶt, takiŶg iŶto aĐĐouŶt the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s 
demographics and the needs of different generations. It should also establish what a 
͞good͟ target outcome is for retirement saving and therefore provide savers with 
confidence. The commission should scrutinise and suggest proposals to change 
legislation. Suggestions were also made to expand its role and provide greater clarity 
of the interaction between retirement and health care needs, along with promoting 
flexible retirement and flexible working to manage the transitions from work to non-
work/less ǁoƌk͛. JaĐkie Wells, NAPF head of poliĐǇ aŶd ƌeseaƌĐh, said: ͚The 
commission would be a purely advisory body, not a policy-making vehicle, and would 
make recommendations to Government based on independent, collaborative 
analysis of the best available evidence, which the Government would be free to 
reject. Ultimately, the aim of the commission would be to help future Governments 
                                                     
1025 Reported in Stephanie Baxter (2015) Independent pensions commission demanded by July, Professional 
Adviser, 10 March.  
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ensure that policy decisions have the needs of savers – including their 
ĐoŶstitueŶts͛.1026  Respondents to the Consultation Paper: 
o There was strong support from 82% of respondents for a permanent 
pensions commission in some form or another. Only 9% were opposed to a 
pensions commission.  All the groups that we interviewed: 
o Providers and investment managers. While it is accepted that ministers must 
make final choices, especially if taxation is involved, all proposals should have 
been developed and examined in a measured and structured way. Examples 
of poor decisions that need to be avoided in future include: (a) the 2014 
Budget, (b) the introduction of a charge cap half way through the auto-
enrolment process, and (c) the political parties salami slicing the existing tax 
sǇsteŵ ;e.g., the Laďouƌ PaƌtǇ͛s pƌoposals iŶ the ϮϬϭϱ GeŶeƌal EleĐtioŶ to 
transfer resources to lowering student fees). There are some important 
issues that the Pensions Commission could deal with:  The current fragmentation of decision making in Government with 
HM Treasury (in relation to tax), the DWP and the Health Department 
all having a say. 
o Trade unions:  ͚With some of the changes of the last few years, it would have been 
very helpful to have an independent commission opining on it. There 
is merit in ensuring it is statutory, as well as having a definite remit 
and an independence of its own͛.  ͚Charges, contributions rates, the statutory retirement age. What is a 
sensible draw down rate? There could be quite a few things it could 
do. Look at what are the right contribution levels. Everyone knows 
they should be higher͛.  ͚It could look at predicted long-term investment growth. It could 
provide a recommended amount of drawdown. You have got life 
expectancies and investment growth from a portfolio. You could say 
the recommended amount you can take out is £X. The problem with 
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 Reported in Laura Blows (2015)  Industry ĐoŶĐeƌŶed politiĐiaŶs ǁould ͚saďotage͛ aŶ iŶdepeŶdeŶt peŶsioŶs 
commission, Pensions Age, 28 April. See also Laura Blows (2015)  Open letters sent to DWP and Treasury 
calling for independent pensions commission, Pensions Age, 2 June. The letters were signed by: Mike Allen, 
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Dame Karen Dunnell, Chair, Longevity Science Panel (Legal & General); David Fairs, Chairman, ACA; Ammo 
Kambo, Charted Financial Planner; Kevin LeGrand, Head of Pensions Policy, Buck Consultants at Xerox; Ronnie 
Morgan, Strategic Market Insight Manager, Royal London; Darren Philp; Alan Pickering, Chairman, 
BESTrustees; Carolyn Saunders, Head of Pensions, Pinsent Masons; Rachel Vahey, Independent Consultant; 
and Jackie Wells, Head of Policy and Research, NAPF. 
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drawdown is the impact of the first five or six years is a big 
determinant of future years͛.  However, the model proposed for the Pensions Commission in the 
consultation paper – along the lines of the MPC – was not welcomed:  ͚I do not think the MPC would be a very good model. You 
could have a Pensions Commission that makes big public 
recommendations to Government and hard for them to 
ignore. The Low Pay Commission (LPC) might be a better 
analogy. Also the social partnership basis on which it is based. 
For example, hearing evidence in public. It is very evidence-
based. It is hard for the Government not to accept an LPC 
recommendation͛.  ͚For the LPC, the Government sets the remit. The remit of the 
LPC has been shaped by different political complexions of 
Government, but it has retained stability while being sensitive 
to the changing political environment͛.  ͚It is difficult for the minimum wage to go up without recourse 
to the LPC. They would not want to do that because of 
precedent. With pensions, there is the question of what the 
commission would look at. For LPC, it is quite tightly defined 
wage rates͛. 
Dr Yvonne Braun, director of long-term savings at the ABI, believes that one of the key 
responsibilities of the PCSC would be to consider intergenerational equity. Writing in 
Retirement 2050: Identifying the Challenges of a Changing World, published by the ABI in 
February 2015, she said ;p. ϮϵͿ:͚The loŶg-term nature of pensions and retirement income 
mean that policy-making should take a long-term view as much as possible, with policies 
lastiŶg ďeǇoŶd a siŶgle PaƌliaŵeŶt. AŶ iŶdepeŶdeŶt ďodǇ ;aŶ ͚OffiĐe foƌ IŶteƌgeŶeƌatioŶal 
ResponsibilitǇ͛ oƌ a ͚‘etiƌeŵeŶt CoŵŵissioŶ͛Ϳ Đould haǀe aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt paƌt to plaǇ iŶ 
informing the policy debate and shaping a national long-term savings strategy, so the 
implications of the ageing society are assessed holistically, rather than by individual 
departŵeŶts͛.1027  
This theme was taken up by Michael Johnson, research fellow at the Centre for Policy 
Studies, in briefing note published in June 2015 entitled The Case for an Office for Inter-
generational Responsibility.1028 He argues: 
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The UK͛s deďt ŵouŶtaiŶ, Đoŵďined with the risk of an anaemic long-term 
ƌate of eĐoŶoŵiĐ gƌoǁth, poses a seƌious thƌeat to GeŶeƌatioŶ Y͛s futuƌe 
economic wellbeing.1029 This, a generation already faced with unaffordable 
housing, college debts, fragmented careers, earnings stagnation, relatively 
thin occupational pension provision, and a rapidly retreating state pension 
age. 
An Office for Inter-generational Responsibility (OIR) should be established 
to co-ordinate the production of Inter-generational Impact Assessments 
and to scrutinise all tax reliefs and exemptions. It could reside alongside (or 
within) the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), and could fruitfully liaise 
with the (now expanding) Office of Tax Simplification.  
An OIR should exude an ethos of fiduciary duty towards current and future 
taxpayers, and aspire to having a reputation for independence akin to that 
of the OBR. If it were to achieve this, it would help close what is currently a 
significant accountability gap between Parliament and the people 
(particularly future taxpayers). In addition, all tax reliefs and exemptions 
could be subject to a five year sunset clause, after which they would cease. 
Lobbyists would be required to present their cases directly to the proposed 
OIR, placing blue water between vested interest groups and ministers. 
 
Politicians were less keen on having a PCSC. While recognising the problems that the 
commission would be trying to address, politicians said it was the responsibility of 
Government to deal with these. Steve Webb, when still Pensions Minister, called for the 
creation of a Department for Pensions and Ageing Society at a Resolution Foundation event 
in February 2015. This would bring together care, the ageing society and long-term savings 
in one department.  He said:  
Your pension outcome depends on every aspect of your life. It depends on 
Ǉouƌ life eǆpeĐtaŶĐǇ, oŶ ǁhat soƌt of eduĐatioŶ Ǉou͛ǀe had, ǁhat Ǉouƌ 
Đaƌeeƌ path is, ǁhat soƌt of fiƌŵ Ǉou ǁoƌk foƌ, ǁhetheƌ Ǉou͛ƌe siŶgle, oƌ 
married, or divorced. It depends on everything. So everything affects 
peŶsioŶs.  AŶd that͛s ǁhat ŵakes it so uŶeŶdiŶglǇ fasĐiŶatiŶg to ŵe … that 
to get peŶsioŶs poliĐǇ ƌight, Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t just thiŶk aďout peŶsioŶs. You͛ǀe got 
to think broadly. But what do we do in Government? I͛ŵ goiŶg to iŶǀeŶt a 
ǁoƌd heƌe … siloise. We doŶ͛t see people, ǁe see poliĐies. CoŵďiŶiŶg Đaƌe, 
the ageing society and long-term saving in one place could solve the 
problem, with joint ministers bridging the gaps. Think about your needs in 
retirement. We focus on income needs but what about care needs, and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 http://www.cps.org.uk/files/factsheets/original/150616121816-
ThecaseforanOfficeforIntergenerationalResponsibility.pdf?utm_source=Michael+Johnson+contacts&utm_cam
paign=bbea3fa3f8-pensionsminister&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d781b4fd08-bbea3fa3f8-303590773 
1029
 Generation Y: those born between c.1980 and 2000, i.e. aged between 15 and 35 in 2015, also referred to 
as ͚millennials͛. TheǇ aƌe pƌeĐeded ďǇ GeŶeƌatioŶ X ;eaƌlǇ ϭϵϲϬ͛s to ϭϵϳϵ ďiƌthsͿ. 
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what about the overlap between the two? Because presumably you need 
resources in retirement to live off and you need resources in retirement to 
meet your care needs, potentially. Do we have an integrated financial 
product for care and for pensions yet? Not in a meaningful way. Why not? 
Partly because we siloise.  
Many industry practitioners agree that a more joined up approach to pensions and long-
teƌŵ Đaƌe is a good idea. Foƌ eǆaŵple, DaƌƌeŶ Philp said: ͚What ǁe aƌe seeiŶg ŵoƌe aŶd 
more is a lack of a joined up strategy when it comes to pensions policy and more widely. 
You have got a number of Government departments which are responsible for various 
aspects – the TƌeasuƌǇ, the DWP, otheƌ ďodies like HM‘C, the FCA, the P‘A, TP‘, aŶd it͛s all 
in a bit of a muddle. I think that, ǁhile it͛s Ƌuite good to haǀe soŵe healthǇ teŶsioŶ ďetǁeeŶ 
diffeƌeŶt depaƌtŵeŶts ǁith diffeƌeŶt oďjeĐtiǀes, ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe seeiŶg is poliĐies that diƌeĐtlǇ 
contradict each other and things not pulling in the same direction. To take one example, a 
lot of work was done on collective DC and defined ambition. The next minute, they open the 
ǁhole ƌetiƌeŵeŶt fƌeedoŵ ŵaƌket ǁith the Budget ƌefoƌŵs. The tǁo doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ go haŶd iŶ 
hand. Collectivisation and individualism are two very distinct things. For me, we need a long-
teƌŵ stƌategǇ that joiŶs this up͛.  
Similarly, Malcolm McLean said: ͚I uŶdeƌstaŶd Weďď͛s fƌustƌatioŶ….I also uŶdeƌstaŶd ǁhat 
he means about working in silos. You speak to someone in the department and find out that 
they deal with one thing, but not with something else. I had an occasion to speak to the 
DWP about the state pension and had to speak to one person about the statements and the 
forecasts, somebody else about the qualifying conditions, somebody else about the new 
sĐheŵes͛. 
However, neither Mr Philp nor Mr McLean agree that overhauling governmental and 
regulatory structure is the best way to achieve more clarity and consistency. Philp saǇs: ͚The 
important thing is that when it comes to manifestoes and developing poliĐies, theǇ͛ƌe doŶe 
ǁithiŶ a ĐoheƌeŶt fƌaŵeǁoƌk aŶd oŶ the ďasis of eǀideŶĐe. That͛s oŶe of the ƌeasoŶs ǁhǇ 
ǁe͛ǀe said that it ǁould ďe good to haǀe aŶ iŶdepeŶdeŶt peŶsioŶs ďodǇ, like aŶ OFPEN, the 
Office of Pensions Responsibility, that analyses the evidence and holds the Government to 
aĐĐouŶt agaiŶst its stated oďjeĐtiǀes͛. 
MĐLeaŶ aƌgues that Weďď͛s suggestioŶ is iŵpƌaĐtiĐal: ͚To aĐhieǀe ǁhat he ǁaŶts, Ǉou ǁould 
have to have one department covering the entire operation of Government, which is just 
Ŷot pƌaĐtiĐal … The ďiggeƌ the depaƌtŵeŶt, the ŵoƌe it suďdiǀides doǁŶ. Oǀeƌ the Ǉeaƌs, I 
think people have recognised the overlap that pensions have with a whole raft of other 
things. Social care is coming into focus now as something that should be linked into it. But I 
doŶ͛t thiŶk Ǉou͛ll eǀeƌ get to a situatioŶ ǁheƌe Ǉou͛ll ďe aďle to saǇ ǁe haǀe eǀeƌǇthiŶg 
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confined into one department. It might be an aspiration, driven by some frustration about 
soŵe of his eǆpeƌieŶĐes, ďut I doŶ͛t thiŶk it͛s pƌaĐtiĐal to Đoǀeƌ eǀeƌǇthiŶg͛.1030  
Nigel WateƌsoŶ, the foƌŵeƌ shadoǁ PeŶsioŶs MiŶisteƌ, ǁhile aĐĐeptiŶg that ͚soŵe loŶg 
termism in pensions and savings policy is what is needed, and the stability that only a broad 
politiĐal ĐoŶseŶsus ĐaŶ deliǀeƌ͛, appears to be doubtful that a pensions commission is 
Ŷeeded: ͚CoŶtƌiďutioŶ leǀels ŵust iŶĐƌease; auto-escalation must also be in the frame. All 
the current talk about decumulation is pretty academic if we don't get up contribution 
levels. We don't need a pensioŶs ĐoŵŵissioŶ to tell us this!͛1031 
Lord David Willetts, the pension expert and former MP, also believes politicians will be 
reluctant to surrender control of certain aspects of pension policy, but was more supportive 
of the idea of a pensions commission having some role: 
I͛ǀe looked at this fƌoŵ tiŵe to tiŵe aŶd the faĐt is that the TƌeasuƌǇ is 
never going to relinquish the lead on tax decisions, so then the only option 
becomes [delegating pensions policy to the Treasury] and that would be a 
very peculiar arrangement. So I personally think that a Treasury and DWP 
shared responsibility is the best that we can hope for, given the nature of 
the pensions issue.  
I remember the original Turner commission on pensions and I thought that 
part of his effectiveness came from the way it assembled a large amount 
of data that hadŶ͛t ďeeŶ pƌopeƌlǇ ďƌought togetheƌ ďefoƌe. I thiŶk theƌe is 
a case for a long-term commission to provide material evidence so that 
Ǉou͛ǀe got a solid, aŶalǇtiĐal ďase, espeĐiallǇ as it is shaƌed aĐƌoss at least 
two Government departments.  
However, looking back now on my political career over 20 years, every 
aƌea that I͛ǀe ǁoƌked iŶ, the elite ǁisdoŵ has ďeeŶ ͞Take the politiĐiaŶs 
out of it, haŶd it oǀeƌ to a ĐoŵŵissioŶ͟. Voteƌs aĐtuallǇ eǆpeĐt ǁheŶ they 
vote to be changing the Government, theǇ doŶ͛t ǀote foƌ poǁeƌ to ďe 
ĐoŶtiŶuouslǇ iŶ the haŶds of a gƌoup of aƌŵ͛s-length commissioners. I 
doŶ͛t thiŶk that soŵehoǁ deĐisioŶs ǁoŶ͛t ďe takeŶ ďǇ eleĐted politiĐiaŶs – 
that͛s ǁhat a deŵoĐƌaĐǇ is.1032  
 
We support the idea of having a standing Pensions, Care and Savings Commission. Such a 
commission could be justified on any number of grounds as discussed above. But perhaps 
the simplest justification would be to help avoid in future the kind of problems that have 
                                                     
1030
 Reported in Louise Farrand (2015) Webb: End pensions silos and create a bigger department, Engaged 
Investor, 12 February. 
1031
 Nigel Waterson  (2015) A time for consolidation – ǁhǇ AltŵaŶŶ ŵust aǀoid ͚iŶitiatiǀe-itis͛, Professional 
Pensions, 27 May.  
1032
 Quoted in  Louise Farrand ;ϮϬϭϱͿ Daǀid Willetts: ͚Puƌe DC eŶds up ǁith too ŵuĐh ƌisk ďeiŶg ďoƌŶe ďǇ the 
iŶdiǀidual͛, PeŶsioŶs IŶsight, ϭϲ MaƌĐh. 
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eŵeƌged ǁith the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ ǁithout aŶǇ ĐoŶsultatioŶ ǁith 
industry, as raised in our interview panels: 
 ͚The Pension Commission had an evidence basis for its policy recommendation – 
auto-enrolment – namely, the success AE as a nudge in the US to increase DC 
savings. There was no evidence basis for ͞freedom and choice͛͟  ͚Even supporters of these proposals could not deny that they failed the test of 
having an impact and risk assessment. Further, they are a clear example of short-
term political populism at the expense of long-term stability͛.  ͚Failure by Government to put in place both success criteria – in particular, a 
defiŶitioŶ of  ͚ǁhat good outĐoŵes aƌe͛ – and methods of measuring and monitoring 
outcomes in response to the new flexibilities, resulting in a complete data vacuum͛  ͚Coupling of flexibility and choice which disregards any understanding about how 
real people choose͛  ͚Lack of member engagement – a disconnect between auto-enrolment at the front 
end and ͞freedom and choice͟ at the back end. Engagement is not necessary for AE 
– it is critical for ͞freedom and choice͟ to ǁoƌk͛  ͚Whoever does it, it is crucial to have information and discussions with employees in 
the workplace to engage them. A workplace visit is the holy grail but is not 
commercially viable in small companies. But smart electronic communications can 
replace face-to-face meetings. Communication, information, education, simplified 
advice are all needed for engagement. Pension Wise does not deliver this͛  ͚Adequate financial education not in place for Flexiday; for example, most people are 
incapable of converting a lump sum into an income equivalent, believing that 
£ϱϬ,ϬϬϬ is a ͚laƌge͛ luŵp suŵ, ǁheŶ it is oŶlǇ oŶe thiƌd of the ǀalue of the Ŷeǁ 
single-tier state pension of £8,000 p.a.͛  ͚Failure to put guided pathways with defaults in place for Flexiday͛  ͚No clarity on charge structures, unlike auto-enrolment͛  ͚Insufficient protection in place for consumers who are at risk of mis-selliŶg oƌ ͚ƌip 
off͛ Đhaƌges͛  ͚Failure to understand that safeguards only work if people are engaged and 
understand the risks͛   ͚Failure to recognise the likelihood of scams – criminals can now directly target 
individuals who can readily be fooled (even if they are also generally smart). The 
Insurance Fraud Taskforce has noticed that the criminals involved with trips & slips, 
whiplash and the claim management companies (dealing with PPI) have moved to 
peŶsioŶ liďeƌatioŶ. You doŶ͛t aĐtuallǇ haǀe to ďe a ĐƌiŵiŶal, just soŵeoŶe ǁho 
recommends an unsuitable investment. Fraud might actually fall, because it is legal 
to promote high risk investments. But people will face cliff edge outcomes – either 
the investment performs very well, or you lose everything. The worst case would be 
to lose the entire pot and then have to pay tax on this͛ 
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 ͚No impact assessment on additional state spending if people spend all their money͛  ͚Failure to deal with the overarching need to encourage more saving͛  ͚Failure to recognise the consequences of ͞freedom and choice͟ for employers and 
their retirement management policy͛  ͚Failure to recognise the long-term consequences for occupational pension provision 
of the reduction in tax breaks – it reduces the incentive for employers to set up a 
pension scheme. Directors can no longer see a benefit in setting up a pension 
scheme, since they do not benefit as much as in the past. Lower income people just 
want the pot and not a pension. A whole range of people with higher incomes are 
likely to find themselves with considerably poorer pension arrangements than the 
baby boom generation͛  ͚Failure to recognise the complete lack of engagement by small employers͛  ͚Pensions are now just a savings product, so why not outsource the whole lot?͛ 
In short, there is no longer a coherent national narrative about what pensions are for, just a 
lot of noise around a series of short-term policy initiatives. This prompted the following 
remarks from our interviewees: 
 ͚What are we trying to achieve with pensions – there is no narrative?͛  ͚People want access to cash – more than ever now. Why? Because there are no well-
established social/cultural norms about what to do at retirement͛  ͚We need a consensus – to get people to understand that pensions are there to 
provide an income and people still need an income in retirement. The worst thing 
would be for the lump sum to become the norm͛  ͚We are a long way from establishing good social norms and cultures in 
decumulation͛  ͚There is a complete lack of legislative and regulatory clarity͛  ͚Trustees are reluctant to help members – far too risky. Trustees are concerned 
aďout gettiŶg iŶǀolǀed due to the ƌegulatoƌǇ ǀaĐuuŵ. TheǇ ĐaŶ͛t do the ƌight thiŶg iŶ 
Đase theǇ get sued. TheǇ ĐaŶ͛t offeƌ sĐheŵe dƌaǁdoǁŶ ǁithout eŵploǇeƌ appƌoǀal – 
ǁhiĐh theǇ ǁoŶ͛t get͛  ͚What will IGCs do to encourage engagement and participation?͛  ͚Why would anyone bring a product to market at the present time? The reforms 
were horribly rushed – regulated providers will bring more products online in time, 
but the pension industry was not set up to deliver such freedoms, so the danger is 
that people will go elsewhere. This is the biggest short term danger͛  ͚There is no clear differentiation between regulated and unregulated businesses. In 
recent years, regulated businesses have improved capital adequacy, professionalism 
and reporting, so there is now a growing gap with unregulated businesses͛  ͚What is tax relief trying to achieve?͛ 
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The pension reforms that followed the 2014 Budget would not be the first example of what 
Anthony King and Ivor Crewe Đalled ͚Đultuƌal disĐoŶŶeĐt͛ iŶ theiƌ ƌeĐeŶt ďook The Blunders 
of Our Governments.1033 By this they meant a set of assumptions that look obvious to well-
educated, middle-class politicians and officials but which collapse when tested in the real 
world. Perhaps the most famous example of cultural disconnect is the poll tax. King and 
Crewe argue that: ͚The ŵaŶ iŶ Whitehall Ŷot oŶlǇ did Ŷot kŶoǁ ďest; he did Ŷot kŶoǁ that 
he did Ŷot kŶoǁ that ǁhiĐh he ďadlǇ Ŷeeded to kŶoǁ͛. “iŶĐe all the ŵeŶ iŶ Whitehall paid 
their taxes, they assumed that everyone would too. The warning cry from a junior official 
͚TƌǇ ĐolleĐtiŶg it iŶ BƌiǆtoŶ͛ ǁeŶt uŶheeded. The ŵiŶisteƌ suďseƋueŶtlǇ ďƌought iŶ to Đleaƌ 
up the mess said: ͚It Ŷeeded eǆĐeptioŶallǇ cleǀeƌ people to pƌoduĐe aŶǇthiŶg so stupid͛.1034  
The people who conceived the ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛ regime appear to have very little 
understanding of longevity risk. We were told at the time that the only piece of information 
that people need to be aware of is their life expectancy. Yet around 50% of 65-year olds will 
live beyond their life expectancy, often by many years.  
A new type of commission is needed to reduce the risk of anything like this happening again. 
 
7.6 Contributing to a national narrative 5: The pension tax system and the level of pension 
savings 
The fifth contribution needs to come from the pension tax regime and the level of pension 
savings it encourages.  
7.6.1 The original system of pension taxation1035 
The system of pension taxation in the UK used to be fairly straightforward. It was based on 
the exempt-exempt,-taxed (EET) framework:1036  
 Exempt – the pension contributions by individuals and employers receive tax relief 
and employer contributions are exempt from national insurance contributions  Exempt – no tax is charged on investment growth from pension contributions, and   Taxed – pensions in payment are taxed as other income, but individuals are able to 
take up to 25% of their pension fund as a lump sum on retirement. 
                                                     
1033
 Anthony King and Ivor Crewe (2014) The Blunders of Our Governments, Oneworld Publications, London. 
1034
 Other blunders discussed by King and Crewe include: the reforms that led to pensions mis-selling in the 
1980s, entry into the Exchange Rate Mechanism, Individual Learning Accounts, the Millennium Dome, the 
Assets Recovery Agency, the Child Support Agency, changes to the insurance industry that led to payment 
protection insurance mis-selling, and the failed National Health Service data base. 
1035
 The appendix to this Chapter shows how the system of  pensions tax relief has developed since A-Day in 
2006. 
1036
 HM Treasury (2010) Removing the Requirement to Annuitise by Age 75, July, para 2.3. 
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The 2010 Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government introduced a set of five 
pension taxation principles consistent with the EET framework:1037  
1. The purpose of tax-relieved pension saving is to provide an income in retirement.1038  
2. Any changes to the pensions tax rules should not incur Exchequer cost and should 
not create any opportunities for tax avoidance.  
3. Individuals should have the flexibility to decide when and how best to turn their 
pension savings into a retirement income, provided that they have sufficient income 
to avoid exhausting savings prematurely and fall back on the state.  
4. In line with the EET ŵodel, peŶsioŶ ďeŶefits takeŶ duƌiŶg aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s lifetiŵe 
should be taxed at income tax rates. The tax-free pension commencement lump sum 
will continue to be available.  
5. On death, pension savings that have been accumulated with tax relief should be 
taxed at an appropriate rate to recover past relief given, unless they are used to 
provide a pension for a dependant. 
The EET framework provides generous tax incentives to save for a pension and is also 
designed to be broadly tax neutral over the life cycle. The tax relief that is granted during 
the accumulation phase of a pension scheme is reclaimed when the pension is taxed during 
the decumulation phase, so that the same income is not taxed twice. This recognises a long-
standing principle of taxation in the UK, namely that tax relief is given at the same marginal 
rate as income is taxed. There is an anomaly in that 25% of the pension pot can be taken as 
a tax-free lump sum. But broadly speaking, the EET system is generally regarded as fair at 
the level of the individual. 
While the EET system might be broadly fair in the sense of being tax neutral over an 
iŶdiǀidual͛s life ĐǇĐle, it Ŷeǀeƌtheless faǀouƌs higheƌ ƌate taǆ paǇeƌs at the eǆpeŶse of 
standard rate tax payers, and especially those who are higher rate tax payers in work and 
only basic rate tax payers in retirement. In 2013-14, the total cost to HM Treasury of 
pension tax relief was £34.3bn (although around £13.1bn was offset by income tax 
deducted from pension payments).1039 A 2013 study by the Pensions Policy Institute1040 
showed that around 20% of tax relief was paid to additional rate taxpayers, who make up 
only 1% of UK taxpayers. Some 80% of UK taxpayers pay the basic rate of income tax but 
ďeŶefit fƌoŵ oŶlǇ Ϯϱ% of the taǆ ƌelief oŶ peŶsioŶs͛. The PPI ƌepoƌt states that ͚theƌe aƌe 
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 HM Treasury (2010) Removing the Requirement to Annuitise by Age 75, July. 
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 Not a lump sum. 
1039
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/463101/September_2015_P
ensions_publication.pdf (see PEN6) 
1040
 Melissa Echalier, John Adams, Daniel Redwood and Chris Curry (2013) Tax Relief for Pension Saving in the 
UK, Pensions Policy Institute. 
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concerns that tax relief is expensive, poorly targeted and does not achieve its policy 
oďjeĐtiǀes͛.1041  
7.6.2 The new system of pension taxation 
The pension reforms, introduced by the 2014 Budget, ended the requirement to annuitise 
pension wealth – the fundamental rationale of a pension scheme. Further, the 2014 
Taxation of Pensions Act which – by ending the 55% tax charge on pension death benefits if 
the member dies before 75 –  allowed pension assets to become inheritable. Both these 
measures have completely distorted the EET model and bring into question the whole 
system of very generous tax relief currently granted to pension savings and investment.1042   
Tom McPhail, head of pensions research at Hargreaves Lansdown, believes the current 
sǇsteŵ is Ŷoǁ ͚iŶ a Đoŵplete ŵess͛. He said the fiǀe pƌiŶĐiples of peŶsioŶ taǆatioŶ 
introduced in 2010 – in particular that a pension should be for retirement income and the 
state would reclaim tax benefits on death –  had ďeeŶ ͚toƌŶ up͛ ďǇ the Government that 
introduced them in the space of one parliament.1043  
The abolition of the 55% tax charge on pension death benefits has conferred massive tax 
benefits on a small group of very wealthy people.1044 They received tax relief on pension 
contributions and investment returns at the highest marginal rate in the accumulation stage 
and will be able to transfer those benefits tax free to their descendants if they die before 75. 
JohŶ ‘alfe͛s letteƌ to the FiŶaŶĐial Tiŵes of ϴ OĐtoďeƌ ϮϬϭϰ stated: ͚the…Government has 
created a simple way for the richest to avoid paying income tax and pass on wealth tax free 
to theiƌ gƌaŶdĐhildƌeŶ͛. AŶdǇ Jaŵes, head of ƌetiƌeŵeŶt plaŶŶiŶg at ToǁƌǇ, said ͚The Ŷeǁ 
regime will bring pensions into overall inheritance planning for wealthy people. You can pay 
the maximum into a pension, currently £1.25m, and it could pass down the generations tax 
fƌee….“adlǇ, the ĐhaŶges to the taǆ Đhaƌges oŶ death foƌ peŶsioŶs ǁill Ŷot help those who 
aƌe still stƌuggliŶg to ďuild up suffiĐieŶt fuŶds to paǇ foƌ theiƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛.1045  
The ending of the 55% tax charge will have further serious unintended consequences as 
Cƌaig BeƌƌǇ poiŶts out: ͚At the ŵoŵeŶt, people aƌe ƌightlǇ aďle to ďeƋueath DC pensions 
pots when they die. But those inheriting these pots are, rightly, heavily taxed when they do, 
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 The ƌepoƌt goes oŶ to ĐoŶsideƌ soŵe alteƌŶatiǀes to the ĐuƌƌeŶt sǇsteŵ, suĐh as ͚ĐhaŶges to the taǆ-free 
luŵp suŵ aŶd usiŶg siŶgle ƌates of taǆ ƌelief ƌatheƌ thaŶ ƌelief giǀeŶ at the saǀeƌ͛s ŵaƌgiŶal ƌate͛. 
1042
 The appendix to this Chapter shows how pensions tax relief restrictions have developed since A-Day in 
2006. 
1043 Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) Govt must clean up pension tax mess and scrap LTA - Tom McPhail, 
Professional Adviser, 5 June.  
1044
 The 55% rate was set to recover the tax relief that a 40% tax payer received on contributions and 
investment returns during the accumulation phase of a pension scheme, taking account of the 25% tax free 
lump sum. This rate therefore made a pension scheme tax neutral over a higher-ƌate taǆ paǇeƌ͛s life ĐǇĐle.  
1045 
Reported in Josephine Cumbo, Alistair Gray and George Parker (2014) UK pension death tax abolition seen 
as benefiting the wealthy, Financial Times, 29 September. 
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reflecting the significant tax relief that supported the savings being accrued in the first 
place. From now on, however, these restrictions will be virtually abolished. This has two 
immediate implications. Firstly, it further biases the pensions tax relief system towards the 
wealthiest savers, that is, those likely to leave inheritable pots behind. Secondly, and most 
importantly in terms of the economics of pensions provision, it means individuals will be 
eŶĐouƌaged to keep theiƌ saǀiŶgs iŶǀested iŶ theiƌ peŶsioŶs sĐheŵe. … IŶ faĐt, Ŷot oŶlǇ is 
annuitisation no longer compulsory, for the wealthiest savers, it is now being significantly 
disincentivised. This brings us to the crux of the matter, and the most important long-term 
implication: all of this makes annuities more expensive. If insurance companies cannot rely 
on a steady stream of wealthy retirees buying annuities, they lose scale efficiences, and will 
have to make their products more expensive for the mass market. In two swift strokes, 
auto-enrolment begins to unravel. The historic compromise that led to DC pensions being 
uŶiǀeƌsalised has ďeeŶ hugelǇ uŶdeƌŵiŶed.….. The oŶlǇ ǁaǇ that ͞oƌdiŶaƌǇ saǀeƌs͟ aƌe goiŶg 
to be affected by this is that they are going to have to pay more to get those annuities. In 
shoƌt, theǇ ǁill ďe ĐoŶsideƌaďlǇ ǁoƌse off͛.1046 
Tom McPhail agrees that the abolition of the tax charge has reduced the attraction of 
aŶŶuities: ͚The whole direction of government policy is going against allowing retirees to 
benefit from mortality cross-subsidy, 1047  which is one of the most valuable and 
economically-sound factors that can influence their retirement outcomes. The mortality 
cross-subsidy is a highly efficient way of maximising your retirement income. The current 
direction of policy is significantly undermining the stability of the pension system. I feel 
uncomfortable at the way the Treasury has suggested 18m people in DB schemes will be 
able to benefit from the new freedoms. That is an irresponsible attitude. People will want to 
transfer out and schemes will collude with them on this. They will offer maybe 95 per cent 
of the value of benefits, and people will take them up on it. I think it is cynical on the part of 
the Government to positioŶ this iŶ this ǁaǇ͛. 1048 
Natalie Holt, editor of Money Marketing, argues that the new regime provides a clear 
iŶĐeŶtiǀe to ƌeduĐe iŶheƌitaŶĐe taǆ: ͚Wheƌeas pƌeǀiouslǇ peŶsioŶs ǁeƌe aďout pƌoǀidiŶg foƌ 
savers in theiƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt, theǇ ŵaǇ Ŷoǁ ďe aďout shelteƌiŶg assets ďeǇoŶd the peƌsoŶ͛s 
lifetiŵe͛.1049 AĐĐoƌdiŶg to Chƌis Maƌshall, teĐhŶiĐal offiĐeƌ at HoƌŶďuĐkle, ͚the ĐhaŶge to IHT 
proposed by the Conservatives [which raises the threshold on primary homes to £1m] will 
disproportionately benefit the well-off (IHT currently affects only 8% of estates, and, 
according to the Institute of Fiscal Studies, the changes would mean limiting it to the top 
6%), [whereas] the theme of changes to pension tax relief since 2009 has been to reduce 
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 Craig Berry (2014), Pensions: End of the road foƌ ͚auto-eŶƌolŵeŶt͛ ďusiŶess ŵodel?, ϯϬ  “epteŵďeƌ;  
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the cost to the taxpayer by getting those at the top of the income ladder to pay for it, or at 
least to limit the amount they save into pensions, and thereby decrease how much tax relief 
theǇ get͛.1050 
Nevertheless, inheritance planning cannot be explicitly used to avoid paying inheritance tax 
oŶ peŶsioŶ assets. As MiĐhelle MĐGagh states: ͚peŶsioŶs aƌe Ŷoǁ ďeiŶg seeŶ as a ǁaǇ to 
pass on money to the next generation tax efficiently. This means wealthier pensioners who 
do not need their pensions to live on can ring-fence their savings for their family. However, 
there is a concern that HMRC will not look kindly on those it believes are gaming the 
sǇsteŵ͛.1051 For example, if someone makes extra large contributions or consolidates a 
Ŷuŵďeƌ of peŶsioŶs aŶd theŶ dies ǁithiŶ tǁo Ǉeaƌs, HM‘C Đould ǀieǁ uŶdeƌ the ͚dispositioŶ 
of assets͛ ƌules aŶd leǀǇ IHT if it ďelieǀes iŶdiǀiduals aƌe usiŶg peŶsioŶs to shelteƌ ŵoŶey.   
In the Autumn Statement in November 2015, the Treasury clarified the situation. It said it 
would legislate to ensure an IHT liability will not arise when a pension scheme member 
designates funds for drawdown, but does not draw all of the funds before death, with the 
change backdated to apply to deaths on or after 6 April 2011. 
7.6.3  What is the role if any of pension taxation relief? 
Now that there is no requirement to annuitise, one of the original justifications for providing 
tax relief has gone. A pension scheme is now no more than a wealth accumulation scheme. 
That raises some fundamental questions. Why should tax payers subsidise pensioners 
buying Lamborghinis or transferring their pension wealth to their grandchildren? It is still 
possible to make the regime tax neutral, but why bother in the first place? These questions 
have prompted renewed interest in the role of pension tax relief since the introduction of 
͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛. 
In March 2015, the ACA published a consultation paper, Creating a Sustainable Pensions Tax 
Framework, which called on all political parties to cooperate with industry in a fundamental 
review of pension taxation that will lead to a sustainable pension taxation system that can 
be readily understood and can properly incentivise retirement savings.
1052
 The ACA said it 
had significant concerns that further reductions will be made to pension tax relief whichever 
party or parties form the next Government and that the changes will be placed on an 
already overly complex system.  
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The papeƌ͛s ŵaiŶ ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs aƌe: 
 Theƌe should ďe Ŷo ͚kŶee jeƌk͛ ĐhaŶges to the peŶsioŶ taǆatioŶ sǇsteŵ afteƌ the 
General Election. The ACA notes that even a reduction in the Lifetime Allowance 
(LTA) might look a simple change – but it brings a new range of individuals into a 
poteŶtiallǇ Đoŵpleǆ Ŷet aŶd Đƌeates a Ŷeǁ ͚pƌoteĐted Đase͛ foƌ sĐheŵes to haǀe to 
deal with – so its impact should not be underestimated  The next Government should initiate a fundamental cross-party review of the 
pension taxation system working closely with employers, pension providers, 
consultants and administration providers to ensure the new system is practical  The review should ensure that full details of the current reliefs, and their distribution 
between various constituencies, are understood  Changes to pension taxation should have cross-party support so that any new 
framework can endure  Any new framework should be given an appropriate lead time so that those who 
manage schemes can change systems appropriately and employers and individuals 
can plan properly for any new change  Once in place the new framework should not have any changes made to it for many 
years. 
The ACA argues that any significant reduction to the amount of tax relief granted on 
contributions could lead to a withdrawal from pension savings which is counter to recent 
government policies, such as auto-enrolment, which are designed to encourage greater 
participation. It believes that complexity results in individuals being put off saving for 
retirement, employers are deterred from establishing and maintaining pension schemes 
beyond the minimum enforced by auto-enrolment, and, for individuals who do save 
diligently (and for employers supporting this), the costs of ensuring compliance with current 
tax law means ultimately that there is less money available for retirement savings. 
The tax system could also be used to provide appropriate incentives. An example of this 
would be to scrap stamp duty for older people to help them move out of under-occupied 
homes, a proposal made by Legal & General in June 2015. 
The insurer has published a report called Free up Housing Stock – Report into the Last Time 
Buyer Market.1053 The ƌepoƌt foĐuses oŶ ͚last-tiŵe ďuǇeƌs͛ ;LTBsͿ, those aged oǀeƌ ϱϱ ǁho 
are sitting on housing wealth of £820 billion that is forecast to increase to £1.2 trillion by 
2020. It estimates that 5.3 million last-time buyers live in under-occupied homes with 7.7 
million spare bedrooms, equivalent to 2.6 million family homes. However, 3.3 million last-
time buyers want to downsize, typically from a four-bed to a two-bed property. While a 
third of older people considered downsizing in the last five years, only 7% did so. This has 
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had the effect of stalling the property market as younger families can neither find nor afford 
suitably large homes. To get around this, L&G believes LTBs should be offered tax breaks, 
suĐh as sĐƌappiŶg staŵp dutǇ ͚to iŶĐeŶtiǀise ƌight-siziŶg͛ aŶd to eŶĐouƌage people to sell 
their home and downsize in later life, freeing up family-size properties for younger 
generations.  
L&G also ǁaŶts to deal ǁith the ͚ĐhƌoŶiĐ uŶdeƌsupplǇ of age-speĐifiĐ housiŶg͛, giǀeŶ that 
just Ϯ% of the UK͛s housiŶg stoĐk is Đlassified as ƌetiƌeŵeŶt housiŶg. AŶotheƌ pƌoďleŵ is that 
the majority of the retirement properties available in the UK are sold on a leasehold basis 
ǁhiĐh ǁill Ŷot ďe attƌaĐtiǀe to ŵaŶǇ ďuǇeƌs. The ƌepoƌt saǇs: ͚[We Ŷeed] iŶĐƌeased ǀoluŵes 
of homes across all tenures, including freehold, shared equity and rented options, [that] 
would allow the system to cateƌ to a ǁideƌ ǀaƌietǇ of Ŷeeds aŶd offeƌ fleǆiďilitǇ as people͛s 
Ŷeeds ĐhaŶge iŶ lateƌ life͛. The ƌepoƌt ǁould also like to see a laƌgeƌ ͚Ŷeǁ hoŵes ďoŶus͛ 
given to those buying retirement-speĐifiĐ pƌopeƌtǇ oƌ a ͚ĐouŶĐil taǆ holidaǇ foƌ Ŷeǁ 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt hoŵes͛ for the first three years.  
L&G has set out a 10-point plan to make downsizing easier. Its recommendations are: 
 Government to support provision of age-specific housing  Housing connected with infrastructure, social and health systems  Retirement housing shouldn't just be leasehold properties  More mid-market supply on top of affordable housing  Public policy should support urban locations for retirement villages  Greater tax reliefs to encourage downsizing  Consolidate benefits, which influence retirement housing  Planning authorities should standardise approaches  Remove development levies imposed by planning system  Government should encourage use of equity release.  
Nigel WilsoŶ, Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe of L&G, said: ͚HelpiŶg ǇouŶg people to get oŶto the housiŶg 
ladder through initiatives like Help-to-Buy is important, but enabling older people to realise 
their downsizing dreams could have a far greater impact in terms of unlocking family 
housiŶg stoĐk foƌ people to ďuǇ͛.1054  
Michael Johnson, in a report entitled Who Will Care for Generation Y?, published by the 
Centre for Policy Studies in June 2015, again considers the question of intergenerational 
fairness.1055 He estimates the size of the tax burden being passed to the next generation.  
His calculations show that the gap ďetǁeeŶ the UK͛s liaďilities and assets grew by an 
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͚uŶsustaiŶaďle͛ 51% in the five years to end-March 2014, to £1,852 billion. At 111% of GDP, 
this is equivalent to £70,000 per household. If the state pension, the largest of all unfunded 
liabilities (roughly £4,000 billion) is included, the burden per household rises to £221,000.  
The report warns that Generation Y could be the first generation to experience a quality of 
life below that of its (baby boomer) parents.  
Mr Johnson comments: ͚Baby boomers have become masters at perpetrating inter-
generational injustice, by making vast unfunded promises to themselves, notably in respect 
of pensions. Indeed, such is their scale that if the UK were accounted for as a public 
company, it would be bust. In any eǀeŶt, GeŶeƌatioŶ Y ǁill haǀe to foot the ďill.… ‘eiŶiŶg 
back on unfunded promises means either stop making them, or fund them now, which 
ǁould ƌeƋuiƌe higheƌ taǆatioŶ ;oƌ additioŶal Đuts iŶ puďliĐ speŶdiŶgͿ͛. 
 
To improve transparency and put a brake on deferring costs, the report outlines six 
proposals: 
1. The UK͛s Whole of GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt AĐĐouŶts ;WGAͿ ďalaŶĐe sheet should iŶĐlude a 
liability to represent future State Pension payments [which they currently do not 
do], based upon a realistic expectation of the future cash outflow, discounted using 
the UK gilt yield curve. 
2. Draft legislation which, if implemented, would produce unfunded spending 
commitments, should be accompanied by an Inter-generational Impact Assessment 
to quantify the impact on the young, i.e., future taxpayers.  
3. An Office of Fiscal Responsibility should be established, under the aegis of the 
Chancellor, to scrutinise the effectiveness and value for money of all tax reliefs and 
exemptions. 
4. All tax reliefs and exemptions should be subject to a five year sunset clause, after 
which they would cease. Lobbyists should be requested to present their cases 
directly to the proposed Office of Fiscal Responsibility, to ensure blue water between 
vested interest groups and ministers. 
5. Departmental budgets should be set both gross and net of expenditure on tax reliefs 
and exemptions, to ensure transparency as to the true level of financial support to 
each area of public policy. 
6. The Prime Minister should embellish his doctrine of personal, professional, civic and 
corporate responsibilities by adding a fifth category: inter-generational 
responsibility. 
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In October 2015, Michael Johnson published another Centre for Policy Studies report 
entitled An ISA-Centric Savings World, in which he proposed replacing the EET pension tax 
system with one similar to the TEE system of ISAs.1056 In particular, he proposed that: 
 All income tax and National Insurance Contributions (NICs) relief on pensions 
contributions be scrapped, to be replaced by a more redistributive 50p Treasury 
incentive per post-tax £1 saved. This should be paid irrespective of the savers tax-
paying status, thereby nailing the conundrum that because income tax is 
progressive, tax relief is inevitably regressive.  A 50p incentive would significantly 
help ƌealise the PeŶsioŶ CoŵŵissioŶ͛s ǀisioŶ foƌ ŵediaŶ eaƌŶeƌs to haǀe a tǁo-thirds 
total combined earnings replacement rate.  Employer contributions, taxed as employee income but eligible for the Treasury 
incentive, would be paid into a Workplace ISA, operating within the auto-enrolment 
arena. Withdrawals would not be permitted until the age of 60, thereby trapping the 
incentive, along with income and net capital gains. Thereafter, they would be, 
ideally, tax-free.  Auto-enrolled employee contributions, paid post-tax but attracting the Treasury 
iŶĐeŶtiǀe, ǁould go iŶto aŶ eŵploǇee͛s Lifetiŵe I“A.  The Workplace ISA and Lifetime ISA could reside within an ISA warehouse, alongside 
other segregated ISA cells dedicated to specific saving purposes (Help-to-Buy, long-
term care, etc.). The ISA warehouse could become a universal, all-purpose savings 
vehicle to serve everyone from cradle to grave. Simplicity to the fore.  Each ISA cell would have its own (tax-based) incentives and deterrents, to reflect 
prevailing policy objectives. They would share a modest annual allowance, such as 
£8,000, subject to Treasury modelling confirmation. A smaller incentive, for example, 
could accommodate a higher annual allowance. 
The report introduced the idea of an ISA Pension, secured with Workplace ISA assets, from 
the age of 60.  Mƌ JohŶsoŶ aƌgues: ͚The pƌiŵaƌǇ dƌiǀeƌ foƌ ŵoǀiŶg fƌoŵ peŶsioŶs͛ EET 
framework to the TEE world of ISAs is the inflexibility of pension savings prior to 55. This is 
at odds with how those in Generation Y, in particular, are living their lives. Many eschew 
pension saving, thereby missing out on tax relief, but engagement with ISAs is high. Ready 
access and flexibility is valued above tax relief: EET is patently failing the next generation. In 
addition, a single TEE tax framework for savings would represent a marked simplification of 
the savings arena. ..Given the individual and societal benefits of annuitisation, a Treasury-
funded inducement should be considered, such as a 25% income uplift. Indeed, this 
appƌoaĐh Đould ďe eǆteŶded to todaǇ͛s I“A suite.  Participation would be optional, 
ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith ϮϬϭϰ͛s peŶsioŶs͛ liďeƌalisatioŶ͛.  He desĐƌiďed the ĐuƌƌeŶt sǇsteŵ peŶsioŶ 
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tax ƌelief as ͚eǆpeŶsiǀe, iŶĐoŵpatiďle, iŶeƋuitaďle, illogiĐal, iŶĐoŵpƌeheŶsiďle aŶd, ĐƌuĐiallǇ, 
aŶ iŶeffeĐtiǀe use of TƌeasuƌǇ fuŶds͛.  ͹.͸.Ͷ The Governmentǯs consultation  
The newly elected Conservative Government released a consultation paper on pension 
taxation in July 2015.1057 The consultation will examine whether there is a case for 
overhauling the current EET system of tax relief, where relief is given on contributions and 
investment income but the benefits on retirement are taxed. 
The Government said the key principles any reform should meet are: 
 It should be simple and transparent. The Government said it believes that greater 
simplicity and transparency may encourage greater engagement with pension saving 
and strengthen the incentive for individuals to save into a pension  It should allow individuals to take personal responsibility for ensuring they have 
adequate savings for retirement. It should encourage people to save enough during 
their working lives to meet their aspirations for a sufficient standard of living in 
retirement  It should build on the early success of automatic enrolment in encouraging new 
people to save more  It should be sustainable. Any proposal for reform should also be in line with the 
Government's long-term fiscal strategy. 
One option to be examined is bringing the tax treatment of pensions into line with ISAs (i.e., 
replacing the EET system with a TEE system) along the lines proposed by Michael Johnson 
who has estimated that such a move could save the Government £10bn a year. In launching 
the consultation in the Budget on 8 July 2015, the Chancellor, George Osborne, said: 
͚PeŶsioŶs Đould ďe taǆed like I“As. You paǇ iŶ fƌoŵ taǆed iŶĐoŵe – aŶd it͛s taǆ fƌee ǁheŶ 
you take it out. And in-between it receives a top-up from the Government. This idea, and 
others like it, need careful and public consideration before we take any steps. So I am today 
publishing a green paper that asks questions, invites views, and takes care not to pre-judge 
the answer. Our goal is clear: we want to move from an economy built on debt to an 
economy built on the more secure and productive foundations of saving and long- term 
iŶǀestŵeŶt͛. 
The idea of having a consultation was welcomed by industry. For example, Hugh Nolan, 
chief actuary at JLT Employee Benefits, said ͚We ǁelĐoŵe aŶǇ geŶuiŶe ĐoŶsultatioŶ to put 
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pensions onto a sound footing for the future, recognising that it's just one form of overall 
saǀiŶg͛.1058  
However, the proposal to tax pensions like ISAs was criticised in some quarters. An early 
critic was the Pensions Minister Ros Altmann who said ͚a peŶsioŶ is Ŷot aŶ I“A͛ aŶd a sǁitĐh 
Đould ďe ͚daŶgeƌous͛ foƌ ƌetiƌees, ĐlaiŵiŶg peŶsioŶs uŶdeƌ the Ŷeǁ ƌegiŵe ǁould ďe ͚too 
easǇ to speŶd too sooŶ͛.  “he said: ͚I do feaƌ that ŵakiŶg peŶsioŶ ǁithdƌaǁals taǆ free at a 
relatively young age (60s and 70s is not old these days) offers dangerous incentives to stop 
locking the money in for later life. Policy must be mindful of offering the right incentives not 
the ǁƌoŶg oŶes….Just saǀiŶg fƌoŵ taǆed iŶĐoŵe isŶ͛t attƌaĐtiǀe…It͛s iŵpoƌtaŶt to eŶsuƌe 
ŵoŶeǇ is kept iŶ peŶsioŶs foƌ loŶgeƌ͛. UŶdeƌ Mƌ JohŶsoŶ͛s pƌoposed fƌaŵeǁoƌk, eŵploǇeƌ 
contributions would be locked in until retirement, while only the employee contributions 
would be accessible at any time. 1059 Another critic was Steve Webb, the previous Pensions 
Minister. He argued that a move to pension ISAs ǁould ďe a ͚fallaĐǇ͛ aŶd a huge step iŶto 
the uŶkŶoǁŶ͛ ǁhiĐh could undermine long-teƌŵ saǀiŶg: ͚The taǆatioŶ of peŶsioŶ iŶĐoŵes 
pƌoǀides a ͞ďƌake͟ oŶ the LaŵďoƌghiŶi. Having to pay tax makes you think twice about 
ǁithdƌaǁiŶg the lot iŶ oŶe go; if peŶsioŶs aƌe taǆ fƌee, ǁhat ǁould hold Ǉou ďaĐk?͛1060  
A number of providers, asset managers and advisers have also come out against the 
proposal, claiming it would damage the savings culture: 
 Zurich said that, according to a survey it conducted, tax relief on contributions is the 
most powerful way to incentivise people to save for retirement, with more than two-
thirds of over-55s surveyed agreeing with this. Gary Shaughnessy, chief executive of 
)uƌiĐh UK Life, said: ͚A ŵoǀe to I“A-style pensions could reverse the early success of 
auto-enrolment. If individuals are taxed on employer contributions, there is a very 
real concern that they would opt out to avoid a hit on their take-hoŵe paǇ͛.  Royal London CEO, Phil Loney, believes savers would not trust the system, concerned 
that the Government would have changed its mind about offering tax-free cash by 
the time it comes to their retirement.  Axa Wealth head of retirement planning, Andy Zanelli, argued that the proposals 
would lead to more people taking out accessible savings products and drawing their 
cash before retirement and hence running out of money. He said: ͚If you are trying 
to address the savings issue by allowing them to put money into something 
aĐĐessiďle it ǁoŶ͛t ǁoƌk. It͛s ĐouŶteƌpƌoduĐtiǀe. If I“As aŶd peŶsioŶs do the saŵe 
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thing people might promote the ISA in place of the pension. People would be 
teŵpted to dƌaǁ ŵoŶeǇ iŶ tiŵes of a ͞Đƌisis͟ aŶd eǀeƌǇďodǇ defiŶes ͞Đƌisis͟ 
differently. If there is one allowance for both products nobody would go for the 
peŶsioŶ͛. 1061  Aviva published research which said that two-thirds of companies believe that a shift 
to an ISA system would lead to employees saving less into their pension.  AllianceBernstein said a move to an ISA-stǇle sǇsteŵ ͚ǁould ƌepƌeseŶt suĐh a 
significant shift as to undermine long-term confidence in the robustness of pensions 
– savers would lack confidence in locking their money up in a system which could 
poteŶtiallǇ ĐhaŶge the taǆ tƌeatŵeŶt ǁithout pƌioƌ ŶotiĐe͛. Fuƌtheƌ, it ǁould Ŷot 
iŵpƌoǀe the iŶĐeŶtiǀe to saǀe, ďut iŶstead ŵake it ͚ĐoŶsideƌaďlǇ ŵoƌe Đoŵpleǆ͛ foƌ 
employees currently paying a higheƌ ƌate of taǆ, aŶd ǁould ďe ͚highlǇ ĐostlǇ͛ to 
introduce across the industry.1062  A survey of 170 advisers by A J Bell found that there was only 4% support for ISA 
style pensions, with 59% saying they did not think the pension tax relief system 
needs to change.  Almost half of advisers – 42% – thought it is right that tax relief is received at the 
rate tax is paid, while 40% said there has been enough change and a period of 
stability is required. Only a third of the advisers questioned said they would like to 
see a flat rate incentive, the majority of which supported one set at 30%, in between 
the basic rate of 20% and the higher rates of 40%-45%. About 8% favoured a system 
of matching Government contributions on a two for one basis.1063 
Zurich, AXA and Aviva agree that the pension tax system should be simplified rather than 
unified with ISA tax relief. They propose that the Government introduces a flat rate tax relief 
of 33%  – a £1 top-up to their pension for every £2 saved – and removes the current £1.25m 
lifetime allowance. 1064   
The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) has argued that ending tax relief on 
contributions by switching from EET to TEE would not necessarily save the Government 
ŵoŶeǇ aŶd Đould iŶstead Đut the taǆ take ďǇ ϭϱ%. It said: ͚Modelling a central scenario, 
which assumes different proportions of contributions from different types of taxpayer — 
both before and after retirement — the tax take for TEE would be 15% less than under the 
ĐuƌƌeŶt sǇsteŵ͛. The NAPF also said it ǁas a ͚ŵǇth͛ that higher-rate taxpayers benefited 
                                                     
1061 ‘epoƌted iŶ CaƌŵeŶ ‘eiĐhŵaŶ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ )uƌiĐh ǁaƌŶs agaiŶst shift to ͚I“A-stǇle͛ peŶsioŶ taǆ ƌelief, ‘etiƌement 
Planner, 15 September; Carmen Reichman (2015) Axa Wealth: ISA-peŶsioŶ ŵeƌgeƌ ǁould ͚haƌŵ saǀiŶgs 
Đultuƌe͛, ‘etiƌeŵeŶt PlaŶŶeƌ, ϭϰ “epteŵďeƌ. 
1062 
Reported in Andrew Pearce (2015) Buyside urges pensions reform rethink, Financial News, 30 September. 
1063 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Advisers shun govt plans for ISA-style pensions and flat rate tax 
relief, Professional Adviser, 19 October. 
1064
 Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) Aviva urges govt to scrap unfair pension tax relief, Retirement Planner, 14 
September. 
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more from the current system than basic-ƌate taǆ paǇeƌs: ͚UŶdeƌ the ĐuƌƌeŶt sǇsteŵ, pouŶd 
for pound saved before tax, higher earners generally get a lower amount of pension to 
spend and pay more tax on their pension savings than lower earners. Non-taxpayers and 
basic-rate savers who drop a tax bracket in retirement do well out of the current system. 
They would lose from a shift to TEE, but would be winners under a single rate of tax relief of 
Ϯϱ%͛.1065 Joanne Segars, NAPF chief executive, said in a statement on 30 September 2015: 
͚The Government says it wants to incentivise saving but it also wants to increase the 
revenue to the Exchequer – but these two objectives are incompatible and lead to quite 
different courses of action. There is a very real risk that to increase the tax take in the short-
term, the Government will gamble away the long-teƌŵ iŶteƌest of saǀeƌs͛. The NAPF 
chairman, Ruston Smith, went further and said that the proposed Government changes to 
pensions tax relief thƌeateŶed to tuƌŶ peŶsioŶ ƌeǀolutioŶ iŶto peŶsioŶ iŵplosioŶ͛: theǇ 
Đould ͚liteƌallǇ dig up aŶd sŵash the fouŶdatioŶs set to Đƌeate a soĐietǇ of lifetiŵe saǀeƌs – 
puttiŶg pƌessuƌe ďaĐk oŶ ouƌ ageiŶg soĐietǇ͛.1066 
In October 2015, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) published 
An Economic Analysis of the Existing Taxation of Pensions (EET) versus an Alternative Regime 
(TEE) and found that under TEE, personal savings would fall, resulting in lower consumption, 
a lower capital stock and productivity and a higher interest rate. Theƌe is also a ͚dǇŶaŵiĐ 
iŶĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ pƌoďleŵ iŶheƌeŶt iŶ TEE͛ as a futuƌe Government could reverse the policy or 
re-introduce taxation on pension income.
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The Government said it would announce its new policy on pensions tax relief decision in the 
March 2016 Budget. 
7.6.5 The effectiveness of pension tax relief 
While providing an incentive to save for those who understand pension tax relief, a survey 
of 1,794 ǁoƌkiŶg adults aged ďeloǁ ϲϱ ĐoŶduĐted ďǇ YouGoǀ aŶd puďlished ďǇ The People͛s 
Pension in September 2015 revealed that 74% of pension savers do not understand (59%) or 
have not heard of pension tax relief (15%). The provider suggested the Government's 
consultation into tax relief was an opportunity to raise awareness about it and encourage 
people to save more. Darren Philp said: ͚This ƌeseaƌĐh ĐoŶfiƌŵs that taǆ ƌelief is Ŷot ǁell 
understood and calls into question whether it is really acting as an incentive to save. 
Incentives only work where they are clear and understandable. Unfortunately, the current 
                                                     
1065
 Reported in Josephine Cumbo (2015) Pension body opposes shift to ISA-style taxation, Financial Times, 23 
September. 
1066
 Reported in Helen Morrissey (2015) NAPF 2015: Changes to tax relief could bring pension implosion, 
Professional Pensions, 14 October. 
1067
 Reported in Rebecca Shahoud (2015) NIESR says TEE is not sustainable long-term, Professional Pensions, 
28 October. 
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sǇsteŵ is just Ŷot up to the joď͛. The suƌǀeǇ also ƌeǀealed that ϲϮ% ǁould ďe ŵoƌe likelǇ to 
increase the amount they saved if the Government matched their contributions.1068 
We would argue that the following factors should be taken into account when designing a 
system of pension taxation and pension tax relief that encourages the optimal level of 
pension savings. We believe that the role of tax policy should be to help achieve one or 
more Government aims when private sector outcomes are considered to be sub-optimal or 
undesirable. In terms of pension tax relief, potential Government aims might be (different 
Governments will put different weights on these): 
1. To encourage the level of pension savings needed to achieve a target standard of 
living in retirement which might be defined as: 
a) ͚esseŶtial͛ – iŶĐoŵe suffiĐieŶt to Đoǀeƌ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s ŵiŶiŵuŵ ďasiĐ 
expenditure needs 
b) ͚adeƋuate͛ – income sufficient to achieve a minimum lifestyle to which an 
individual aspires in retirement 
c) ͚desiƌed͛ – income sufficient to achieve the full lifestyle to which the 
individual aspires in retirement. 
2. To encourage individuals to make provision for long-term care. (While this is not 
directly a pension issue, the relationship between the joint increases in longevity and 
morbidity inevitably link the two.) 
3. To achieve tax neutrality over the life cycle. One objective of pension tax relief is to 
encourage larger pension funds than otherwise, but to do so in a way that is tax 
neutral to each generational cohort, so that the cumulative value of tax reliefs during 
the accumulation phase broadly equals the present value of tax that will be collected 
during the decumulation phase (both valued at the date of retirement). 
4. To achieve a degree of equity between members of the same generation through a 
redistribution of resources between low- and high-income individuals, men and 
women etc. 
5. To achieve a degree of equity across generations and, in particular, to avoid unfair 
burdens falling on future generations. 
It is also important to recognise the two principal types of individual decision makers, 
͚eĐoŶs͛ aŶd ͚huŵaŶs͛. As we discussed in Chapter 3, ͚eĐoŶs͛ aƌe fullǇ ƌatioŶal lifeĐǇĐle 
financial planners. They perfectly understand and value the role of pensions in redistributing 
ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ oǀeƌ the lifeĐǇĐle fƌoŵ the ǁoƌk phase to ƌetiƌeŵeŶt. ͚EĐoŶs͛ ǁill start and 
optimally manage their own pension schemes regardless of any tax incentives. 
                                                     
1068
 ‘epoƌted iŶ MiĐhael Kliŵes ;ϮϬϭϱͿ People͛s PeŶsioŶ: thƌee Ƌuaƌteƌs doŶ͛t gƌasp iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of taǆ ƌelief, 
Professional Pensions, 22 September. 
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͚HuŵaŶs͛, ďǇ ĐoŶtƌast, haǀe ďehaǀiouƌal tƌaits aŶd faĐe ďehaǀiouƌal ďaƌƌieƌs ǁhiĐh iŶhiďit 
them from behaving optimally. In a pension context, a particularly important behavioural 
trait of humans is a poor understanding of the time dimension of their lives. Many humans 
have a good understanding of the present and the near future, but have very little 
comprehension of the distant future. The idea of thinking about their older self in 10 Ǉeaƌs͛, 
ϮϬ Ǉeaƌs͛ oƌ ϯϬ Ǉeaƌs͛ tiŵe is ĐoŵpletelǇ alieŶ to theŵ. This leads to a pƌaĐtiĐe kŶoǁŶ as 
hyperbolic discounting which implies that people exhibit short-term impatience and long-
term patience. The classic illustration of this is that, given the choice between one apple 
now and two apples tomorrow, most people choose the apple now (short-term impatience 
or the desire for instant gratification). But given the choice between one apple in 100 days 
and two apples in 101 days, most people choose the two apples (long-term patience or a 
willingness to exhibit deferred gratification). Transposed into a pension context, humans can 
see the benefits of saving for retirement if it is explained to them (deferred gratification), 
but since they only live in and comprehend the present, they never start the pension plan 
(i.e., without a pre-commitment device, they never get to that 100th day in the future 
where they would exhibit long-term patience and see the benefits of deferred gratification), 
since they are unwilling to give up current consumption (short-term impatience and instant 
gratification always dominate). Another related behavioural trait is inertia: people see the 
benefits of saving for retirement, but never get around to starting their pension plan. 
Another one is lack of willpower: again people see the benefits of saving for retirement, and 
may even start a pension plan, but they do not have the willpower to maintain it over the 
long investment horizon required. 
Now let us look at the role and effectiveness of pension tax relief with these two different 
types of decision maker. The position with econs is straightforward: they will plan their 
pension plan optimally regardless of any tax incentives. In fact, pension tax incentives are 
not needed for econs. However, the evidence suggests that the proportion of econs in the 
population is low. Most people are humans. 
The role and effectiveness of pension tax relief in the case of humans depends on how 
severe their behavioural barriers are. If the barriers are low – people understand the value 
of pensions, and are willing to save for a pension, but suffer from inertia – then people just 
need an incentive or a nudge to get started. Tax relief provides such a nudge. UK pension 
tax policy is predicated on idea that most people are humans and need some 
encouragement to start a pension scheme. Governments have, however, differed in their 
view about how severe the behavioural barriers are. Before 1988, people were obliged to 
joiŶ theiƌ eŵploǇeƌ͛s peŶsioŶ sĐheŵe as a ĐoŶditioŶ of eŵploǇŵeŶt, although theǇ still 
received the tax relief. This suggests that prior to 1988, Governments believed that the 
behavioural barriers were sufficiently high that nudges alone would not be adequate and 
that compulsion was needed. However, between 1988 and 2012, there has been no 
compulsion to join a company pension scheme. The Government͛s argument in 1988 was 
that people should be free to choose how they spend their money, suggesting they thought 
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that most people were in fact econs. The declining membership of workplace pension 
schemes, especially in the private sector, since 1988 provides evidence that this is not the 
case and that most people are indeed humans. This has been accepted by all Governments 
since the Pension Commission recommended auto-enrolment (a classic example of the use 
of inertia to help humans overcome a behavioural barrier) in workplace pension schemes in 
2005. AE was introduced with all-party support in 2012.  
With this in mind, we can now examine the potential reform of pension tax relief in the light 
of the five aims of Government pension tax relief policy above: 
1. The cost of the tax relief here depends on both the chosen target standard of living 
for each individual (essential, adequate, or desired) and the number of individuals 
covered. Clearly, the more generous the target, the more generous the tax relief and 
the less the Government has available to spend elsewhere. The number of 
individuals covered will also depend on the success of auto-enrolment. If auto-
enrolment is successful in bringing more people currently without pensions into the 
pension system, then total tax relief will rise. If auto-enrolment fails, an alternative 
way – possibly the only way – of getting more people to join a pension scheme is 
compulsion. This would, in turn, reduce the need for such generous tax relief.  
 
2. The current situation with long-term care provision needs to be resolved. Most 
people do not seriously prepare for the possibility of long-term care until it is too 
late, with the result that 50,000 people a year are forced to sell their homes to pay 
for care. This has led to the following question being asked: Why should people 
make sacrifices to pay off a mortgage if they are going to be penalised in this way, 
when those who did not bother to buy a home get their care costs paid by the state? 
Currently, annual care costs vary between £30,000-50,000 depending on the extent 
of nursing care required. The 2011 Dilnot Commission on Funding of Care and 
Support recommended that: the amount any individual should be required to 
contribute to the cost of their social care should be capped at between £25,000 and 
£50,000 (excluding normal room and board costs) and that the means-test threshold 
be increased to £100,000. The total cost to the Government was estimated to be 
£2.2bn.   
 
One in five of us will need care for an average of two years. This means that long-
term care is a classic insurance problem with a standard insurance solution. Above a 
certain minimum income level, individuals could be encouraged to take out long-
term care insurance, possibly by diverting some existing pension tax relief for this 
purpose. If we all did this at a young age, the annual premiums would be fairly 
modest. But there is a free rider problem to consider. If the scheme is voluntary, 
some people will choose not to participate, despite the tax relief, in the belief that 
since everyone else is covered, they will be able to slip through the net if they need 
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care which they might not. The young in particular are likely to believe that they will 
never need to draw on the insurance policy. There is a danger that sufficient 
numbers of people will not participate for these reasons. So compulsion might be 
the only effective way of dealing with the free rider problem, in which case again tax 
relief is not necessary. 
 
3. The net cost to HM Treasury of pension tax relief (tax relief on pension 
contributions, on investment income of pension funds and lump sum withdrawals 
less tax liable on pension payments) was £22.8bn in 2012-13.1069 It is impossible to 
tell from this figure whether it is consistent with tax neutrality over the life cycle, but 
we can say that we are not currently in a state of tax neutrality, since there has not 
so far been a year in which pension tax relief has not exceeded pension taxes. This 
might happen in the future as more baby boomers retire and if taxes exceed relief. 
But the taxes would have to exceed the relief by a substantial margin in the years 
ahead: the net tax relief between 2000-01 and 2009-10 alone was £168.7bn. A 
tentative conclusion, therefore, is that the current system does not lead to tax 
neutrality when aggregated over individual life cycles within one age cohort: the 
structure of tax reliefs is too generous compared with the taxes subsequently 
collected. Pension taxes could be reformed to rectify this. They could also be 
reformed to make post-retirement work more attractive (the Government͛s deĐisioŶ 
in the 2012 Budget to remove the higher income tax thresholds for older people 
militates against this, however). 
 
4. If the Government wants to cap the total cost of tax relief, especially if the pension 
tax system is not neutral over the life cycle – a fact that benefits the better off – then 
one solution favouring greater equity is to make the system less generous for the 
better off. This can be done on both the contribution and benefit side. In terms of 
contributions, the Government has already severely capped the level of 
contributions which attract tax relief. It would not be sensible to reduce this cap any 
further, since this would greatly penalise people who do not start a pension scheme 
until late in their working life and hence need to make very high annual 
contributions to catch up. So a better way might be to remove higher rate tax relief 
on pension contributions and only allow tax relief at the basic rate or a new flat rate 
of, say, 33%.1070 In terms of benefits, the (currently tax-free) lump sum could be 
taxed above a certain level. A more extreme solution would be to remove the tax-
free lump sum altogether. This, of course, would be extremely unpopular. Also the 
lump sum plays an important role in providing a rainy day fund for people in 
                                                     
1069
 http://www.parliament.uk/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/commons/2015-02-
10/223929; see also https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/registered-pension-schemes-cost-of-tax-relief 
1070
 This would, however, break a long established principle of the UK tax system that income is taxed and any 
offsets are tax relieved at the same marginal rate. 
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retirement: many people are not able to finance big ticket expenses, like boiler or car 
repairs, from their pensions. Nevertheless, while politically unpopular, the proposed 
reforms here would not only deal with equity issues, they would also help the 
system move closer to tax neutrality over individual life cycles. 
 
5. Finally, the issue of intergenerational equity: no generation is entitled to unfairly 
burden generations which do not yet have the vote or which have not yet been born. 
It is also unwise for them to try and do so, as these later generations can choose not 
to honour the obligations that have been placed upon them and which they have not 
agreed to. This becomes more likely if the later generations are smaller in size and 
poorer than the earlier generations, a possibility that seems increasingly likely in the 
UK and other parts of the developed world – unless there is mass immigration, a 
possibility which now seems equally likely. This reinforces the argument that the 
pension tax system should be tax neutral between generations and should not 
involve the tax liabilities of one generation being passed on to future generations.  
To summarise, the effectiveness of pension tax reforms in encouraging an optimal level of 
pension savings will largely depend on the balance between three types of individual: 
 Econs – reforms will not alter the behaviour of econs who have already optimally set 
up their pension schemes, regardless of the level of tax relief; indeed econs do not 
need any  tax relief to set up a pension scheme  Humans facing extreme behavioural barriers – no amount of tax relief is going to 
nudge such people into setting up and maintaining a pension scheme, so again there 
is no need for tax relief in this case. Making occupational pensions compulsory 
rather than voluntary is the clear solution here, but all Governments have shied 
away from this, afraid of the accusation that this would be another form of taxation.   Humans facing moderate behavioural barriers – here nudges in the form of tax relief 
will be effective.  However, the biggest beneficiaries of pension tax relief are always 
going to be higher income and better educated people, unless tax relief is genuinely 
made tax neutral over the life cycle through some combination of limits to the tax 
relief on contributions (such as restricting it to the basic rate or a new flat rate of 
33% which is probably less distortionary than increasing the cap on contributions) 
and increased taxes on benefits (such as taxing the lump sum above a certain limit).  
7.7 Recommendations 
Our discussion in this Chapter leads us to make the following five recommendations. 
Recommendation 7.1: Reviewing the working relationships within the pensions industry 
We recommend that the pensions industry – via its trade associations – conducts a review 
of the working relationships of its various components – providers, advisers, investment 
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managers and insurers – to remove the serious fissures and thinly disguised hostilities that 
currently exist, and which impede customers getting the best solutions for their needs.  
All these parties are necessary to provide appropriate, effective and value-for-money 
retirement income solutions, yet the evidence we have gathered for this report suggests 
that the working relationship between the parties is not working effectively in the best 
interests of customers. 
 
Recommendation 7.2: Creating a single pensions regulator 
We recommend that the Government creates a single pensions regulator, with the 
regulatory powers of the Financial Conduct Authority over contract-based schemes 
transferred to The Pensions Regulator. 
This would be consistent with the enhancement of the powers of independent governance 
committees in contract-based schemes to match those of the trustees in trust-based 
schemes proposed in Recommendation 3.6. It would also help to provide greater 
consistency of treatment between trust-based and contract-based schemes. Particularly 
important in this context is the issue compensation in the event of the insolvency of a 
pension scheme or a service provider to a scheme.  Our research shows that there are many 
serious and significant discrepancies between the compensation rules of trust-based and 
contract-based schemes. The creation of a single regulator would help to bring clarity and 
consistency to pension savers' rights and protections.   
 
Recommendation 7.3: Establishing a pension tax and tax relief framework that reflects 
how people behave 
We recommend that the Government establishes a pension tax and tax relief framework 
that encourages the optimal level of pension savings given the reality that most people 
are ͚huŵaŶs͛ Ŷot ͚ecoŶs͛. 
The aims of the pension tax and tax relief framework would be: 
6. To encourage the level of pension savings needed to achieve a target standard of 
living in retirement which might be defined as: 
a) ͚esseŶtial͛ – income suffiĐieŶt to Đoǀeƌ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s ŵiŶiŵuŵ ďasiĐ 
expenditure needs 
b) ͚adeƋuate͛ – income sufficient to achieve a minimum lifestyle to which an 
individual aspires in retirement 
c) ͚desiƌed͛ – income sufficient to achieve the full lifestyle to which the 
individual aspires in retirement. 
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7. To encourage individuals to make provision for long-term care. (While this is not 
directly a pension issue, the relationship between the increases in longevity and 
morbidity inevitably link the two.) 
8. To achieve tax neutrality over the life cycle. One objective of pension tax relief is to 
encourage larger pension funds than otherwise, but to do so in a way that is tax 
neutral to each generational cohort, so that the cumulative value of tax reliefs during 
the accumulation phase broadly equals the present value of tax that will be collected 
during the decumulation phase (both valued at the date of retirement). 
9. To achieve a degree of equity between members of the same generation through a 
redistribution of resources between low- and high-income individuals, men and 
women etc. 
10. To achieve a degree of equity across generations and, in particular, to avoid unfair 
burdens falling on future generations. 
 
Recommendation 7.4: Establishing a permanent independent Pensions, Care and Savings 
Commission 
We recommend that the Government establishes a permanent independent Pensions, 
Care and Savings Commission which reports to Parliament.   
Its remit would be: 
 To assess the impact of the Budget flexibilities on default investment strategies   To consider whether a default decumulation option is required for savers making 
poor decisions  To assess the impact of the reforms on the suitability and accessibility of retirement 
products  To recommend market interventions where the market was not working in saǀeƌs͛ 
best interest  To tackle high charges and poor governance in legacy schemes  To review auto-enrolment, including making recommendations on minimum 
contributions and defining adequacy of retirement income and how the policy 
should be assessed as a success. The committee said using opt-out rates to measure 
success would not be meaningful in the long term  To oversee any further changes in savings and tax policy  To assess the minimum age at which people can exercise their pension flexibilities. 
The current age is 55 and this will rise to 57 in 2028 when the state pension age 
increases to 67. But allowing people to draw on the private pension ten years before 
state pension age could create unrealistic expectations about the age at which they 
can afford to stop working. The commission  would consider whether this should be 
reduced to five years, except for those in ill health 
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 To look at issues relating to auto-enrolment: the challenges of extending auto-
enrolment to smaller employers, the level of minimum contributions for employers 
and employees, how currently excluded groups, such as the self-employed and those 
in multiple low-paid jobs, can be brought into pension saving more effectively  To review the structure of state pensions and the Government͛s tiŵetable for raising 
the state retirement age to reflect both improvements in life-spans and overall 
fiŶaŶĐial Đosts to the taǆpaǇeƌ ;giǀeŶ the ĐuƌƌeŶt ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to the ͚tƌiple loĐk͛ 
indexation of the basic state pension)   To advise every three years on the need or not for a general increase in retirement 
age to reflect increases in longevity so as to keep pension funding costs broadly 
stable over the long-term where scheme specific information is unavailable   To recommend policies designed to encourage more employers and employees to 
invest in retirement income plans, including auto-escalation and other measures to 
maximise design flexibilities and choices, advising on financial and tax incentives to 
encourage wider coverage, whilst taking account of the UK economic, demographic 
and financial backcloth and life-style changes   To review and make recommendations on tax incentives for long-term care products   To promote legislative and regulatory simplification to encourage quality provision, 
accepting that legislatioŶ ŵust ĐoŶtiŶue to pƌoteĐt ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵes 
from the impact of employer or provider insolvency or default   At the request of Government, to review on a periodic basis the structure and rules 
of the NEST scheme to ensure employees are offered an appropriate fall-back 
retirement income plan where no better scheme is offered by a sponsoring 
employer   To ensure that over the long-term, the cost of public sector pensions, and those that 
are largely funded by the taxpayer, are transparent in cost to the taxpayer, are 
sustainable and are fair set against the scale of private provision available to the 
majority of taxpayers   To report on matters referred by Government to the Commission on an ad hoc basis 
and also on European directives that could have an impact on any of the above  To conduct a cost-benefit analysis of any proposed pension reforms  To investigate whether the Government should be recommended to introduce 
products such as longevity bonds or deferred annuities to help hedge longevity risk  To examine the issue of inter-generational equity. For too long Governments have 
kicked this can down the road. Eventually they will run out of road, and this could 
happen sooner than we all think. 
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Recommendation 7.5: Adopting a national retirement savings target of 15% of lifetime 
earnings 
We recommend that the Government adopts a national retirement savings target of 15% 
of lifetime earnings, achieved through auto-escalation, to avoid future pensioner poverty. 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
The unifying thread that runs through funded pension scheme is the requirement to 
annuitise enough pension wealth, at the appropriate age, to provide an adequate lifelong 
income in retirement when combined with the state pension – which is the rationale for 
establishing a private-sector pension scheme in the first place. It is this requirement which 
makes a funded pension scheme different from any other type of savings scheme.  
When annuitisation becomes optional, that unifying thread is no longer present and there is 
a real danger that the pension system begins to unravel. At best, it just becomes a tax-
favoured arrangement for operating a multi-purpose spending pot and once the money has 
been spent for one purpose, it cannot be spent on another. At worst, it becomes a honey 
pot for thieves and other opportunists: while Ǉou ĐaŶŶot steal soŵeoŶe͛s peŶsioŶ, Ǉou ĐaŶ 
steal their pension pot, as a number of people are now discovering. Lying between these 
extremes are millions of people who are now in control of their pension fund and who will 
be trying to do the best for themselves and their families. But for anyone who understands 
the risks in Table 1.2, many of these people could well find themselves in the same kind of 
control as a yachtsman in the middle of the Atlantic in a force nine gale. 
A great deal of effort will now have go into re-establishing what a good pension scheme is, 
as outlined in Table 1.1. This will need a commonly agreed national narrative. If we do not 
achieve this, ǁe Đould eŶd up iŶ the positioŶ ǁheƌe people͛s aǀeƌsioŶ to aŶŶuitisatioŶ 
combined with their willingness to pay highly for both flexibility and guarantees in 
drawdown products leaves many of them not much better off and possibly worse off than if 
they purchased an annuity to begin with. In other words, the behavioural bias against 
annuities could be used by the pensions industry to extract as much if not more from a 
customer than a 'terrible poor value' annuity. 
And to establish a national narrative that builds a consensus around retirement income will 
Ŷeed the suppoƌt of all the kiŶg͛s hoƌses, all the kiŶg͛s ŵeŶ – and all the kiŶg͛s ǁoŵeŶ. This 
is a significant challenge. But it is one that is well worth the effort because ͚pensions ARE 
pƌeĐious͛.1071 
                                                     
1071 Ros Altmann, Pensions Minister, quoted in in Jenna Towler (2015) Pension fraud 'increasingly linked' to 
investment scams, Professional Adviser, 7 August. 
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The key elements of a national narrative 
 The primary purpose of a pension scheme is to provide an income in retirement for 
however long the scheme member lives – that is, it will not run out of money before 
the member dies.  A pension scheme needs to offer accessibility, inflation protection (either directly or 
via investment performance) and longevity insurance.  A pension scheme needs to provide value for money with the benefits clearly and 
transparently exceeding the costs.  Individuals should not be expected to manage the risks involved in the generation of 
retirement income from pension savings themselves.  Middle Britain – with pension assets between £30,000 and £100,000 – should be 
recommended to use a retirement income plan that involves a simple decision tree 
with a limited set of pathways.  The retirement income plan would be self-started following a guidance or advice 
surgery.  The plan member would choose from a set of safe harbour products approved by the 
regulator. The purpose of the decision tree is to identify the products that are most 
suitaďle foƌ ŵeetiŶg the plaŶ ŵeŵďeƌ͛s Ŷeeds. The aiŵ is to aĐhieǀe a siŵple 
solutioŶ that is appƌopƌiate ;i.e., ͚good eŶough͛Ϳ foƌ those ǁho do not wish to make 
any financial decisions themselves.  The safe harbour products would include annuities, drawdown products and 
longevity insurance that meet minimum design standards in terms of efficacy and 
deliver clear value for money.  The plan member would have flexible access to the pension pot until the point that 
longevity insurance kicks in.  A national narrative requires the integration of the accumulation and decumulation 
phases. AŶ esseŶtial paƌt of this Ŷaƌƌatiǀe is ͚aŶ adeƋuate peŶsioŶ Ŷeeds adeƋuate 
ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs͛. To haǀe aŶ adeƋuate peŶsioŶ iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt, Middle BƌitaiŶ, Ŷeeds to 
understand that – together with the employer – it has to save 15% of its lifetime 
earnings in a pension scheme.  A parallel narrative is required to address the needs of the millions of private-sector 
workers who are self-employed or whose contracts of employment exclude them 
from auto-enrolment. 
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Appendix: The Professional Pensions guide to how pensions tax relief restrictions have 
developed since A-Day in 2006.
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Pension tax allowances since 2006 
 
Tax Year Annual Allowance (£) Lifetime Allowance (£) 
2006-07 215,000 1,500,000 
2007-08 225,000 1,600,000 
2008-09 235,000 1,650,000 
2009-10 245,000 1,750,000 
2010-11 255,000 1,800,000 
2011-12 50,000 1,800,000 
2012-13 50,000 1,500,000 
2013-14 50,000 1,500,000 
2014-15 40,000 1,250,000 
2015-16 40,000 1,250,000 
2016-17 40,000 1,000,000* 
* Indexed to CPI from April 2018 
 
Budget 2009 
The first major tax relief restrictions since A-Day in April 2006 began with Alistair Darling's 
2009 Budget, when he announced he would restrict higher-rate tax relief on pension 
contributions for people with incomes over £150,000. 
Restrictions had previously been governed by the A-Day reforms, which gave an absolute 
lifetime allowance of £1.75m and an annual allowance of £245,000 (limits for the 2009/2010 
tax year). 
In his 2009 Budget, Darling said that, from 2011 and for incomes above the £150,000 level, 
the value of pensions tax relief would be tapered down until it is 20% for those on incomes 
over £180,000 - making it worth the same for each pound of contribution to pension 
entitlement as for a basic rate income tax payer. 
In addition, Darling said that, in anticipation of this change, he was also introducing 
legislation to prevent individuals taking advantage of the pensions tax relief while it is still 
                                                     
1072
 Jonathan Stapleton (2015) How pensions tax relief has been slashed since 2006, Professional Pensions, 17 
March;  
http://www.professionalpensions.com/professional-pensions/news/2162378/budget-2012-guide-tax-relief-
restrictions 
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available to them at a higher rate - and making substantial additional pension contributions 
prior to the restriction taking effect. 
DaƌliŶg said: ͚It is difficult to justify how a quarter of all the money the country spends on 
pensions tax relief goes, as now, to the top ϭ.ϱ% of peŶsioŶ saǀeƌs͛. 
Pre-Budget Report 2009 
In his pre-budget report of December 2009, Darling announced higher-rate tax relief 
restrictions - originally announced in the April 2009 budget - would now include employer 
contributions and affect those with relevant income of £130,000 and over rather than the 
previously announced figure of £150,000 and over. 
This would have effectively meant anyone with income of £130,000 or more would not 
receive higher-rate tax relief on their contributions. 
It was believed as many as 150,000 people could be caught out by this extension of higher-
rate tax relief restrictions. 
A statement by HM Treasury at the time confirmed: "From April 2011 tax relief on pension 
contributions will be restricted for individuals with gross incomes of £150,000 and over, 
where gross income incorporates all pension contributions, including the value of any 
benefit funded by, or eventually funded by, an individual's employer. 
͚Tax relief will gradually be tapered away so that above £180,000 it is worth 20%, the same 
rate received by a basic-rate income taxpayer. To provide more certainty for individuals 
around whether they are affected, and to reduce administrative burdens for schemes, this 
will be subject to an income floor at £130,000 of pre-tax income (excluding the value of any 
employer peŶsioŶ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶsͿ͛. 
Budget 2010 
In what would be his last Budget, Darling rejected industry pleas to change the way it was 
going to implement pensions tax relief restrictions. 
DaƌliŶg ĐoŶfiƌŵed: ͚Tax relief on pensions will be restricted but only for those earning 
£ϭϯϬ,ϬϬϬ a Ǉeaƌ͛. 
HM Treasury also published a summary of the responses it received on its consultation on 
implementing the restriction of pensions tax relief - and outlined the Government's 
response and the next steps for developing the restriction ahead of its proposed 
introduction in April 2011. 
But it rejected pleas from the pensions industry to reduce the annual or lifetime allowance 
instead - saying such a move would hit lower earners. 
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It said: "A reduction in the annual or lifetime allowance would potentially apply to pension 
savers with much lower incomes, particularly in DB schemes. Furthermore, it would allow 
high-income individuals to continue to benefit from a higher rate of tax relief than other 
pension savers. 
͚In addition, alternative options could not be implemented fairly without making significant 
adjustments to the pensions tax system that would also add theiƌ oǁŶ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ͛. 
It ĐoŶtiŶued: ͚The Government does not propose any changes to the annual allowance or 
the lifetime alloǁaŶĐe at this stage͛. 
And the Treasury remained adamant that restricting tax relief was the right thing to do. 
It said: ͚The Government remains clear that the restriction of pensions tax relief is 
proportionate and necessary, and many stakeholders agreed that action to restrict the 
amount of relief going to those on the highest incomes is appropriate. 
͚The measure also represents an important part of the Government's consolidation of the 
public finances. In restricting relief on pension contributions, the Government's objectives 
are to rebalance the pensions tax system to ensure that pensions tax relief remains 
affordable, and to address the disproportionate levels of relief going to those on the highest 
incomes, aƌouŶd Ϯ% of peŶsioŶ saǀeƌs͛. 
The Budget also announced further decisions on how the restriction of relief would be 
applied and delivered - noting that deemed contributions to defined benefit pension 
schemes will be valued using the age-related factors method. 
And it said the restrictions would primarily be delivered through self assessment - noting tax 
returns would be modified to report additional information to HMRC and to calculate the 
restriction of pensions tax relief. 
It said, where individuals are affected, HMRC will collect a recovery charge reflecting the 
restriction of relief through self-assessment. 
A cost-benefit analysis, published at the time of the Budget, revealed that HM Treasury had 
trebled its estimate of the one-off costs that pension schemes, employers and individuals 
would incur as a result of the tax on higher earners' pension contributions. 
The new impact assessment said the one-off costs incurred during the transition to the new 
regime will total £900m - or around £3000 for each of the 300,000 taxpayers affected - 
compared with the £305m estimate published in December. 
The increase is particularly pronounced for employers, whose one-off costs are now 
expected to be £330m rather than £40m. Annual costs are now expected to be £115m, 
rather than £90m. 
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Emergency Budget 2010 
In his Emergency Budget - held just after the coalition Government came to power - 
Chancellor George Osborne announced he would work with the pensions industry on 
͚alteƌŶatiǀe ǁaǇs͛ to implement pension tax relief restrictions - and was considering 
reducing the annual allowance to as little as £30,000. 
OsďoƌŶe said: ͚Many businesses are alarmed at complexity. I have listened to those 
concerns, however, I must also protect £3.5bn revenue it would create. 
͚I will work with industry on raising same amount of revenue - potentially by reducing the 
aŶŶual alloǁaŶĐe͛. 
In a Treasury document - published alongside the Budget - the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt said ͚provisional 
analysis suggested an annual allowance in the region of £30,000 - £45,000 might deliver the 
ŶeĐessaƌǇ Ǉield͛. 
The document also confirmed the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt has ͚ƌeseƌǀatioŶs͛ about the approach 
adopted in Finance Act 2010 - saǇiŶg it Đould haǀe ͚unwelcome consequences for pension 
saving, bring significant complexity to the tax system, and damage UK business and 
ĐoŵpetitiǀeŶess͛. 
It said the Government wanted to engage employers, pension schemes, experts and other 
interested parties to determine the best design of a regime - looking at a wide range of 
issues that will need further consideration. 
National Association of Pension Funds chief executive Joanne Segars feared the proposals as 
they stood would cost between £2.5bn to £3bn to implement and lead to senior corporate 
decision-makers disengaging from workplace pensions, eroding employer interest in the 
schemes. 
The trade body suggested reducing the amount of pension contribution eligible for tax relief 
from £255,000 to about £50,000, which will limit the tax relief available to high earners, but 
in a way less harmful to pension provision. 
͚This will be less damaging to pension saving and cost faƌ less to iŵpleŵeŶt͛, Segars said. 
Treasury announcement - October 2010 
In October 2010, the Treasury confirmed the annual allowance would be cut from £255,000 
to £50,000; the lifetime allowance reduced from £1.8m to £1.5m, and the factor for valuing 
final salary benefits increased from 10 to 16. 
It said this ǁould ƌeplaĐe the ͚Đoŵpleǆ pƌoposal͛ legislated for by the Labour Government. 
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The Treasury said the measure would raise £4bn a year - but would be targeted at those 
who make the most significant pension savings 
It said these new allowances will for the time being be frozen - with options for indexing to 
be considered from 2015-16. 
Pension benefits for deferred pensioners will be exempt from the annual allowance regime. 
The Treasury estimated the changes would affect 100,000 pension savers - 80% of those will 
have incomes of more than £100,000. 
However, the Government said it was committed to protecting individuals on low and 
moderate incomes as far as possible. 
It said to protect individuals who exceed the annual allowance due to one-off "spike" in 
accrual, the Government would allow individuals to offset this against unused allowance 
from the previous three tax years. 
The Treasury said it would also introduce a CPI exemption - which would mean only pay 
rises in excess of CPI inflation would be taken into account for final salary benefit 
calculations. 
In addition, it said it would consult on options enabling people to meet tax charges out of 
their pensions. 
The Treasury said in order to protect the public finances it was necessary to introduce the 
reduced annual allowance from April 2011. The Government said it planned to introduce 
the reduction in the lifetime allowance from April 2012. 
Financial secretary to the TƌeasuƌǇ Maƌk HoďaŶ said: ͚We have abandoned the previous 
Government's complex proposals and developed a solution that will help to tackle the 
deficit but not hit those on low and moderate incomes. We have taken a tough but fair 
decision. 
͚The coalition Government believes that our system is fair, will preserve incentives to save 
and - compared to the last Government's approach - will help UK businesses to attract and 
ƌetaiŶ taleŶt͛. 
Budget 2011 
In his 2011 Budget, Osborne confirmed the planned £50,000 annual allowance for tax free 
pension contributions. 
It confirmed the move, first announced on 14 October, last year would come into force from 
6 April 2011 
The document also confirmed the lifetime allowance would be £1.5m. 
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Budget 2012 
In the run-up to the the 2012 Budget, a cut to the aŶŶual alloǁaŶĐe eŵeƌged as the ͚stƌoŶg 
faǀouƌite͛ to be announced by the Chancellor. 
The Liberal Democrats had been calling publicly for cuts to higher-rate tax relief to fund a 
hike in the income tax threshold to £10,000. 
At the time it was said three options were on the table: a cut in the higher-rate tax relief 
from 40% to 20%, a further reduction in the annual allowance or changes to the size of the 
tax free lump sum available on retirement. 
IndustrǇ ĐoŵŵeŶtatoƌs ďelieǀed it ǁas ͚75% likelǇ͛ a cut in annual allowance would be 
included in the Budget but hoped the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁould leaǀe taǆ ƌelief ͚aloŶe eŶtiƌelǇ͛. 
In the end, the Government decided to make no further changes to tax relief. 
Autumn Statement 2012 
Chancellor George Osborne announced he would cut the annual allowance from £50,000 to 
£40,000 and reduce the lifetime allowance from £1.5m to £1.25m from the 2014/15 tax 
year. 
The Chancellor said the cut to the tax-free allowance would save the Treasury £1bn a year 
by 2017/18. 
He said 98% of the population have less than a £1.25m pension pot and noted the median 
pot in the UK was £55,000 with 99% of savers' annual contributions less than 40,000. 
Osborne said the average annual contribution was less than £6,000. 
The Autumn Statement said that in 2010-11, tax relief for pension savings cost the 
Government around £33bn - with over half of this relief going to higher rate taxpayers. 
And it said, even with changes made to reduce the cost of pensions tax relief, the 
Government was still likely to forgo around £31bn in tax revenues this year, rising to £35bn 
in 2015-16. 
Budget 2013 
The Government has confirmed it would end tax relief on contributions to schemes set up 
for employees' spouses or families as part of a clampdown on avoidance. 
HM Treasury revealed in the budget that it would include legislation on the practice in the 
Finance Bill 2013. 
It said: ͚As announced at Budget 2012, legislation will be included in Finance Bill 2013 to 
remove the tax and NICs incentives for employees and employers respectively from 
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arrangements where an employer pays a pension contribution into a registered pension 
scheme for an employee's spouse or family member as part of their employee's ﬂeǆiďle 
ƌeŵuŶeƌatioŶ paĐkage͛. 
Autumn Statement 2013 
The Chancellor announced he would abolish the 55% tax charge levied on beneficiaries of 
individuals who die under the age of 75 with a joint life or guaranteed term annuity. 
In a widely anticipated move, the Government said beneficiaries would be able to receive 
any future payments from such policies tax free where no payments have been made to the 
beneficiary before 6 April 2015. 
It said the tax rules would also be changed to allow joint life annuities to be paid to any 
beneficiary. 
If the annuitant dies after the age of 75 then the beneficiary will pay the marginal rate of  
income tax, or 45% if the funds are taken as a lump sum payment. Lump sum payments will 
be charged at the beneficiary's marginal rate from 2016-17. 
The announcement will bring tax treatment for annuities in line with income drawdown. 
The original proposals would have weighted the decision-making in favour of the riskier - 
but more flexible - income drawdown option. 
Budget 2014 
The Government announced it would scrap restrictions on how people take pensions 
income as part of a radical overhaul of tax relief. 
From 27 March 2014, the Government said it would slash the minimum income 
requirement for retirees entering flexible drawdown from £20,000 to £12,000 and raise 
maximum GAD limits for those in capped drawdown from 120% to 150%. 
In a widely anticipated move Osborne also raised trivial commutation limits from £2,000 to 
£10,000 and the trivial commutation lump sum limit will increase from £18,000 to £30,000. 
However the Government said it planned to be even more radical - saying that from April 
2015 it would allow anyone over the age of 55 to take their entire pensions pot as cash, 
subject to their marginal rate of income tax in that year. 
The Government also said it would raise the age at which an individual could take their 
pension savings under the tax rules from 55 to 57 in 2028. 
And said it would offer all DC scheme members access to free and impartial face-to-face 
guidance on the range of options available to them at retirement. 
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Delivering the changes Osborne said: ͚We will legislate to remove all remaining tax 
restrictions on how pensioners have access to their pension pots. Pensioners will have 
complete freedom to draw down as much or as little of their pension pot as they want, 
anytime they want. No caps. No drawdown limits. Let me be clear. No one will have to buy 
aŶ aŶŶuitǇ͛. 
Budget documents revealed the move would increase tax income by £1.2bn a year by 2019. 
The Government estimated the move would raise £320m in 2015/16, £600m in 2016/17; 
£910m in 2017/18 and £1.2bn in 2018/19. 
Budget 2015 
Chancellor George Osborne confirmed the lifetime allowance would be reduced from 
£1.25m to £1m from the 2016-17 tax year, netting the Treasury an extra £600m a year. 
But he said he would index the lifetime allowance from the 2018-19 tax year - and also ruled 
out making any further change to the annual allowance. 
DeliveƌiŶg the Budget, OsďoƌŶe said: ͚From next year, we will further reduce the lifetime 
allowance from £1.25m to £1m. This will save around £600m a year. Fewer than 4% of 
pension savers currently approaching retirement will be affected. 
͚However, I want to ensure those still building up their pension pots are protected from 
inflation so from 2018 we will iŶdeǆ the lifetiŵe alloǁaŶĐe͛. 
This comes after Labour leader Ed Miliband revealed his party would cut the lifetime and 
annual allowances in an effort to reduce university tuition fees if it wins the general 
election. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
